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 i 
Abstract  
This research assesses the experiment of the Islamic movement in Sudan following the 
1989 coup. The main question that needs to be answered with regard to Turabi and the 
Islamists in Sudan is the gap between theory and practice. Sudan is a complex country, 
with a diverse population encompassing different tribes, languages, religions and 
cultures, all impacting on the country’s history and future. Consequently, the Islamic 
movement was influenced by the nature of this society. 
The Islamisc movement in Sudan was established in the 1940s, linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and to revivalists in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, such as al-
Afghani, Mohammed ‘Abdu, Mawdudi, Hasan al-Turabi and Rashid al-Ghannouchi. 
The research assesses the theories of Turabi in Shura, democracy and issues of 
government. It critically evaluates the concepts of Tawhīd, the state in Islam, and 
human rights, minorities, women, etc., in the Islamic state. 
This research established that gaps existed between the theory and practice of Turabi 
and the Islamists in Sudan. Their military coup represents the first violation of 
democracy. They possessed a clear human rights’ vision, but in practice violated them 
from the early days of the coup. They developed mature theories on power sharing, 
justice and equality, but have monopolised power since 1989.  
Shura was implemented in the movement institutions, but remains to be enhanced in the 
State. In the first decade, Islamist succeeded in developing the economic sector, by 
exploring for oil, and establishing a free market, but with no mechanisms to mitigate its 
negative side-effects. In society, significant laws were developed, in favour of women, 
education, and media. One may argue that Islamists need to take further steps towards 
Shura and democracy on the practical level, and establish proper mechanisms. 
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 1 
Introduction 
In the last five decades, Islamists have established themselves as major political actors 
in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Arab World. The Islamic movement in Sudan 
is one such movement, which has experienced different stages of reform and 
transformation since its establishment in the late 1940s. In fact, there were significant 
turning points in 1964, 1976, 1985 and 1989, that impacted on the thought, methods and 
actions adopted by the movement at each stage. Since 1964, Hasan Abdallah al-Turabi 
has been the principal ideologist in the process of renewal, in line with the changing 
political and social situation in Sudan. The movement has always been characterised by 
independence, flexible organisation and adaptable fiqh (jurisprudence); indeed, it has 
adopted a pragmatic method of work. This was reflected in frequent constitutional and 
other changes; at important junctures, the movement reviewed its position and 
introduced structural and organisational changes in pace with changing times. However, 
the National Islamic Front (NIF) Shura Council, then the delegated executive office of 
NIF, planned and carried out a coup in June 1989. This qualified the Islamic movement 
in Sudan as an appropriate case study to be compared with other movements, 
theoretically and practically, to reach rational conclusions that explain the theoretical 
and practical performance of the movement. 
 
Islamism: Definition of the concepts 
We cannot avoid the question of how to label those Muslims who invoke Islam as the 
source of authority for all political and social actions. Should they be labelled Islamic or 
Muslim fundamentalists? Or are they better described as Islamists? It is common to 
 2 
describe certain contemporary movements in the Muslim world as an expression of 
political Islam, Islamism, fundamentalism, or Khomeinism.  
Historically, the term ‘Islamism’ developed through different periods of time, and in 
different fields, such as the academic, media and politics fields. It is notable that 
different terms emerged through history; and, during each period, terms gained different 
definitions. In the end, there are many definitions of the phenomena, where precise ones 
are rarely found in the academic literature. However, the media and politicians played a 
key role in creating these terms, while scholars tried to define and put them into a 
social, political and historical context. 
Many commentators, such as Martin Kramer, argued that the term ‘Islamism’ is 
considered to have first begun to acquire its contemporary connotations in French 
academia during the late 1970s to the 1980s. However, it can be said that it was the 
Iranian revolution which inspired most Islamic movements in the world. More 
significantly, the 1980s were dominated by images of American embassies under siege, 
hostages and hijackings, while the 1990s were dominated by the decline of the Soviet 
Union, which collapsed in 1990. This brought predictions of insurgent movements in 
most of the Muslim world, i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, and Bosnia. The 
media headlines announced the possibility of a worldwide Islamic uprising, and a clash 
of civilisations, in which Islam could overwhelm the West. The writings of Fukuyama 
and Samuel Huntington alarmed the West, and in the academic field many conferences 
were held to study the phenomenon. The concern spanned all levels of policy and 
decision-making, national and international. 
However, Versaille (1994) asserts that the term ‘fundamentalism’ began to migrate from 
the French language to the English language in the mid-1980s, and in recent years has 
largely displaced the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in academic work. The 
 3 
International Crisis Group (ICG) asserted that the concept of ‘political Islam’ first 
appeared in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution, with Shiite activism then viewed as 
the most worrying threat (ICG, March 2005). However, it would be linked to the 
suggestion of defining the term by some incident in the political field. The study by the 
ICG, in 2005, discovered that the concept of ‘political Islam’ and its definition as a 
problem only occurred when Islamic politics began to articulate anti-Western or, more 
specifically, anti-American attitudes. They explained that: “There has, therefore, been 
confusion between the implied notions that ‘political Islam’ represents the deviation 
from political norms ... in effect Islam was only seen as political when it was seen to be 
a threat” to the West (ICG, 2005). This definition is more politicised, but shows how 
some institutions define political Islam and analyse the actions of Islamists. 
The term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in the last two decades was well-known in the 
media. It is inevitable that fundamentalism was not the only negative term used to 
describe the phenomenon and, as such, it was criticised by Islamists, scholars, 
journalists and observers. When the term ‘fundamentalism’ was used in the history of 
Christianity, it was used to define a rejection of church traditions in customs and social 
life. Burgat (1988, p.67) asserted that the term “developed throughout history to label 
those who literally interpret the religious text, and [they] were an obstacle for ‘Tajdīd’ 
renewal and ‘Ijtihād’”. It can be said that this term was developed in a historical 
context, different from the current context. Therefore, it cannot be applied to the 
phenomenon we are studying, i.e. Islamism or fundamentalism, unless we redefine and 
connect it directly to its cultural and historical context. 
On the other hand, the issue has been the subject of heated debate for over two decades. 
For a while, many terms were coined by politicians and the media, such as 
fundamentalism, Islamism, etc. While both public and scholarly usage in America 
 4 
accepted fundamentalism, the term was not accepted by Islamists themselves, for the 
reason mentioned above. Even those who accepted it, such as Turabi and Ghannouchi, 
redefine and isolate it from its historical context. They defined it as a term derived from 
‘Usūl’, which literally means ‘origins’, referring to a return back to the original sources 
of Islam, i.e. the Qur'an and Sunnah (Turabi interviews, August 2007; 26 December 
2010). 
As for the term ‘Islamism’, 
“it emerged in the late 1980s in French academia, and then crossed into English, 
where it eventually displaced Islamic fundamentalism in specialized contexts. 
More recently, the term, Islamism, has gained even wider currency, and since 
September 11, 2001, it may even have established itself as the preferred 
American usage. Still newer terminology may lie over the horizon” (Kramer, 
2003, pp.65-77). 
This debate shows that the terms were confusing and need to be defined carefully and 
clearly, to reflect the meaning intended by the researcher. Indeed, the term itself reflects 
the historical events that impact on its usage, and definition. It could be said that the 
term reflects the political situation and dominant schools of thought that are backed by 
political power; these schools have impact on the concept and its uses. As such, these 
definitions reflected interpretations of the actions of Islamic movements, including 
Islamists in Sudan, over the last two decades. Moreover, the media played the most 
significant role in conceptualising the term, when they used it to identify and define 
specific incidents and movements. However, there were two problems in their 
definition; first, it presupposes that Islam in itself is not political, whereas Islam is 
intrinsically combined with the assertion that Islam is not simply a religion, but a 
comprehensive way of life. Secondly, it presupposes that all forms of Islamism are 
unanimous or homogeneous, while there are different trends between radical and 
moderate groups, i.e. Islamism is heterogeneous, where even one group may 
accommodate different trends, such as the Islamic movement in Sudan. The study will 
 5 
not discuss groups, such as Ansar al-Sunnah, and others, which are confined to 
missionary work in Sudan. 
In some cases, the use of the term ‘Islamism’, was at first, “a marker for scholars more 
likely to sympathize with new Islamic movements” (Kramer, 2003, pp.65-77). 
However, as the term gained popularity, it became more specifically associated with 
political and militant groups. The term sometimes expresses a negative impression, and 
so some Islamists may not agree with all definitions here. I may argue that some 
Islamists are associated with political Islamic groups, which are not armed, and most of 
the time are political parties, such as NIF in Sudan, pressure groups or even Da’wa or 
charity organisations, such as in Yemen, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and some African 
movements. The study uses the term ‘Islamist’ to describe the Islamic movement in 
Sudan, which formed the NIF in 1985 and carried out the 1989 military coup.  
El-Affendi (2003a) argued that, in the current discourse, Islamism refers to the cluster 
of movements which emerged in the 20
th
 century, and which insist that religious values 
should play a decisive role in public life. These include a wide range of diverse groups, 
from the quasi-secular Refah and al-Nahda, to the very militant Islamic Jihad (Egypt), 
Hamas (Palestine) and the Armed Islamic Group AIG (Algeria) (el-Affendi, 2003a, 
pp.211-220). 
However, regarding the term ‘Islamic movements’, el-Affendi (2003, p.7) asserts that 
some scholars prefer the term ‘fundamentalism’, which is translated from English, while 
others tend to use ‘Islamism’, which is derived from Islamist. He added that the term 
‘Islamic movement’ is used to refer to those groups that are active in the political arena, 
and call for the application of Islamic values and laws in both the private and public 
spheres.  
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In addition, el-Affendi (2003) distinguished between the Islamic and the Sufi 
movements; he mentioned that the term ‘Islamic movements’” is mostly used for 
movements that call themselves such, and which are active in the domain of politics. It 
is rare to see this term applied to Sufi movements that are not politically active. 
Moreover, he thinks that this description is not normally used for any of the following. 
1. Traditional movements with an Islamic background, such as Hizb al-Istiqlal in 
Morocco, or Hizb al-Ummah in Sudan. 
2. Regimes and movements that traditionally rule by Shari‘a, as is the case in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example; while it is needed to describe the 
movements that oppose such regimes. 
3. Parties and movements in Iran, though the regime depends on Islamic 
legitimacy; terms such as ‘reformers’ and ‘radicals’ are mostly used to label the 
political trends there. 
4. Modern movements with partial or complete Islamic authority, such as 
Mujahidin khalq in Iran, or al-Hizb al-Jumhuri in Sudan that were set up by the 
late thinker, Mahmud Muhammed Taha. 
5. Movements that call themselves Islamic, such as the Muslim League in 
Pakistan, notwithstanding its claim to being Islamic (el-Affendi, 2003. p.8).  
However, what is an Islamist? According to Graham E. Fuller (2004, p.3), an Islamist is 
anyone who believes that the Qur’an and Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life, 
actions, and words) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, 
and who tries to implement those principles in some way. It must be said that this 
definition embraces a broad spectrum that includes radical and moderate, violent and 
 7 
peaceful, traditional and modern, democratic and anti-democratic trends. Rashid al-
Ghannouchi (1939- ), when asked to define the Islamic movement, replied: 
“a broad spectrum of groups and individuals, and even states fall under this 
concept; those who believe in Islam as a faith and way of life, of rituals and 
morals, religion and state, those who practice this in the private and public 
space, and until this perception prevails, as it is the final word of God, and 
optimal religion, and Straight path of guidance for its followers to happiness in 
this life and the Hereafter; the Almighty has enjoined on His slaves, and guided 
them to this. ... Everyone associated with this perception is part of what is 
known as the Islamic movement” (Ghannouchi interview, November 2006). 
However, it can be suggested that the term ‘Islamist’ is defined here to include those 
individuals, groups, and States that actively seek to bring the political and social life of 
their nation into perfect accord with the sacred laws and norms of Shari‘a, whether 
abruptly or gradually, whether by social reform, political contest, or revolutionary 
takeover of the State. These groups understand Islam as a comprehensive religion that 
should be applied in all aspects of life, social, economic, political, and private. In other 
words, a Muslim is one who believes in Islam, while the term ‘Islamist’ indicates an 
active Muslim, who tries to apply Islamic values in his private and public life. This 
definition could be applied to the Islamic movement in Sudan. 
 
Research questions 
The central research questions are: 
a- What are the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular 
respect to democracy? 
b- How have these elements been made operational in his political action? 
c- Is there a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice? 
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That means the main question that needs to be answered with regard to Turabi and the 
Islamists in Sudan is the gap between theory and practice. Second, how is the Tawhīdi 
theory applied in Turabi’s work? The thesis critically analyses Turabi’s adoption of 
Tawhīd1 to put forward the Tawhīdi theory, and its application to everyday politics. The 
thesis also seeks to assess Islamists’ experimentation with Shura,2 before and after 1989. 
The thesis also seeks to assess Islamists’ experimentation with Shura, before and after 
1989 with an added emphasis on the period between 1989-2001 which corresponds to 
the period when Turabi held political office and therefore had a chance to implement his 
ideas. 
The main claims to originality include: a) assessing the Islamists’ claims to practise 
Shura in the post-1989 period based on an evaluation of Turabi’s philosophy and actual 
implementation of his ideas during 1989-2001; b) offering new insights on the basis of 
recent original data collection. The thesis also examines the mechanisms used by 
Islamists in the application of Shura. In fact, the Islamic movement, as a political party 
or movement, adopted ‘Shura’, or what may be called a democratic structure and 
procedures to run its affairs. These procedures and methods are examined as well.  
 
Methodology 
The research is accomplished in several steps, through collecting, organising, and 
analysing data. The subject of the thesis is ‘Islamists and democracy in Sudan: the role 
of Hasan Turabi: 1989-2001’, with data collected from both primary and secondary 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘Tawhīd’, in the classical Islamic literature, refers to the affirmation of the ‘Oneness of God’. 
Tawhīd (Monotheism), an axial doctrine of Islam, and at the core of religious experience, is the belief in 
God, with the profession of the Islamic faith (Shahadah), i.e. testifying that there is no god but Allah and 
that Muhammad is His Messenger. 
2
 Literally the Arabic word for ‘consultation’ – more widely associated with Islamic democracy and the 
associated democratic structure and procedures to run Islamic affairs. 
 9 
sources. The most significant of the primary sources are in-depth interviews with 
Turabi, Ghannouchi, al-Mahboub, Abdelsalam Mustafa Osman Ismail, Elamin 
Mohammed Osman and Abdelmonem Abulfotuh and others, and official documents and 
statements from the leaders of the Islamic movement in Sudan. Secondary sources of 
importance are books, articles, journals, and newspapers, as well as authentic Internet 
sources used as needed. 
The thesis is based on qualitative research. More precisely, it is a case study of one 
organisation, namely the Islamic movement in Sudan. The research limits itself to 
studying the Islamists in Sudan and democracy, Shura. The research examines the 
factors that have impacted on the political thought and debate among the Islamists. 
Historical and sociological variables are used to explain the context and background, 
but are not major factors in the study. As such, the methodology applied is historical and 
comparative, where comparative techniques are used to contrast how various sources 
have perceived the work of the Islamic movement in Sudan. Indeed, historical and 
comparative methods are widely used. The historical method offers more 
comprehensive understanding of the socio-economic, demographic and political 
conditions that influence the political performance of the Islamic movement in Sudan 
by exploring it throughout its history. The study utilises the comparative method that 
provides more comprehensive understanding of the response of each movement when it 
faced the same challenges, how each movement understands and interprets Islam, and 
how it applies it. The comparison of the theoretical and practical approaches of these 
movements presents a deep understanding of the behaviour of these movements and 
their responses. The comparative method is applied horizontally across the different 
movements in different countries, and vertically through time.  
The research used original sources of information, namely the books and documents 
published by, and interviews done with, the key persons in the research, such as Turabi, 
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Ghannouchi, and Abdelsalam, and to some extent al-Banna and Qutb and other 
reformist scholars.  
Interviews with Dr Turabi were conducted in both Arabic and English. I also asked him 
to interpret specific terms that I noticed he translated differently, such as state, and 
Hākimiyyah, etc. Moreover, I concentrated on the definitions of the concepts that he 
uses in a different way, such as fundamentalism and state. The three interviews with Dr 
Turabi were done in stages; the first comprised general discussion, the second was more 
specific to the research questions, during which notes were taken, while the third 
interview was recorded and went into detail, covering the gaps in the two previous 
interviews. Turabi was willing to do the interview in both Arabic and English, and was 
willing to translate his words, when asked (from or to either language). Each interview 
lasted two hours on average. It is important to say that I left the door open for any 
questions, and that he agreed to answer any question at any time. Al-Mahboub 
Abdelsalam was interviewed more than five times, two of them face-to-face, while the 
others were conducted by telephone over a total of more than ten hours. Moreover, 
Abdelsalam was willing to help obtain resources and to answer all my questions, 
clarifying information in his books and published papers. As for other interviewees, I 
met with Rashid Ghannouchi twice, in 2007 and 2011, at the University of Westminster, 
for a total of about one-and-a-half hours. I conducted two interviews, for a total of about 
two hours, with Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail in London. The interviews were recorded, 
and focused on international relations, given that he was the Foreign Minister in the 
1990s-2000s. All the interviews, except for those with Turabi, were conducted in Arabic 
and then translated into English by me. Interviews provided original data, clarified the 
grey area for the researcher, and helped answer the main research question. Equally 
beneficial group discussions with a group of university lecturers were held twice in 
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Sudan in 2010, and discussed the different historical incidents, the nature of the 
movement, democracy and the movement.  
Abbreviation is kept to a minimum in this work. Furthermore, the research defines the 
concepts used when needed, and explains the different uses of each concept, such as 
Tawhīd, Shura, Shari‘a, and ‘state’, which is used sometimes to indicate government 
instead of the state ‘which is the land, people, and authority’. In writing some Arabic 
names, it is notable that these are written differently in different sources; the research 
adopted the most common one, or may refer to how it is written by the person himself. 
For example, Ghannouchi, where in some references, it is written Ghannoushi, but he 
writes his name as ‘Ghannouchi’. Names such as Abdelsalam and Abdallah, which are 
familiar to the English reader, are spelled without the prefatory apostrophe; other proper 
nouns follow suit and omit the prefatory apostrophe. Others such as Shari‘a, Shi’a, 
Qur’an, and other select terms have been spelled according to their standard 
transliteration. 
 
Limitations of the study 
Although this research was carefully prepared, I am aware of its limitations. The 
research is conducted on the Islamic movement in Sudan, but does not cover other 
Islamic movements, such as Ansar al-Sunna, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (international 
organisation) and other small Islamic groups. Likewise, the case studies chosen were 
countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, while other movements were excluded from 
the study for methodological reasons. Despite these limitations, the study covers the key 
Islamic movements in Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia that have a direct impact on 
the political life there. 
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Transliteration 
The thesis follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies’ (IJMES) system, as 
the standard transliteration system for writing names and Arabic words. Diacritical 
marks, i.e. áyn and hamzá, have been kept to the minimum. Most transliterated words 
are italicised at every appearance and some such as Ijtihād, Tawhīd, Shura, Shari‘a, 
sunna and Shi’a and the well-known terminology. In addition, the prefix, al-, on Arabic 
names is omitted except at first appearance except some names such as al-Jazeera, al-
Arabiya, for Ashura in IJMES the thesis uses Shura without the ‘A’, which indicates 
‘al’, meaning ‘the’. 
 
Organisation of the study 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the thesis is divided into seven chapters: 
Chapter 1, titled ‘Historical Background’, critically evaluates the history of Sudan, and 
how it impacts on the movement. It concentrates on the political and social factors that 
reflected directly on the approach, attitudes and philosophy of the Islamist intellectuals 
in Sudan. The chapter is divided into six sections covering Sudan’s history and 
geography, the Ansar and Khatmiyyah Sufis, and the political parties. The first section 
demonstrates how the history and geography of Sudan (being an Arab African country), 
and the nature of Sudanese society (Sufism, multi-culturalism, and extended families) 
influences the practice and fiqh (jurisprudence) of the Islamic movement in Sudan. The 
research critically evaluates these factors, and analyses events accordingly. 
Section 2, the Islamic movement’s historical background, seeks to critically evaluate the 
history of the Islamic movement in Sudan, its establishment, and the most important 
events that had an impact on the future of the movement, its organisation and ideology. 
Section 3 analyses the emergence of the Islamic Front for Constitution (IFC) as the first 
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broad Islamic umbrella body in Sudan, and evaluates the development of the movement 
during the Ibrahim Aboud regime (1959-1964) (the first military regime). Section 4 
critically evaluates the movement during the second democracy (1964-1969). Section 5 
covers the May regime (1969-1985), and the second democratic period (1985-1989). 
The section first evaluates the ideology of the May coup and its impact on the Islamic 
movement’s performance at that time, leading the movement to institute rapid changes 
in its methods, way of thinking and the fiqh as well. The research in this chapter 
evaluates and explores an important era of the movement’s history, i.e. the 
establishment of the NIF, the Islamist political party. At this stage, the movement 
developed economic and social institutions, and built up international relations that had 
powerful consequences on the relations of the state after the coup in 1989. In this 
period, the movement made the decision to carry out the national salvation coup. 
Section 6 explores the international relations of the movement, its historical context, 
relations with other movements and how it deals with the Sunni-Shi’a division.  
Chapter 2, the ‘Literature Review’, critically evaluates the writings of the key scholars,3 
who studied the Islamic movement in Sudan. The study compares and contrasts their 
different ways of analysing the same event and identifies the gaps in their work. 
Moreover, the study offers a new perspective from which to analyse the data. The 
chapter is divided into five sections that explain the important issues and concepts in the 
research.  
Chapter 3, titled ‘Islamists and democracy’, is divided into five sections: the first and 
second cover the role of revivalists and how the movement was viewed by 
                                                 
3
 Such as Esposito, Tigani Abdalgadir, Haydar Ibrahim Ali, Moussalli, Hasan Makki, or el-Affendi and 
others, they interviewed Turabi, and collected data, yet their research projects ended years ago, or were 
concerned with the issues current at that time. Therefore, in terms of data collection, there is now a good 
opportunity for more recent data that will be analysed from a different perspective; this represents an 
original contribution to knowledge.  
 14 
governments. Section 3 deals with the theoretical approach of Islamists, while Section 4 
critically evaluates Islamist experiments in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, which were 
chosen as case studies. Egypt witnessed an important experiment in its history, given 
that it is home to the main Ikhwan school, which spread its ideas all over the world. 
Moreover, it has long experience with dictatorial regimes, and has participated in the 
elections in Egypt many times and in different situations.The Islamic movement in 
Jordan has long experience as a moderate school of thought that has participated in 
different governments since the 1950s, and has been part of the democratic process in 
the last two decades. Tunisia is a unique experiment given the dictatorial nature of the 
last regime, yet the Islamic movement developed a comprehensive theoretical 
framework through its leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi. The research deals with each of 
these movements, how each of them developed its perspective on democracy, and how 
they practise it. The final section offers information about Salafi groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and democracy. This chapter is scene setting; it concentrates on comparison, and 
critically evaluates the theory and practice of the chosen Islamic movements. The 
chapter offers an opportunity for assessing the generalisability of research findings.  
Chapter 4, the ‘Islamist experiment in Sudan 1989-2001’, critically evaluates the 
experiment of the Sudanese Islamic movement in the first decade of their government. 
The chapter is divided into five sections that evaluate the practice of the Islamist state in 
Sudan, in light of Turabi’s political theory. Sections 1 and 2 investigate the preparation 
for the coup d'état and its objectives, and the empowerment plan. Section 3 illustrates 
how state institutions were built, including the constitution, political system or al-
Tawali al-Siyasi, political consensus, and the economic institutions (Islamic banks and 
insurance companies). Section 4 covers the cultural (arts and music) sphere, education, 
justice, human rights and women’s participation, international relations, and the role of 
the society compared with the role of the state. Section 5 critically evaluates the human 
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rights’ record in Sudan during the period studied. This chapter evaluates the main 
question that needs to be answered with regard to Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan, 
which is the gap between theory and practice. 
Chapter 5, ‘Islamists in Sudan and International Relations’, is divided into two sections: 
the first evaluates how the Gulf War and the establishment of the Popular Arab Islamic 
Conference (PAIC) impacted on its relations with other countries. Moreover, it 
evaluates people’s diplomacy which was adopted by Islamists in Sudan. The second 
section investigates Sudan’s international relations, and foreign affairs principles, values 
and plan in the first decade (1989-2001). This covers Sudan’s relations with the United 
States (US) and European Union (EU), with the Horn of Africa, neighbouring and North 
African Countries, Asia, the Far East and China.  
Chapter 6, titled ‘Islamists in Sudan and the State’, is divided into six sections, preceded 
by a theoretical evaluation of Turabi’s contribution to the questions of Islamists and the 
state, democracy, gender, and minorities. Section 1 critically evaluates the role of the 
state in Islamist political thought. Section 2 evaluates the role of society, Section 3 
covers the distribution of wealth and power, and Section 4 deals with civil liberties and 
freedom of speech, elections, etc. Sections 5 and 6 evaluate the participation of women, 
ethnic minorities, and non-Muslims, no-party and multi-party systems, and international 
relations in an Islamic state. These are the issues that faced Islamists in Sudan and other 
countries. The chapter explores the theoretical frameworks proposed by Turabi and the 
important element of his theory compared to other revivalists in the second half of the 
last century, and the first decade of this century. It also reveals the foundations on which 
these scholars based their theories.  
Chapter 7, or ‘Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory [unitarianism]’, is based on theoretical 
evaluation of Turabi’s philosophical contribution to the theory and how it related to 
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democracy or ‘Shura’ and the question of Islamists and the state, gender, and ethnic and 
religious minorities. It is divided into five sections. The first section examines and 
inspects the philosophical approach of the theory. The second section critically 
evaluates the concept (Tawhīd), which is the main pillar of the Tawhīdi theory. The third 
section is a critical evaluation of the pillars of the theory. The fourth section assesses 
Turabi’s democratic model, which deals with consultation and consensus, how he builds 
this model, and how it works. Section 5 concludes with a critical assessment of the 
whole theory, its concepts and other practical mechanisms, and how it is associated with 
all aspects of life. The principal conclusions and outcome of the critical evaluation of 
research are revealed in this conclusion. A summary of the results is presented, and 
points for further study discussion and research are suggested, along with other 
suggestions arising from the work.  
Critical evaluation of the ideas and practice of Islamists in Sudan is the main work of 
the thesis. It critically assesses the Islamist exercise of governing on two levels. First, 
the practical level, focusing on the post-1989 experience and the extent that Shura is 
actually practised. This evaluation includes methodologies/mechanisms that have been 
implemented. Second, the theoretical level, evaluates Turabi’s discourse, which is 
related to this practice.  
In conclusion, the research has a central focus on the Islamist movement in Sudan, 
which influenced and was influenced by Sudan’s socio-political conditions. It shapes 
and is shaped by Sudan’s local, regional, and international relations and complications, 
and indeed, inherited Sudan’s social, economic, and political complications. 
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Chapter 1: Historical Background 
This chapter presents historical background on Sudan, in general, and the Islamic 
movement, in particular. It concentrates on crucial historical events, providing 
information to facilitate a deeper understanding of the Sudanese Islamic movement, and 
Turabi’s theories. The chapter is divided into six main sections, the first giving a brief 
introduction to Sudan, and its geography. Subsequently, a more detailed overview of the 
emergence and the historical development of the Sudanese Islamic movement is 
presented. The chapter focuses on the turning points that impacted on the theory and 
practice of the movement in Sudan throughout its history. The presentation includes the 
influence of Sudanese culture, tribal system and political history on the movement. It 
explores the different ways in which the Islamic movement has developed, and how it 
benefited from the domestic Sudanese environment. 
 
Section 1. Geographic, Historical and Demographic Context 
1.1 Sudan’s Historical and Geographical Context 
Prior to 2011, Sudan was the largest country in Africa (after the separation of South 
Sudan, it is now the second largest after Algeria). Sudan is located in north-eastern 
Africa, bordered by nine countries, Egypt to the north, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, 
the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Kenya, Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to the south. The Blue Nile flowing from Ethiopia, and 
the White Nile from Kenya and Uganda meet in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, and 
continue to Egypt as the River Nile. The country has extreme diversity in climate, soil, 
vegetation and natural resources, resulting in great potential for agriculture and energy, 
especially oil. Civil wars delayed the production of oil and the development of all other 
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fields, but the government is now able to concentrate on the development of these 
industries and activities due to the current peace processes. 
The demographic situation of Sudan is complex, with a diverse population made up of 
different tribes, languages, religions and cultures, which all impact on the country’s 
history and future. 
“… tribal identification and lineages classification that remains to date bed rock 
for Sudanese social structure. Sudanese people from family to tribe are still fond 
of preserving pedigrees and well attached to their traditions tribal based social 
setting” (Hamid, 1989, p.21). 
This social structure is reflected in the political environment and structures in Sudan. In 
addition, the tribal system has significant influence on social and political culture, and 
axiomatically impacts on the religious schools, and the Sufi orders (Tariqa), with 
followers from different tribes and regions. 
Consequently, this Sudanese context influences the thought processes, development, 
and ways of acting, nationally and internationally, of the Sudanese Islamic movement, 
including how it reacts to events and social change, and how it benefits from the nature 
of society. 
Historically, Islam entered Sudan and was accepted voluntarily, after the collapse of the 
Islamic Caliphate. Tijani Abdalgadir Hamid argued that popular Islam that has no 
institutions represents strength, yet at the same time weakness (Abdalgadir, 1995, p.41). 
He asserts that the first rise of Islam was connected to the crusades against the Islamic 
world, and the long clash of civilisations over Palestine. Salah al-Dīn al-Ayyubi sent his 
brother, Toran Shah, to Sudan in 1269 (668 Hijri) (Abdalgadir, 1995, pp.41-42). 
Therefore, Sudan’s relations with the Islamic centres commenced with Egypt, Baghdad, 
al-Hijaz and Morocco. These relationships developed into social and economic 
associations that established Sudanese society, Sufi culture and social peace that 
continued for five centuries. 
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Before Turko-Egyptian rule, the Sudanese people did not constitute one nation. Indeed, 
the Sudan was divided politically into kingdoms ruled by sultans. The most important 
being the Sultans of al-Fonj in Eastern Sudan, Fur in the west, and the Nubians in the 
north (Amara, 2007, p.273). 
The modern political history of Sudan during the past century can be divided into three 
main periods, namely Turko-Egyptian rule from February 1821, Anglo-Egyptian rule 
from 24 November 1899, and independence from January 1956. The first period began 
when the Ottoman Sultan’s Viceroy in Egypt, Mohammed Ali, entered Sudan in the 
early 1840s, and brought the northern region under his government. The Turko-
Egyptian rule lasted for four decades, until the local Islamist, Mohammed Ahmed al-
Mahdi, managed to end it in 1885. This revolution resulted in many changes in 
Sudanese social and political history. During this time, Sudan asserted significant social, 
political and economic power, and was later reflected in the country’s 20th century 
political life. Mahdi was “the leader of the revolution that united the Sudanese for the 
first time” (Amara, 2007, p.275). However, Mahdi was later defeated by British forces, 
and in 1899 an Anglo-Egyptian condominium was proclaimed over the entire Sudan. 
Half a century later, in December 1955, Britain and Egypt signed a formal agreement 
giving Sudan the right to self-determination, and the Sudanese Parliament proclaimed 
independence to take effect on 1 January 1956; both Britain and Egypt recognised 
Sudan’s new status (Hamid, 1989, p.46).  
However, Abdalgadir (1995) asserts that the educational institutions prior to these 
periods did not build strong Islamic institutions in the political, economic, or military 
fields, which resulted in the aforementioned foreign intervention from 1821. Therefore, 
fundamentalists established small protest groups to stand against Sufi deviance, tribal 
leaders and foreign influence. In 1885, under Mahdi’s leadership, they led a revolution 
that drew the attention of Islamic and European countries. 
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However, this revolution faced many obstacles to its primary aim of ensuring an Islamic 
state. First, internally, Mahdism failed to transform the revolutionary forces into 
institutions to govern the state; moreover, some internal actors were supported by the 
British colonial process. Second, externally, the British interfered directly in Sudan in 
1899, and became the only authority that organised society and established and 
governed a secular state. Axiomatically, the Sufi and religious leaders isolated 
themselves from public life, restricting themselves to Sufi practices in private. 
It is well documented that the European colonisation process began rebuilding societies 
and states in Africa and Asia, according to the European experience, without 
considering local cultures and religions. In Sudan, the British replaced the traditional 
leaders with new cadres trained by them, mainly secular and Westernised. The impact 
was that Sudanese society became divided into many sections, which were diverse in 
both political and economic power resulting in different influences on the society. 
 
1.2 The Ansar and Khatmiyya: Sufis and political parties 
The Ansar and Khatmiyyah
4
 are the two main Sufi orders in Sudan, and have influenced 
social and political life for the last century. The Khatmiyyah started as a Sufi group that 
came from Mecca and al-Taif in Hijaz, and became rooted in the Sudan. The Ansar 
started as a Sufi group, which developed into a Jihadist revolutionary movement, 
standing against secularism, imperialism and their local allies. This led to long conflict 
with the first Sufi group in Sudan, i.e. the ‘Khatmiyya’, which had aligned itself with 
the Turko-Egyptian (1821-1885) and the Anglo-Egyptian (1889-1956) rulers. These 
internecine struggles weakened the country, allowing it to fall to British colonial rule 
(1889-1956). The four trends, namely tribes, Sufi orders, societal divisions, and elites, 
                                                 
4
 Sufi sector established by Mohammed Osman al-Merghani; this Tariga laid the bases in the south and 
west of the Arabian peninsula, and crossed into Sudan Egypt and Eretria. 
 21 
influenced modern society in Sudan, and developed into the main political powers. 
Since both Ansar and Khatmiyyah were centres of political and social power for many 
decades, they still have sizeable followings in the country (al-Shahi, 1986, p.24). Many 
social, economic and political difficulties were created by this polarisation by the mid- 
1940s, the Mahdist-supporters (or Ansar) forming the Ummah party and its allies on the 
one hand, and an assortment of revivalist political groups united by support for some 
form of unity with Egypt on the other. The latter groups were backed by Khatmiyya, 
and the main party among them was the Ashiqqa party, led by Ismael al-Azhari, who 
was President of the Graduates Congress from 1942 (el-Affendi, 1991, p.36).  
The family of al-Merghani (the Khatmiyya) inherited economic, social and political 
power. However, they did not have a vision of reforming and developing Sudan, 
politically or economically, and so could not formulate a drastic political programme to 
solve the social, economic or political problems in Sudan. On the other hand, the Ansar 
established the Ummah Party (UP), under the direction of ‘Abdurrahman al-Mahdi, 
whose sons later inherited the party. Al-Saddig al-Mahdi tried to change this, but faced 
his uncle, al-Hadi, over legal inheritance of the leadership. The leadership conflict, or 
what became known as the conflict of al-Imama (1966-1968) or conflict of political 
Imama, divided the party and weakened it.  
These two Sufi groups and some secular elites controlled Sudanese politics for three 
decades or more (1954-1989) and participated in building Sudanese political culture. 
The Islamic movement also played some role during these three decades, and relied on 
the Sufi culture and traditional popular Islam to promote its pressure group or political 
party objectives (Mekki, 1999, p.204). Other Sufi groups, Tijania and al-Samania, also 
played a significant role in building the Sudanese personality, identity and culture. They 
were able to influence political values and political culture, which impacted on many 
events in Sudanese history and the thought, intellectual work and history of the Islamic 
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movement (Hamid, 1989, pp. 259-267; Mekki, 1999, pp.175-190). Compared to other 
Islamic movements in the region, it became more open, pragmatic, and moderate in its 
handling of religious and political issues.  
The Islamic movement in Sudan has therefore been strongly influenced by these 
traditions, but significantly is not considered a Sufi movement. The Islamic movement 
in Sudan rejects mysticism, because Sufism, according to them, was not a part of the 
Prophet’s teaching in the early period of Islam (Niblock, 1991, p.254). I may say that 
the Islamist movement inherited some of the religious and educated people of the Ansar 
and Khatmiyya.  
 
Section 2: Islamic Movement’s Historical Background 
2.1 Establishment of the Islamic Movement in Sudan: 1946-1955 
The Islamic movement in Sudan has experienced reform and renewal since its 
establishment in the late 1940s. It has always been characterised by independence, 
flexible organisation and adaptable fiqh (understanding); some scholars say it has a 
pragmatic method of work. 
“This reflected in frequent constitutional changes, regular changes. Important 
turning points, the movement has reviewed its position and introduced structural 
and organisational changes in pace with changing times” (Hamdi, 1998, p.14). 
The history of the Islamic movement in the Sudan is intrinsically linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928, four years after the decline of the 
Caliphate. El-Affendi states that: 
“the focal institution that symbolised Muslim unity since the death of the 
Prophet in 632 CE was abolished in Turkey in 1924. This was a traumatic 
development for many Muslims, even though the Caliphate had by then become 
a purely symbolic institution” (el-Affendi, 2003, p.313). 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by a young charismatic school teacher, Hasan al-
Banna (1906-1949) in Ismailia. However, the first contact between the Brotherhood 
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movement in Egypt and the Sudanese was in 1937, as was stated by Hasan al-Banna; 
the first contact with the Sudanese was in Mohammed Osman el-Merghani’s mosque in 
Ismailia. In fact, it was individual contacts between Egyptian Muslim Brothers and 
some Sudanese. Hasan al-Banna, General Guide (al-Murshid al-‘Ām) of the group (al-
Jama‘a), used to invite some Sudanese to meetings. This early stage of contact and 
membership impacted on the history of the Islamic movement. Some studies mentioned 
that the Sudanese Islamic movement was founded in 1944-45 (Mekki, 1998, p.3), while 
others claimed it was established in 1949.  
However, while al-Ikhwan (Brotherhood) movement became an international 
movement, the Sudanese Islamic movement built its independent structural 
organisation. Yet, it was based on the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and 
other intellectual works of Egyptian Ikhwan and other movements, including Jamaat-e-
Islami in Pakistan (Sayyid Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi) and other intellectuals, as mentioned 
later in this study. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, was banned in 
1949, and its leader assassinated in February 1949 (it has been alleged that this was by 
government instigation). It was restored to legality following the military coup of July 
1952, but soon fell into dispute with Egypt’s President, Jamal Abdul Nasser, and was 
banned again in 1955. However, the movement continued to expand and establish 
branches or offshoots in most other Arab countries and beyond.  
The assassination of Hasan al-Banna in February 1949 was a turning point in the history 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Islamic movement in Sudan. His 
assassination encouraged the members to do more work for Da‘wah (propagation of the 
Islamic message) and increased the branches in Egypt and Sudan. Other major Islamist 
groups were influenced by this event, especially in Syria, Jordan and Iraq.  
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However, the emergence of the Islamic movement in Sudan was late compared to Syria 
and Palestine. Hasan Mekki asserts that “the British isolated Sudan from any Egyptian 
influence” (Mekki, 1982, p.11). However, Haydar Ibrahim Ali attributes this to 
“the existence of traditional religious political parties which were close to 
peoples’ ‘traditional’ Islam and Sufism, these parties were very popular, so the 
Islamic movement never tried to face it at that time” (Ali, 2003, p.49). 
The author asserts that, at that time, the movement did not introduce itself as a political 
party or group, as was done by Khatmiyyah and Ansar, but later it influenced their 
projects and recruted some of their followers.  
 
2.1.1 The Islamic movement in Sudan: the three trends 
First: the Egyptian trend, which started with the initial visit (1944-1945) by Egyptian 
lawyer, Salah Abdalsid and Jamal al-Dīn al-Sanhouri (a Sudanese who went to Egypt in 
the 1930s, and came back from Egypt to establish the first committee for Ikhwan). The 
next visit was made by Ibrahim al-Mofti, Badawi Mostafa and Ali Talballah, who were 
then followed by Awad Omer al-Imam. In 1946, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sent 
two members (‘Abdulhakim Abdin and Jamal al-Din al-Sanhouri), some of the 
members were already members of other parties, and all of them supported unity 
between Sudan and Egypt at that time. According to Hasan Mekki, the organisation was 
poor, and had no vision at that time, so they wasted most of their efforts (Mekki, 1982, 
pp.17-18). 
The British noted the relation between Ikhwan in Egypt and Sudan, as both were 
opposed to the British colonisation, resulting in the first Ikhwan-led demonstration in 
Sudan in 1948. The British imposed sanctions on some of the main participants, 
including Mohammed Sadiq al-Karouri, Mohammed Nour, Mohammed Abdallah al-
Zamzami, Abdaraziq al-Fadni and others who were involved; for example, they 
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deported Mohammed Aashour (Egyptian) back to Egypt, and Ali Talballah was jailed 
(Mekki, 1982, pp.17-18). 
Second: the trend of Sudanese students in Egypt, which began with the first student 
Jamal al-Dīn al-Sanhouri, who joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. 
Then Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid, Kamal Madani, Mohammed Ziyada Hamour and Jabr 
Abdarahman became the first students who joined Sayyid Qutb’s assembly (Ali, 2003, 
p.54).  When the group returned to Sudan, they started to contact students in secondary 
schools to disseminate their learning, but faced a conflict with the existence of “Harakat 
al-Tahrir al-Islami” or the Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM), which is discussed 
below. 
Under the influence of visiting Ikhwan activists from Egypt, the principal aim of this 
trend was to develop a Sudanese branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Whilst 
this group of Ikhwan found acceptance in the circles that favoured unity with Egypt, the 
movement later protested against such unity, because of Nasser’s stance towards Ikhwan 
in Egypt. 
Third: the independent trend, known as Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami or ILM, was formed 
in response to the rise of the communist movement in schools and colleges. In 1949, in 
Hanotaub and Wadi Sayeidna secondary schools, it was suggested by Babikir Karrar 
and Mohammed Yousif to write a pamphlet under the name of Harakat al-Tahrir al-
Islami (ILM). They contacted Yousif Hasan Saied and al-Tayib Salih.
5
 They were 
influenced by the visit of Abdalhakeem Abdin and Jamal al-Dīn al-Sanhouri, but did not 
know anything about the Ikhwan organisation before that time (Mekki, 1982, pp.30-31). 
Therefore, it is clear that this movement emerged in the student community without 
                                                 
5
 The well-known writer and novelist, who worked at BBC Arabic in London in the 1970s-1980s; his 
famous novels are O’rs al-Zain, and the season of migration to the north, Domat wad Hamid. The first 
one was made as a film in the 1970s.  
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contact with the Ikhwan. One may argue that this is the reason why most sources claim 
that the Islamic movement in Sudan emerged in 1949.  
El-Affendi argued that: 
“… at first only Karrar was in contact with Talballah. But changes were taking 
place in Egypt, the effects of which were being felt in Sudan. The Wafdist 
government that replaced Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi’s anti-Ikhwan cabinet 
rehabilitated Ikhwan somewhat, and even the trials of Ikhwan cast them in a 
heroic light, revealing their contributions in the war in Palestine and their anti-
British guerrilla activities in the Canal zone. Affiliation to Ikhwan thus became a 
source of pride, so that the ILM group no longer had to deny its relationship to 
Ikhwan. Banna’s rasail (messages) became an important part of members’ 
education in the Sudanese movement. Many students spent long nights making 
copies by hand, until some were learned by heart …” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.51). 
This is evidence that whilst ILM had contact with the Ikhwan group it was only through 
Karrar, and was not denied by the members who followed Banna’s guidance. 
Consequently, the three elements of the ‘three trends’ notion are not completely 
independent from each other; el-Affendi criticised the notion and affirms that “… an 
atmosphere was created where the barriers between the various sectors of the movement 
no longer existed”. Many of those who joined ILM in this phase did not even hear about 
its original name, but considered themselves to be a part of Ikhwan, which brought the 
group closer to other strands of Ikhwan. Consequently, ILM members acted in 
coordination with the wider Ikhwan movement, especially since college students were 
in a better position to carry out the task of education and indoctrination of ordinary 
members. The college itself was a centre for Ikhwan cultural activities (el-Affendi, 
1991, p.51), which is further evidence of the close coordination between the different 
strands of the Islamic movement.  
Another point raised by el-Affendi confirms that these strands were not independent 
from each other: 
“… in addition the majority of adherents remained students since the movement 
had not by that time made much headway outside student circles. The gradual 
and informal integration was assisted by the fact that ILM itself was amorphous, 
having no well-defined leadership. There appeared to have been little concern 
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about structures or leadership and more concern about the general and wider 
goals …” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.52). 
These views were supported by Mohammed Khair Abdalgadir’s statement: 
“… there was no direct connection between the establishment of ILM among the 
students in Khartoum and the Ikhwan movement in Egypt and even in Sudan; 
these students did not know about Ikhwan in Egypt. But after the activities 
extended to secondary school, a section for external relations was established, 
and connection with Ikhwan in Sudan started, then it extended to Egyptian 
Ikhwan; these connections were enhanced by the migration of some of the 
students to study in Egypt” (Abdalgadir, 1999, p.66-67).  
In 1952, a delegation from the Egyptian Ikhwan led by Abdalbade’e Saqr, suggested 
that Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM) join the Ikhwan movement in Egypt. But the 
suggestion was rejected by Yousif Hasan Saeed, who pointed out that if they did not 
have a Sudanese movement distinct from Egyptian Ikhwan, then the movement would 
lose many of its supporters. Consequently, they chose not to join Egypt’s Ikhwan. 
According to what was mentioned previously, this did not mean that they were 
completely different from the other elements of the three trends, or that they would not 
cooperate with them.  
However, the emerging movement was facing its first conflict. An internal conflict 
about the character of the movement, its goal and methods. In 1952, Karrar temporarily 
deserted the movement in protest against too close an identification with the Egyptian 
Ikhwan (el-Affendi, 1991, p.52).  
The next year, in 1953, Babikir Karrar called for a meeting attended by 40 of the 
members (his followers). El-Affendi described it as a ‘coup’, as these members wanted 
to be distinct as Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM) from Ikhwan. However, in the end a 
compromise was reached until a general conference could be called to resolve the issue.  
At that time, there were three groups (Mekki, 1982, pp.38-42): 
1. al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood: abbr. Ikhwan), its leader was Ali 
Talballah, it counted itself as a branch of Ikhwan in Egypt. 
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2. Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM), a group that called for independence, 
authenticity, and the need to play a political role. 
3. a group that called for borrowing the Egyptian Ikhwan experiment, whilst retaining 
some independence and concentrating on individual education.  
In order to solve the problem of these three groups, the movement held its first 
conference, as described by Mekki. 
“Thus, the university student independent movement emerged, it was connected 
in concepts and ideas to Egyptian Ikhwan; it was moderate between the extreme 
of Babikir Karrar and inexpertise of Ali Talballah, this trend found a chance to 
grow up till these days” (Mekki, 1982, p.49). 
I may say these three groups at the end had established the main stream of the 
movement that did not belong to any one group but inherited members of all three 
groups and benefited from the groups’ experience. 
 
2.2 Eid Conference 1954 
This conference, the ‘Eid Conference’,6 was held on 21 August 1954 in Omdurman 
Cultural Club; students, Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM), and the people’s trend were 
invited. The Unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood organisation was established during 
the conference, which would give the mainstream modern Islamic movement its shape. 
The importance of this conference is that the name of the movement, ‘Ikhwan’, was 
adopted. They agreed that they should remain faithful to the same ideological 
principles, but, in terms of organisation, remain independent from the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. They raised the issue of an Islamic constitution, and chose to work for 
Da‘wah, as a non-secret movement. It was clear that they tried to draw up the objectives 
of the movement, and concluded they were primarily concerned with explaining Islam 
                                                 
6
 It was known as the Eid Conference, because it was held in the second day of Eid al-Adhha (sacrifice 
Eid). 
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to the people. It has since been known as Nashr al-Da‘wah, which means propagation 
of the message; in fact this term is borrowed from the Egyptian experience. Turabi 
believes that this term did not reflect the true nature of this practice, which consisted 
mainly of recruiting individuals through personal contact, which in no way included 
public propagation of any message on a mass scale as the term implied (Turabi, 2008, 
p.31). Ali Talballah boycotted the conference, and ignored its resolutions. The 
conference elected new leaders, and Mohammed Khair Abdalgadir was elected as 
Secretary-General.  
Moreover, other key objectives of the movement were agreed, i.e. liberating Sudan 
politically, economically, and socially, and building the society on the principles of 
Islam, participating in building Muslim society, developing national wealth, and 
achieving social justice. Another important decision was the intention to build an 
Islamic government that applies the teachings of Islam in ‘ruling’ public life. It was 
clear that these were broad ideas, and they did not know how to set out the details and 
build practical projects, and how to realise these practically. 
Finally, the Secretary-General, Mohammed Khair Abdalgadir, was elected. However, 
Abdalgadir’s period in leadership continued to be a turbulent one. Even though only a 
tiny group supported either of the dissident factions, Abdalgadir was forced to resign 
within one year, after suffering harassment from Talballah, who kept up a relentless 
campaign of protest against the resolutions of the Eid congress. He was succeeded by 
Babikir Karrar (el-Affendi, 1991, p.53).  
However, by announcing these resolutions, the movement had finished building its 
administrative body, achieved its unity, adopted the name of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
(The Muslim Brotherhood), and decided that the movement should adopt an educational 
method (Tarbiyyah) with a comprehensive message of Islamic reform. The movement 
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inherited the Islamic activities and activism in the universities and schools but, at that 
time, it played a very limited political and social role.  
The 1954 conference was drastic in many ways; most radicals in ILM, headed by 
Babikir Karrar, Abdalla Zakariyya, Merghani al-Nasri and Nasir al-Sayyid, left the 
organisation in protest against the adoption of the Ikhwan name. They formed their own 
group, “al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya”, which ended up as the Islamic Socialist Party (ISP) 
after the October revolution. ISP never gained roots in Sudan, though, surprisingly, it 
attracted the attention of Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, when he launched a successful 
military coup in 1969 (Hamid, 1989, p.100). Hasan Mekki asserts that Babikir Karrar, 
Abdalla Zakariyyah and Nasir al-Sayyid had a strong relationship with Qaddafi, and it 
was proved that they influenced his thought. He mentioned that Nasir al-Sayyid told 
him that he translated some chapters of “the Green Book”7 into the English language 
(Mekki, 1998, pp.121-124). Yet others think that they participated in drafting the “Green 
Book”. Abdalla Zakariyyah participated in the conferences on the political system, 
following the 1989 coup, with the same socialist ideas. 
It could be concluded that, during this conference, the unified Sudanese Muslim 
Brotherhood organisation was established and the Ikhwan name was adopted; the 
mainstream modern Islamic movement thereby took its shape. They have remained 
faithful to the same ideological principles but, in terms of organisation, have remained 
independent from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
 
                                                 
7
 A book written by the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, first published in 1975, outlining his views 
on democracy and his political philosophy, which consists of three parts: The Solution of the Problem of 
Democracy, 'The Authority of the People'; The Solution of the Economic Problem: 'Socialism' and The 
Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 
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2.3 The Movement Organisation and Ideology 
During this period the movement was largely dependent on outside groups in its 
ideology and organisational model. The literature circulated to members consisted of the 
works produced by the Egyptian Ikhwan or the writing of Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A‘la 
al-Mawdudi, the leader of Jama‘a Islami in Pakistan. The simple organisational forms 
adopted were identical to those of the Egyptian Ikhwan (Turabi, 2008, p.31). At this 
stage, the basic organisational unit was the cell (Usra), but had limited functions. The 
group of cells in each defined area formed a branch (Shu‘ba). The role of these cells and 
the members of the movement was to recruit new members and to run educational 
programmes for members. The nature of these activities was secret and closed. Turabi 
(2008, p.32) attributes this secrecy to two reasons. 
 First: the closed nature of these programmes and the secrecy surrounding them was 
due to the alien origin of the new movement, and the unusual content of its message 
with regard to the Sudanese environment. 
 Second: it was inspired by security worries, associated with the revival of the 
communist movement in consciousness of the experience of the Ikhwan in Egypt. 
However, there was limited participation in public life at this stage.  
“In public life, the movement adopted a stance only on limited number of issues, 
mostly issues of direct concern to it. For example, they supported the Egyptian 
Ikhwan against persecution by Nasser’s regime, and supported the 1953 
agreement between the Egyptian government and the major Sudanese parties on 
self-determination. This agreement, which paved the way for independence, was 
strongly opposed by the communists” (Turabi, 2008, p.32). 
The researcher argues that a limited role was natural for the movement at that time for it 
still needed to resolve its internal issues, for example its leadership was primitive in 
structure and incapable of responding effectively to issues or problems. 
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Section 3. Emergence of Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC) 1956-1959 
3.1 The establishment of the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC) 
The new united movement expanded, forming branches all over the country. In this 
period, the pioneers of the student Islamic movement started to graduate and take their 
place in the society. Consequently, they were leading the people to join the movement. 
This period also witnessed the movement’s first recourse to mass communication, such 
as newspapers, rallies, public speeches, and general involvement in wider political 
debate; representing a turning point in the history of Sudan. Additionally, there was 
competition between the political parties, and different ideologies and leaders as 
discussed by Turabi. 
“With independence in 1956, groups of educated elite entrenched themselves in 
positions of power and the country witnessed a period of intense political 
struggle in a democratic set-up, where the issue of liberation and the 
determination of the country’s foreign relations were debated” (Turabi, 2008, 
p.33). 
The overriding issue was self-determination or the search for national identity. Turabi 
asserts that the major currents were either those in favour of an authentic national and 
political identity (expressed in union with Egypt or independently), or those favouring a 
new identity, “modelled after East or West” (Turabi, 2008, p.30). Axiomatically, the 
postures of each of the parties or groups had their impact on Sudan’s future foreign 
relationships, especially with Egypt. Moreover, they continue to affect the relationship 
between Egypt and each of the main political parties in Sudan, to the present day.  
By late 1955, with the internal structures and procedures in place, and under the 
leadership of al-Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr, who had earlier shown a good grasp of political 
issues and a thirst for direct action, the Sudan Ikhwan moved to put some of their 
programmes into practice (el-Affendi, 1991, p.57). In this stage, the new leader of the 
movement reduced the Egyptian direct role. Many reasons lay behind this decision. 
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First, the movement started to transform its objectives into political objectives, so as to 
get ready to shift to an active political party. Second, the extreme dislike of Nasser 
towards Ikhwan for supporting the independence of Sudan, and not unity with Egypt. 
This meant that Ikhwan in the Sudan had changed their opinion towards unity with 
Egypt, based on Nasser’s policies towards Ikhwan in Egypt.  
El-Affendi argued that: 
“… in that period three major influences were shaping the movement’s 
perspectives: its anti-communism, its opposition to Nasser, and its ultimate goal 
of setting up an Islamic order” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.57). 
There was significant development in the objectives and programmes of the movement 
at this stage including its call for an Islamic constitution. The movement mobilised 
other parties and individuals to support the idea. It was the first recourse to the method 
of mass communication.  
However, after Sudan’s independence in 1956, there were proposals for the constitution, 
but it was a temporary constitution. The Ikhwan established the IFC, which was the first 
political umbrella for the movement in Sudan, and many Islamic groups joined it (the 
Islamic Charity Association in Khartoum, Jam‘iyyat al-Muhafaza ‘ala al-Qur’an in 
Omdurman and Shambat, and the Islamic cultural club Khartoum North, etc.) 
(Sheikoon, 2002, p.236). In the field of media, the Ikhwan newspaper was issued in 
June 1956, under the supervision of Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid, then al-Manar magazine 
issued by the Muslim sister’s branch, then the student Muslim sisters (Karrar, 1998, 
pp.150-151). In this phase: 
“the movement was also pushed to develop its educational (Tarbiyyah) and 
recruitment functions to reflect its new role as a pressure group, and a movement 
for mass mobilisation. For this purpose, the Islamic Front for the Constitution 
(IFC) was set up as a front for the movement, and also widen its appeal. The 
slogan of the Islamic constitution served as a mobilising call, while the 
movement maintained a strong popular campaign, which did not seek to 
transcend the existing parties, but attempted to pressurise and embarrass them 
into responding to its demands” (Turabi, 2008, p.33). 
 34 
It was clear that, at this stage, the movement could not do more than a successful 
pressure group because it was still weak (most of its members were students or newly 
graduated). Moreover, it had no clear vision for the role of the movement and it was not 
a political party yet. In addition, the two traditional parties dominated most of the 
Sudanese scene. Later, the issue of whether the movement wanted to be a pressure 
group or a party seeking power was raised, and the movement defined itself not as a 
pressure group. 
Hasan Mekki concluded the strategic plan for IFC in two points.  
 First: to mobilise public opinion in different legal ways and means to call for an 
Islamic constitution. 
 Second: to contact all organisations, leaders and individuals to support the IFC 
to call for the Islamic constitution (Mekki, 1982, p.74). The IFC succeeded in 
mobilising most of the elite leaders, organisations, and public opinion to support 
its objectives. 
I agree with Haydar Ibrahim Ali who refers the successes of the Islamic movement to 
establishing of alliances, building broad fronts with others, and adopting general 
programmes (Ali, 1996, p.283).  
 
3.2 The Development of the Movement during Abboud’s Regime 1959-1964 
This was the period of the first military coup in Sudan in November 1958, i.e. the: 
“first military dictatorship under General Ibrahim Abboud. The junta maintained 
a moderately conservative policy and did not apply excessive repression. The 
approach of the military was to some extent political, and they concentrated on 
development and pragmatic administration, making as little revolutionary or 
doctrinaire claims as possible” (Turabi, 2008, p.34). 
Turabi asserts that it was an overreaction when the movement was pushed underground 
by itself. This was caused by comparison with the Egyptian example, as it faced little or 
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no oppression, and this excessive caution threatened to stifle it. The Abboud regime did 
not start attacking the movement, but the experience of the Egyptian movement with 
Nasser’s regime was one of the factors that pushed the movement to take this decision. 
However, the student wing rejected this approach, and carried on their activities in 
universities and schools; it continued to agitate incessantly and openly against the 
regime. This was the period of fast development of the student section of the movement. 
I think this happened because the student wing found a good chance to express its views 
among students in different issues, and so recruited many members. Some student 
leaders graduated, and supervised the work, and so most of the resources of the 
movement were directed to the active wing (student wing). Outside universities and 
colleges, activities were restricted to cultural activities. I believe that these cultural 
activities raised the awareness of the members of the movement to the importance of 
social and cultural activities as a way of direct communication and development of 
communities. This is why the movement succeeded in building different organisations 
in different fields in the future, and have expertise in the fields of youth, mothers and 
family, children, charities, education, and Da‘wah. 
In 1962, another conference was held in al-Elafoun (known as al-Elafoun Conference), 
where the movement’s 1954 constitution was modified, and Turabi was elected 
Secretary-General for the movement, and other leaders were elected with him. 
“The period of stagnation caused the movement to be inward-looking, and 
provoked instances of self-examination and self-questioning. For the first time, a 
serious and systematic debate was organised around several issues. The issue of 
leadership was discussed, leading to a move towards collective leadership after 
criticisms of the style of the earlier leadership” (Turabi, 2008, p.34). 
This was a significant step in the movement, by changing the style of leadership and 
electing collective leaders for the movement. This meant it practised Shura for the first 
time. Other questions were raised about the education, ‘Tarbiyyah’, the movement 
offered, its quality, aims and whether the Usra was an ideal vehicle for it. The nature of 
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the movement was also discussed, and the people asked if the movement wanted to be a 
pressure group or a party seeking power. Relations with other political forces were also 
discussed. In the end, these debates led to a revision of the movement’s constitution to 
incorporate the new suggestions agreed (Turabi, 2008, p.34). Turabi supported the idea 
of being a pressure group. I believe that these were the first steps in thinking 
systematically about the vision of the movement; members started to think critically 
about developing the movement structure, its role and objectives. The questions raised 
were core questions, and the answer to these questions led the movement to new roles 
and objectives.  
Ten years later, after the first conference in 1954, “in 1964, the movement established a 
political organisation, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), which soon became a significant 
political force with proper diversified functions” (Hamdi, 1998, pp.14-15). The ICF 
included many Islamic groups, and was kept away from the main body of the 
movement, although the movement guided it. The ICF participated in the National Front 
that led the resistance against the Abboud regime.  
 
Section 4. The Movement and the Second Democracy 1964-1969 
This period in the history of Sudan witnessed significant changes, internally, regionally 
and internationally. The 1964 October Revolution toppled the Abboud regime, in which 
the movement played an essential role and led the masses. Regionally, the defeat of 
Egypt by Israel on 9 June 1967 was a significant event. These two events shaped most 
of the events in this period. Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoob, Prime Minister at that time, 
declared war on Israel. Following al-Mahjoob, Turabi announced freezing 
disagreements with Egypt, and mobilising all forces in the war to liberate Palestine 
(Mekki, 1999, p.22). Sudan’s government led a coalition to support Egypt, which 
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resulted in the Arab summit conference of 29 August 1967 in Khartoum. In the same 
year, a group within the army started their activities, and were able to come to power in 
a coup in May 1969. 
“This phase which started with the October 1964 revolution in which the 
movement had taken the initiative, a factor which gave it confidence and 
momentum, this was the era of extended freedoms which opened the door wide 
for political debate and competition” (Turabi, 2008, p.35). 
Turabi considered this an era of extensive popular mobilisation, which shook the 
traditional parties and posed the political issues in a radical fashion, transcending the 
tradition-bound styles of the older politicians, who were keen to perpetuate the system 
inherited from the colonial era. 
“With the impetus gained from the revolutionary fervour and achievements, the 
movement moved ahead to develop its earlier plans for a broad Islamic front. 
Not content with spontaneous and erratic mobilisation of the masses, it decided 
that time has come for it to be the focus of an organised mass movement. For 
this end, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was established around a written 
charter produced by the movement and bringing together a number of 
individuals and groups in a unified political party. But the movement reserved 
for itself certain independence vis-à-vis the mass party it created” (Turabi, 2008, 
p.35-36).  
Therefore on 16 December 1964, less than two months after the revolution, the ICF was 
established: “the movement established a political organisation called the Islamic 
Charter Front (ICF), which soon became a significant political force with proper 
diversified functions” (Hamdi, 1989, pp.14-15). “The main difference from its former 
structure was its enhanced and improved organisation and openness towards other 
political groups” (Hamdi, 1998, p.17-18). However, it is clear that the movement chose 
broad fronts (1955 and 1965) in all its phases, especially on national agendas. The 
establishment of these two fronts led to division in the movement between idealistic and 
pragmatic members. In the period 1965-1969, the ICF grew as a pressure group, 
campaigning for an Islamic constitution in Sudan. It presented a moderate draft of an 
Islamic constitution in 1969, which required defining Sudan as an Islamic state. Shari'a 
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should be the source of law, and any laws contradicting the Shari'a should not be 
applied, etc. (Shingiti, 2001, p.72). Both the Ansar and Khatmiyyah sects were 
supportive. However, the proposed constitutional changes where pre-empted by the 
military coup by Nimeiri and the Communist party in 1969.  
Turabi believes that the leading role of the modern sector in the country’s affairs was 
enhanced by the role of the students in lighting the spark of the revolution. Equally 
important was the role of the trade unions, which responded to the student initiative by 
organising a political strike and demonstrations. An experience of the leading role in the 
revolution had increased the confidence of the movement. Consequently, the movement 
went on to establish other groups to act as a focus for mass action for the main sectors 
in the society, i.e. youth and women, in the form of the National Youth Organisation, the 
National Women’s Front and other trade union organisations. These organisations were 
mainly national organisations that played a social and political role, and acted as fronts 
for the movement’s activities. 
Establishing these organisations in this period had an impact on the development of the 
movement on two aspects. First: the organisational aspect, where the movement began 
to establish a quasi-federal system to play different roles in different fields. I think it 
carried on using the same method to build the movement in the future. Second: the 
theoretical, where I believe that these organisations were supported by leaders who 
developed ideas, fiqh (understanding) and practice. On these ideas and fiqh, many 
organisations were built in the social, economic, development, and educational fields 
during the life of the movement. Moreover, it practically trained more members as 
cadres in different fields. 
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Section 5. May Coup 
5.1 The Ideology of the Coup  
The military coup of 25 May 1969 was the second coup in the history of Sudan. It was 
supported by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP). However, there were internal and 
external factors that played different roles in the success of the coup. 
Hasan Mekki argues that Nasser was not happy with the Sudanese government, because 
it was calling for independence rather than unity with Egypt. He was also not happy 
with the Islamic trend, and the Ummah party. He therefore started thinking of gaining 
power over Sudan, and relieving himself of the three things that bothered him 
(democracy, Islam, and the Ummah party). Hasan Mekki affirms that Nasser supported 
the coup of the Nasserists, and leftists in coalition with the communists. Mekki 
considers the coup to have been under the direct supervision of Egyptian agents. He 
reasons that Nasser wanted to build a strong defensive front around Egypt in Sudan and 
Libya. 
The 25 May 1969 coup led by Jaffer Mohammed Nimeiri was supported by the 
Communist party, Arab Nationalists (Nasserists), and democrats who wanted to 
establish a socialist system. The revolution was influenced by that of July 1952 in 
Egypt, and by the ideas of Nasser. They were also eager to eradicate Islam in its new 
forms, as a movement, and a political and intellectual orientation. 
“Nimeiri did his utmost to stifle the Islamic movement, muzzling it and 
imprisoning its activists. Even after his erstwhile supporters, the communists, 
unsuccessfully tried to topple him in July 1971, leading him to adopt an anti-
communist stance, he still continued to bear a grudge against the Islamic 
movement” (Turabi, 2008, p.38). 
Nimeiri went on to establish a one-party state, maintaining a monopoly over political 
organisation, political activism and state organs. In January 1972, the first conference 
was held to establish the Sudanese Socialist Union Party (SSUP) (al-Itihad al-Ishtiraki) 
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to put the principles of the constitution of the Sudan (al-Booni, 1995, p.32-33). The 
SSUP was developed, and even the opposition parties joined it after 1976. 
For the Ikhwan, however, the coup was clearly leftist, and supported by the Communist 
party. So they started resistance from the very first day, although Sadiq al-Mahdi tried to 
dissuade them, saying that Nimeiri is one of our sons, i.e. he is from an Ansar family. 
However, the Ikhwan resistance continued in alliance with the Ansar (Mahdists). They 
started military training for the Ansar in Aba Island, where hundreds of Ansar and 
Ikhwan were killed by Nimeiri in 1970, among them Mohammed Salih Omer and al-
Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi. They were killed while they were leading the armed uprising 
against Nimeiri’s rule.  
With Turabi and Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid in prison, and Jaffar Sheikh Idris and 
Osman Khalid in exile, the Ikhwan membership was left to backbenchers and young 
university graduates. Under this leadership (1969-1972), the Ikhwan were preoccupied 
with the question of survival rather than theory (Hamid, 1989, p.108). They soon 
controlled many of the student unions in schools and universities, and used these as a 
tool of resistance to the regime; students led the Sha‘ban Revolution in 1973. Then 
Ikhwan and Ansar prepared for another military assault on the regime, launched from 
Libya, in 1976. However, none of these actions were successful. 
“As a result, the Ikhwan revised their course of action. They shifted from 
opposing the regime to joining it and, when the older generation was released 
from prisons in 1977, Turabi’s way of operating, through manoeuvring and 
reconciliation, was already in progress. In the first meeting of Shura, Turabi was 
elected Secretary General, and the Musálaha (reconciliation) initiative was 
confirmed” (Hamid, 1989, p.108). 
The reconciliation led to other divisions in the movement, as some Ikhwan did not agree 
to participate in Nimeiri’s regime; Jaffer Sheikh Idris and Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid 
refused to participate in constitution committees after being chosen by Turabi to 
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represent the movement. Under Turabi, Ikhwan worked within Nimeiri’s SSUP, and 
tried to inject their programmes, objectives and their Islamic model into it.  
After the reconciliation with Nimeiri’s regime in 1977, Ikhwan resorted to a strategy of 
institutional Islamisation. This strategy had been based on forming autonomous cultural, 
economic and youth organisations, which offered direct services to the masses, as well 
as penetrating government institutions, influencing them so as not to adopt an anti-
Islamic programme (Hamid, 1998, p.276). This experiment was not completely 
successful, but it was useful.  
On the other hand, Tijani Abdalgadir argued that the experiment of penetration was very 
useful to the Ikhwan. It gave its leaders and followers a great opportunity to appreciate 
for themselves the distance between rhetoric and reality, how modern state bureaucracy 
is complicated, and how Sudanese politics and economics really are.  
In addition, the Ikhwan succeeded in turning into a mass movement, which established 
important organisations, such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamiyya, al-Wakala al-
Islamiyya, Jam‘iyyat al-Islah wa al-Muwasa, Jam‘iyyat Ra’idat al-Nahda, Shabab al-
Bina’, etc. (Mekki, 1999, p.123). Moreover, the movement established Islamic 
economic institutions, such as banks and companies. It mobilised the masses, and 
recruited more students, who were elected and led the student unions. They participated 
in state institutions as ministers and parliament members, and in the political party. The 
Islamic movement in this period adopted a federal system, and established new 
branches in the different regions of Sudan, and internationally in Europe, the United 
States, and supported Arab Islamic movements. They succeeded in weakening the 
secular Western influence.  
In September 1983, Nimeiri surprised the Ikhwan by announcing and applying Shari'a 
law in Sudan. The Ikhwan supported his programme and led the masses to support the 
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programme. They called for a rally, and about two million people are claimed to have 
participated (some observers disagree with the estimated number). This aroused 
Nimeiri’s suspicions; he feared the power behind it, so he started to expel the Ikhwan 
from the government. 
Sadiq al-Mahdi did not welcome these laws, and was jailed by Nimeiri’s authority. A 
new era of international pressure started, politically, militarily and through the media. 
Many internal and external incidents took place in that period. A drought struck western 
Sudan, and there were economic crises, so the student unions and trade unions began to 
strike, and the war in the south started. The United States and Egypt were not happy 
with Shari‘a, so they pressured Nimeiri and asked him to dismantle the Islamic 
institutions and repeal Shari‘a law.  
Bowing to these pressures, on 10 March 1985, Nimeiri jailed most of the Ikhwan 
leaders. However, on 6 April 1985, with a wave of popular protests and civil 
disobedience sweeping the country, Nimeiri reached Cairo from the United States. Yet 
that same day, Army chief, ‘Abdurrahman Suwar al-Dahab, announced that the army 
had taken power as an institution, and announced their desire to act as a neutral arbiter. 
 
5.2 National Islamic Front (NIF) 
After this change, the movement thought of a new formula to suit the new democratic 
process. They proposed a formula that gathers all trends in one organisation that 
supported the Islamic programme. This was at the start of the transitional period, from 
May 1985 to April 1986. This was the movement’s moment of maturity, and reflected 
the advantage Ikhwan gained from their pragmatic strategy of cooperation with Nimeiri, 
and their successful mass mobilisation in that period. El-Affendi thinks that it 
represented the ultimate triumph of the pragmatist line advocated by Turabi since 1962, 
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and some of its rewards, while at the same time revealing the limitations of pragmatism 
(el-Affendi, 1991, p.131). 
In May 1985: 
“[t]he Islamist trend crystallised within the National Islamic Front (NIF), which 
was officially founded in a congress attended by some 3,000 delegates. The 
grouping was in effect a new name given to the broad alliance Ikhwan were 
busy forging during the later part of Nimeiri’s era. NIF, besides Ikhwan, the first 
congress included Sufis and Ulama, and supporters of the Shari‘a, tribal leaders 
and ex-army officers. There was also a significant presence of women and youth 
formulations, which Ikhwan had developed earlier. In addition, some 140 
delegates represented southern Muslim groups” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.136). 
NIF represented a new coalition between the Islamic movement and part of the society. 
For Turabi and other observers, it was a number of tribal and popular figures who 
undertook to protect and preserve the achievement of the movement against the 
campaign by secular political parties and power groups to totally eradicate the Islamic 
legacy of Nimeiri’s regime. 
Establishing NIF was a major turning point for the movement; in fact it was launched as 
a political party that emerged as the third largest bloc in parliament in 1986. According 
to Turabi, the NIF “was an advanced stage in the development of the Islamic movement 
… from a simple group to an integrated social organisation and from religious faction to 
a state institution” (Hamdi, 1998, p.6). Therefore, the NIF inherited all functions of the 
movement, unlike the 1964 Charter Front, which was no more than a political front 
reflecting the decision taken by other sections of the movement.  
Turabi argued that this, finally, was the era when the theoretical foundations were laid 
down, and programmes were detailed for public action in such areas as public policy, 
external relations, security, the economy and the legal system. The movement was thus 
ideologically transformed from the level of slogan, principles and propagation to the 
level of actual programmes, practical suggestions, and detailed models applicable to the 
given reality (Turabi, 2008, p.44). 
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In the 1986 election, the progress achieved by the NIF was undeniable. The movement 
progressed from being a small group having five seats in the parliament, to a powerful 
third party with fifty-one seats, and 18.46% of the popular vote. Its powerful and skilled 
parliamentary members dictated the agenda for national debate. The “NIF leaders have 
argued that their gains, which occurred mainly within urban areas and among the 
educated, means that theirs was the ‘party of the future’” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.142). The 
NIF had now experienced practising democracy within the movement and within the 
state. From 1986 to 1989, the NIF participated in the government.  
The result of the election did not allow any of the political parties to form a government 
by itself; the Ummah party gained 105 seats, the Democratic Unity Party (DUP) 63 
seats, and 51 for NIF. Ikhwan knew from experience that gaining a foothold in 
government was vital to increase their influence. 
Ikhwan’s relations with Sadiq al-Mahdi, who emerged as potential prime minster, were 
at a low ebb, because NIF and Ummah had exchanged bitter attacks during the election 
campaign. However, NIF signed a secret deal with DUP, in which it was agreed that 
neither party would accept an offer to join the coalition with the Ummah separately. 
However, Mahdi managed to woo DUP with favourable offers, and the latter reneged on 
its pledge to NIF, which was left to lead the opposition (el-Affendi, 1991, p.143). NIF 
was not able to join the coalition for many reasons relating to the two big traditional 
parties, Ummah and DUP. Some argued that this was because the other political parties 
rejected the participation of NIF in government. Sadiq al-Mahdi experienced pressure, 
and announced that he opposed the NIF because it still supported the existence of 
September laws (Shari'a law). Moreover, the Islamic programme or al-Sahwa 
programme adopted by the Ummah party rejected the September laws. In addition, the 
competition between the two traditional parties was over government posts, and so they 
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refused to let the NIF join them. Furthermore, the southern parties rejected the 
participation of NIF, because it supported Shari‘a (Jadain, 1997, pp.109-121). 
The NIF in that period, 1988, focused on, and succeeded in passing, Islamic law 
through the parliament. In November, the DUP signed an agreement with John Garang, 
leader of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which became known 
as the Merghani-Garang agreement. This agreement froze any Islamic laws, and was 
opposed by the NIF. The effective opposition tactics employed by NIF increased its 
prestige and popularity considerably. For this reason, some leading figures opposed 
joining the government, although Turabi and others thought it better to join the 
government. His argument for joining was that the democratic system was too fragile, 
and too effective an opposition was likely to cause its collapse (el-Affendi, 1991, 
p.143). After initial opposition, for the second time, the NIF agreed to join the 
government in January 1989, with a power-sharing agreement of Ummah (12 
ministries) and NIF (7 ministries), National Party and southern Parties (5 ministries). A 
memorandum was issued by the army, which was interpreted as opposing the 
participation of the NIF. The DUP, Ummah party and others formulated a new 
government, while the NIF led an extensive campaign against it. In June 1989, the NIF 
led a coup that ended the third democratic period in Sudan.  
The NIF experienced great changes, in practice and in theory. It faced different 
challenges, both internally and externally. Internally, it practised Shura in its federal 
body and organisations. Externally, it examined its efficiency in ruling, and tried to 
practise what it called for. These experiences made them realise the difficulty of 
applying goals and objectives under internal and external pressure. Moreover, they 
understood that broad objectives need to be translated into practical projects. At the end, 
while the NIF was in the opposition, the Ikhwan were preparing for the coup. This 
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means they benefited from the situation in opposition, and while they were in the 
government.  
For international relations, as is mentioned in the relevant section, there was huge 
expansion in international relations with governments and Islamic movements.  
 
Section 6. The Movement and International Relations 
6.1 Historical Context 
Historically, the Sudanese Islamic Movement was influenced by changes in Sudan and 
neighbouring countries, as well as wider regional and international factors. As was 
mentioned before, Sudan’s history has had an impact on the movement’s development. 
Mohammed Khier Abdalgadir mentioned in his study that the Islamic Movement in 
Sudan was established and developed as a result of the interaction of the history and 
influence of the colonial period. It had connections with the renewal movements in the 
19
th
 century, such as Mohammed Ibn Abdelwahab, Ahmed Ibn Idris and al-Senussiyyah 
in Libya, Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani and Mohammed ‘Abdu and the Mahdi revolution. He 
added it was influenced by the Jihad in Palestine, and the oppression of Ikhwan in 
Egypt (Abdalgadir, 1990, pp.10-12). I think this history was created by Sudanese 
culture, and its way of practising Islam; providing a distinct Sudanese mood to relations 
with neighbouring countries, friends and enemies.  
It is obvious that the establishment of the movement and its relations with Egyptian 
Ikhwan allowed the movement to inherit pan-Islamist tendencies in ideology and 
relations. However, the movement was established independently from the Egyptian 
Ikhwan, and does not believe in the one global organisation, as adopted by the Egyptian 
Ikhwan.  
 47 
“Fellow-Muslims living in alien countries have to be supported, albeit never in 
contravention of any treaty obligation … The Islamic movement, already 
emancipated from nationalist ideology, was interacting more intensively across 
the world” (Turabi, April 1992). 
Turabi many times emphasised the universal scope of Islam, both in his religious 
deliberations and in his political discourses. On top of that, he defines the concept of 
international relations, stating that: 
“Islam is the religion transcending all geographic boundaries … Muslims must 
continuously strive to extend Islam in space, and disengage it from territorial or 
parochial confinement, towards a universal scope … final loyalty must be 
rendered to the Ummah [i.e.] the whole community of Muslims” (Turabi, 1992, 
p.49). 
According to this ideal concept, the Ikhwan in Sudan contacted many Islamic 
movements and Muslim societies without distinction on the basis of school of thought 
(Madhab), method (Taríqah), or group (Firqah). They also contacted other religious 
people, even if they were not Muslims, because they call for the same values. They 
established relations with other nations, such as China. These broad relations reflect the 
flexibility and moderate way of thinking of the movement in Sudan. 
 
6.2 Relations with other Movements 
The movement in the Sudan had established its own way of dealing with other 
movements. It decided in the Eid conference to be an independent movement, and 
sought autonomy at an early stage. Although the movement seeks unity with other 
Islamic movements, they understand that this unity does not require a unified 
leadership. In the beginning, the primary aim for the Islamic movement was to work 
towards the establishment of an Islamic order within Sudan. However, although it was 
independent from the Egyptian movement, they supported Ikhwan through the media, 
and demonstrations in Sudan during their crisis with Nasser; “the Sudanese movement 
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supported Egyptian Ikhwan, many refugees finding sanctuary in Sudan” (el-Affendi, 
1991, p.145). So these crises enhanced ties between the two groups. 
“Sudanese Ikhwan participated in attempts to set up a pan-Arab Ikhwan 
movement. The Sudanese later resisted a move to create a unified movement. A 
joint council established in Jeddah in 1961, operated until early 1969, but the 
Sudanese (supported by Iraqis) refused to accept its authority” (el-Affendi, 
1991, p.145). 
I believe that the Sudanese movement thought of a cooperative body that deals with 
strategic issues that face the nation, but not an authoritative one. It is mentioned by el-
Affendi that the only major operation the joint council undertook was the setting up of a 
military training camp in Jordan, but this folded in September 1970 to avoid 
embroilment in the Black September clashes between Jordan and the Palestinian 
Liberation Movement (PLO).  
The Sudanese Movement always advocated having a loose grouping of all Islamic 
movements, even non-Arab Islamic movements in countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia 
and Turkey. At that time, when they made a move towards these goals, they were faced 
by strong opposition from the pan-Arab Ikhwan leadership. 
“Turabi was accused of sowing division, which brought out the struggle over the 
leadership of the pan-Islamic movement; [the] Egyptian Ikhwan claimed 
leadership as historical prerogative, whereas the Sudanese, seeing themselves as 
the most powerful and intellectually-advanced movement in the Islamic world, 
claimed leadership by merit, each wanting to model the new pan-Islamic 
grouping after its own image” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.145). 
The idea for this cooperative body was developed by the Sudanese Islamic Movement 
in 1992, while it was in power. So it established the Popular Arab Islamic Conference 
(PAIC). The conference was joined by most Islamic movements all over the world 
(including non-Arab), Arab nationalists and other activists. Because of the PAIC, the 
Sudanese government (and movement) faced regional and international pressure, so it 
folded in 1995, after two large gatherings in Khartoum. I believe this PAIC organisation 
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is one of the idealistic ways of thought that was put into practice without any real 
calculations of the political cost that they will pay.  
However, the Sudanese movement developed relationships with liberation movements 
in Africa, and Arab and Asian countries. They supported Kwame Nkrumah,
8
 who called 
for establishing an Africa League, Kashmir activists, and they participated in Jihad
9
 in 
Palestine: 
“… in 1956, they participated in establishing a liberation movement in Chad and 
the liberation movement in Eritrea, and accommodated some of their leaders. 
There was unlimited support for Palestine, and the Algerian revolution, and they 
demonstrated supporting the Mohammed 5
th
 movement, and the Musadaq 
government in Iran; and they continually mention the Palestine and Kashmir 
issues in their festivals and forums” (Mekki, 1998, p.40). 
Such kind of support can be counted as support in issues of public opinion. 
To further shed light on the relationship between the movement in Sudan and Jamaat-e-
Islami, Turabi says that the Pakistani movement’s “relations with other Islamic 
movements is very limited” (Hamdi, 1998, p.92). However, the movement started direct 
relationships with other movements through students unions and organisations in 
Europe, the US, and other countries, where there were Sudanese students. Most of the 
leaders of the Islamic movements, who had studied in these countries, had been working 
together as students, and when they return home they develop these relationships to 
cooperate together. Moreover, in the 1990s, the movement stood by the Bosnians and 
supported their stand through the media. The movement used all its means, students, 
women, and mosques to support Bosnia. 
Moreover, there was a significant leap forward in the international relations of the 
movement, when they started working with Nimeiri after 1977. In that period, they 
                                                 
8
 Kwame Nkrumah (21 September 1909-27 April 1972) was the first president of Ghana. An influential 
20
th
 century advocate of Pan-Africanism, he was a founding member of the organisation of African Unity. 
9
 Some members went to Palestine to fight with Palestinian people such as Mohammed Salih Omer who 
was a lecturer in the University of Khartoum. 
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started establishing social organisations, and economic relief, health and education 
institutions. Moreover, they started to strengthen their relationship with the Arab world 
and other movements. 
However, after 1985, the NIF appeared as a political party, so it established its 
international relations as a political party, and started to contact some countries for 
strategic relationships, for example, China, Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, Comoros, and 
other countries and organisations. These relations were extended after the movement 
took over the government in June 1989, and were invested in extensively in building the 
country after the revolution, especially the strategic plans for oil investment and 
infrastructure; as such, a wide range of industrialisation programmes and economic 
reconstruction took place. 
At all times, the movement maintained relationships with African countries and Islamic 
activists in Africa, even if they did not belong to the same Madhab or Taríqa. The 
movement supported African Muslims in the education and health fields. It tried to 
build good regional relations with Chad, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. These contacts 
reflected maturity and awareness of international relations, and how to approach these 
regional and international relations (Mekki, 1999, p.221). Turabi stated in a public 
lecture in Madrid in 1994: “I know every Islamic movement in the world, secret or 
public” (Turabi, 1994). This means that “he” as a leader of an Islamic movement has 
direct contact with Islamic movements, but this may not mean more than meeting each 
other, and talking about issues or experience without joint leadership, or even an 
organisation for cooperation. 
However, few Islamic organisations have the will or the resources to prioritise 
international issues to the detriment of domestic issues. However, we can say that 
communications are more frequent with groups that are both regionally and 
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ideologically close to the Sudanese movement. The nature of relationships is mostly 
cooperative on broad international issues.  
These relations reflected the pressure by international powers; Egypt especially feared 
any communications or coordination between the two movements, while the Soviet 
Union was not happy with the movement’s support for the Afghan Mujahidin. When the 
Ikhwan contacted Iran in 1979, Saudi Arabia feared that relationship and tried to talk to 
them about it. Yet the movement leaders solved this misunderstanding, and built a good 
relationship with the Saudi government and movement; the same happened with Kuwait 
and some other Arab countries.  
Many Islamist activists from Pakistan, Malaysia, the US, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Arab 
countries, Muslim minorities, and other African countries visited Sudan on different 
occasions. 
However, despite the complications, the movement gained good experience in building 
and maintaining international relations. They (Ikhwan) knew how to deal with Islamic 
movements, states, government, organisations and different schools of thought.  
I hold a firm belief that there was a large shift in the fiqh of the movement in the 
political field, especially in dealing with the complications of state, mechanisms of 
building societies, theories of social change, Shura, and economic issues. In this 
context, many critical questions will be addressed in this thesis. 
 
6.3 The Islamic Movement and the Sunni-Shi‘a Division  
Although Sudan is classed as Sunni, it was not influenced by this classification in its 
relations with Shi‘a countries or movements. Historically there are no Shi‘a in Sudan or 
neighbouring countries. The Sudanese movement is part of the Sudanese social fabric, 
which means it holds the same nature of relationship. However, the Ikhwan understand 
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the differences between understanding Islam and creed (Aqídah) issues. El-Affendi 
(1991, p.146) mentioned that “the Sudanese Ikhwan had practically no links with Shi‘a 
activists prior to the Iranian revolution.” In the Sudanese universities, the syllabus 
contains some studies about some Shi‘a Firqah (sect) as a deviant group. In spite of all 
this, the Iranian revolution inspired the Ikhwan in Sudan. 
“Like all Islamic activists, Ikhwan were elated at the Iranian success. 
Demonstrations were organised in support of Khomeini in the university and 
elsewhere, and many delegations were sent to Tehran”10 (el-Affendi, 1991, 
p.146). 
This can be interpreted that the Islamic movements needed a significant event so as to 
inspire the Islamic world and activists. Some Shi‘a thinkers were even inspiring the 
Ikhwan in some fields; for example ‘Our Economy’, the book written by Mohammed 
Baqhir Alsadr was a main reference for Islamic economics in Sudan. Other books were 
also referred to, including the book of Ali Shri’ati, “the philosophy of the pilgrimage” 
translated by al-Mahboub Abdelsalam, a Sudanese Ikhwan. This means that there was 
no history of direct conflict with Shi‘a groups. In conclusion, we can say that Sudanese 
people were never influenced by the historical division that happened in Islamic 
political thought, and proceeded to develop a Sudanese school of thought. They love the 
family and relatives of the Prophet, i.e. ‘Ali, al-Hasan and al-Hussein or Āl al-Bayt, and 
so the Sudanese do not have a bias towards either of the two schools, which emerged 
after the battle of Siffin between ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Mu‘awiyyah Ibn Abi Sufyan. 
Hasan Mekki refers this to the Sudanese culture, which combines rational Sufism and 
fiqh. Even Turabi introduced himself in Madrid in a lecture, in 1994, as a 
fundamentalist, who is neither Sunni nor Shi‘a. 
“Modern Islamic movements do not believe in schools of jurisprudence, they do 
not define themselves as Shi‘a, or Sunna, or of this Sufi order or that Sufi order. 
They recognise this as quite a heritage and they can learn a lot from such history. 
                                                 
10
 Al-Tigani Abu-Jidairi, and Osman Khalid Mudawi went to Tehran to congratulate the Imam Khomeini 
revolution. They were making good contacts and probably some friends within the new Iranian 
revolutionary Government. 
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They don't want to break with history altogether, but they want to go forward 
and develop” (Turabi, 1994). 
Hasan Mekki predicted that the Sudanese movement will be qualified to play a role in 
dialogue between Sunni and Shi‘a, “if the movement developed its political and 
intellectual tools” (Mekki, 1998, p.113). I think he was right in his prediction, because 
the movement in the 1990s played a role in Sunni and Shi‘a dialogue, and tried to find a 
way for cooperation between the two schools on some issues.  
However, to understand the phenomenon that produced such a philosophical approach, 
it is useful to consider the historical context of the issues that developed in each period. 
What needs to be noted is that the researcher tends to focus less on why Islamists have 
emerged at different moments in different places than on how Islamists seek and 
exercise power; the essential conception of Islam is combined with the assertion that 
Islam is not simply a religion, but a comprehensive way of life. 
In conclusion, the history of Sudan has had an impact on the history and future of the 
Islamic Movement in Sudan. This chapter investigated and analysed the historical 
background of Sudan, and its impact on the Sudanese Islamic Movement. It reviewed 
Islam and political Islam, in the context of Sudan, focusing on the social and political 
developments, and the impact on the political thought of the Islamic movement, and its 
pragmatic approach and the development of different schools inside the movement, 
Salafi and Sufi. According to the above analysis, the Sudanese society throughout the 
Sudan history has influenced the development of the Islamic movement in different 
dimensions such as al-fiqh, methods of work and the flexibility in accepting others. 
According to this you can find many trends in the movement and they work together. It 
is noticed that the movement witnessed division with each new step towards 
participating in government or adopting new changes in its method or the nature of the 
orgenisation, e.g. ICF or NIF. On the other hand the movement developed a unique 
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international relations that appears as if it associated with contradictory movements and 
states; the movement developed and balanced its relation with the traditional and 
renewal schools, sufi, Salafi and Shi’i. Furthermore, the movement dealt with the Shi‘a 
purely as another school of thought; it built a cooperative reationship with the different 
Islamic movements. This approach is different than the method adopted by the Ikhwan 
in Egypt who believe in one international organisation. However, in the relations at state 
level, the movement managed to link itself with Saudi Arabia and Iran, China and 
Malaysia etc. Throughout its history, the movement gained more experience and 
maturity to tackle the problems facing it, and developed a comprehensive theoretical 
framework and a theory of practising Shura. Despite the oppression faced at different 
times, democratic consultation (Shura) was adopted as a mechanism of decision making 
inside the movement structure. The movement before 1989 did not practise rule by 
itself; it was participating with others, as in the May regime after 1977 and in the 
democratic periods after 1964 and 1985. In each period the movement was an effective 
actor. These different experiences developed the movement’s approach at the practical 
and theoretical levels. The question is, to what extent were the theories of democracy 
that developed throughout its history practised after the 1989 coup, and what is the 
extent of the gap between theory and practice? This will be evaluated in the related 
chapters. However, according the above evaluation, it could be said that the movement 
was pragmatic when it comes to the participation in the government; it worked 
effectively as an opposition party or in the legislative body of the government.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the literature on the Islamic 
Movement in Sudan, and build a theoretical framework for analysing and describing the 
Islamic Movement in Sudan, with special reference to Turabi. This chapter will cover 
the literature on Islam and democracy and the ideas of Turabi; how scholars, journalists, 
politicians and the academics understood his ideas; and how they criticised and 
interpreted them. 
There are many questions posed by institutions, researchers, and others. These are 
questions concerning the details of how the Ikhwan think about Shari‘a, its principles, 
and how to apply it.  
The chapter is divided into five parts; each part covers what has been written on an 
issue of interest. Since the first chapter in this thesis already covered the historical 
background of the Islamic movement, and gave details of what has been written on the 
history of the Islamic movement, this chapter will not deal with those issues. Therefore, 
the first part of this chapter gives an introduction to Islam and state, with particular 
emphasis on Turabi’s views. The second part gives a brief introduction on Shura as a 
concept and practice from the Sudanese Islamic movement’s perspective and Turabi’s 
vision. The third part presents the important concepts that relate to the study. The fourth 
part covers the objectives of the Islamic movement in Sudan; and the fifth part deals 
with the access to power.  
 
Section 1. Islam and State in Turabi’s Political Thought 
This is one of the most important and controversial issues among scholars and Islamic 
leaders and movements. Some think that the Islamic state is the main objective of 
Islamic movements, while others think that it is just an instrument, not an objective in 
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itself. However, the most powerful political movements of contemporary Islam, al-
Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and the Islamic 
Movement in Sudan, have devoted all their energies to this goal.  
For Muslims, God is the Sovereign Ruler over the universe, and consequently the focal 
point of their belief system. Traditionally, a Muslim’s duty is obedience and submission 
to the will of God, not only to accept dogmas or rituals, but also to strive to realise 
God’s will in history; namely, to see that all men are obedient to Islamic rule under 
God’s law. However, God does not rule directly, and it is man’s task, as God’s 
vicegerent, to implement His rule on earth. This rule affects every part of life from 
prayer or fasting to politics and law (Esposito, 1983, pp.3-4). The discourse of state was 
influenced by the historical and political development of the Islamic world. So, in each 
period, we find the discourse influenced by political and social factors.  
El-Affendi argues that Turabi gave much thought to the question of the state, and had 
much practical involvement in it. He approached the issue from a methodological angle, 
arguing that the state represented a central legislative principle in Islam, but so did 
popular consensus (el-Affendi, 2008, p.94). El-Affendi also discusses the matter of state 
generally in depth in his book, ‘Who needs an Islamic state?’. 
Turabi rejects the traditional assumption that authoritative consensus meant the 
consensus of Ulama. This view is supported by el-Affendi (2008, p.94); he makes 
reference to Turabi (1982), who explains that binding consensus was that of the Muslim 
populace (or public opinion) at a given moment. Popular choice should be enlightened 
by experts, including the Ulama, but also including experts in other fields, such as 
economics, medicine, law, the social and exact sciences, etc. If we look to Islamic 
history, we find that the dominant schools of thought were selected by free popular will. 
The government should also be freely chosen to reflect the popular will. Once this 
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happened, then the elected government would have a religiously significant legislative 
role, and could arbitrate in differences on interpretation of Shari‘a. El-Affendi thinks 
that Turabi in one stroke elevated the state to the role of religious adjudicator, and 
subordinated it to popular will (el-Affendi, 2008, p.94). 
However, there is no agreement among scholars on this point; el-Affendi (2008) 
compares Turabi’s opinion with Ghannouchi and Mawdudi; he found that Ghannouchi 
went further by limiting the role of the Islamic movement to just another actor within 
the liberal-democratic state. Meanwhile, even Turabi seemed to regard the Islamic 
movement as the guardian of Islamic morality within the state, a role that Islamists have 
assumed since the demise of the Islamic Caliphate (Khilafah), yet Ghannouchi rejected 
this idea. For him, the Islamic movement had neither a monopoly on the interpretation 
of Islam, nor in dictating morality. It was just another political party offering its 
programme to the people, and inviting them to decide freely between rivals. I firmly 
believe that Turabi will conclude with the same idea as Ghannouchi, after the failure of 
what was known as al-Tawali al-Siyasi.
11
 El-Affendi makes reference to Ghannouchi 
(1987) for the previous point, and adds that this could lead to the adoption of non-
Islamic programmes, given the nature of the modern national state, as Mawdudi 
predicted. This did not seem to disturb him: as the movement was not a guardian over 
the people, all it could do was preach and attempt to persuade; what the people chose 
was their business. El-Affendi affirms that Hasan Turabi similarly regards the particular 
subdivision into nation-states as natural and valid. Just as the family is not incorporated 
into society by dissolving it, but by preserving it, so the individual state need not be 
abolished to form the Muslim world or the pan-Arab nation. They are incorporated as 
organic wholes into the overall formula, without losing their individuality.  
                                                 
11
 Its literal meaning is ‘continuous succession’: it means people have the right to organise themselves for 
political, cultural, trade unions and academic purposes, and that should be done through proper legal 
regulations.  
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It is arguable that nationalism is a more difficult issue to handle. “There is general 
agreement among Islamic Movements that nationalism is an import from Europe that is 
different from Islamic political organisation” (Rosenthal, 1965, p.6). Enayat (1982, 
p.115) observes that most pioneers of Islamic modernism tended to oppose nationalism, 
since they considered it incompatible with Islamic universalism. This debate was 
occurring when the nationalist movement was at the top of the agenda of researchers 
and political leaders. However, the ideological controversy among Muslim intellectuals 
centres on: 
“the basic contradiction between nationalism as a time-bound set of principles 
related to the qualities and needs of a particular group of human beings, and 
Islam as an eternal, universalist message, drawing no distinction between its 
adherents except on the criterion of their piety” (Enayat, 1982, p.112). 
In Turabi’s own words: 
“we do not believe in nationalist values that divided people on basis of colour, 
geography, or national interest. These are values fundamentally at odds with 
Islam … our firm belief is that mankind is one community, and people can 
cooperate in the field of science and knowledge and exchange ideas and 
achievements” (Hamdi, 1998, p.44). 
At the time, Turabi was in power, and tried to open the country, Sudan, to all people, 
even without passports. In Hamdi’s book, Turabi confirmed his ideas: 
“I am no longer a believer in divisions created by nationality, passports, and 
visas. These are symbols of backwardness and I hope that we can all get rid of 
them gradually until the whole world is open to every human being, free to 
move and exchange goods, knowledge, culture, and all other material and 
spiritual benefits” (Hamdi, 1998, p.48). 
From my own perspective, this is an unrealistic idea, which is difficult to implement in 
real life within the political factors and the domination of different theories and powers. 
Morrison pointed out that “Turabi clearly rejects the nation-State and has strong 
allegiance to the Ummah, or community of Muslim believers” (Morrison, 2001, p.154). 
He rejects the nation state, but accepts it as a reality and calls for gradual unity, such as 
the EU, or Gulf states. The foundation of Turabi’s rejection of nationalism lies in the 
doctrine of Tawhīd and unity of human life, which we try to put under what we call the 
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Tawhīdi theory of Turabi that explains most of his views, and relate these to Tawhīd 
directly. There is no other research dealing directly with this issue, as raised in this 
thesis.  
Most of these studies and comparisons were in the early 1990s, which means the 1989 
coup was in its first year, so it was not evaluated. This study will offer in-depth 
evaluation for the experiment for one decade. Moreover, Turabi released his famous 
statement on issues of state and international relations. These statements and the 
practical experience of Turabi will be discussed in the thesis as part of the Islamists and 
democracy chapter, and Islamist and state in Sudan in another chapter, and Turabi’s 
Tawhīdi theory. Today, it is widely recognised that Turabi released many new books, 
and made statements in interviews to explain his understanding of the state in Islamic 
theory and his own theory.  
Esposito argued that the NIF made some efforts to define an Islamic state in terms that 
could include a significant level of religious diversity, within a relatively decentralised 
political system (Esposito, 1996, p.97). Moreover, Esposito considered that there is a 
direct relationship between Turabi’s activities as a political leader in Sudan, and the 
specifics of his evolving definition of an Islamic state (Esposito, 2001, p.137). In 
evaluating Turabi’s work, Esposito notes that, in terms of theory and principle, Turabi 
was relatively consistent over the years on this issue (Esposito, 2001, p.137), i.e. that of 
state. His view is supported by the work of Hamdi (1998). However, there is no 
agreement among scholars; el-Affendi argued that Turabi always advocated dealing 
with reality. He complained that the main problem of modern Islamic movements was 
uncompromising idealism. They recognised only the absolute ideal, and did not map the 
way to it by defining intermediate stations leading towards it. In contrast, the Sudanese 
Islamists were realistic, and accepted making compromises, like the deal with the 
regime of former president Nimeiri, as a provisional step towards achieving an Islamic 
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state in Sudan (el-Affendi, 1990, pp.137-151). He makes reference to Turabi’s interview 
with al-Ummah in January 1985. According to el-Affendi, 
“a corollary of Turabi’s methodology, and a substantive assumption behind it, is 
the recognition of reality not precisely in Hegel’s manner of accepting that ‘what 
is real is rational’, but rather on the line of Marx’s dynamic realise” (el-Affendi, 
1990, pp.137-151). 
It is interesting that Esposito reached the same conclusion, when he found that Turabi’s 
writing on the nature of the state reflected the pragmatic opportunities presented by 
changing political conditions in Sudan. During parliamentary eras, the general approach 
involved participation in politics and, at the same time, emphasising the need to 
Islamise society, before the achievement of an Islamic state. However, during the period 
of authoritarian rule by the military, when the rulers worked to implement state-imposed 
Islamisation (as happened in the early 1980s under Jaffar Nimeiri, and following the 
military coup in 1989), these rulers received the active support of Turabi and the 
Islamist movement (Esposito, 2001, p.138).  
Many scholars, such as Eissa, believe that, according to Turabi, society is the basic 
Islamic institution and not the state (Eissa, 2005, p.321). Eissa makes specific reference 
to what was said by Turabi in Hiwarat; he argued that society is the basic institution and 
not the state. In fact, society represents the basis on which the state and the government 
are to be institutionalised. In Islam, civil society institutions could take good care of 
people’s needs. There was a time when the Islamic society developed its own health 
care and education systems, in addition to social welfare, by means of endowments, 
volunteerism and non-governmental action. This development took place when 
government became negligent and despotic. Therefore, government should confine its 
activities to what civil society and the private sector could not do well for members of 
society; hence, it has a limited role to play in terms of provision. The most important 
function of the state is to lead the society towards the achievement of the ideal Islamic 
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community (Hiwarat, 1992, pp.150-157); related ideas were presented by Rahal 
(2004)
12
 and Moussalli (2003; 2004). Rahal argued that Turabi had been focusing on the 
role of society in return for the role of the state since the 1970s. He considered that the 
most important features of the Islamic society are depriving the governor from the two 
important authorities, which have been used as weapons against the individual in the 
West, i.e. taxes and legislation. After 1990, when he became a part of the ruling regime, 
he stressed on the importance of reducing the authority of the state, and giving more 
space to society. As a result, he considers that the absolute state, which dominates the 
life of the people, is rejected by Islam. Islam is comprehensive, but does not end in a 
central state.  
Related ideas were presented by Moussalli, who argued that Turabi, the leading 
powerful fundamentalist thinker of contemporary Islamic movements, deals with a 
number of taboos around the concept of the state. He removes a number of conditions in 
the nature of the institutions that may be established by the Islamic constitution and 
Islamic state, in a more comprehensive way than Hasan al-Banna. Turabi imposes 
Islamic limitations on the position of the state, which is very similar to the limits of the 
liberal state. For him, the Islamic state must not go beyond formulating general rules 
enabling society to organise its affairs. The legitimacy limits the authority of the state 
and emancipates society to the maximum, on the basis of ‘the promotion of virtue and 
prevention of vice’ (al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa alnahy ‘an al-munkar) as the work of the 
society, not the state (Turabi, Summer 1992, pp.52-54). 
The explanation of Rashid Ghannouchi (2006) is that Turabi does not make Islam a 
condition for the post of president of an Islamic state, and makes reference to the 
Sudanese constitution, which was written mainly by Turabi. Ghannouchi attributes 
                                                 
12
 For more details see  
http://www.Ghannouchi.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267:turabi&catid=37:kita
bat&Itemid=54 
 62 
Turabi’s stance to the situation in Sudan; a country diverse in religions, tribes and ethnic 
origins. Moreover, Sudan had experienced a long civil war. So, Turabi seeks unity and 
political stability, so as to strengthen the society, and enable it to play its role.  
‘Abdullahi A. Gallab claimed that: 
“insight developed from the Sudanese Islamists’ model of state and the entire 
Islamist discourse all illustrate the validity of such an observation’—meaning 
Mark Juergensmeyer’s observation that the Islamists’ are ‘concern[ed] not so 
much about political structure of the nation-state, as they are about the political 
ideology undergirding it’” (Gallab, 2007, p.16). 
He concluded that: 
“al-Turabi’s writings and speech about the state before and after 1989 clearly 
show a marked change in perspective. In 1983 al-Turabi wrote the ideological 
foundation of an Islamic state lies on the doctrine of Tawhīd—the unity of God 
and human life—as a comprehensive and exclusive programme of worship’. He 
maintained that the Islamic state is not secular, not nationalistic and not an 
absolute or sovereign entity. He claimed that the ‘Islamic state’ is not primordial 
because the primary institution in Islam is the Ummah, but after this charade of 
what the Islamic state is not, al-Turabi failed to indicate what the Islamic state 
is” (Gallab, 2007, p.16). 
He makes reference to Turabi (1992) in his famous speech on Islam as a Pan-National 
Movement, and Nation-State doctrine of human association. 
According to Moussalli: 
“Theoretically, Turabi justifies the needs of al-tajdīd (renewing). He argued that 
the branches of this religion and its usul have developed in historical contexts, 
and is therefore subject to change, according to the requirements of society. The 
historic nature of these usul may not necessarily obtain the status of a 
constitution, as is the case with the text. Therefore, the replacement of usul and 
branches with other modern [ideas] is not a violation of religion. This 
replacement process, which depends on the basic texts, the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, should be built on the consensus of Muslims, based on the real choice of 
nation through a modern Shura” (Moussalli, 2004, p.97). 
Moussalli (2004) argued that, therefore, according to Turabi’s view, the consideration of 
Shura and democracy out of its historical context makes the two ideas carry the same 
meaning. While he recognises that the supreme legitimacy is for Allah, the political and 
practical legitimacy is for the people (community, or Ummah). Shura never eradicates 
the collective public freedom, to determine the political, social and economic 
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programmes and rules of the political game, and the representative councils. But Turabi 
warns of any changes in the fundamental principles of the Qur’an (Moussalli, 2004, 
pp.96-97). On this point, Moussalli makes reference to Turabi (1987a; 1988; 1987; 
March 1992).  
It is significant that Moussalli (2004) relates the above and concludes that, therefore, 
Turabi has decided that the highest political reference is society, which has a covenant 
with the government on choosing to organise their affairs. The role of the ruler is no 
more than to execute the popular mandate to serve the interest of the community. 
Therefore, Turabi accepts the legitimacy of any system that is established on exchange 
of covenant, where the governor does not go beyond the individuals’ and groups’ 
freedom, as provided by the Holy Qur’an. Turabi imposed this condition, because he 
considers that the Qur’an addresses the people as a group and individuals, not the 
governors. Thus the real Islamic constitution must establish and protect public and 
individual freedom. Therefore, representative councils are needed to prevent the 
possibility of the government ruling unjustly (Moussalli, 2004, p.97). He concluded 
these points by arguing that, although Shari'a law plays a pivotal role in Turabi’s 
thought, it did not preclude institutions and non-Islamic principles, especially when the 
Muslim community needed these. Turabi urges Muslims to consider the purposes 
(Maqāsid) of Shari'a in the process of renewal (Tajdīd). Justice, for example, has 
concepts that are different in each historical period; from this point of view, these 
concepts should be developed, but should not deviate from the text of the Qur’an or 
contradict it. It should be said that, on this point, Turabi calls for studying the concept in 
its historical context, so as to reach a real definition or meaning for it, and then build 
any opinion on that.  
However, the ideology of political Islam is built upon a total system of existence, 
universally applicable to all times and places. There is no separation between the faith 
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(Dīn) and the state (Dawlah). Islam is the final truth and final revelation. The 
fundamental mission in life is to worship God and propagate Islam. This can only be 
done by a return to the ‘straight path’. One should go beyond the five pillars and 
commit oneself to a life of action in building the ideal community, the universal 
Ummah. This community is based on social justice, a central concept in Islamic 
ideology. Social, legal and international justice must replace all existing kinds of 
injustice. As such, the Islamic way of life is not a life of mystical contemplation 
(Dekmijan, 1995, pp.41-44). Morrison found that “… in fact, the justification for the 
Islamic state can be viewed as the combination of the political and the ethical aspects of 
tawhīd” (Morrison, 2001, p.154). 
However, the Sudanese Islamists were more realistic, when they looked to their 
situation in a country like Sudan, with all its complex political instability and social 
diversity and all other weaknesses, in the economic field, and security threats from 
many neighbours. This is why they accepted many compromises, as provisional steps, 
in their long march towards achieving an Islamic state in Sudan.  
 
Section 2. Islamists and Shura: The Sudanese Perspective 
Many scholars, public opinion leaders, and politicians addressed the issue of Shura in 
Turabi’s political thought and fiqh (jurisprudence), which is built on his efforts in 
reforming the Islamic fiqh, and understanding the context of Qur’an and Sunna. These 
scholars referred to what has been said, or written and published by Turabi. The most 
important figures in this field are: Abdelwahab el-Affendi, Hasan Mekki, John L. 
Esposito, Haydar Ibrahim Ali, Ahmed Moussalli, and ‘Abdullahi Gallab in the academic 
field, and many others in the fields of media or politics. The concept of Shura in 
Turabi’s thought was discussed by most of them. 
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2.1 Turabi’s Conception of Shura 
Turabi developed a conception of Shura, when he defined it in a way that can be 
practised in the modern state, and by developing the mechanisms that make it work. 
Eissa notes that Turabi went on to illuminate the concept of Shura as a form of Islamic 
democracy, which is remarkably different from the Western form in its frame of 
reference. Shura is believed to be underpinned by basic Islamic beliefs comprising 
submission to God’s will as ordained in the Shari‘a, whereby all aspects of life are seen 
as a form of worship, and Shura should be construed as a right conferred by Allah on 
people to exercise governance as his vicegerents on earth, and the right to participate in 
decision making by all Muslims. Shura should, therefore, permeate all activities of the 
Muslim society, such as the area of religion and politics (Essa, 2005, p.319). Eissa 
observes that the salient differences between the two concepts are not confined to their 
different frames of reference alone. According to Turabi, they can be usefully delineated 
as follows. 
 Firstly, democracy originates either from secular or anti-religious convictions, 
whereas Shura is based on Islamic faith (Īman) and values, and workable only 
within the Islamic context. 
 Secondly, while Shura is a total system of living that should permeate Islamic 
practice in all walks of life, democracy is confined to political systems.  
 Thirdly, the Western perception of democracy confers sovereignty on the people, 
who should enjoy absolute authority and freedom of choice exercised rationally by 
their policy makers.  
 66 
By way of contrast, Shura recognises governance and sovereignty as designations of 
God, the Absolute, but Muslims exercise them as His vicegerents on earth, while 
constrained by Shari‘a. 
 Fourthly, liberal democracy gives absolute freedom to policy makers to use the 
means at their disposal to reach their goals, including the use of Machiavellian 
strategies and cut-throat political tactics, while in Shura such tactics are excluded 
and constrained by Islamic morality and Islamic Shari‘a. 
 Finally, liberal democracy is based on majority rule, where the winner takes all, to 
the detriment of the minority, who must wait for another chance to secure a majority 
to win; meanwhile, Shura is based on consensus of members of the community, 
taking all viewpoints into account and incorporating all interests, including those of 
the minority (Kausar, 2005, p.319). 
He makes specific reference to Turabi (2000a) in comparing Shura and democracy. 
Some Western scholars have compared Shura with Western-style concepts, and simply 
concluded that “political Islam is the opposite of democracy, personal freedom, equality 
human rights, and liberalism” (Entelis, 1997, p.18). Other scholars have said that, 
“while the West is based on secular materialism, scientific reason, and lack of moral 
philosophy, Islam is based on faith, patience, peace, and equilibrium” (Moussalli, 1999, 
pp.71-72). Morality is thus a main component in Islamic ideology. How to act and how 
to behave become important questions, and the only way to act and behave correctly is 
to follow Islamic law in an Islamic state. The existence of an absolute moral is for the 
fundamentalists an objective reality beyond reason (Moussalli, 1999, p.23). 
However, strong effort was made by Turabi to clarify the concept of Shura and to push 
the movement to practise it in its institutions. Hamid argued that this blend of 
institutionalisation is certainly pushed by Turabi himself; he strongly believes that the 
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community (Jama‘a) is the source of power and that this power should be distributed 
among constitutional bodies according to the wide process of Shura. This of course is 
the ideal, and there is nothing to suggest that it has been followed to the letter (Hamid, 
1988, p.272). 
Eissa argued that it should be pointed out that Turabi’s concept of Shura represents an 
original thesis based on fundamentals of Islam, in addition to borrowing the 
mechanisms of elections, referendums, and opinion surveys from Western thought. 
Hence, he made no claims that Shura was practised beyond the days of the Prophet and 
his four immediate successors, at which time it took the form of direct participation by 
all citizens; nevertheless, some versions of limited Shura were used by other Muslim 
governments. In contrast, he attributed the decline of the Islamic state and civilisation to 
the lack of Shura, tyrannical autocratic government, and intellectual stagnation resulting 
from the lack of Ijtihād. Thus, the revival of Islamic civilisation is possible only if the 
Shari‘a is brought back into the lives and politics of Muslim communities, along with 
Shura, Ijtihād and intellectual freedom (Kausar, 2005, pp.320-321). The concept of 
Shura had been well-clarified by Turabi who put the concept in its historical context and 
conducted the principles that stand on it; moreover he accepted the mechanisms which 
were developed by the people throughout history, and these steps constructed the 
practicability of the concept.  
 
Section 3. Important Conceptions 
3.1 Tajdīd ‘Reforming’  
Tajdīd in the literature is known under different terms, including ‘renewal’, ‘revival’, 
‘reform’, ‘innovation’, etc.  
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The contemporary encounter between traditional, underdeveloped Muslim societies, and 
modern Western civilisation, and the ensuing responses interested academicians in 
various fields of research science at the turn of the last century. Among Muslim 
thinkers, probably no-one has highlighted the issue better than Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, 
and his disciple Mohammed ‘Abdu. For that reason, Afghani has been accredited with 
the title of Rā’id Madrasat al-Tajdīd al-Dīni, or leader of school of religious reform 
(Hamid, 1988, p.255).  
Turabi also developed his own independent ideas on Islamic jurisprudence and law. 
These ideas, based on critical analysis of Islamic sources, generally revolve around the 
concepts of Ijtihād and Tajdīd, or free inquiry and renewal, in an attempt to adapt the 
temporal to the eternal. In the intellectual venture of reformulating Islamic thought, 
Turabi brings to the fore a whole range of controversial issues; giving, thereby, extra 
ammunition to his opponents, who, by 1978, had formed their separate Ikhwan (Hamid, 
1988, p.273). These ideas are supported by Esposito and el-Affendi’s arguments: 
“the idea of necessity of renewal is fundamental to Turabi’s understanding of the 
history of the community of Muslim believers. From the ‘first generations’ 
Muslims have, in Turabi’s view, advocated that constant renewal in the 
professing of the faith is an obligation in all believers to participate in such 
renewal” (Esposito, 2001, p.126).  
While el-Affendi expresses a similar view and suggests that “Tajdīd is Turabi’s most 
cherished idea, and as such it is the source of the most controversy he continues to 
generate. Tajdīd for Turabi takes revolutionary and very radical content” (el-Affendi, 
1991, p.170), Haydar Ibrahim Ali argued that: 
“the idea of tajdīd is based on a difficult equation, which needs to join between 
the constant and inconstant, eternal and historical, the ideal and reality, the 
relative and absolute, the divine and human. We find that Turabi in these views 
is closer to the theories of social science and manmade laws, where he puts 
religious thought under the condition of the reality and the social changes and 
experience, and what he calls trials (Ibtilā’)” (Ali, 1996, p.288). 
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Ali argued that “Turabi’s problem with these views is that Turabi did not define the 
concepts that he uses.” Ali notes that Turabi speaks about renewal of religion, or fiqh, or 
religious thought, or the renewal of the religion. However, he thinks that the words used 
by Turabi, ‘fikr meaning thought’, ‘fiqh meaning jurisprudence’, and ‘Dīn meaning 
religion’, have been used in a different context (Ali, 1996, p.289).  
Ali (1996) went further by pointing out that there are two ways of Tajdīd: revival, and 
development. Moreover, he thinks that the way for revival and development is not 
constant, but has its turns, and ups and downs; this kind of analysis interprets the defeats 
in the history of the Muslim community and Ummah. He thinks that Turabi argued that 
the reasons for these defeats were the halt in Tajdīd, and not interacting with the eternal 
fundamentals (Usūl). He claimed that Turabi used the idea of Tajdīd as justification for 
his political position, and his pragmatic logic. Moreover, he thinks that Turabi 
concentrated his writing on political fiqh (Ali, 1996, p.290). In contrast, el-Affendi 
argued that Tajdīd for Turabi takes on a revolutionary and very radical content. In one of 
his first public expositions of the concept, Turabi said that Islam needs to be rethought 
radically (he means the fiqh of Islam); it is not true, he said, that it is eternal and cannot 
change. There are eternal principles in Islam, but fiqh, the classical exposition of 
religious law inherited from an earlier generation of Muslims, is a mere human 
endeavour, which represents the cumulative understanding of our forefathers of 
religious truths and commands, and can be re-evaluated freely by today’s Muslims (el-
Affendi, 1991, p.170).  
“It is interesting that Esposito relates the idea of the necessity of renewal as 
fundamental to “Turabi’s understanding of the history of the community of 
Muslim believers. He refers to Turabi’s words, ‘Tajdīd is the most necessary of 
the requirements of the faith of Islam’; when subsequent generations ceased to 
fulfil this obligation, ‘they bequeathed to us a kind of passive and stagnant 
profession of the faith’, and when the enterprise of the Muslim becomes stagnant 
with respect to their being Muslims, their Islam freezes and the history of their 
life takes a form that is not Islamic. In this way the history of Islamic civilisation 
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has been a tension between the forces of renewal (Tajdīd) and the forces of 
imitation of the past (Taqlīd)” (Esposito, 2001, pp.126-127). 
Hence, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), for Turabi, depends on a continuous renewal of 
ideas to be able to provide answers to current problems, and he thus transforms religious 
jurisprudence into political doctrines (Moussalli, 1994, p.62). 
It would be useful to consider el-Affendi’s argument that renewal or revival is an 
ongoing exercise, which needs to be undertaken continuously; it is the collective task of 
the Ummah, not individual reformers. It is not true, as is widely believed, that the 
community of the Prophet is the most perfect paradigm that can never be improved 
upon. It is possible, with the help of constant regeneration, to improve tremendously on 
the performance of that first generation. An example is the principle of Shura 
(consultation) expounded in the Qur’an and acted upon by them, which can be raised to 
higher levels by the advances in communications at our disposal (el-Affendi, 1991, 
p.170). These arguments show that renewal is a collective effort, and Turabi follows this 
method to induct his fiqh.  
However, el-Affendi explains these ideas for more understanding of Turabi’s views: 
“this does not mean that we will be better than earlier generations (or worse for 
that matter), because each is to be judged by the best use of resources and 
knowledge at its disposal. In fact many previous schools of thought have been 
transcended, not because they were unsuccessful in solving the problems of their 
age, but because they were too successful. Once they succeeded in solving the 
problems, which necessitated their rise in the first place, they became redundant. 
Renewal, therefore, is not transcendence of religion but a response to the 
demands of religion in an evolving situation” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.171). 
The political ideology of Ikhwan in Sudan is based on Islamic law (Shari‘a) and 
jurisprudence (fiqh), and the idea of an Islamic state, which means a Tawhīdi approach. 
However, this ideology is strongly influenced by Turabi’s ideas of reform and renewal. 
First, on a practical level, it includes programmes for social change and human 
development. Second, on a theoretical level, it consists of a ‘non-traditional’ way of 
interpreting Islamic jurisprudence. Regarding the latter, traditional jurisprudence has, 
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according to Turabi, stagnated, and frozen and there is “a dire necessity not only to 
consider new answers to new problems, but also to reconsider how to revitalise the 
methodology (Usūl) of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.128). This new 
interpretation will be outlined below. 
It is known that the resources of fiqh (Usūl al-Fiqh), or methodology of jurisprudence, 
is based on four pillars: the Qur’an, the Sunna, Ijma‘, and Ijtihād.  
However, we have seen above how the scholars deal with Turabi’s ideas. This part will 
examine how the scholars respond to Turabi’s Ijtihād, and his views about Ijma‘, which 
are different from those of the traditional Ulama.  
Turabi’s concept of the new Ulama, including experts in all fields, e.g. doctors, 
economists, etc., is crucial in this process of creating a new and comprehensive fiqh. 
Esposito points out that, in terms of specific methods, Turabi argues for a thorough re-
examination of the fundamental sources of the Shari‘a. In this effort of reinterpretation, 
Turabi proposes a radical expansion of the traditional method of analysis (Esposito, 
2001, p.130). Esposito explained that scholars developed many rules that narrowed the 
flexibility of specific legal reasoning by analogy, and this became a part of the rigid 
structure that Turabi rejects. Turabi proposed the replacement of the limited Qiyās13 by 
a new, broad analogical analysis of the fundamental sources. One area where Turabi 
outlines how this new approach would provide different perspectives is in the 
redefinition of the meaning of Shura (consultation) in the context of the modern world 
(Esposito, 2001, p.131); on this point Esposito makes reference to Turabi (1980).  
Ijma‘ for Turabi is a consensus of the community. For others, Ijma‘ is the consensus of 
Ulama or religious leaders. For “Turabi, the Ulama may consist of people that are 
knowledgeable and educated, like engineers, doctors, and lawyers in addition to 
                                                 
13 One of the major developments in the study and definition of Islamic law was the utilisation of ‘judicial 
reasoning by analogy’ or Qiyas. 
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religious leaders” (Niblock, 1991, pp.263-265). Thus, important public issues are 
decided by representatives of the people, and not solely by a religious authority. 
Traditionally Ijma‘ is understood as the consensus of Ulama, or consensus of the 
traditional religious leaders. Esposito stated that Turabi’s departure from historical 
precedent is also shown in his insistence that renewal and necessary Ijtihād is the 
responsibility of the whole community rather than a small intellectual elite. The 
foundation for this is Turabi’s redefinition of the people of knowledge in the 
contemporary Islamic community. Historically, the ‘people of knowledge’ or the Ulama, 
represented a very small part of the whole community; as the learned elite, they were 
viewed as speaking for the community of believers as a whole. On the important issue 
of the validation of practice and legal traditions through the consensus (Ijma‘) of the 
community, for example, it was accepted that legitimate consensus was the agreement 
of the Ulama. Interestingly, in Turabi’s thought about Ijma‘ and Ijtihād is his emphasis 
on the role of the people.  
When it comes to Ijtihād, Turabi’s contribution in the Tajdīd process, Turabi stresses 
that this should also be open to all Muslims; he says: “I believe that Ijtihād is open to 
every Muslim, no matter how ignorant he or she might be, everyone can exercise 
Ijtihād, even if only to make a small contribution” (Hamdi, 1998, p.45). Sidahmed has 
drawn attention to the fact that “this is not to say that all Muslims can authoritatively 
interpret Islamic law. For Turabi, people who are willing and competent to interpret 
Islamic law may coordinate their findings through regular consultations and hence come 
up with new ideas through consensus” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.129).  
For Turabi, Ijma‘ or ‘consensus’ is better than majority rule. However, every decision in 
consensus should be guided by the principles of Shari‘a; as Moussalli says: “because the 
Qura’anic text, and not the people, is the ultimate founding power and standard applied 
in evaluating people’s actions, then the practices of the ruler, the legislative, and the 
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judiciary are finally bound by the Shari‘a” (Moussalli, 1994, p.61); and in the process of 
Tajdīd as mentioned before, Ijma‘ is that of the community (Ijma‘ al-Ummah) not the 
Ulama. However, this is a new approach that Turabi adopted, which will change the 
power distribution and the institutions (religion institutions) that monopolised the 
power.  
 
3.2 Tawhīd 
Tawhīd means monotheism, or the oneness of Allah (God), ‘the belief that there is but 
one God’. In Arabic, ‘Tawhīd of God’ is the doctrine of Oneness of God, also 
transliterated ‘Tawheed’ and ‘Tauheed’; Allah, in Arabic, is one (Wāhid) and unique 
(Ahad). The counterpart of Tawhīd is Shirk which translates as ‘polytheism’, but 
literally means sharing Allah’s attribute with others.14 Tawhīd is the very cornerstone of 
Islam, as it means maintaining the belief in true God without any equals or partners; 
Tawhīd literally means unification. 
“The term originally referred in classical Islamic literature to the affirmation of 
unity of God, but is used by Turabi in its ambiguous sense, which means also 
unification. The corollary of accepting the unity of God is the realisation that 
everything in life must heed his commands. This is the classical Islamist demand 
for ordering life according to Shari‘a, and this dimension of it was amply 
emphasized by Mawdudi and Qutb. … Turabi also uses the term to refer to the 
‘union of the central divine commands with the changing conditions of human 
life’, or ‘the reuniting of the ideal with the actual’” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169). 
The last point was criticised by Ali, who argued that: 
“we can not find a comprehensive consistent thought with strict eternal logic 
that can be referred to when we need to judge the political and organisational 
attitudes of the movement” (Ali, 1996, p.291).  
The belief in unity (Tawhīd) and sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and 
moral system propounded by the prophets. It is the very starting point of the Islamic 
political philosophy. The basic principle of Islam is that human beings must, 
                                                 
14
 For more see; "http://www.pwhce.org/tawhid.html" www.pwhce.org/tawhid.html 
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individually, surrender all rights, and collectively, surrender all rights of overlordship, 
legislation and exercising of authority over others (Donohue, 2007, p.263). 
The work by Eissa shows that: 
“for Turabi the point of departure for political thinking should be the 
fundamentals of basic Islamic doctrine. A Muslim should believe firmly in the 
unity of Allah; hence, he must believe in unity of all aspects of life and existence 
made by Him. Islam is a total way of life, so that all aspects of the life of the 
Muslims must be governed by their faith, in addition to their own ingenuity in 
improving their society and well-being” (Kausar, 2005, p.316).  
El-Affendi asserts that the theme of the unity of Muslim life figures in another of 
Turabi’s prison books, entitled in translation: ‘Religious Belief, its Effects in the Life of 
Man’. He reports that a timid attempt to produce an ideological work was made by 
Turabi around 1972, when he published a book whose translated title is ‘Prayer, the 
Central Pillar of Religion’. Turabi used this discourse on prayer to tackle some wider 
ideological issues. He started by affirming the importance of prayer as a central and 
indispensable obligation for Muslims. The book: 
“sheds light on the integral nature of the teaching of Islam, and the unity of 
meaning which runs through it, in order to reveal the harmony between prayer 
and all acts of worship, nay even between prayer and religious obligations in all 
walks of life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.168). 
El-Affendi here makes reference to Turabi (1977). He found that the aims set for the 
book reveal the core of Turabi’s outlook. He argued that his main concern is ‘to bring 
religion to life’, by extracting the essence of religion and then putting it in touch with 
life (el-Affendi, 1991, pp.168-169). El-Affendi suggests that the rules that govern the 
leaders and those led in prayer are the same as those governing conduct in other aspects 
of public life, pointing to the unity and integrity of Islamic religious life. It could be said 
that realities of life could not be studied from the perspective of religious belief, since 
these are two separate fields. However, this is not true, because religion is not given in a 
vacuum. Religion is concerned mainly with life, and how to live it. The whole life is a 
theatre for expression of religious belief, and therefore the discussion of belief is 
 75 
actually a discussion of the totality of human life. This latter point is also one that is 
central to Turabi’s thought. He uses the term ‘Tawhīd’ (unification) to express this idea 
(el-Affendi, 1991, p.169). Ali has drawn attention to the same point (Ali, 1996, p.288): 
the author asserts that there is a relationship between those two books; el-Affendi also 
drew attention to them; both illuminate Turabi’s approach to Tawhīd (unification) in its 
broad meanings.  
El-Affendi concludes that Tawhīd is equally liberation from enslavement to one’s own 
or others’ whims and desires. A true believer achieves complete liberation by not 
allowing anything, be it his or her own desires, tradition, worldly authority, social 
environment or material conditions, to cause him or her to deviate from the path 
enjoined by God; Tawhīd is thus the ultimate liberation of man (el-Affendi, 1991, 
p.170). Tawhīd is the dynamic principle that unites the material and the spiritual, the 
real and the ideal, and subsumes the ever-changing reality under eternally valid 
principles.  
It is arguable that those two books paved the way to the Tawhīdi (unitarianism) theory 
for Turabi, which defines and interprets all sorts of life’s activities as acts of worship, 
and a part of the Tawhīd.  
Other than el-Affendi’s contributions on the issue of Tawhīd in Turabi’s thought, there 
are not many other specific contributions that examine Turabi’s vision about this issue. 
Most of the writings are about the issue of Tawhīd as subordinate to other issues such as 
Tajdīd, state, and others. Thus, more study is needed, and it is important for it to be 
related to other issues that Turabi connected directly to Tawhīd.  
 
 76 
Section 4. Objectives of the Islamic Movement in Sudan 
Islamists in Sudan faced debates on objectives and strategy; should the group apply its 
ideological goals through the transformation of the state or society? If the former, 
should the transformation be rapid or gradual? From its inception, the movement was 
inward-looking, insisting that its primary aim was to work towards the establishment of 
an Islamic order within Sudan (el-Affendi, 1991, p.145). 
According to Hasan Mekki, the objective of the Movement in the constitution was “to 
apply Islam in real life through establishment of a free Islamic republic, a sovereign 
state” (Mekki, 1998, p.34). It means that applying Islam in real life is the objective that 
cannot be achieved, except through the establishment of the Islamic state. It can 
therefore be understood that the main objective of the movement was to establish an 
Islamic state, as is mentioned in the definition of the Ikhwan movement: 
“it is a movement of renewal and reform: education and politics are instruments 
for civilisation change. In other words, it is a social change movement that seeks 
political authority, to make the change through gradual reform or through 
revolution-Jihad” (Mekki, 1998, p.98). 
Related ideas were presented by Mohammed Khier Abdalgadir, when he discussed the 
issue of the Islamic constitution (al-Dustūr al-Islāmi) (Abdalgadir, 1999, pp.109-116). 
These views are supported by el-Amin al-Haj Mohammed Ahmed, who argued that the 
main objective for the movement was to apply Shari‘a; moreover, they were convinced 
that there was no way to achieve that except through governing, as any ruler or 
governor who does not believe in Shari‘a law will never apply it, and any efforts for 
Da‘wah will fail (Ahmed, 1994, pp.63-64). 
Morrison claims that the ultimate objective for the Islamic Movement in Sudan has been 
to establish an Islamic state on the principle of Shari'a and the unity of Ummah 
(Morrison, 2001, p.154). However, Turabi himself has used numerous words and 
expressions to explain the aims of the Islamic movement. Generally, he says, the: 
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“sole aim of Islamic movements, in their early stages, has been to devote their 
resources to the general propagation of basic Islamic teachings in most walks of 
life. The main objective has been to restore people’s awareness of Islam instead 
of hankering after Western ideas and systems, which try to eliminate religion 
from public life altogether” (Hamdi, 1998, p.89). 
It is clear from Turabi’s argument that the main objective is to put the people on the 
right path towards better understanding and practice of Islam; he did not mention the 
state as an objective. Morrison argued that the “justification for the Islamic state can be 
viewed as the combination of the political and the ethical aspects of tawhīd” (Morrison, 
2001, p.145). From the above statements, the ultimate objective of most Islamic 
movements today is clear; namely, the establishment of an Islamic state and Islamic 
government, to emancipate the society and allow it to play its role. 
Others, such as Moussalli, give a greater explanation; from a fundamentalist 
perspective, the Islamic movement means liberation from both authoritarian and 
unrepresentative regimes. An Islamic state is in opposition to capitalism and socialism, 
which are both rooted in economic interests. An Islamic state is supposed to eliminate 
paganism and lead people to self-sacrifice, love for humanity, and adherence to truth 
(Moussalli, 1999, p.58). Abdullahi A. Gallab argued that scholars agree that Islamists 
have been advocating a political ideology based on Islam, asserting the primacy of 
Islam, and calling for an Islamic order (Gallab, 2008, p.7). 
On the other hand, Hamid argued that: 
“their avowed objective was to emancipate Muslim individuals from blind 
allegiances to traditional Sudanese sectarianism and, thus, to create an 
independent power base that, cutting across traditional sectarianist parties, could 
establish a kind of modern Islamic state” (Hamid, 1989, p.266). 
I do believe that to establish an Islamic state is not the real goal, but the strategic 
objective is to emancipate human beings, and achieve spiritual progress that guides 
people to more equality and justice, and freedom, except from being servants of Allah. 
Moussalli expresses a similar view, and suggests that “fundamentalists believe that the 
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Islamic state will lead to political and spiritual progress, since its religious method 
originates from the Divine” (Moussalli, 1999, p.50).  
Ahmed Moussalli also writes “Islam’s main goal, from the fundamentalist perspective, 
is the unity of races, peoples and societies; it is necessary concomitant interests” 
(Moussalli, 1999, p.64). On the other hand, Emad al-Din Shahin argued that the 
objective of the Islamic movements is: 
“not based on accelerating the process of development, nor on a desire to block 
ongoing changes taking place in society. On the contrary, they aim at redirecting 
the political orientation of their respective countries from secularism to 
Islamism” (Shahin, 1997, p.241).  
From his perspective, Ghannouchi’s argument explains the idea that the state is an 
instrument through which Muslims can apply Shari‘a. 
“The establishment of the Islamic government is the short- or long-term goal of 
every Islamic group in order to implement Allah’s commandments; the Shari'a 
(Islamic Law) does not take into consideration the possibility that such a goal 
may be easily accomplished, and therefore an alternative is provided. Under 
exceptional circumstances, the Islamic group may forge alliances with non-
Islamic groups, in order to establish a pluralistic government system with power 
held by the majority party” (Donohue, 2007, p.277). 
According to Turabi, the ultimate goal should be the freedom to address the whole 
world through Islam without any restrictions whatsoever: “we are calling for a unified 
strategy of life for all humanity. This is our main task as Muslims today” (Hamdi, 1998, 
pp.44-45). Furthermore, Islamic movements “are committed to fighting secularism and 
establishing God’s order in society” (Hamdi, 1998, p.89).  
The objective is clear: to establish an Islamic state to enhance the values of Islam. But 
what is Turabi’s concept of the Islamic state? Some of his views are in the above 
section. However, it must be recognised that he derives his understanding from the: 
“teaching of the Qur’an as embedded in the political practice of the Prophet 
Muhammad and constitutes an eternal model that Muslims are bound to adopt as 
a perfect standard for all time” (Esposito, 1983, p.241). 
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Turabi (2008) describes this as a four-stage process, where at the initial stage the 
Islamic revival is a mere trend, with no defined organisational structure. 
“This may be called the Da‘wa stage, marked by spontaneous awareness of 
Islamic identity, and a need to express and promote it. This emerges in the form 
of small groups scattered here and there … The next stage is when that general 
trend is streamlined into an organised group aiming for greater self-education, 
solidarity and cooperation to represent and promote Islam … In the third stage, 
the small localised groups grow into an effective movement with tangible 
influence in society.”(Turabi, 2008, p.11) 
It assumes a reformist role with political needs and priorities addressed to the society at 
large. It develops detailed programmes to uphold its beliefs, to mobilise social forces 
against corruption and anti-social activities, to promote good and constructive work, and 
to bring pressure to bear on powers that be. 
“The fourth stage comes when the Islamic movement assumes the mantle of the 
political leadership of the society and takes charge of public policy, putting into 
action its programmes aimed at building a cleaner, freer, and better society, and 
raising its religious and material living standards. It will be called upon to put 
forward specific political, economic, social and cultural programmes, and 
comprehensive policy proposals for running society. It will have to cater for the 
international dimension towards the rest of the Muslim Ummah and the wider 
international community” (Hamdi, 1998, pp.109-110). 
It seems to me that each of these stages is an objective at a specific time, but the 
ultimate objective remains the society and individual, and enhancing their chance to 
worship God freely, and to enjoy the spiritual and material life, in this life and the 
hereafter.  
 
Section 5. Access to Power 
However, according to the above discussion, questions may be raised: how can the 
movement achieve the mentioned objectives? what is the best way to achieve them? is it 
through military power, revolution or democratic mechanisms? Abd al-Salam Sidahmed 
in his study concluded that “Turabi has underlined three ways of access to power: 
revolution, as in the case of Iran, through the ‘military institution’ as in the case of 
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Sudan, and through the ballot box as in Algeria” (Sidahmed, 1992, p.18). Turabi 
actually endorsed all these examples as legitimate (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996, 
p.13). However, although Turabi thinks it is legitimate to come to power through the 
military institution in Sudan, he thinks it is not the best way to access power, but he 
reached this point after been deposed by his own students in the military and civilian 
sector. “He further looks to freedom to organise political institutions as a necessity for 
Islamic revival” (Moussalli, 1999, p.91). The work of el-Affendi indicates that the 
movement has taken the very significant step of making its primary goal the seizure of 
power in Sudan as soon as possible, rather than the more vague objective of working 
towards the setting up of an Islamic order (el-Affendi, 1991, p.184). El-Affendi reached 
this conclusion after tracking the objective of the movement at each phase of 
development of the movement, from pressure group to political party. He asked the 
question: to what goal are these tactics supposed to lead the movement? He then 
considered the entire step to reach that goal to be a tactic, and so concludes with the 
statement above. The difference between el-Affendi’s work and others, is that he 
understands that the establishment of the Islamic state is not an objective in itself, but an 
instrument for achieving higher goals (Tawhīd). El-Affendi shows concern for the fact 
that the movement drew a plan for the interim objective of working towards the setting 
up of an Islamic order for the reasons of freeing people, revolutionising society, and 
hastening economic development; this means material, and as well as spiritual interests, 
i.e. reaping the worldly benefits of religious belief. “Union of the eternal divine 
commands with the changing conditions of human life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.170). It is 
important to say that the role of the state is stated by Turabi here: “The most important 
function of the state is to lead the society towards the achievement of the ideal Islamic 
community” (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010). 
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However, the questions arise: is the national state primarily an entity in Turabi’s views? 
is it considered a transitional phase or an interim stage, after which it would be absorbed 
into the global Ummah state? El-Affendi found that: 
“the unity Ikhwan seek is a decentralised arrangement, probably more like EEC 
than the USSR or the USA. This is perfectly in line with their position on the 
kind of unity that should exist between different Islamic groups” (el-Affendi 
1999, p.178). 
Turabi went further by stating that: 
“National resources of different countries and regions of the world should be 
pooled, and by cooperation and sharing between the wealthy North and the poor 
South—the former with its financial wherewithal and the latter with its 
manpower—everyone will benefit” (Hamdi, 1998, p.44). 
These ideas were interpreted by some scholars as a reflection of socialist influences. 
However, Enayat refutes that: 
“In contrast some scholars argued that the Islamic movement in Sudan has been 
influenced by external ideologies like socialism and nationalism, the former has 
many similarities with Turabi’s ideology and thought, while the latter has been 
seen as a contradiction to the Islamic idea of the Ummah. Socialism comes close 
to Islam’s central summons for brotherhood, social harmony and egalitarianism. 
Islam and socialism are united in their high regard for collectivism, state control, 
and an equitable distribution of wealth” (Enayat, 1982, p.139). 
However, the philosophical background of socialism and Islam are different, and what 
has been said by Turabi is based on Islamic ideas.  
In Chapter 1—on historical background—the issue of the perspective of the Islamic 
Movement in Sudan on unity with other movements, and their views regarding national 
state unity was discussed. It is understood that they support a broad cooperative body. 
The research will critically evaluate these views. 
To conclude this chapter it could be said that theories developed during this chapter 
encompass the work of a number of scholars. In some situations, research is very 
specific on a particular idea and translating this to a different level may provide a 
different understanding of the Islamic movement’s concepts and objectives. However, in 
most cases, there are aspects of the researcher’s findings that can make positive 
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contributions to understanding the Islamic movement as a whole, and Turabi’s views in 
particular. There are some gaps in the conception, which this research will seek to fill. 
Another point is that most of the existing studies did not cover the implications of the 
application of the theories of the movement to different fields, such as socio-economics, 
art, ethnic minorities, women, international relations, and internal public policy, so as to 
answer the main questions of the research: what are the basic elements in Turabi’s 
political thinking with particular respect to democracy and how have these elements 
been made operational in his political action, and to examine if there is a contradiction 
in his political ideas and his practice. 
As the Sudanese Movement defines itself as a reforming movement, the Ikhwan revised 
most of the traditional fiqh, and tried to create and adopt a new school of thought, 
especially in issues of state, public policy, ethnic and religious minorities, women, 
economics, culture, and all aspects of human life. Most scholars address these issues, 
but in isolation, each separated from the others. However, Turabi deals with them as one 
unit that cannot be divided into different fields. Most of what has been written about the 
Islamic movement is about its historical development. 
In contrast to other scholars, this research will focus on building Turabi’s Tawhīdi 
theory as one philosophical entity. The majority of other scholars examine individual 
elements of Turabi’s theory, such as the state, economic issues, Shura, political issues, 
fiqh, prayer (Salah), charity (Zakat), or personal issues. This research will not isolate 
such issues, but will focus on Turabi’s theory as one unit, and examine the ways in 
which the different elements relate to the others in the context of Tawhīd.  
There is not enough research in the practice of Shura after 1989 in Sudan. Indeed, 
Sudan is the first Sunni country to be governed by Islamists in this era. The research 
 83 
will examine Islamists and democracy, in terms of Shura theory and practice in Sudan 
after 1989, and to what extent Islamists have applied what is claimed in their theory. 
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Chapter 3: Islamists and Democracy 
This chapter critically evaluates Islamist discourse and practice of democracy. The 
chapter focuses on the experiments in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. It concentrates 
specifically on Islamic movements and their leaders. Moreover, it focuses on the 
political thought and practice of these movements.  
Current events in the Muslim world, particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Turkey, 
Tunisia and Sudan, have produced political and academic discussions among Islamists 
themselves, and also among Islamists and others on the compatibility of Islamist 
discourses with democracy, human rights, pluralism and the new world order. These 
discussions influenced the vision of Islamists towards establishing an Islamic state. The 
criticisms they faced motivated development of their approach to political participation 
in government, or establishing their own state. According to the debate and practice, 
different schools of thought among Islamists emerged. It could be said that although 
they developed the theories they could not introduce any mechanisms for 
implementation, or practical steps towards applying the values of Islam in reality.  
This chapter, therefore, aims to critically evaluate some of the important visions and 
practical experiences of Islamists in some countries. 
 
Section 1. The Role of Revivalists and Movements 
Throughout history, there were revivalists in the Islamic world. The most recent Islamist 
phenomenon began in the 19
th
 century with reformist trends; in particular, the school of 
Sayyid Jamal el-Dīn al-Afghani (1839-1897) and his student Muhammad ‘Abduh 
(1879-1905). Their school of thought was influential in shaping the intellectual climate 
in which the first major Islamic group was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949). 
The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in the 1920s, followed by another major Islamist 
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group, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which was founded independently in India in 1941 by 
journalist, Sayyid Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979). The reformist ideas had a 
significant impact on modern Islamic movements in the Muslim world, and different 
schools of thought emerged according to their intellectual work, and actions. However, 
Oliver Roy (1994, p.3) affirmed that “The Islamist movement, born about 1940, is a 
product of the modern world, influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts about 
revolutionary organisation.” Islamists consider Islam to be as much a religion as an 
‘ideology’, a neologism which they introduced, and which remains anathema to the 
Ulama (the clerics or scholars).  
It is arguable that the 20
th
 century witnessed the colonial period for most of the Islamic 
world, that had its impact on the political thought of any movement at that time, be it 
Marxist-Leninist or Islamist; all were seeking to free their countries from colonial 
occupation, so the revolutionary way of thinking, or any other attitude reflected this 
fact. For Islamists, the decline of the caliphate was another factor that influenced their 
methods of building their organisations. This factor shaped the vision of most of those 
scholars, while they were searching for solutions for the Muslim world’s problems. 
However, they were not thinking on a national level only, but approached the Ummah as 
one, united nation. The approaches of the early revivalists towards political issues had 
significant impact on the approaches of recent reformers. 
There are many challenges facing Islamists: first, how to develop a comprehensive 
theoretical and practical approach that addresses current issues; second, how to develop 
a qualified and effective political system that fulfils the Islamic conditions and values in 
the political system such as Shura (consultation), justice and human rights, and which is 
not less than democratic models in developed countries. However, it must be said that 
each generation of scholars tried to develop models that take account of Islamic values, 
while at the same time using the mechanisms developed by human experience. Turabi, 
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Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, Khomeini, Amara, el-Awa and others scholars inspired 
Islamists in most Muslim countries, and became a frame of reference for most Islamic 
movements in practising ‘Shura’ democracy, and participating in government, as a step 
to a fully democratic ‘Shura’ system.  
However, there is a wide range of Islamist discourse, from moderate to extreme 
radicalism; and, while some Islamists are pluralistic in terms of inter-Muslim relations 
and between Muslims and minorities, others are not. Turabi asserts that: 
“I am pluralistic. It is possible to say that political parties have the right to be; 
diversity and difference is natural (Sunna of life); when the Prophet governed al-
Madina, there were different religions, and ethnic, and political powers; there 
were Jews, non-believers, and Muslims, their rights were secured by him. 
Generally, what benefits the people will remain; the people have to choose the 
political party whose values they believe in” (Turabi, Interview 25 December 
2010). 
Moreover, it can be said that “while some Islamists [are] politically pluralistic, but 
theologically exclusive, others are accommodating in religion” (Moussalli 2003, in 
ECSSR, p.115). Most of the reformists influenced a wide range of Islamic movements 
and activists. However, Islamists in general believed that governments in their countries 
do not serve Muslim values, ideologically, politically, and economically, and at the same 
time serve the interests of the dominant world powers; a view held by Islamists in 
Egypt, Mauritania, Jordan, Algeria and Tunisia, for example.  
However, in the current debate regarding democracy, what needs to be noted is that 
liberalisation, whether economic, political or cultural, as well as social justice, political 
freedom and democracy, are the major demands of moderate Islamist groups. Moreover, 
there is debate among Islamists themselves regarding the Islamic state, freedom of 
speech, ethnic and religious minorities, social development, community welfare, and to 
some extent international relations. Many Islamist scholars and theorists, politicians or 
movements proposed different methods of developing or establishing an Islamic state; 
the political system and basic ideology can provide us with indications to classify them, 
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whether they are pro-democracy or not, reformist or radical. However, radical trends 
among moderate Islamists are very small in number, and most of the time are by 
individuals. The pro-democratic groups were encouraged by inclusion in some 
governments that left room for Islamists to participate in political activities.  
 
Section 2. Inclusion and Exclusion by Governments 
Inclusion is seen as a mechanism for deflating radical opposition voices, promoting 
tolerance and pluralism, and perhaps even advancing the process of democratisation. 
But the inclusion moderation hypothesis is not unique to the transition paradigm. In fact 
large and varied bodies of literature deploy some version of the idea that inclusion 
produces moderation in behaviour, practice or belief (Schwedler, 2006, p.11).  
As a result of national, regional, and international transformations, pressure for 
democratisation is increasing, and significant debates on the issue of democracy are 
carried out at national level in each country, within regional and international 
organisations, and in academia. El-Affendi argues that “[T]he debate over democracy 
has been one of the most important debates in the Muslim world this last century” (el-
Affendi, 2010, p.31). One may agree with el-Affendi about this debate among Islamists, 
but there are other levels of debate inside regimes that fear democracy, and meanwhile 
faced pressure from internal opposition groups and also external pressures. However, 
different regimes reacted differently towards these pressures. In response to 
international pressures, some regimes made limited, artificial, controlled reform to 
avoid full-scale democratisation, while others warned of Western alienation, in that they 
claim that, if they adopted the described democratic process, this will bring Islamists 
into state legislation and executive institutions. According to John Voll: 
“the whole discourse of modernisation and Westernisation has come into 
question. The rise of more populist movements affirming Islam and the global 
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pressures for democratisation combine to force a reconstructing of religion 
political discourse in North Africa. The result is contestation of the basic 
concepts of political life, with Islamic movements emerging as a significant 
factor, both in the political struggle and in the development of viable political 
conceptualisations for North Africa states and societies” (Voll, 1997, p.xii). 
Some scholars, such as Anderson and Waterbury (1997), connected the need for social 
economic reform to political reform. Waterbury (1997) argued that: 
“political economy of authoritarianism and democracy does not stop at a given 
country’s border, but is connected to the international market, sources of credit 
and arms, investment flow, strategic rents, and the instruments of international 
clientage and dependency” (Waterbury, 1997, p.145). 
However, Islamists compromise most of the time, and agree to participate, if the regime 
agrees to be inclusive. Some regimes do compromise and accept limited controlled 
participation by the Islamic movement. John Voll (1997) argues that: 
“[O]ne of the distinctive aspects of Islamic populist opposition to authoritarian 
regimes at present is that these often well-organised movements continue to be 
willing to operate within the existing political system to promote the 
democratisation process. This within the context where the regimes being 
opposed are less authoritarian than the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe 
and are more willing to make some compromises. The process of 
democratisation assumes a different form under these conditions. Jordan 
provides an interesting example of a country in which activist Islamists 
challenged monarchical authoritarianism” (Voll, 1997, p.8). 
Voll added that: 
“[T]his did not produce a revolution. Instead it provided the impetus for the 
beginning of democratisation of the system in which the king opens the way for 
‘Islamic activists’ participation in the elections and then within the resulting 
parliament” (Voll, 1997, p.8). 
Eickelman argues that: 
“politics as leviathan is thus decisively abandoned in favor of politics as 
decision makers, in spite of a faction of Western commentators with ‘Islamist’ 
discourse. This is a rising tide of Muslim moderates responding to what they see 
as a bankruptcy of traditional religious and political discourse” (Eickelman, 
1997, p.xiii). 
Islamists in these countries represent the main force for change, and not the Westernised 
groups; yet both call for democracy. Fergani concluded that: 
“In countries where radical Islamic movements are forbidden, like Tunisia, 
Libya and Syria, all serous analysis considers that political Islam represents the 
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main force of opposition. Even if there is no legal political expression, its 
influence on society and in the field of the culture is such that the powers feel 
themselves compelled to adapt their discourse and political practice” (Fergani, 
2006, pp.66-71). 
Fergani’s analysis was borne out; after the revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, Islamists 
were the main force in political life in their countries. 
In conclusion, national and international pressures were directed at democratising 
countries. Different countries reacted differently, where some carried out limited and 
controlled reform to include Islamists in the government, as a response to these national 
and international pressures. Some countries included Islamists in government as early as 
the 1950s, such as Jordan, while others were more intent on broadening the base of 
support for elites, rather than creating a truly democratic system or real participation. It 
is notable that the reasons for inclusion are diverse, and vary at different periods of time 
in different countries. However, the dictatorship, oppression, and controlled democracy 
led to revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.  
 
Section 3. Islamist Reformists and Democracy: A ‘theoretical approach’ 
Islamists across the Islamic world tried to develop philosophical frameworks to guide 
their movements to a better understanding of religion’s role in all aspects of life, 
specifically in those new issues that emerge in human life. These include political 
issues, which are related to practical needs, such as political participation, whether 
‘Shura’ or ‘democracy’; how to rule; how to solve the problems of ethnic and religious 
minorities; and how to address economic development.  
This part of the study will shed light on the contributions of those leaders or scholars, 
who produced theoretical or practical visions for the concepts that connected directly to 
the practice of Shura and state building, i.e. institutions such as the parliament, and 
modern economic and social institutions. In this case, a number of scholars, such as 
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Ghannouchi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and Hasan al-Turabi, developed theoretical 
frameworks, which were also adopted by many other Islamists. The reformers 
mentioned are the most influential among recent leaders. These reformers’ objectives 
concentrated on solving Muslims’ problems in all aspects of life, without separating 
what is worldly from what is divine. 
In contrast, some revolutionaries in the 19
th
 century concentrated only on the hereafter, 
not worldly issues; for example, Mohammed al-Mahdi in Sudan, who summarised his 
vision succinctly: “I came to you with the destruction of the world and the building of 
the next.” El-Affendi asserts that: 
“they were not concerned with playing a role in economic, political or social 
reform, except when it was religiously mandated and was the fulfilment of some 
values or teachings. The reformers did not think that the objective of their 
reform was the improvement of livelihood, the increase of welfare of Muslims, 
or similar mundane interest” (el-Affendi, 2003, p.14). 
In this context, the modern Islamic movement understood that they came to guide 
people to practise religion in all aspects of life, which defines their approach to social, 
economic and political issues. Although they adopted the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’, 
they did not, as yet, propose a comprehensive practical plan to solve the problems that 
face the Muslim world. Even Islamists who won elections in some countries, such as 
Palestine, Kuwait, Algeria, and Sudan in 1985, did not possess the comprehensive 
solutions they spoke about.  
However, in the last two decades, Islamists have experienced the practice of 
government, and faced many problems. In order to solve these problems, they held 
conferences to discuss those issues that needed religious or ‘fiqh’ opinion. It is notable 
that there was development in their approaches towards recent issues. As such, the 
reformers started to focus on improving the livelihood in their communities, and 
developed charitable organisations in health and education. In the economic field, they 
established banks and companies to implement Islamic values in formal institutions. 
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However, as education among Islamists and Muslims increased, the media and 
communication with the wider world has impacted on their vision of the world, and 
their internal problems. Hence, it is clear that most reformists have looked to other 
nations and learned from their experiences, but still they need to walk a long way to 
tackle their economic and social challenges. 
El-Affendi refers the development in the reformists’ approach and the issues they 
addressed to the Muslims’ awareness; 
“perhaps what really distinguished this new world was the Muslim awareness of 
the existence of another world, dimensions and visions that were different from 
those known by their predecessors. In addition they were affected by the new 
worlds and longed to participate in them. These were the worlds where the 
Islamic movements surfaced and began to take their form within new 
frameworks” (el-Affendi, 2003, p.17). 
It could be said that communication with other nations raised Muslims’ awareness to the 
extent that the majority accepted the reformers’ new visions and opinions, which had 
not been accepted in the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Thus, communication made it 
easy for new ideas to reach everywhere at the same time, and so be discussed in the 
media, and in academic and political spheres. 
 El-Affendi (2003) asserts that there is near consensus among analysts in this field on 
linking contemporary Islamic movements to the intellectual and reformist effort exerted 
by Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, and his disciple, Mohammad ‘Abdu (1849-1905). It is true 
that Afghani was one of the most distinguished reformers of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries, who inspired most of the scholars and politicians in the 20
th
 century. Afghani 
influenced a whole generation of Muslims in the different regions of the Muslim world 
that he visited, beginning with Iran through Afghanistan, India, Egypt and then Istanbul 
where he died (el-Affendi, 2003, p.19). It could be said that the countries he visited at 
that time were the most influential and powerful, culturally and politically. His 
influence also spread through his disciples, such as Mohammed ‘Abdu, who in turn 
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influenced a whole generation of thinkers and intellectuals in Egypt and Syria, and 
contributed to the reform of educational institutions, such as al-Azhar,
15
 and state 
institutions, like the courts. El-Affendi (2003) claims that this influence spread through 
Mohammed Rashid Rida and his journal, Manar, reaching the farthest corners of the 
Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia. The general legacy of this intellectual 
school, such as establishing the basis of Shura and the reform of government, religious 
reform, and the renewal of reform, constitutes the basis for the emergence of the 
modern Islamic movements. These points show that the important contribution of this 
school of thought was noted in the Islamic world, and in the modern Islamic movement, 
and by reformists, such as Hasan al-Banna and then Ghannouchi, Turabi, Qaradawi, and 
Abassi Madani. Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi who established an Islamic group in India in 
1940, like Banna, addressed public political issues related to his county. However, he 
criticised the national state, and believed that it contradicted the teachings of Islam. 
Mawdudi’s influence reached to the heart of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. 
Further support for this argument can be taken from the work of el-Affendi (2003), who 
found evidence to suggest the significant intellectual influence of the group and its 
founder, as Mawdudi might be one of the most widely-read Muslim thinkers in the 
world. Those thinkers agreed that Islam was in decline, and called for rebirth, and 
reinterpreting of the main source of Islam, the ‘Quran’. They were influenced by 
European power that had colonised their lands in the first half of the 20
th
 century. Most 
revivalists at the time reinterpreted Islam as a world view, in answer to the question of 
government, or presented Islam as a force of resistance against Western hegemony. 
                                                 
15
 Al-Azhar Mosque (359-361AH)/(970-975m) is one of the most important mosques in Egypt, most 
notably in the Muslim world. A mosque and university for more than a thousand years, it was established 
in the first Fatimid Caliph in Egypt: Al-Azhar mosque was completed in the month of Ramadan in the 
year 361AH = 972, and it is the first mosque established in the city of Cairo. It is the oldest existing 
impact of Fatimid Egypt. The historians have disagreed in the naming of it but most likely it is after the 
name of the daughter of Prophet Muhammad Fatima al-Zahraa. 
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However, these scholars also challenged the traditional institutions and their 
understanding of Islam.  
Accordingly, a modern school of thought was born, the school of Ikhwan. This is the 
major school of thought in the Middle East established by Hasan al-Banna, and his 
disciple, Sayyid Qutb, who was an advocate for radical transformation of Muslim 
society. Qutb was an influential political philosopher, whose writings, especially his 
political writings, guided many trends inside the Islamic movement. According to 
Ahmed S. Moussalli: 
“the theme that underlines Qutb’s political thought is that Islam accepts only 
virtuous and good society and demands absolute obedience to God’s teaching” 
(Moussalli, 1992, p.147). 
This way of thinking created some trends among Islamists, believing that building the 
virtuous society is more important than participating in any government; moreover, it 
created militant Jihadist groups
16
 that believe in education and Da‘wa activities as 
priorities. While it is generally agreed that those are the most influential thinkers in the 
last century, it is arguable that the latest generation of thinkers, such as Turabi, 
Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, and other Islamist practitioners, address the issue of democracy 
directly, and have developed a theoretical and practical approach that has tried to 
answer the critical questions that face Muslim societies in politics, economics, social 
domains, and all other aspects of life. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, to understand the phenomenon that produced such a 
philosophical approach, it is useful to consider the historical context of the issues that 
developed in each period. What needs to be noted is that the researcher tends to focus 
less on why Islamists have emerged at different moments in different places, than on 
                                                 
16
 It is not a part of the study; those groups do not believe in democracy. They are independent groups. 
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how Islamists seek and exercise power; the essential conception of Islam is combined 
with the assertion that Islam is not simply a religion, but a comprehensive way of life. 
Mawdudi’s writings focused on detailing the ideal Islamic state, and the work that was 
needed for its establishment. In practice, the Islamic group in India finally participated 
in the politics of the national state, although in principle it rejected this orientation. 
Contrary to Banna, who accepted the centrality of nationhood in Egypt, and saw no 
contradiction between the call to Arab nationalism and the Islamic call, Mawdudi 
brought together the complete rejection of secularism and nationalism, as well as 
democracy (el-Affendi, 2003, p.33). For Mawdudi (1978), nationalism is the deification 
of national interests, while democracy is deification of man and making the desires of 
the majority the governing principle of the state. These principles may contradict the 
Islamic Shari'a principle that upholds the universalism of the call of Islam, and the 
principle of divine governance. In other words, the freedom of the majority is restricted 
to what God has revealed and the principle of submission to the authority of the 
almighty God over people’s life, both private and public. Thus, the objective of the 
Islamic nation must be the establishment of the divine caliphate based on worship of 
God in every aspect and domain (el-Affendi, 2003, p.33). However, this explanation 
raises the problem of the majority and minority in a democratic system, if adopted by 
Islamists, as to how to take into account the opinion of religious minorities. Later, 
Turabi tried to solve this problem by adopting what he called al-Tawali al-Siyasi, 
through which minorities’ opinion can be taken into account; this issue will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
Islamic thought includes many, varying, intellectual trends, such as secularism, 
socialism, nationalism, and others. However, two trends in modern Islamic thought are 
characterised by accepting Islam as the basis of civilisation, and as a fundamental 
foundation of knowledge and a repository of the principles of the constituent, the 
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political system and social reform, namely Islamic reformism, and Islamic 
fundamentalism. Islamic reformists are represented by Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Muhammad Iqbal, and Islamic fundamentalism is represented 
by Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini, they 
differ primarily in their approaches of building knowledge and reaching it.  
However, according to the above, Islamists are not one homogeneous group, but differ 
theoretically and practically; some are very extreme and others moderate accepting 
modern life within Islamic values. Most extremist or rejectionist movements were 
influenced by Qutb’s approach, especially his concept of Jāhiliyyah, which means 
ignorance, and rejecting others and treating them as infidels, even if they are Muslims. 
Others do not adopt Qutb’s approach, such as Shukry Mostafa,17 Omer ‘Abdurrahman 
(1938-)
18
 and Aboud al-Zumar,
19
 as they represented Takfiri trends in Egypt. However, 
all these groups rejected democracy, and counted it as Kufr; at the same time, they reject 
their governments, and any kind of contact with them (Esposito, 1996, p.179). 
According to this approach, they blame Ikhwan in Egypt, because they participated in 
the parliament. However, according to Abu Rumman (2007), in Jordan Ikhwan led the 
way in boycotting elections and political participation, after the government signed the 
‘Wadi ‘Arba’ peace agreement with Israel on 26 October 1994, and changed the election 
law, similarly, in Algeria and other countries. 
 
                                                 
17
 Born 1942, established Jam’at altakfeer and al-Hijra, that think the society and the state are Kafir, and he 
concentrated on Hjra, which means ‘to stay away from this infidel society’. 
18
 He is a leader of al-Jama’a al-Islamia; he was a prisoner in USA on 24 June, 1993. 
19
 He is former military intelligence, a colonel in the Egyptian Army; he was the founder and the leader of 
a Jihad Group; he was sentenced to life imprisonment in Cairo for being implicated in the assassination of 
president Anwar Saldat in October 1981 ( released from prison in March 2011).  
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3.1 Islamists and Democracy 
There are famous scholars who developed a comprehensive approach and ideas about 
Islam, Shura and democracy. They concentrated on issues that answered today’s 
problems, such as political participation, human rights and international relations; for 
example, Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, el-Awa and Amara. While some movements 
and leaders went further in practice in the democratic process, and succeeded in 
adopting and playing a comprehensive role in developing ideas and practices for 
Islamists, other scholars tried to find a theoretical approach for the practice, through 
Ijtihād. Such scholars, like Turabi and Ghannouchi, take into account their own 
experiences. This study focuses on the most influential scholars, where it is notable that 
they tried to develop the ideas of Shura and democracy in Islam, generally, so that these 
can be applied anywhere. 
 
3.1.1 Islamists and democracy: General perspective 
Esposito argued that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood under Hasan al-Banna had a 
leader-centric authority structure, mobilisational youth league, and paramilitary 
organisation, familiar from fascism (though Sufism was in fact the strongest influence 
on Banna) (Esposito, 1998, p.157). But, in decades, a noticeable change had happened 
to their stance; they started to accept partial participation in the democratic process in 
Egypt. However, internally, the movement is still centralised, and Shura is practised 
most of the time. The main trend in the movement accepts democracy as a tool for 
change. But other extreme movements in Egypt such as Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami, al-
Takfir wa al-Hijra and Hizb-ut-Tahrir did not accept democracy, nor changing society 
through it; they have been influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah’s, Mawdudi’s and Qutb’s 
schools of thought. However, the main trend of Islamists, the Ikhwan, reject violence, 
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and believe in gradual change through political participation and social activities. This 
trend of Ikhwan condemned the assassination of Sadat in 1981.  
Not only in Egypt, but Islamists everywhere faced a particular debate over strategies. 
They raised an important question that showed their vision towards changes; should the 
group achieve its goals through gradual transformation of the state authority or through 
society? 
It is arguable that Islamists may be divided into purely evolutionary Islamists, who see 
no active role for the state authority in purifying Muslim society, or democratic 
Islamists, who believe that the best means to institutionalise Shari‘a is to peacefully 
convince a majority of citizens to assent to it over repeated elections. Indeed, one may 
say that the experiment in Turkey encouraged some scholars to reflect on the best way 
forward. In Sudan, Turabi and others have firsthand experience of using a military coup 
to take over the state and seek to change society. Surprisingly, they produced literature 
that supports the gradual transformation of society through repeated elections, and for a 
fact, Turabi admitted their mistake (Turabi interview, 26 December 2010). Ghannouchi 
went further, by accepting democracy and its process, and agreeing to the mechanisms 
as well. Islamists in Egypt faced the same questions, and developed their theories and 
practical experiment. “They believe that democracy is a peaceful way to achieve the 
goals of the movement” (Abu-al-Futouh, interview, 17 March, 2011, London). 
However, the great majority of Islamists, quite unsurprisingly, see the state as a natural 
instrument to institute and execute Shari'a law. Judging by their literature, most 
Islamists also perceive their goals to be in tension, if not in conflict with various 
principles of liberal democracy, including popular sovereignty, separation of powers, the 
mutability of laws, and government multi-party contestation for power, and equal rights 
for Muslims and non-Muslims, and women and men. In this case, Turabi and 
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Ghannouchi inserted and developed the concept of citizenship, and public freedoms into 
the Islamic state model.  
Ghannouchi argued that, on a practical level, the Islamic trend demands political change 
with the objective of setting up Islamic democratic and consultative institutions, instead 
of the existing dictatorial and secularist ones. Likewise, it demands social, economic 
and cultural change and the establishment of all social activities on an Islamic basis 
(Ghannouchi, 2001, p.115). This argument shows that the Islamic trends wanted the 
state authority as a tool for social change, and to enhance religious values of freedom, 
peace and justice.  
Refa'at al-Sayyid Ahmed (2005) argued that, in the years 2002-2003, in less than two 
months Islamic movements succeeded in parliamentary elections in four countries: 
Pakistan, Morocco, Bahrain and Turkey. However, this victory raised many questions 
about why Islamists were elected. He mentioned four reasons: first, it was a reaction to 
American terrorism against Muslims and the Islamic world; the second reason was 
Western support for dictatorship; the third reason was that the Islamic movements had 
gained good experience in the political field; fourth, was the spread of corruption and 
poverty in the Islamic world. These ideas may be supported by Ghannouchi’s argument 
that democratisation faces not only internal obstacles, but is hindered by massive and 
direct Western support for dictatorship (Kausar, 2003, p.343). Though these reasons are 
acceptable, some, in their influence, are stronger than others, at different times, and in 
different countries. 
For Ghannouchi today, most Islamic parties have rejected the use of force to achieve 
political ends, and instead search for opportunities that would enable them to effect 
change through peaceful means (Ghannouchi, 2001, p.115). Ghannouchi argued that 
they are indeed well aware that it is possible to realise their objectives through the 
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creation of legally-recognised political parties and agencies, or by joining existing ones. 
It could be said that this is a realistic point of view that has been adopted by many 
Islamic movements, which established their own political parties, e.g. Sudan (NIF), 
Egypt (MB),
20
 Tunisia,
21
 Algeria,
22
 Turkey,
23
 Yemen, Pakistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Malaysia, Somalia, Mauritania, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Indonesia. 
However, in other countries, they have established organisations or other umbrella 
bodies to get in touch with the society seeking social change through individual change. 
This process took decades, and the Islamic movements gained gradually due to the 
practical experience and the continuance of debate in the field of political thought.  
The enormous shift achieved by the reformers, from Afghani, and Mohammed ‘Abdu to 
Mawdudi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi and Turabi, during the last and the present century 
resulted in changes in the attitude and way of thinking among Islamists. However, 
Ghannouchi asserts that the combined effort of both the first group, official Islam, and 
the second, opposition Islam, has given considerable impetus to the call of reformist 
Islam, leading to the penetration of reformist ideas in all strata of society, and thereby 
representing the widest cultural and political currents in the Islamic world (Ghannouchi, 
2001, p.115). 
I may argue that a significant evolution in Islamist political thought and practice 
occurred in the last two decades; this evolution is due to internal and external factors. 
The internal factors could be attributed to the members of those movements educated in 
modern institutions in most countries; those students in the 1960s-1970s became leaders 
                                                 
20
 In 1928, Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimūn) in Egypt 
following the "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution" 2011 Egyptian revolution, and on 
5 June 2011, for the first time, they established a political party named al-Hurriyh wa al-‘Adala (Freedom 
and Justice). 
21
 In 1981, Rashid al-Ghannouchi established Harakat Al-Itijah al- Islami (Islamic Trend Movement) then 
the Nahdha Party (Renascence Party). 
22
 In 1988, Abbasi Madani established the Salvation Islamic Front, and Abdallah Jab Allah established 
the Renascence movement.  
23
 In 1970, Arbakan established the National System in Turkey (al-Nizam al Watani, then al-Rafah). 
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in their countries. Therefore, modern education itself is another factor, which helped 
Islamists organise their movements in a modern way. It helped them build modern 
institutions in the social, economic, cultural and media fields. However, these 
institutions are part of the state structure. It increases the Islamist experience in leading 
societies, and answers the questions of ruling in modern societies, followed by other 
internal factors in that the rulers in some cases were in need of the support of Islamists, 
when they felt they were not popular anymore. Moreover, the awareness of the people 
of the importance of political participation put pressure on governments and, as a result, 
reforms were introduced in some countries. The external factors can be concluded in the 
democratic trend, which covered most of the Islamic world by virtue of the single 
superpower, and international organisations, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
3.1.2 Islamists and political parties 
In this part, the study explores the Islamist practice and theoretical approach to political 
parties. However, it must be said that Islam accepts different opinions, but not a division 
among nations. According to this opinion, some Islamists reject the idea of a multi-party 
system, while others accept the practice of political parties. Unless parties stand against 
Islam and reject Shari‘a, they are still counted as another category of opinion. Turabi 
tried to solve this problem by establishing what he called al-Tawali al-Siyasi (political 
consensus or association). His theory is that of one party or umbrella within which 
different opinions or trends co-exist, but the final decision that comes out of it is 
obligatory or binding, ‘Mulzim’, for all members of the community. Al-Tawali was not a 
successful experiment, although theoretically it offers a comprehensive solution for 
diversity and unity issues. However, Sudan was not a suitable place to apply this theory 
at that time, because of the internal and external factors that stood as obstacles in the 
face of such an experiment; these will be examined in the next chapter. The theory itself 
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was faced by a campaign of criticism from Sudanese opposition parties, and Sudanese 
scholars, such as Gallab, Abdallah Ali Ibrahim, and others who thought that the concept 
was not clear. However, they judged the intention of the government not the theory 
itself.  
Islamists dispute the philosophical basis of Shura and democracy, but accept democracy 
as a tool through which they can apply Shura. Yet they disagree on the concept of 
sovereignty (people are sovereign in democracy, while sovereignty is to Allah only, not 
the people; people are vicegerent (Khalifah) of Allah in His earth (to which He granted 
the honour of ruling themselves). 
As mentioned before, Islamic movements started establishing political parties, but this 
was faced by criticism from other Islamists. Ghannouchi expresses similar views, and 
claims that there is no consensus among Muslims today on the most appropriate 
methodologies of change. Furthermore, the issue is not confined to differences about 
degree of legitimacy and propriety of using force as a means of change, nor to 
determining the legitimacy of existing Islamic states. Ghannouchi (2001) shows concern 
for the fact that, in the Islamic countries, when the idea of an Islamic party has become 
so established, there is at least one Islamic party in each country. He noted that some 
contemporary views rejected the idea of an Islamic party altogether, and others rejected 
the idea of a multi-party system. Ghannouchi asserted that the notion of a multi-party 
system, they argue, is essentially alien, and does not accord with the unitary concept of 
Tawhīd that proclaims the primacy of the Ummah and not the party as a focus for 
political work and loyalty. Ghannouchi noted that this criticism was shared by the ultra-
traditionalist (Salafi) militant groups, which reject the concept of multi-party politics, 
and also those states founded on the idea of modern Islamism, such as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. He added that the same can also be said of certain scholars who enjoy 
a special relationship with their rulers. Ghannouchi (interview, November 2006,) and 
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Turabi (interview 25 December 2010) agreed on accepting the idea of a multi-party 
system, while Turabi went further by saying that even the party of the devil can be 
established and compete with others; he compared it with the Madina political system, 
in which non-Muslim groups existed, or played a role; yet some of them came to the 
Prophet to judge over their dispute. According to Sayyid Dusuqi Hasan (2001, p.116), 
the Islamic movement must be a reformist movement, which establishes its work upon 
social interaction and the awakening of man to construct, do good and display the 
Qur'anic values embedded in his being. This individual must also transform these values 
into a potent system in life. Islamists build their political parties in most countries, but 
in some countries they are not legal parties, because they are not registered. This claim 
is supported by Moussalli (2004), who asserts that “from 1984, the Ikhwan in Egypt and 
other similar movements, e.g. al-Nahda in Tunisia and Jabhat al-Inghaz al-Islamia 
(Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria, tried many times to enter the political field legally, 
and participated in NGOs.” In other words the problem was not the Islamists, but the 
regimes in those countries, which refused to recognise these political parties. However, 
nowadays in most Islamic countries there is one or more Islamic party and, in some 
cases, there is an Islamic community (Jama‘a Islamiyyah). It could be said that, 
practically, Islamists went further than developing a theoretical approach only. 
 
Section 4. Islamist Political Participation: The Practice of Democracy 
4.1 Egypt 
The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimīn: abbr. Ikhwan) was founded in 1928. 
The Ikhwan movement had, as its main objective, Islamising individuals, families, 
society and then the state. They adopted a gradual approach to attain their goals (Tal, 
2005, pp.16-18). 
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The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement of the 20
th
 
century, and perceives itself as “the mother of all centrist Islamist movements.” It is an 
activist movement with a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensional 
spheres that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is 
severely constrained by the Egyptian regime. The movement is a production of earlier 
reform movements (such as Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism) and can claim to 
be the heir of ‘reformist Islam’ (Shahin, 2007, p.1). 
With regard to historical development, throughout the history of the movement there 
were many trends, moderate, extreme, and in between, because of the oppression during 
Nasser’s era (1954-1968). The execution of Qutb in 1966 was a turning point that led 
some Islamists to adopt Qutb’s political thought. As a consequence, the Jihadist 
generation emerged, and faced the Egyptian regime twice. First, in April 1974, in the 
state military education school (Ibrahim, 2003, p.3), and the second, with the 
assassination of President Sadat on 6 October 1981. Later, in the 1990s, the Jihad 
movement confronted the regime in limited military operations (Ibrahim, 2003, p.vii). 
As the impact of external and internal conflicts and crises the main trends of these 
movements, such as Ikhwan, followed the example of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, and 
reviewed their stances and rejected violence. Moreover, externally, revivalism in the 
Muslim countries and international factors played a role in developing the strategy of 
Ikhwan in Egypt. A study by Abd Kotob, and Sullivan (1999, p.12) concluded that: 
“the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change 
that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, while the more 
moderate groups, epitomised by Egyptian’s Muslim Brotherhood, call for 
gradual change to be undertaken from within the political system and with the 
enlistment of the Muslim masses.” 
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4.1.1 Egyptian Ikhwan political thought 
The political discourse of Ikhwan in Egypt has shown significant development since its 
establishment. The ideological political discourse of the founder of the movement of 
Muslim Brotherhood and the first leader, Hasan al-Banna, is the basis of the inclusive 
moderate perception of the concept of Hākimiyyah or ‘governance of God’, and that of 
the verbal and political dimension. Although the concept of governance of God 
historically, and currently, was used to exclude what is not counted as Islamic, Hasan al-
Banna counts it as a source of legitimacy and moderation (Moussalli, 2004, p.85). In 
other words, the moderate perception is original in Ikhwan political thought from the 
beginning.  
However, Mohammed Amara asserts that the Khilafah debate in Egypt, for example, 
could not be isolated from ongoing contests over the status of the monarchy; given 
Egypt’s own transitional status following its separation from the Ottoman Empire and 
its quest for full independence from Britain, and the changing alignment of rival 
political and social forces (Amara, 1989, p.1). Mohamed Selim el-Awa
24
 confirms in his 
lectures that Hasan al-Banna was influenced by the decline of the Khilafah. Following 
continuous debate, political thought in Egypt was developed. Throughout history and 
across all political thought, Ikhwan were one of the important schools that extensively 
developed, specifically with regards to political thought. A key scholar, such as 
Mohammed Amara, wrote more than 180 books, most of which discuss the issues 
related to the state, political participation, reform and renewal of the religion, women’s 
status in the state, women’s emancipation, non-Muslim minority, governance, concept 
of freedom, etc. Amara asserted that: 
                                                 
24
 Although Amara and al-Awa are not members of the MB, they played an influential role in shaping its 
thoughts, and the movement distributes their intellectual products, and publishes their publications on 
their websites, so they celebrate their intellectual production.  
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“we do not exaggerate, if we said that pluralism is a fruit of Islam, attached to 
the Islamic message and embodied in its civilisation, because pluralism is the 
standard of human civilisation, then we accept to live with others” (Amara, 
1998, p.10).  
Amara explains the notion of pluralism in Islam by referring to its doctrine. He asserts 
that: 
“this global nation—meaning Muslims—was established on pluralism. He added 
pluralism is a condition to be global (international); global means inclusive, 
continually for whom he enters in the universal field for the nation; the unity of 
doctrine (Aqeedah), unity of Shari‘a, unity of civilisation, and unity of state” 
(Amara, 1998, p.113). 
In an interview with Muhammad Habib, the First Deputy of the General Guide of the 
Ikhwan on 18 August 2005, he argued that public freedoms are the basic foundation of 
Islamic law. He added that, if parliament is chosen democratically, and expresses the 
will of the people, then its legislation would not contradict the legislation and laws of 
Islam. He added that they would like to establish a political party, but the regime 
refused to accept their application (Sharif, 2005). In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, setting up a political party has never been a realistic alternative due to the 
Egyptian government’s constant refusal to legalise the Brotherhood, which remains a 
banned organisation (the government banned any religious political party) (Hamzawy, 
2008, p.7). However, in the same interview, Habib added that public freedoms are the 
natural approach to Islamic law, and they could see no contradiction between the 
application of Islamic law and democracy, which to them, means a peaceful transfer of 
power and political pluralism; in other words, the nation and people are the source of 
authority. However, their project includes all spheres, whether cultural, social, political, 
economic, etc., and the people can accept or reject them on the basis of this programme 
(Sharif, 2005). 
It is important to stress that the Ikhwan stand against proselytising in Egypt, while 
Hasan al-Banna disagreed about that, especially after he met one of the priests, and said 
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it is the duty of all religious people to stand against atheists (Moussalli, 2004, p.87); in 
other words, Coptic Christians and Muslims are equal Egyptian citizens. Regarding the 
current debate concerning the political discourse of Ikhwan, it is important to say that 
scholars, such as el-Awa, Amara, and Qaradawi, produced literature that discusses most 
of these political issues, and has opened debates within Ikhwan and with others. Tal 
(2005) and Zubaida (2000) argue that conservative Islam primarily seeks moral and 
social control of its citizens. The foremost representation of this type is in the Gulf 
states, in particular Saudi Arabia. The second type is best exemplified by the Egyptian 
Islamic groups, building on the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, that seek to overthrow unjust 
rulers. The third type, political Islam, differs from the two others by seeking to reform 
society and politics. Nevertheless, both second and third types have played a significant 
role in Egypt.  
However, based on the theoretical framework discussed above, the study critically 
evaluates and analyses the experiment of Egyptian Islamists, who participated in 
government, and as an opposition group most recently. 
 
4.1.2 Ikhwan’s political participation 
In Egypt, Banna, was calling for political participation, and he himself was a candidate 
for the parliament twice, while other members of Ikhwan were members in Egyptian 
political parties (al-Saeed, 1986, pp.93-116). In other words, Ikhwan at the time did not 
think of having their own political party, thus some of them were members in other 
parties. In that period, the movement accepted the legitimacy of the government, and 
competed with al-Wafd and the Communist Party in elections. However, Banna 
criticised these political parties, not because they were ignoring religious factors and 
values, but because of corruption; more specifically their collaboration with the British 
(Banna, 1984, pp.60-84). In other words, his criticism was not about rejecting the 
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political parties, in principle, but for practical reasons. He considered that these political 
parties failed to solve problems, and needed redirection and rehabilitation.  
However, Ikhwan in Egypt, in fact, thought about political participation in two ways: 
first, that they cannot change the regime in the country, so they have to adapt to the 
situation for the benefit of the movement; second that they would lose their purity if 
they participated in the government; in this case, they faced many problems. If they 
participated, they would be speaking two languages to their members, and will lose 
supporters, especially as they are a strict religious group. For example, what happened 
to Ikhwan in Kuwait, when they decided to support the political participation of women 
in the political process. In these cases, they had to practice Ijtihād and know how to 
balance between participating in, and criticising the government, at the same time. 
Moreover, they should think of how to satisfy the majority of members for the sake of 
the unity of the movement.  
It is known that Banna was not a pure idealist, and was pragmatic; he believed that there 
is no ideal in politics, there is no absolute good and absolute evil, so he communicated 
with the leaders and was keen not to isolate himself and his movement from society and 
other ideologies, but tried to accommodate them. In contrast to this position, Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-1966) condemned the statutes at that time, and isolated the ideas from 
practice and confronted the regime. According to his ideas, the movement refused to 
normalise relations with Nasser in the 1960s-1970s, and their General Guide, Hasan al-
Hudayibi, elected in October 1951 (Tal, 2005, p.23). He did not agree to participate in 
the government, unless the state was turned into an Islamic state completely. Zollner 
(2009) believes that he called for change in the society, because it was not aware of the 
political nature of the Islamic belief: “al-Hudhaybi refuted revolutionary overthrow 
instead of preaching gradual development from within” (Zollner, 2009, p.4). Hudhaybi 
clearly stated in an interview with the al-Jumhur al-Masri newspaper in 1951 that 
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Ikhwan were only interested in spiritual power, while material power was exclusively 
the domain of the government (A’shur, 2010, p.177). According to Tal (2005, p.23), 
Hudhaybi adopted a more moderate stance than his predecessor; Tal confirmed that he 
rejected violence. It must be noted that it was difficult to establish an Islamic state in 
Egypt at that time for the reason that Arab Nationalist and Communist ideology 
dominated the Arab region and Egypt.  
Abd Kotob, and Sullivan (1999, p.59) concluded that “the brotherhood has 
accommodated itself to working within the established system, but in hopes of gradually 
enlightening the masses so that eventually the Islamic nation will be formed.” However, 
the same study noted that the group is not content with its de facto recognition by the 
state, which is by no means a legal recognition of its status as a political party, but the 
Brotherhood believed it is important that the state agrees to cooperate with it, so that 
misperceptions can be erased and society’s ills can be readdressed. In addition, it may 
be noted that Ikhwan had no comprehensive and ready project to apply. It might be said 
that one of the mistakes that Ikhwan understood lately was that they lost the opportunity 
to practise ruling with Nasser, so as to gain experience and protect themselves from the 
oppression of the regime. However, according to this orientation, during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, Ikhwan rejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political 
process. However, in recent years, they have revised their political strategies, making a 
clear departure, and focusing on rebuilding their organisation’s structures, in the form of 
health and education institutions, charities and Islamic banks (Tal, 2005, p.48). Some 
scholars claim that Ikhwan were avoiding confrontation with the regime that might have 
provoked repression of the movement.  
However, according to Shahin, by the mid-1980s, they began to participate in the 
parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties, such as Wafd in 1984, 
and the Labour party in 1987. They also contested elections in syndicates, and 
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succeeded in gaining control over many of them later in the 1990s. After 2000, the 
Ikhwan adopted an increasingly assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime, 
and a pragmatic reform agenda (Shahin, 2007, p.1). However, according to Hamzawy 
(2007), the Muslim brotherhood has shown an increased interest in participation in the 
political process since 2003. While the movement was intermittently active in electoral 
politics in the past, its recent participation has been more substantial, and far more 
successful; the result of considerable organisational and planning effort. 
 Shahin (2007) demonstrates that, in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood won almost 20% of 
the People’s Assembly, becoming the strongest opposition movement challenging 
Mubarak’s semi-authoritarian regime. It could be said that the cooperation with other 
political forces that did not share their ideological perspectives was a step towards 
reform, and was a new orientation for the movement against the long background of 
major revisions. Shahin (2007) affirms that revisions introduced gradually since 1994, 
i.e. its electoral programme of 1995, its reform initiative of 2004, and its electoral 
programme of 2005, are also reflected in a seemingly consistent vision among the 
movement’s leadership towards reform and the means to achieve it. 
During the last decade, the movement published many documents with stated policies, 
such as the Muslim Brothers’ reform initiative of 3 March 2004. This document 
reasserts a commitment to the civic nature of political authority, reiterates their 
adherence to the principle of the Shari‘a, and respect for the basic values and 
instruments of democracy; respect for public freedom; acceptance of pluralism; transfer 
of power through fair and true election; sovereignty of the people; separation of power; 
rejection of the use of violence, and adopting gradual and legal means to achieve 
reform; acceptance of citizenship as the basis for rights and responsibilities for Muslims 
and non-Muslims; and support for human rights, including those of women and Copts. 
Yet these developments cannot be isolated from regional and international factors, and 
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the scholars from other movements in the region, and the continuous discussions among 
Islamists, generally, during the 1980s, 1990s, until today.  
It is important to focus on the developments inside the movement itself. On closer 
inspection, it is worth considering that, by the end of the 1980s, a relatively younger 
generation of Islamists with different political experience than the 1960s and 1970s, and 
a more proactive political culture joined the movement, and gradually managed to 
influence its orientations. One may agree with Tadros that these members represented 
different trends, which called for change, while the old generation, which were 
described as rigid, did not understand the need for change. According to these different 
views, the movement split into two; some of the young generation formed al-Wasat 
Party in 1995, for which they pursued recognition from the regime for more than a 
decade (Tadros, 2012, pp.9-13). 
Hamzawy (2007) affirms that, despite the limited track record of Islamists as political 
actors, there is some evidence that they have respected the rules governing their 
participation in legal politics. Even in the cases where these rules are highly restrictive 
and unfair, such as in Egypt and Algeria, Islamist parties have chosen to adhere to them. 
It is important to emphasise the effectiveness of Ikhwan when they participated in 
parliament, because they were well-organised and qualified to play a significant 
political role. This point was verified by the study of Hamzawy (2007), who insisted 
that the Islamists have taken participation in the legislative bodies seriously, more so in 
fact than the ruling establishment and secular opposition parties. 
 
4.2 Jordan 
Ikhwan were established in 1946 in Jordan; Islamists in Jordan participated in the 
government in the 1950s. They built on the intellectual work of many moderate schools 
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of Ikhwan. Ibrahim Gharaiba (1997) asserted that Islamists in Jordan concentrated on 
the ideas of political participation from Hasan al-Banna, el-Hudhaybi, Abd-al-Halim 
Mahmoud, Mohamed Selim el-Awa, Essam al-Arian, Fathi Osman and, to some extent, 
Hasan al-Turabi, Ghannouchi and Yousuf al-Qaradawi; those are the most important 
references for Islamist reformists. However, as for all Islamists, the movement in Jordan 
counts Islam not only as a religion, but as an ethical scheme, which approaches 
economic, social, political and spiritual issues. The movement claims to seek social 
justice through applying Islamic principles and Shari‘a   to society. Moreover, the 
movement introduced itself as a peaceful religious and social movement, and enjoyed 
the support of Prince Abdallah in the 1940s, then King Hussein in the 1950s. 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the Islamists did not support the government, because of 
political issues, such as the Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A particular point of 
difference was the peace process with Israel, when the Jordanian government signed an 
agreement with Israel in Wadi Araba on 26 October 1994 (Abu Rumman, 2007). 
 
4.2.1 Islamists in Jordan and democracy 
Islamists in Jordan did not show acceptance or rejection of democracy, but applied it in 
practice. According to Ali Abdal-Karim al-Kazim in Hussein Abu Rumman (1997), 
some leaders of Ikhwan oppose democracy and count it as non-Islamic and a secular 
tool for governing; they reject it, and consider Shura as the alternative. This opposition 
led some to combine Shura and democracy. The fact is that they participated in most of 
the parliaments since the 1950s, which shows that they were involved in the democratic 
process, even though some members disagree on democracy as a concept and method of 
governing. However Abdalatif Arbiat, one of the intellectual leaders in Jordan with 
theoretical contributions regarding democracy and reform, argued that there is no 
conflict between the concept of Shura and democracy, even though they are not the 
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same. He added that Shura is more comprehensive than democracy, as it includes every 
aspect of life, while democracy is only a part of it: 
“democracy solves a specific part of human life, the problem of those who 
argued that democracy is kufur (infidelity) is that they live under dictators, but 
we say democracy is the tool through which we can apply Shari‘a. Therefore, we 
put democracy on its level, and Shari‘a on its higher level; we use the tools to 
reach the goal” (Arabiat). 
Another Jordanian Islamist, Yousuf al-Azm (Rashid, 1994) argued that democracy is a 
step in our contemporary society, which we should develop till we reach Shura: we 
cannot accept other than Shura; developing it comes through thought and dialogue, not 
sticks and stones. Yusuf al-Azm (in Rashid, 1994) added that Islamists had previously 
rejected democracy, but now accepted it; yet, which democracy is acceptable? 
Democracy that rejects atheism, and accepts what we agreed on. We take from 
democracy what benefits us and reject others. In light of these views, it can be argued 
that Islamists in Jordan follow the general trend in the Islamic world, and depend on the 
political thought of reformers like Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, Turabi and the broad 
international Muslim Brotherhood publications. This can be applied not only to 
Jordanian Islamists, but to most Islamic movements today. As such, the movement 
emerges as a global reformist one, focusing the vision of the human being towards the 
divine. It guides people to the Qur'an, so that they may extract its valuable treasures in 
every domain of life, enabling them to build their lives around systems. It is thus not an 
executive political movement. Further, it is the duty of the Islamic movement to send 
cadres into society possessing an array of leadership abilities; it should not imprison 
them within its ranks (Ghannouchi, 2001). This view shows us that the role of Islamists 
is to think globally, because Islam itself is global. Moreover, it shows that Islamists in 
Jordon benefited from reformist thought from all over the world. 
However, in 1989, when the movement participated in elections, they won 34 out of 80 
seats in the national parliament; yet the Islamic Action Front (IAF), established in 1992, 
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lost some seats in the 1993 election, in which they won only 16 seats, or a fifth of the 
parliament seats. In the 2007 election, Islamists achieved a humble result compared to 
previous results, and gained only 6 out of 110 seats. However, according to Abu 
Rumman: 
“the humble electoral results achieved by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
Jordanian parliamentarian elections of November 20, 2007 shocked most 
observers and analysts. The extent of the poor results was a surprise even to 
those who had predicted that the popularity of the Brotherhood was retreating. 
Even the most pessimistic estimates did not expect the limited amount of 
parliamentary seats that were gained by the Brotherhood” (Abu Rumman, 2007, 
p.9). 
However, it could be said that these election results were due to many reasons: the 
internal crisis within the party, their relationship with Hamas, the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the peace agreement, which was signed between Jordan and Israel, the Gulf War, 
the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition, and the war against terrorism after 11 September 
2001. These are some factors that impacted on Islamist unity, and their relationship with 
the government, and were reflected in the election results. It should also be mentioned 
that many observers, as well as trade unions and student organisations, announced that 
the election was not free and fair. We cannot read the results in isolation from all these 
factors, internal or external. However, in response to these factors, there were changes 
in the Ikhwan discourse and practice, some of them made a serious commitment to 
democracy, while others adopted an extreme and radical line. According to Abu 
Rumman (2007), “officials and others close to the government claim that the 
Brotherhood has taken a more fanatical and radical line in their political discourse and 
practice in this past period.” This claim can be explained in that some Ikhwan rejected 
the agreement, which was signed with Israel, and stand against the government. They 
used the trade unions and student unions in universities, which they controlled.  
However, the government never expected their allies to stand against them, so the state 
adopted policies that targeted Ikhwan, as well as the restriction on public freedoms that 
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undermined the efficacy of political participation. This pressure had its impact on the 
Ikhwan discourse and practice, weakening them. On the other hand, Abu Rumman 
(2007) claimed that their opinion is to the contrary, in that the Brotherhood has taken a 
more serious attitude and commitment to democracy, its prerequisites and its 
preconditions. Abu Rumman added “And contrary to the propaganda of the Arab 
regimes, the Brotherhood is actually paying a high price for their moderation” (Abu 
Rumman, 2007, p.33). It could be said that both opinions are right, because there are 
two intellectual schools of thought each adopted by some leaders; the school of Sayyid 
Qutb and the other closer to the more pragmatic ‘realists’ in the movement.25 But it 
could be noted that the moderate school, which was influenced by the recent reformers 
has been dominant in recent years. 
 
4.2.2 Evolution of the Jordanian Ikhwan political discourse 
During the 1960s-1970s, Ikhwan political discourse focused on a limited set of political 
issues, of which democracy was not one. The movement was deeply influenced by the 
political environment in which Islamists operated in that period, and Sayyid Qutb’s 
school of thought was dominant. The early 1970s witnessed criticism of radical ideas of 
Sayyid Qutb in Egypt. As such, “this critical trend was reinforced by the publication of 
a book entitled ‘Preachers not Judges’ (Du‘āt lā Qudāh) by Hasan al-Hudaybi, former 
General Guide of the Brotherhood (al-Murshid al-‘Ām). This book was followed and 
supported by other publications, written by Salem al-Bahnasawi” (Abu Rumman, 2007, 
p.34). However, in Jordan, according to these critiques, two intellectual schools of 
thought emerged, and were competing to define the Ikhwan political discourse. Abu 
                                                 
25 In the second half of the 1960s, a new Ideological school of thought began to appear within the Ikhwan 
in Jordan with the spread of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamic intellectual, his ideas 
represented a reflection of the mood which arose from the catastrophic outcome of the bloody 
confrontation between the Egyptian Ikhwan and the Nasserite regime in Egypt.  
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Rumman and other scholars classified them as ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’; he argued that the 
first school was closer in ideology and influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, while 
the second was closer to the more pragmatic ‘realists’ in the movement (Abu Rumman, 
2007, p.33-34).  
Yet, after more than two decades, Ikhwan in Jordon have debated the issue of 
democracy internally. These debates strengthened the division between the two schools 
of thought (Shahata, 2012, p.77). Abu Rumman claims that “the ideological school of 
‘hawks’ did not accept the modern democracy in any of its forms, because it represents 
a Western system that gives power and rule of law to people and not to God”; it is the 
problem of Hākimiyyah, which we will discuss in the next chapter. Following this 
rationale, the hawks worked diligently to deconstruct the concept of democracy into a 
philosophy and into a set of instruments. The followers of the hawk ideology put 
forward the following logic: “we accept the mechanisms, but refuse the philosophy of 
democracy.” Therefore, in the choice between democracy and dictatorship, the hawks 
would choose democracy. However, between democracy and Islam, they would choose 
Islam (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.35). In other words, the equation supposed that the hawks 
viewed democracy as a transitional political form of the state, and Islam as the final. On 
the other hand, the rationalist trend or pragmatists accepted democratic values and 
political participation. Abu Rumman affirms that “the rationalist trend or pragmatists 
were influenced by the writings of Rashid al-Ghannouchi and Hasan al-Turabi”, and 
added that the Egyptian Sheikh, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in the 1990s, also played a large 
role in constructing the pragmatist trend (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.35). However, the 
competition between the two schools of thought continued under one movement until 
2001, when some members left Ikhwan, either by choice or by expulsion, after the 
decision to boycott the election was made under the influence of the hawks; a group of 
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these members formed Hizb al-Wasat or the Islamic Moderation Party in 2001 
(Hammerstein, 2010, p.49). 
The pragmatists practically participated in the government in the 1970s, when Ishaq al-
Farhan accepted to be a minster in the government. According to this decision, his 
membership in the movement was frozen for many years. On the other hand, in the 
1990s, the pragmatist trend pushed Ikhwan to participate in the parliamentary elections, 
and subsequently in the cabinet of Muder Badran in 1991. Consequently, this step led to 
significant changes in the movement. This analysis is supported by Abu Rumman’s 
statement, when he affirms that: 
“with the return of the parliamentary life, the pragmatist would re-impose their 
presence in the leadership of the Brotherhood and its various institutions. Six 
months after the 1990 parliamentary elections, the brotherhood executive office 
was made up mainly of moderate members from the pragmatic trend” (Abu 
Rumman, 2007, p.35). 
Although this ‘executive office’ resigned two years before its term, because of conflict 
within the movement, further reinforcement of the moderating trend in the movement 
was made. 
 
4.2.3 Debate over participation in the government  
According to these conflicts, further heated debates took place between the two trends: 
“the conflict was epitomised in a book published by one of the most prominent of the 
hawks, Dr Mohammed Abu Faris, entitled ‘Participation in the Jahilya System’s 
Government’ in which he refuted the arguments that the Brotherhood relied on in 
making their decision to participate in the government” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.36). 
Consequently, the pragmatists reacted to that book, and called on Dr Omer al-Ashkar to 
respond to Abu Faris’s claims in a book entitled ‘The ruling to participate in the cabinet 
and in municipal councils’. In his book, Ashkar refused Abu Faris’s Fatwa and accepted 
participation in the parliament and the cabinet. At the same time, he considered that “the 
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rule should be ‘not to allow participation in such a state’, with the exception of allowing 
participation based on the long-term strategic interests and aims of the Brotherhood” 
(Ashkar, 1992, pp.1-35). Surprisingly, that means both Ashkar and Faris consider that 
participation in the cabinet in such states (Arab states) is not legitimate, but the 
difference between their opinions is that Ashkar proposed some exceptional cases by 
allowing Ikhwan to participate based on the long-term strategic interests of the Islamic 
movement to take steps towards its end goal, which is establishing an Islamic state and 
applying Islamic values in society and government institutions. Later, Dr Ali al-Sawwa 
responded to both Abu Faris and Ashkar rejecting their main argument, and considered 
the Fatwa of ‘not legitimatising political participation’ as not valid, rejecting this Fatwa 
to be the foundation for Ikhwan to build upon (Gharayba, 1997, pp.109-112). This 
dispute increased confidence among Ikhwan that general opinion among them will not 
strongly resist the moderate stands of the movement, so they started to accept the 
pluralistic stance, and participated in national policy making. As a consequence, they 
started to participate in the national political agenda. Ishaq al-Farhan affirms that: 
“in the early 1990s, the Brotherhood actively participated in drafting the 
National Charter, which was tantamount to a political document prepared by a 
core group of representatives from different Jordanian political parties or 
perspectives. The Charter announced the commencement of a new era in public 
politics in Jordan. It introduced many new political perceptions, which implied 
the Brotherhood’s acceptance, to a large extent of political and ideological 
plurality and other major aspects of human rights, public freedoms and other 
conditions of political modernity” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.56). 
In conclusion, this debate enriched the Ikhwan alternatives, and drove them to reform 
their understanding of religion. Moreover, it raised the awareness of the members of the 
movement of the importance of contributions to policy making in the country, and 
participation in the parliament, and the government cabinet. Moreover, during the 
1980s-1990s, public opinion in the Islamic world, specifically Islamist opinion, was 
inclined strongly towards political participation. This public opinion was mobilised by 
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many activities and debates among Islamists through regional conferences, the media 
and publications. 
 
4.2.4 Building a political party 
Ikhwan in Jordan existed as a charitable organisation, not as a political party. Although 
some members participated in the government, during the 1950s-1980s their 
organisation enjoyed the privilege of government support and being a part of it. 
However, Ikhwan supported the government all this period as well. On the other hand, 
the Ikhwan were registered with the Ministry of Social Development as a charitable 
society. Therefore, if they wanted to become an official political party, it would not be 
possible to work as a charity, and they may perhaps not be able to practise advocacy 
work. The Ikhwan with independent leaders, who adopted Islam as their state reference, 
had established their party following the experiment of the National Islamic Front in 
Sudan, which had been established by Islamists and independent national leaders, and 
even non-Muslims in 1985. “In 1992, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) was established by 
Ikhwan as a response to the new political climate in Jordan, especially after the 
enactment of the political parties law” (Abu Rumman, 1996, pp.50-54). The party faced 
many problems, and was never able to gain independence from the Ikhwan organisation 
(Hammerstein, 2010, p.48). However, the question is to what extent this political party 
believed in democracy, theoretically and practically. Indeed, the principles of the IAF 
confirm that the consolidation of national unity and democratic approach, ‘Shura’, are 
the main principles of the party. Moreover, defending dignity, human rights and freedom 
in general are important objectives. It could be said that building the party itself can be 
evidence of accepting democracy, and playing a role in establishing a pluralistic 
democratic system. As a result of the debates, a third trend started to appear on the 
horizon, and was enhanced and grew within the movement, and was later called al-
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Wasatia, and later formed the Wasatia forum, which is characterised by the fact that its 
members agree with the doves’ political discourse in which: 
“they accept democracy, they do not brand the government as an ‘infidel’ and 
they believe in political participation, contrary to the hawks. However, Ikhwan 
political discourse shows that the doves and al-Wasatia are more democratic 
than the hawks, but all the trends are involved in the political participation and 
democratic process” (Wasatia conference papers, 2008). 
“al-Wasat committed to democratic process pluralism and rights of women” 
(Hammerstein, 2010, p.49).  
In light of what has been discussed, it is important to say that Islamists confirm that the 
terms governing the nation-state are one of their significant concerns, and come from 
the following provision: 
“Adopting Shura, principles and tools of democracy, including accepting the 
electoral process according to justice, law, transparent elections, and a peaceful 
rotation of executive power, as a constant approach in political life and practice” 
(Abu Rumman, 2007, p.47). 
In addition, in most Islamist documents, such as the ‘Vision for reform’, issued in 2005, 
they: 
“reiterate the ideal of protecting freedoms, such as the right of assembly, 
freedom of expression and peaceful demonstration. They also guarantee the 
freedom of belief and religious practices for all citizens, as well as safeguarding 
the individual freedoms of citizens; for example, individual and personal privacy 
of citizens and with regard to women’s issues, the document states its support of 
the right of women to vote, to run in elections, to assume political offices and to 
join political parties” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.47). 
Although the Ikhwan discourse developed significantly during the last two decades, and 
was considered as a step forward to conformity within the tent of modern democracy, it 
does not approach all the issues that should be approached. Such discourse left many 
grey areas, especially those issues of regional and international relations, economics, 
and the political rights of minorities. On the other hand, there was a serious problem 
between their discourse, and the reality or practical implementation of their programme, 
which depended on altruistic demands, principles and values, without a plan of action or 
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practical steps to apply these values, and deal with challenges facing the state, or the 
alternatives in upcoming issues. However, Islamist political participation in Jordan was 
supported by the majority of the movement members, although some trends reject 
participation in the cabinet. 
 
4.3 Tunisia 
Tunisia is a North African, Arab country. It was colonised by the French between 1881 
and 1956, after which Bourghiba became its first president (1957-1987), followed by 
Zein al-Abdine Ben Ali (1987-2011). Both men adopted a secular political system, 
although Islam is rooted in Tunisia; as in Algeria, it inspired the freedom fighters 
against colonialism (Borowiec, 1998, pp.xi-xii). According to Salwa Ismail, in the 
1980s-1990s Algeria and Tunisia witnessed the rise of the Islamist movement (Ismail, 
2006, p.5).  
Rashid al-Ghanouchi is one of the influential modern Islamists; he was sentenced to 11 
years for his political activities, and jailed in 1981, but released in 1984 under a 
presidential pardon. In June 1981, the Islamic Trend Movement (ITM) (Harakat Al 
Itijah al-Islami) was established. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987, but in 
the same year Zein al-Abdine Ben Ali replaced Bourghiba and released 608 prisoners; 
Ghannouchi was among them. In 1989, ITM was turned into Hizb Harakat al-Nahda 
(abbr. al-Nahda), which participated in the national election and won about 24%-30% of 
the vote. However, the government took tough measures against the movement, and 
many members were jailed. It could be said that the same historical context influenced 
most Islamists at that time. 
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4.3.1 Political discourse 
It is important to explore the political discourse of Islamists in Tunisia: how it 
developed; to what extent it was influenced by the Ikhwan school; and how they 
renewed and built their approach towards a comprehensive theory of life. In this case, 
this study concentrates on their key theories and practice; in particular, exploring 
Ghannouchi, who did revolutionary work in the political, economic and social fields. 
It must be said that Malek Bennabi (1905-1973)
26
 had a profound influence on 
Ghannouchi, who considered him a pillar of Islamic thought and a revivalist of Ibn 
Khuldūn's Islamic rationalism (Tamimi, 2005, p.31). Ghannouchi himself asserts that 
“Bennabi's methodology was different from what had been accepted in the orthodox 
Islamic text” (Kausar, 2005, p.338). It could be said that Bennabi's ideas were 
representative of the Arab Maghreb School that drew its inspiration from the reformist 
thought of Khayr al-Dīn al-Tunisi, Mohammed ‘Abdu, Ibn Badis, al-Tha‘alibi and A'lal 
al-Fāsi (Kausar, 2005, p.347). 
From this perspective, it could be said that Ghannouchi was influenced by Bennabi and 
Ibn Khuldūn, then went to Syria and Egypt, and started his activities in Tunisia. In 
1970, Ghannouchi and Abdalfatah Moro established an Islamic movement for culture, 
education and Da’wa, ITM (Moussalli, 2004, p.239). However, in 1981, as Ghannouchi 
set up his political party, ITM, he applied for a licence, but never received a response. 
The ITM proclaimed itself as a “political movement based on Islam”. Abdelsalam 
asserts that Ghannouchi called for reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable 
basis, and the acceptance of political pluralism and democracy (Kausar, 2005, p.340). It 
should be said that, in this period, Ghannouchi advocated a resurrection of Islamic life 
                                                 
26 Or Malik Bin Nabi: he is a great thinker. Algerian Malik Bennabi was born in Constantine. Highly 
regarded as the most eminent scholar and thinker, and one of the foremost intellectuals of the modern 
Muslim world. Educated in Paris and Algeria in engineering, he later based himself in Cairo, where he 
spent much of his time toiling through fields of history, philosophy and sociology. 
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in his country, the renewal of Islamic thought, a return to moral and religious values, 
and limiting Westernisation. In addition, he confirmed the ITM's rejection of violence as 
a means of transforming society.  
However, Abdelsalam asserts: “at that time, Ghannouchi’s espousal of democracy was 
unacceptable to many Islamic groups outside Tunisia, who interpreted it as imitation of 
the west” (Kausar, 2005, p.340). It must be said that this opinion shows the leading role 
of Ghannouchi and others, who encouraged Muslims to adopt or accept democracy as a 
way of changing towards Islam. This experience encouraged him to develop a 
theoretical approach to democracy, and he played a leading role among Islamists in 
reforming and renewing the issues of democracy, freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and human rights for ethnic and religious minorities, and the role of women. 
He shares this view with Turabi in Sudan, and to some extent el-Awa and Qaradawi in 
Egypt.  
However, Ghannouchi and other Islamist ‘reformists’ supported the principles of a 
multi-party democratic system, and evidence supports the idea that this was not a tactic, 
especially since Ghannouchi and Turabi were persistently promoting these principles. 
Ghannouchi used to defend these principles, arguing: 
“stop saying the concept of democracy is not a part of our culture ... Democracy 
is Islam. ... What can we say for those Islamists (political activists) who say 
democracy is an infidel concept? Is this only a language difference, so the 
problem is a mere formality (Shakliyyah). Democracy is only a peaceful tool for 
political and intellectual conflicts. Is Islam a religion that does not include any 
restriction? It is obviously so in politics. Freedom is not expected to be a danger 
for Islam, as long as it represents its soul or core” (interview 26 November 2006, 
London). 
There was a general development in the history of Islamists towards accepting 
democracy as a concept and as a tool. 
“Four decades ago, writers within the mainstream Islamic political throughout 
treated democracy and pluralism as alien to Islam. This was typical of the 
position of writers affiliated with Sayyid Qutb who rejected the secular 
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foundation of not only democracy but also capitalism and communism” (Burgat, 
2001, p.344). 
Yet, by the mid-1980s, this trend started to lose its momentum with the rise of a new 
paradigm that treated democracy not as ideology or philosophy to be emulated by 
Muslims, but as a tool for electing, checking, and rotating political power and for 
protecting civil liberties and basic rights of citizens (Kausar, 2005, p.346). Ghannouchi 
is one of the revivalists, who participates in, crystallises, and advocates this vision. 
Moreover, Abdelsalam argues that Ghannouchi had been at the forefront of this new 
trend that advocated democracy and pluralism. He rejected the Western notion that 
secularism is essential for democracy, and insisted on the compatibility of some of the 
principles of democracy with Islam (Kausar, 2005, p.347). 
It was during his detention in 1980-1984 that Ghannouchi evolved his ideas about the 
question of civil liberties and democracy. In prison, Ghannouchi started writing his 
renowned work, ‘Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Āma fī al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah’ (Public Liberties in 
the Islamic state), which represented his attempt to refute misconceptions, which 
portrayed Islam as a threat and grave danger to civilisation in its modern sense, and the 
freedoms of citizens, both civil and personal (Kausar, 2005, p.347). Ghannouchi agreed 
with Bennabi on the answer to the question: is democracy in Islam? He affirmed that 
Islam is a democratic ideology emphasising Muslim political and social rights to resist 
enslavement. In addition, he observed that democracy was practised in the first Islamic 
state. Abdelsalam argued that “Ghannouchi was profoundly inspired by ideas of 
Bennabi on democracy and found them more matured than those espoused by the school 
of Sayyid Qutb, which rejected democracy” (Kausar, 2005, p.347). 
Azam Tamimi argued that: 
“Ghannouchi drew a sharp distinction between the western and secular state, and 
the secular state in the Maghrib. In the former, there is recognition of power 
sharing, but in the latter there is no such recognition. To Ghannouchi, this model 
identifies more with fascist and communist models. The institutions of civil 
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society, mosques, endowments, religious schools, trade unions, political parties, 
charities and mass media have all been put under tight state control” (Kausar, 
2005, p.46). 
On the other hand, Abdelsalam asserts that Ghannouchi criticised two groups: first, the 
Arab secularists, who treated democracy as a set of sacred absolutes; and, second, the 
extremists, who would blindly reject everything that comes from the West. For 
Ghannouchi, more constructive and positive interaction with the West requires Muslims 
to borrow from the West what is compatible with Islam, and reject what is antithetical to 
Islam (Kausar, 2005, p.342).  
However, to Ghannouchi, new generations of Muslim reformists educated in the West 
aspired to rebuild their society, applying modernity, but not necessarily Westernised, 
which can be operationalised by these reformists to mean liberty, dignity, and effective 
participation in government by all citizens, and not merely coping with the negative 
aspects of Western civilisation. Ghannouchi called this reformist trend: “the Islamic 
revival movement”, while Westerners referred to it as “fundamentalism”—a term which 
Ghannouchi characterised as derogatory, hence objectionable. In his paper, ‘Islam and 
the West’, Ghannouchi argues that this movement is similar in some ways to the 
Protestant reform movement of the Renaissance, inasmuch as it is characterised by vivid 
social, economic and political activity, intellectual revival, profound belief in liberty and 
political participation. This is the case, because these Islamists have accepted the values 
of modernity and democracy, but within the framework of the values of Islam 
(Ghannouchi, 2005, p.343). 
The establishment of ITM in 1981 was a watershed in the political history of Islamic 
movements; it preceded the NIF, which was established in Sudan in 1985. Ghannouchi 
(1992) presented a paper about ‘The Islamic Concept of the State’; it was presented at 
the annual spring conference of the Young Muslim Association in London. In the paper, 
he pointed out that in time he had unequivocally given his full commitment to 
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democracy as a system of government, and as a method of change. Despite the criticism 
levelled against him and his movement by other Islamists, especially those from the 
Mashriq or ‘East’, Ghannouchi remained firm in his convictions on democracy and 
pluralism.  
One of the important theoretical Islamist achievements was Ghannouchi’s book, Al-
Hurriyyat al-‘Āma fī al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah. In it, Ghannouchi analysed a number of 
basic principles of his political scheme for a contemporary Islamic state. Foremost 
among these are: the concept of freedom, citizenship, citizenship rights, political rights 
and liberties, the inadequacy of Western democracy, the foundation of Islamic 
democracy, and the principles of an Islamic state; his book is a landmark in the history 
of revivalism. However, Ghannouchi’s moderate vision was criticised by the Tunisian 
Islamic Salvation Front, which adopted revolutionary military action and hard-line 
positions (Moussalli, 2004, p.211). 
 
4.3.2 Political party 
It is important to point out that Islamists in Tunisia could not establish a legitimate 
political party, because the government never issued a licence. Therefore, they turned 
into a secret movement that could not practise politics, except through the Tunisian 
student associations, and general labour union. In 1989, a new law prohibited political 
parties of a religious character. Consequently, the Islamists changed the name of the 
movement to Harakat al-Nahda, and changed the nature of its activities into political 
ones under the leadership of Ghannouchi and Moro. However, since the founding of the 
movement, the government began to take tough measures against the leaders and 
members of the movement. The confrontation culminated in massive arrests in 1987, 
the dismantling of most of the organisational structures of the movement, and the 
President, Habib Bourguiba, issuing death sentences on some of the leaders of the 
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movement, but Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, his Prime Minister, played a major role in 
removing him from power (Moussalli, 2004, pp.239-249). Ghannouchi went into exile 
in London, but returned to Tunisia in January 2011 to resume political activities after 
the revolution that removed Ben Ali. 
In conclusion, it could be said that, in Tunisia, Ghannouchi contributed significantly in 
developing the concepts and theories related to democracy, as mentioned above. In 
practice, the Islamists tried to form a political party in 1984, to participate in legitimate 
political and civil society activities, but were confronted by a dictatorship, which jailed 
most of its members, while some members fled to Europe, the US and other countries. 
However, how Islamists practise democracy, participate in governments and 
parliaments, and compete with other parties in election processes could not be examined 
because they never had a chance to apply these theories. However, researchers can now 
observe their behaviour over the next few years, as Tunisia is now a democratic, 
pluralistic country, in which Islamists promise to participate in the political process, and 
to enhance the democratic experiment in Tunisia. Al-Nahda leaders returned from exile 
after the successful revolution in Tunisia in 2010 (described below), and the party was 
officially registered. 
 
4.3.3 Islamists in Tunisia after the revolution 
In a dramatic sequence of events on 17 December 2010, Tunisia kick-started the Arab 
Spring by overthrowing the dictatorship there, followed by Egypt and Yemen, and 
others. In Tunisia, what is known as the ‘Jasmine revolution’ began when a fruit vendor, 
Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself alight in an act of public protest. The protests that 
began in Sidi Bouzid, his hometown, quickly spread to other parts of the country. This 
was the beginning of the revolution that removed Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 14 
January 2011; he officially resigned after fleeing to Saudi Arabia, ending 23 years in 
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power. A new era began in Tunisia, where democracy and political participation was 
granted and political parties were legalised. Tunisia with many decades of secular 
government and traditions may be compared to Turkey, as a secular country ruled by 
Islamists. Elisabeth Fair (2011, p.41) believes that “Turkey has been cited thus far as a 
good example of a secular country ruled by an Islamist party; let us hope that Tunisia 
takes this example and fashions it as their [sic] own.” Once the Islamist political party, 
al-Nahda, was legalised, its leaders came back to Tunisia after 23 years of exile. 
 
4.3.3.1 Islamist opposition to violence and the call for democracy  
Ghannouchi is opposed to any change through violence. He agrees with Turabi that 
change may be achieved through reform. When Ghannouchi analysed the option of 
revolution, he confirmed that he opposed violence, and that dictatorial governments 
have forced people to adopt violence as a means of change. In this context, some Salafi 
groups chose the way of violence, and were jailed by the regime. Ghannouchi explains: 
“this led to a situation of despair, people giving up on the idea that change can 
be through reform, and a lot of people called for violent means of change. They 
developed theories that change in the region was only possible through violence. 
We find, in Tunisia, thousands of young people, who are Salafis, jailed because 
of their violent ideas; some went to Iraq, to Afghanistan—and are also in 
European prisons” (Ghannouchi, 30 November 2011). 
One may agree with Ghannouchi’s point of view, in that these trends emerged because 
the regime delegitimised moderate movements, such as al-Nahda, and so this situation 
was “created by the void that al-Nahda left when the regime decided to delegitimise al-
Nahda and imprison its leaders” (Ghannouchi, 30 November 2011). In the same 
document, in his evaluations, Ghannouchi confirms that: “All alternatives to reforms – 
through violence – have failed, and all violent ways have failed. They did not produce a 
single case of success.” It is apparent that he came to this conclusion after evaluating 
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those cases where violence was adopted, and failed to achieve the goal of change. 
Indeed, it is his belief that reform is the best way to effect change.  
 
4.3.3.2 Democracy: one of the reasons for the Arab revolutions 
Many observers refer the basis for revolution to economic reasons, encompassing the 
rising rate of unemployment and the mounting social pressure. This may be true, yet 
others argue that the reasons are related to human dignity and liberty, more so than 
economic factors. In a lecture entitled ‘Islamists in power … economic challenges of 
transition’ delivered at the Carnegie Centre in Washington DC, Mondher Ben Ayed 
argued that: 
“[t]here are two main slogans that were raised during the Tunisian revolution, 
which is [sic] liberty and dignity. So it is not the bread and food revolution. It is 
a revolution against dictatorship to regain freedom and dignity as well ... we 
need to keep that in mind” (Ayed, 5 April 2012). 
However, in the same lecture, he confirms: “there were also some social economic 
problems that were, you know, developing in the society before the revolution.” It could 
be noted that this is no different from the reasons for the revolution in Egypt and other 
countries, which followed in the steps of the revolution in Tunisia. This raises the 
question of how Islamists will solve the economic and social problems, and the issues of 
human rights; how will they react to the issues raised by the revolution? As mentioned 
above, Ghannouchi’s political thought offers theoretical solutions, but has not been 
examined in practice yet.  
 
4.3.3.3 Challenges facing al-Nahda 
Al-Nahda is faced with challenges in the human rights, political and economic domains. 
It is notable that Ghannouchi reacted positively to the challenges related to the liberty of 
the people, and the freedom of religion, expression, and speech. The project for the 
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Nahda party is to establish a solid democratic system, and to solve the economic and 
social problems. In an interview with Asharq al-Awsat on 26 December 2011, 
Ghannouchi argues: 
“politics is judged by words and actions, not intentions. Since the Nahda party 
came to the political arena in 1981, we have confirmed our commitment to 
grand principles such as democracy, human rights, [political] pluralism, 
rejection of violence and coups as mechanisms of [political] change, as well as 
our complete commitment to equality between the sexes. This is something that 
we have stressed in all of our speeches and rhetoric, and it is clear to anyone 
who has studied our statements in a scientific manner. We are committed to 
these principles, and this is something that we have repeated a thousand times.” 
It is clear that he addresses these issues and tries to answer the people’s questions on 
how al-Nahda, as an Islamist party, will approach the issues of democracy, human 
rights, and the economic and social challenges existing in Tunisia. In further 
clarification, on 15 January 2011, Ghannouchi announced, 
“we want an example of a democratic state; to strive for common values; for a 
society in which democracy is respected—we want to establish a religious base 
for democracy and human rights.” 
This is in contrast to his preaching in the 1970s, in which he condemned the rise of 
secular ideas in his homeland, and the advances in women's rights. Indeed, Ghannouchi 
has said that Shari‘a (Islamic law) had “no place in Tunisia” (al-Arabiya, 1 March 
2011). Furthermore, on the al-Arabiya news channel on 19 October 2011, Ghannouchi 
confirmed, “We are ready to lead a government of national unity if the Tunisian people 
place their trust in us.” This was before the election, in which most observers predicted 
that al-Nahda would win most of the votes. When elections were held, Ghannouchi's 
party, al-Nahda, emerged as the clear winner, with about 90 (42%) of the 217 seats in 
the Constituent Assembly, confirming predictions by observers and the Islamists 
themselves. It is noticeable that, during the election, al-Nahda was sending moderate 
messages to Tunisians, contrasting with the Salafi groups. This allowed them to win the 
hearts and minds of this percentage of the vote, and to be respected by other partners, 
who welcomed participating in the government with al-Nahda. It is important to 
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confirm that the movement succeeded in forming a government with partners from 
leftist political parties. Al-Nahda adopted an inclusive approach towards all the political 
parties and individuals. In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington 
on 30 November 2011, Ghannouchi asserted: 
“The case in Tunisia was characterised by the fact that the Islamists and also the 
secular and leftist parties of the opposition came together in 2005, and they 
established a common platform between them; a platform that is agreed upon by 
all parties; that establishes a civil, democratic way of government, that 
recognises universal human rights, including the rights of women as defined by 
the Personal Status Code in Tunisia; that also defines a clear role between 
government and religion -- government, the state, whose role is not to impose 
any religion or to forbid any religion.” 
On examination, it is clear that Ghannouchi adopted the civil democratic way of 
government when al-Nahda won the election in October 2011. As for the gender issue, 
of the 90 members of the Party elected to the Constituent Assembly, 42 were women, a 
percentage more than in any other party. 
The approach adopted by the movement is one of the main factors behind winning these 
first elections. In the same speech in Washington (at the Council on Foreign Relations 
on 30 November 2011), Ghannouchi explained why al-Nahda won the election. He 
asserted: persecuted 
“Al-Nahda won the first elections in Tunisia because of two factors. The first 
factor is the capital of sympathy that it had with people, because it was the most 
persecuted in the past years, so -- and the second factor is because al-Nahda 
spoke a very easy language, a language that is very close to the people, to their 
understanding; and that it freed Islam so that Islam became a symbol of 
fraternity, a symbol of freedom, including the freedom of women's rights. And 
for that matter, even the practice illustrates that, since in the constitutional 
assembly there are 49 women today elected among 217, 42 of whom are from 
al-Nahda. And some of these al-Nahda women are -- have the headscarf; others 
do not.” 
One may say that the first factor will not continue to be influential in the next election, 
as the people will judge the movement by what it has done and how it acted. The second 
factor led al-Nahda to be welcomed in Tunisian society and in the international 
community, as a moderate Islamic movement, but in fact it faces challenges inside the 
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movement itself, where some members think that it is too flexile and does not express 
their Islamic views. Although this group is a minority in the movement, it is important 
to reflect their existence. Indeed, it is important for the movement to engage in internal 
dialogue to minimise future division, if the expectations of this group become a wider 
trend in the movement.  
 
4.3.3.4 Al-Nahda and the state 
In this chapter, the study evaluated Ghannouchi’s theoretical approach on the issue of 
the state. In this context, the study evaluates how Ghannouchi and the Nahda party 
practised democracy, according to the theoretical approach explained above. After the 
revolution, elections were held, in which al-Nahda won 42% of seats in the parliament, 
which allowed them to form the government given the majority they won, along with 
two other secular parties. Ghannouchi did two things: first, he approached Tunisian 
society and political parties with messages to show that they were an inclusive, open, 
and democratic political party that respects others’ political opinion, personal privacy, 
and choices (human rights). Accordingly, al-Nahda approached all the political parties 
when they came to form the government. Ghannouchi explained that al-Nahda had a 
very open platform that was inclusive of most Tunisians. Second he sent messages to 
Tunisians that the government does not interfere in their personal religiosity, and that it 
had no business interfering in the people’s personal choices; for these reasons, they 
were keen to form a national unity government. On this point, Ghannouchi (30 
November 2011) confirms: 
“that is why we were keen on forming a national unity government, a national 
coalition that includes Islamists, but also includes secular parties, parties from 
the left, parties who are liberal, in order to say to the people that we want to 
unite and include, not divide, and that the debate is not between Islamist and 
non-Islamist or Islamist and secular. There are many kinds of secularism and 
many models for secularism.” 
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Ghannouchi not only approached the secular parties and groups, but also Salafi groups, 
and sent positive messages to them, through direct contact and the media. Ghannouchi 
(30 November 2011) asserted: 
“the Salafists are part of the Tunisian people; they faced what all members of 
Tunisian society who confronted tyranny faced. This group faced the worst 
suppression – from the former regime – after the Nahda party; indeed their 
members have taken the place of the Nahda prisoners. They are our people, and 
we have been prevented from carrying out our duties towards them [during the 
previous era]. If some of them are known for extremism, this is a response to the 
state’s suppression, and the harsh laws, and so their reaction must be equal to the 
[original] action.” 
Here, Ghannouchi recognised the sacrifices of the Salafis, and showed understanding of 
their reaction to the previous government’s suppression. These kinds of messages may 
lead Salafi groups to adopt a moderate approach towards political practice and Tunisian 
society, which will lead to a more tolerant society. In another interview with the Asharq 
al-Awsat newspaper, he argued that: 
“[T]he Salafists in Tunisia are not a single party or trend, there are a number of 
Salafist trends, and we expect that, with the absence of suppression and the 
provision of an atmosphere of dialogue and freedom, the phenomenon of 
extremism will decrease, and that the Tunisian religious outlook, that is known 
for moderation, will prevail in the end, and that all political trends in society will 
exist within a compassionate national unity framework” (Asharq al-Awsat, 26 
December 2011). 
From this discourse, it is clear that Ghannouchi is trying to approach the challenges with 
practical methods that unite Tunisians to work together for Tunisia, and to minimise the 
difference between the major political and social forces in the country, and push them to 
come to an agreeable platform to govern the country and establish a solid democratic 
system that is respected by all the political powers and society. Ghannouchi (19 October 
2011) on al-Arabiya TV insisted that his party’s main aim was the formation of an 
interim government “which unites all the parties with the participation of Tunisia’s state 
organs.” Radwan Masmudi evaluated the election in Tunisia, and affirmed that: 
“al-Nahda in the end, emerged as the main political party in Tunisia. After 30 
years of being systematically put down, it was finally recognised as a political 
party in February 2011. More importantly, it succeeded in portraying itself as 
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rooted in Islamic values, but simultaneously and deeply attached to democracy, 
human rights and dignity for all” (Masmudi, 13 December 2011). 
However, one may agree with observers who believe that, at this stage, compromise and 
prioritising the nation's interests are essential ingredients for a successful transition to 
democracy. 
The other issues, such as rights, citizenship, and women in the state, were confirmed by 
the leader of the party, and practical steps were taken in this regard. Ghannouchi on al-
Jazeera TV, on 25 October 2011, declared that “We accept the notion of citizenship as 
the basis of rights, so all citizens are equal whether they are Islamist or not Islamist.” He 
also stressed that al-Nahda accepts gender equality, enshrined in Tunisia's Personal 
Status Code under Mr Ben Ali, as “an acceptable interpretation within Islam.” These are 
some of the most important points that concerned Tunisians, specifically gender issues 
and human rights. One of the leaders of the movement compared their movement with 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey “In Turkey and Tunisia there was the same 
movement of reconciliation between Islam and modernity and we are the descendants of 
this movement” (al-Arabiya, 20 April 2012). The party declared that it respects state 
institutions, the independence of the judicial system, and human rights issues. Nur al-
Dīn Beheiri, a member of the Political Bureau in the Nahda party confirms: 
“We are with the reconstruction of constitutional institutions based on respect 
for the law and the independence of the judiciary, and respect for the rights of 
women, and even strengthened on the basis of equality among all citizens, 
regardless of creed, sex and body to which they belong” (BBC, 25 October 
2011). 
However, it is clear that the leaders of the party were very keen to achieve a united 
Tunisia, and to establish a solid democratic system that satisfies most of the community 
and is agreed upon. They pursued the consensus of the majority of political parties and, 
for these reasons, al-Nahda’s leaders confirmed that they abandoned the demand for 
inclusion of Shari‘a in the constitution, and were satisfied with the first chapter, which 
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states that “Tunisia is an Islamic state”. This reflects rational and pragmatic political 
decisions made by the Islamists. Nevertheless, these declarations were faced with 
criticism from some Islamists and secularists; the Islamists argued that al-Nahda 
abandoned its promises of establishing an Islamic state, and its Islamic objectives and 
values. On the other hand, the secularists argued that al-Nahda speaks two languages, 
and consider that the party has a secret agenda to impose hard-line Islam. In their view, 
al-Nahda adopted these ideas for internal reasons, such as seeking more supporters and 
votes, and external reasons, such as international pressure. On many occasions, the 
leaders of al-Nahda, unlike many Islamist groups in the region, declared that they have 
explicitly guaranteed to campaign for democratic values and women’s rights, yet secular 
groups and some Islamist groups still criticised them. However, it is still early to judge 
this short experiment, in a complicated situation, internally and externally. 
 
4.3.3.5 The government 
In the election held on 23 October 2011, al-Nahda won 90 out of 217 seats. The second 
party was the Congress for the Republic,
27
 a nationalist leftist party, led by scholar al-
Moncef al-Marzouki (1945-),
28
 with 30 seats. The third party was the Democratic Bloc 
Party for Work and Freedom (Ettakatol),
29
 a moderate leftist party, under the leadership 
of Mustafa Ben Jaafar with 21 seats. In forming the government, Ghannouchi was 
aware of the challenges facing the country after a long period under dictatorship, as well 
as the different approaches adopted by the political parties to confront these challenges. 
                                                 
27
 The Congress for the Republic (CPR) is under the leadership of al-Moncef al-Marzouki. The previously 
banned leftist, nationalist party promises a socialist approach: stronger control over the banks, 
redistribution of wealth, the creation of agricultural cooperatives, and lower VAT. 
28
 Born in 1945, from south Tunisia; he is a PhD holder in medicine, and has been a human rights’ activist 
for about two decades. He was teaching in a university in France. 
29
 Ettakatol is led by Mustapha Ben Jaafar, who has declared his presidential ambitions. The party seeks a 
stronger regulatory role for the state. It promised the creation of 100,000 jobs in 2012-2013, partly 
through expanded public works programmes. It has prioritised the eradication of regional differences 
between cities on the coast and the poorer, inland areas, long overlooked for investment by the state. 
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Therefore, he called for consensus and coalition between the political forces in the 
country, to participate in government and building the state. On this point, Ghannouchi 
declared: 
“We seek a consensus with the other parties, because we believe that Tunisia 
must have a coalition government for the next five years, because the situation 
in the country cannot be handled by a single party” (Ghannouchi, 30 November 
2011). 
Moreover, Ghannouchi insisted that his party’s main aim was the formation of an 
interim government, “which unites all the parties with the participation of Tunisia’s state 
organs” (al-Arabiya, 19 October 2011). These declarations had significant positive 
influence on the political atmosphere in the country, and raised confidence in the Nahda 
party, which tried to allay the fears of secular groups, and women specifically. It could 
be said that these declarations encouraged the other political parties to participate in the 
coalition government. At the same time, it helped the international community to 
understand the new political leaders in Tunisia.  
Al-Nahda formed the government; they built a coalition with the Congress for the 
Republic and the Democratic Bloc Party for Work and Freedom; they chose al-Moncef 
al-Marzouki, the leader of the former party as President of Tunisia, and Mustafa Ben 
Jaafar, the leader of the Democratic Bloc Party for Work and Freedom, as President of 
the Constituent Assembly, while al-Nahda’s Secretary-General, Hamadi al-Jebali, was 
chosen as Prime Minister. This coalition governed Tunisia after the October 2011 
election. They agreed on common ground to establish a democratic system that respects 
political pluralism, individual freedom, freedom of expression, and the equality and 
emancipation of women. Indeed, Ghannouchi said to the media in London before 
returning home from exile on 30 March 2011: “For many years we have agreed 
alongside the opposition parties on common ground, including approving freedom of 
conscience, political pluralism ... and we have agreed on a paper on gender equality” 
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(al-Arabiya, 30 March 2011). Moreover, Nur al-Dīn Beheiri, a member of the Political 
Bureau in the Nahda party, confirmed his party’s commitment to “respect the rights of 
women and all the pledges of the Tunisian state” (BBC, 25 October 2011). For greater 
consensus in Tunisia’s political community, al-Nahda declared on 26 March 2012 that it 
opposed incorporating Shari‘a law into the new constitution, disappointing religious 
conservatives, including the third largest party in the Constituent Assembly, who have 
called in recent weeks for Shari‘a to be the main template for the document (al-Arabiya, 
2 April 2012). This declaration attracted the attention of the media and politicians; the 
same declaration was published by The Times (9 April 2012), which stated: 
“on 26 March 2012 al-Nahda said that the country’s post-revolution constitution 
would not mention Islamic law as a source of legislation, signalling a forceful 
break with ultraconservatives who had been demanding an Islamic state. Instead, 
a drafting committee will preserve language in Tunisia’s constitution that refers 
to Islam as the state’s religion and Arabic as its language, according to Said 
Ferjani, a member of the political bureau of al-Nahda.” 
However, this step was criticised by both religious conservative groups and the 
opposition leftist groups, who considered that this declaration did not reflect the real 
agenda of the Nahda party. Moreover, some feminist groups have worried that 
Ghannouchi's return may signal a rise in political Islam that could endanger their hard-
won rights; even though he has said that such concerns were “only based on ignorance” 
(al-Arabiya, 1 March 2011). He declared that the party respects women rights and will 
build on what has been gained under former regimes. The party also declared that it 
guarantees women’s equal rights to work and vote, and vows to “oppose any 
compulsion to adopt a specific pattern of dress.” It also seeks to allow women “to 
contribute to the development of society, free from the obstructions of decadence” (The 
Times, 29 October 2011). Despite all these declarations, there are still some feminist 
groups campaigning against al-Nahda, and the government faced the pressure of secular 
groups demanding a secular state. Moreover, several groupings, including the 
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Progressive Democratic Party of Ahmed Nejib Chebbi and the Modernist Democratic 
Pole,
30
 established a leftist alliance to counter the Islamists. 
The Nahda party, concerning international relations and the international community, 
confirms its respect for all the commitments of the former governments. Ghannouchi 
confirmed “we are committed to respect all commitments of the Tunisian state, on 
security and international peace and security in the Mediterranean region” (al-Arabiya, 
1 March 2011). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafik Abdessalam, confirms that, in 
international relations, Tunisia has adopted openness. He explained that Tunisia will 
make neighbouring countries and Africa its concern, and will develop the European 
relationship into a significant partnership. These relationships should consider the 
economic and political benefits for Tunisia, while the priority is to achieve cooperation 
with the Arab countries (Abdelsalam, 25 May 2012). On the other hand, they declare 
that they are seeking a good relationship with the EU and the international community. 
Tunisia is a member of the non-aligned movement, and the Arab league. It is committed 
to both regional and neighbouring countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafik 
Abdessalem, also added that they will state in the constitution that they will prohibit 
relations with Israel, and confirms that they will not establish a relationship with Israel, 
but this will not be written in the constitution (al-Jazeera, 2 February 2012) as some are 
pressuring the government to do.  
In conclusion, Islamists until now have shown a good understanding of the situation in 
Tunisia, in approaching the issues of concern to the people. They have adopted a 
moderate way of tackling the challenges facing the country in different dimensions, 
                                                 
30
 The Modernist Democratic Pole (PDM), a coalition of five leftist parties, and the Democratic 
Progressive Party (PDP), founded by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, are likely to form a common bloc of 
democratic liberals. Defenders of free expression and secularism, they have promised vigilance against 
any attempt to diminish civil liberties and minority rights. The PDP proposes a “modern vision of Islam” 
and wants an education system that will “purge” society of “obscure and oppressive practices.” The 
parties seek to boost economic growth by stimulating foreign investment. 
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such as human rights, gender issues, Shari‘a and writing the constitution. Indeed, they 
succeeded in forming a coalition government with two secular parties. Still, it is a long 
way for Islamists in Tunisia to practise their views, and to establish the democratic 
system that Ghannouchi has campaigned for over decades. Tunisia is an opportunity for 
Islamists to apply their theories on democracy, liberties, and human rights, which were 
developed by their leaders over the last three decades. However, many fear that, despite 
all the promises from al-Nahda to uphold democracy, they will impose a theocracy that 
would roll back all the hard-won gains, including women’s rights and secularism and 
rights. Others see this as an opportunity to bring a moderate form of political Islam into 
the Arab world, as a symbol following the successful governance of the Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey. However, the greatest achievement for Tunisians is the 
coalition formed between the moderate Islamists and moderate secularists. 
 
Section 5. Salafi Groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Democracy 
A number of groups oppose democracy, such as Salafis and Hizb ut-Tahrir (the 
Liberation Party).
31
 These groups have a stated position vis-à-vis radical theorists, such 
as Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi and Qutb, whose views were evaluated and explained in the 
second chapter, and the above sections. These groups regard democracy as disbelief 
(Kufr); and, hence, their interpretation of Islamic values is different from the reformists 
introduced previously in this study. El-Affendi asserted that: 
“one of the groups that are most vehemently opposed to democracy on principle 
is Hizb-ut-Tahrir, [who] advocate a full return to the khilafa system as it had 
been practised before its final collapse in Turkey in 1924” (el-Affendi, 2006, 
p.228). 
                                                 
31
 Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1952 by Taqiuddin an-Nabahani (1909-1977). It is a political party with 
Islam as its ideology. Its objective is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic state that 
implements Islam and carries its message to the world. 
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Indeed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (2001, p.52) declares in its official documents that “With western 
democratic models in ruins, the Muslim world must look to achieve accountability 
without democracy.” From its perspective, the concept of authority and its position in 
Islam has to be discussed in the context of Islamic law (Shari‘a) (Hizb ut-Tahrir 
publications). In this sense, it rejects the idea of democracy, and seeks to re-establish the 
Islamic state (Khilafah). Hizb ut-Tahrir (2011, p.8) confirms that the state in Islam is not 
theocratic, nor is it secular; rather, its authority is gained from the Umma. While 
sovereignty is to the Shari‘a, ruling and governing is by the Umma. As explained by 
Mawdudi (1967), the system of rule is based on popular (Umma) sovereignty, but 
limited by the divine law (Shari‘a), and the men of authority, led by the supreme ruler 
(Khalifah), will determine what law is.  
As cited in el-Affendi (2006), according to one theorist of this group, Zallum (1995), 
democracy promoted by the infidel West in the lands of Islam is a system of unbelief, 
with no relation to Islam whatsoever. It contradicts the rules of Islam absolutely, in 
generalities and particulars, in its source and its basic ideology, in the foundation on 
which it was established, and the ideas and systems it advocates. It is therefore 
absolutely unlawful for Muslims to accept it, implement it, or advocate it (Zallum, 
1995, p.5). This means that these groups understand that democracy is a system of rule, 
where the state of reference is the people rather than any other authority from other 
sources. Therefore, the legislative and other authorities belong to, and are approved by, 
the people, who are free to choose whatever they agree on. El-Affendi (2006, p.229) 
explains: 
“in order for the people to be really master of itself and select its rulers without 
pressure or coercion, certain freedoms have to be safeguarded for all individuals, 
including personal freedoms and freedom of belief, opinion and property.” 
Zallum (1995) explained that this system originated in the rebellion of the people 
against the monarch, who claimed a divine right to rule, and oppressed people on this 
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pretext. As a result of this conflict, a compromise was reached, whereby religion would 
be banished from public life, and the clergy would have no direct political role (Zallum, 
1995, p.8). Based on this understanding, these groups rejected democracy, and believe 
that “the secular state is not the choice of the Ummah” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, p.3). In 
their document, Hizb ut-Tahrir (2011) discussed the issue of Islam and democracy, and 
interpreted the campaign by the West to promote democracy, as a conspiracy against the 
Muslim countries. They believe that the West wants to keep religion apart from public 
life in general, and the ruling system specifically. This interpretation of the process of 
democratisation led them to criticise reformist and moderate Islamists, such as 
Ghannouchi and Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They heavily criticised 
the Turkish model, and the acceptance of Islamists to participate and govern under a 
secular system. Moreover, they criticised the Arab revolutions, and the support of the 
Turkish government for these revolutions (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, pp.4-5). It is important 
to interpret their criticism of Ghannouchi and Erdogan as criticism of the moderate 
school of thought adopted by many Islamists. This confirms that they still maintain their 
stance of rejecting democracy, as cited by el-Affendi (2006): 
“this shows that democracy is the antitheses of Islamic values, and Muslims are 
thus forbidden to ‘adopt it, advocate it, form political parties on this basis, 
accept it as a worldview, or implement it as a basis for constitution, law or 
education’” (Zallum, 1995, p.61). 
They understand democracy as defined by Zallum:  
“[as] a system developed by people to rule themselves, which means it is a 
human-made system that has no relations with religion. It is a Western concept 
and terminology, that means (rule of people by people) people are the owner of 
the sovereignty and they are the source of the authority ... democracy springs 
from the belief of the separation of the religion from the public life and state ... it 
is a capitalism idea ... This is the creed that separates the church from the public 
life and state” (Zallum, 1990, pp.2-3).  
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This uncompromising rejection of democracy by Hizb ut-Tahrir is also true of other 
radical Islamic groups, such as Salafis. In essence, el-Affendi asserted that: 
“some objections to democracy by radical Islamic groups, though comparably 
strong, are more nuanced. According to one representative of the traditionalist 
Salafi trend, a distinction needs to be made between democracy as an actual 
practice, and democracy as a theory, ideology and idea” (el-Affendi, 2006, 
p.230). 
This point is explained further by al-Faqih (2001): 
“there are, among Salafi trends, two broad views on democracy in practice. The 
first regards participation in an existing democratic process [as] categorically 
unlawful, since it is tantamount to giving legitimacy to systems that do not 
implement Islamist values. The second, a more a cautious one, treats this matter 
in pragmatic rather than legal terms, arguing that Islamic groups could 
participate in the electoral process if this protects them from harassment and 
helps promote Islamic ideas. However, some within this latter camp have argued 
on the same pragmatic grounds that participation may be unhelpful, since it 
tends to give legitimacy to oppressive regimes that rig elections and contravene 
Islamic teachings.”  
Although they differ in their views, on a practical level, one may agree with el-Affendi 
and Faqih that: 
“[O]n the theoretical level there is more consensus among the Salafi trends, 
since all agree that there is fundamental contradiction between the bases of 
legitimacy of the democratic and Islamic systems ... Ideologically most Salafis 
reject democracy on philosophical grounds, since it is regarded as fundamentally 
secular, and as it values the democratic consensus above religious teachings” 
(Faqih, 2001, p.8). 
However, some of these theoretical views represent some trends in the Ikhwan 
movement, as well.  
On the other hand, Hizb ut-Tahrir (2011, pp.4-5), regards democracy as a Western 
cultural hegemony, with the objective of destroying the values of Islam under the name 
of “civil democratic Islam”, by those powers that call for democracy. It is a “new 
secular malignant garment, which was well planned”. Moreover, they criticised the 
terms used, such as ‘good governance’, and interpreted these as: 
“soft terms that are designed to not provoke the Islamic emotions, and could be 
interpreted and construed positively not to contradict Islam, such as the terms 
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‘good governor’, ‘revivals’, ‘civil society’ and ‘civil state’ etc.” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
2011, pp.5-6). 
They believe that all these terms kept their ambiguity “and they make all these efforts to 
make the religion apart from life” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, p.8). They differentiated 
between the Islamic constitution and the secular constitution in the issue of legitimacy. 
According to an-Nabahani (1953): 
“in the constitution (not the Islamic one), the people are the source of the 
authority and the sovereignty is for the people, but [for] the Islamic constitution 
and law its source is the Qur’an and Sunna, no other ... the sovereignty is for 
Shari‘a      , and Ijtihād is obligatory upon all Muslims, and some of them can do 
it, and the adoption of al-Ahkām al-Shari‘a       (Islamic rules) is a right of the 
khalifa only” (an-Nabahani, 1953, p.89).  
Although Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects democracy, they do not object to establishing political 
parties for the accountability of the rulers, and to attempt to reach power using the 
Ummah. However, their condition is that such parties should be established on the 
Islamic creed (Aqeeda), and the adopted laws should be the rules of Shari‘a, without 
need for permission to establish a political party (an-Nabahani, 1953, p.93). It could be 
noticed that, from the beginning, they did not reject political parties or their role. While 
they reject democracy, they do not object to using democratic methods to achieve their 
objectives. 
It is important to mention that some Salafi groups in Egypt participated in the 
democratic process after the 25 January revolution, and established their own political 
party, the Alnour Party. In Yemen, the Salafis also established a political party on 13 
March 2012 (Aljazeera TV). However, this is a new dimension in the Salafi movement, 
as it is the first time for them to establish a political party. In Yemen, the Salafis 
discussed many issues in their conference, such as their justification for political 
activities (i.e. the legitimacy of democracy), and their vision of democracy. These steps 
may show that Salafi groups have started to face the questions regarding the practical 
implications of political activities. It is believed that this step will lead them towards 
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compromise, and may lead some of them to adopt a practical approach instead of the 
theoretical approach that was adopted for decades. The Alnour Party’s political project 
shows a pragmatic approach, specifically in essential rights and public liberties, and 
confirms in their political project that: 
“it is a necessity to achieve democracy within the framework of Shari‘a       
(Islamic law), where by necessity the people exercise their right to freely form 
political parties, and guaranteeing the freedom of political parties to perform 
their activities, in light of commitment to the constitution, and the principles of 
the Ummah and its general system, and the peaceful transfer of power through 
free and fair direct election, as well as people’s freedom to choose their 
representatives (members of parliament) and rulers ... scrutinising and holding 
the government accountable, and to remove it if proved in deviation” (Alnour 
Party political project, the party publications). 
This project is not different from the Ikhwan discourse, and shows the probability of 
accepting a moderate stance when it comes to the real practical experiment. This 
demonstrates the difference between forming theories without practical experiment, and 
adopting a practical project on the ground with the challenges of real political issues. 
However, through close evaluation of the discourse of the Salafi groups that formed 
political parties after the Arab spring, it is noticeable that they started a new phase of 
political vision, practice and language. 
In conclusion, radical Islamic groups, such as Salafi groups and Hizb ut-Tahrir, reject 
democracy, categorically and unequivocally. But some trends distinguish between 
democracy as a practice and as a theory, where, ideologically, most Salafis reject 
democracy on its philosophical grounds. However, some of them are pragmatic, and 
participate in political activities, and the electoral process to protect their group. Others, 
however, reject this justification, and consider it as supporting oppressive regimes. 
Indeed, they regard democracy and the new accompanying terms, civil society, civil 
state etc., as Western cultural hegemony. However, some Salafi groups after the Arab 
revolutions formed political parties, such as in Yemen and Egypt, and participated 
actively in the electoral process.  
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It could be said that the dispute over political participation started in the 1970s, and 
escalated inside Islamist organisations despite the fact that some of them, such as in 
Jordan, participated in government and supported it during the 1950s. However, the 
reasons for these debates were national, regional and international challenges. Some of 
these reasons can be attributed to internal Jordanian government policies, and their 
policies towards Palestine and Middle Eastern issues. Other reasons are connected to 
revivalists’ influences, and their impact on Islamists’ attitudes and approaches towards 
political issues. There was a significant development in the approach of Ikhwan towards 
political jurisprudence, in general, and political participation and democracy, 
specifically. Thus, they focused on the modern issues, such as political participation, 
citizenship, freedom of expression, ethnic minorities and women. Other reasons were 
the global war on terrorism, and international trends towards implementing democracy 
in Middle Eastern and Third World countries. Despite all these obstacles, Jordan has 
seen considerable political evolution over the last three decades; most notably, the 
emergence of their political party, IAF. Ikhwan in Jordan have shifted significantly in 
their political view towards democracy, and political participation, which was deeply 
influenced by the political environment in which Islamists in Jordan operate. However, 
there is no doubt that there are trends among Ikhwan in Jordan, including high 
leadership positions, whose acceptance of democracy is genuine, and who believe that it 
does not need to clash with religious values, objectives and ideas. At the same time, 
there are others who reject the idea of democracy with its Western concepts, but do not 
present an alternative. In general, the moderate trend has been the majority in the 
movement, especially in recent years.  
In conclusion, the cases studied are similar in many of their characteristics, and the 
approaches adopted. They are characterised by similar reactions in similar 
circumstances. It could be said that when these movements are compared in any of these 
 145 
countries, the study finds that every movement has identical currents of radical and 
moderate groups. The study observed that these movements were all exposed to splits in 
different periods of history in Algeria and Tunisia, and recently the emergence of 
moderate trends, in the form of political parties in Jordan and Egypt.  
Nevertheless, all these movements are distinguished by making Islam the frame of 
reference, and the Islamic state as their main objective. Moreover, they are fruits of 
Hasan al-Banna and his disciples’ schools of thought, inheriting the legacy of the 
previous century’s reformists, such as Afghani, ‘Abdu, Mawdudi and Bennabi. 
Similarly, almost all these movements were influenced by reformists in this century, 
most of whom are leaders in their movements, such as Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, 
el-Awa, Amara and many scholars. 
It is important to recognise that the movements mentioned above accepted democracy, 
but were also affected by their circumstances. However, there are important and even 
essential differences in accepting democracy and its mechanisms. Although Islamists in 
Egypt and Tunisia accepted democracy with its mechanisms, in Algeria and Jordan they 
accepted the mechanisms and disputed over the values and ethics of democracy and its 
philosophical bases. In accord with what has been circulated by some analysts, in each 
of these countries there are those Islamists who reject democracy and believe that it is 
incompatible with Islam and Shura. This emphasised that, even in one movement, there 
are many trends, which compete with each other, or dispute, to develop a new approach.  
However, since 1984, the Ikhwan in Egypt, and elsewhere and other similar movements, 
such as al-Nahda in Tunisia, have made several attempts to enter the political arena and 
engage civil society institutions. In Jordan, for example, Ikhwan participated in the 
government in the 1950s without establishing a political party. They have established a 
legal political party since the 1990s, and some of its members joined the government 
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cabinet and parliament. Simultaneously, the landscape for Islamists in Egypt has 
changed significantly over the past two decades; the mainstream movement, ‘Ikhwan’, 
has undergone a significant transformation; Hizb al-Wasat (Islamist Centrist Party) has 
emerged and, for the last ten years, has been struggling to acquire official recognition. 
In Egypt, Jordan, Algeria and Tunisia, the radical movements have reassessed some of 
their methods and adopted a moderate approach towards modern issues.  
The study argued that Islamists in Egypt and Jordan have taken participation in the 
legislative bodies seriously, more so in fact than the ruling establishment and other 
opposition parties. Whether in national parliaments or municipal councils, Islamist 
movements, even those not legally recognised as political parties, such as in Egypt, 
have been disciplined actors that used all available instruments to influence the outcome 
of the legislative process. 
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Chapter 4: The Islamist Experiment in Sudan (1989-2001) 
Islamists came to power in Sudan through a military coup on 30 June 1989, i.e. a decade 
after the Iranian revolution. The outcome was described in the media as the first Islamist 
republic in the Sunni Muslim world. The Iranian revolution had been similarly 
described as the first Shi’a republic in the Muslim world. Although the revolution in 
Iran, led by the ‘Shi’a movement’, was a popular revolution, the one in Sudan involved 
a military coup supported by NIF members.  
This chapter will focus on the Islamist experiment in Sudan in the period 1989-2001. It 
will explore several questions:  
 How have the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular 
respect to democracy been made operational in his political action?  
 Is there a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice?  
 Why have Islamists resorted to a military coup to assume power?  
 How have Islamists applied their theory to the political system they adopted?  
 How have they dealt with the constitution, power-sharing, ethnic minorities, 
women and religion, foreign and military affairs, and political culture and social 
development?  
It will critically evaluate the practice of Islamists in different stages and fields: to what 
extent they applied their theory, and how this suits a country with a diverse ethnic and 
religious minority. Moreover, it will examine the relationship between Islamist theories 
and the practice of power. 
The chapter will critically evaluate the experiment of the Sudanese Islamic Movement 
in the first decade of their government. The chapter is divided into five sections that 
review the practice of the Islamist state in Sudan, in light of Turabi’s political theory. In 
this chapter, the preparation for the military coup, and its objectives, will be critically 
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evaluated. The empowerment plan, how state institutions were built, the constitution, 
political system (al-Tawali al-Siyasi), political consensus, the economic institutions 
(Islamic banks and insurance companies), the cultural aspect (art and music), education, 
justice, human rights, women’s participation, international relations, and the role of 
society compared with the role of the state, are also addressed in the chapter.  
 
Section 1. Sudan Before the Coup 
Sudan witnessed a popular revolution on 6 April 1985, ending President Nimeiri’s 
regime, which had come to power in the 1969 May Revolution. With the fall of 
Nimeiri’s regime, Islamists established their own political party, the NIF, and prepared 
themselves for elections. The revolutionary leaders in 1985 (the transitional leaders) 
promised the Sudanese that they would build a democratic system to elect the 
parliament and form a government within one year. They fulfiled their promises and 
organised elections in 1986. Peter Woodward (1990, p.206) believes that: 
“the holding of the election was a return not only to liberal democracy in 
principle, but also to the practice and behaviour of 1960, and that was continued 
once the elections were over.” 
Serious competition ensued between the three major parties, the Ummah Party (UP), the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the NIF, and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi from the UP was 
elected as Prime Minister. There were also other influential parties, such as the 
Sudanese Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party. 
Earlier, Nimeiri had courted his ‘Islamist’ allies, but then imprisoned them on 10 March 
1985: 
“at that time, the movement had picked the fruits of reconciliation and it 
strengthened its position in the state and the society by establishing institutions, 
and protected itself from being eliminated” (Abdelsalam, interview, 2011, 
London). 
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Nonetheless, arresting Islamists was not the end of the movement, but signalled the end 
of Nimeiri’s regime in April 1985.  
Although Mahdi came to power as Prime Minister, the result of the election 
demonstrated that none of the political parties had the majority that qualified it to form 
the new government except in coalition with others.
32
 I believe the result of the election 
reflected in unstable government and it pushed the major three political parties to 
manoeuvre, as we will see in the next sections. 
 
1.1 Unstable Government 
Although Mahdi’s government was democratically elected, it was not stable and, within 
three years, Mahdi had formed five different governments. The NIF participated in two 
of these governments lasting for a total of about one year. The first government was that 
of reconciliation, or ‘al-Wifaq’, between UP, DUP and NIF, while the second was a 
bipartisan government formed by the UP and NIF. El-Affendi (1995, p.118) asserted 
that “this government agreed to Islamic laws to be adopted in the north only, with the 
exception of the south.” Conversely, this step provoked internal and external actors to 
take action. On the other hand, “the debate between the NIF and the other parties was 
heated, yet failed to reach common understanding in some issues; this forced al-Mahdi 
to exclude the NIF from the government” (Abdelsalam interview, 2011, London). It 
should be said that these issues included the war in the south of Sudan, where the rebels 
defeated the Sudanese army and overran many cities.
33
 At that point, the NIF asked the 
political parties to unite and prevent the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) 
                                                 
32
 In the 1986 election, the UP, DUP, and NIF won 99, 66, and 51 seats respectively. The DUP and NIF 
signed an agreement that none of them would join with the Umma Party without the other. However, the 
DUP broke its promises, and the agreement ceased to be valid. 
33
 On 26 January 1989, the rebels took the southern city of Nasir. The Defence Minister, Abdelmajid 
Hamid Khalil, announced that foreign countries were involved in the war, pointing to Israel as one such 
country. On 2 February 1989, the SPLA/M rebels took the town of Kapoeta followed by Nimule, where 
the Sudanese army surrendered. In some references, 80% of the South was now under SPLA/M control.  
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rebels from achieving any more military successes. At the same time, the NIF called for 
the tribes in the areas of conflict to arm and defend themselves from the SPLA rebels, 
who used to attack them and take their cattle. Later, after the June 1989 coup, the 
Islamists implemented the idea, and formed a civilian militia known as the Popular 
Defence Forces (Quwāt al-Difā‘ al-Sha‘bi).34 
The performance of the political parties was very poor, and they were unable to manage 
the national problems. For over three years, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s coalition governments 
had been incapable of governing effectively. This was illustrated by the reports on the 
last days of the parliament and accompanying political events. Mohammed al-Hasan 
Abdullah Yasin, a leading DUP member, asserted that “the performance of the parties 
was very weak; there were no regular meetings, which reflected on the performance of 
our governors and ministers” (Yasin, 1993, p.456). On the other hand, in the Sudan 
Studies official Newsletter, Charles Gurdon affirmed that: 
“it is now almost eighteen months since the Islamic fundamentalism dictatorship 
of Genaral Omer al-Bashir came to power in June 1989. Those analysts who 
thought that nothing could be worse than the democratically elected but corrupt 
and inefficient regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi have tragically been proved very 
wrong” (Gurdon, 1990, p.5). 
One may agree with Peter Woodward that “the shortcomings of democracy in Sudan 
have led to disillusionment that has encouraged military intervention” (Woodward, 
1990, p.12). These are some of the reasons that weaken the democratic experiment and 
encourage Islamists – which had the best organised and strongest political party – to 
carry out their coup. 
 
                                                 
34
 The Public Defence Forces were an idea introduced by the NIF. All persons over the age of 18 could 
volunteer to be trained, and participate in any war to defend the country. The idea was based on Islam, 
where Muslims in the Prophet’s time had trained and participated in war; then, there was no professional 
military force, but all the community participated, even women. The NIF proposed the idea following the 
successive rebel victories in the South, which threatened the North. The idea was implemented after the 
NIF came to power in 1989. 
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1.2 Security and Economic Problems 
During Mahdi’s administration, there were huge security and economic problems. Many 
reports demonstrated that the government had failed to provide security at the level of 
citizens or the state. The SPLA/M rebels threatened the south of the country and most of 
the north. Many regions, such as Darfur and South Kordofan, and sometimes the capital 
Khartoum, faced the danger of armed bandits. The situation was further exacerbated by 
the aggressiveness of neighbouring countries, without an adequate response from the 
government. The breakdown in domestic security was highlighted by events, where: 
“[i]n January 1988, Mahdi al-Hakim, an Iraqi opposition figure, was 
assassinated in the Khartoum Hilton Hotel; after a while, a Palestinian group 
attacked the Acropole Hotel and the Sudan Club, killing four people—three of 
them were foreigners. Similarly, Ethiopia was publicly supporting the rebels 
with the assistance of Kenya and Uganda” (el-Affendi, 1995, p.50). 
Moreover, the economic disorientation that plagued the state was a major undermining 
factor. In December 1990, Charles Gurdon reported that: 
“within the past month there have been a number of reports which forecast that 
Sudan is facing a major famine, which will be worse than the one in 1984-1985. 
It is believed that about 159,000 people starved to death in the 1984/85 drought 
and famine, and that at least 250,000 died in 1988 as a result of the man-made 
famine in southern Sudan” (Gurdon, 1990, p.7). 
Other factors threatened the government, and citizens as well, where: 
“there were economic problems and scarcity in the essential needs of the 
citizens, such as sugar, wheat, petrol, electricity, cooking gas, and water” 
(Abdelsalam interview, 2011). 
This was confirmed by al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2005), who indicated that the war 
consumed significant economic resources. Indeed, the government could not provide for 
essential human needs like food and petrol. Moreover, it was unable to keep up debt 
repayment instalments and associated interest. This resulted in funding institutions 
refusing to deal with Sudan.  
On the other hand, reports showed that the security situation in South Kordofan and the 
Nuba Mountains had deteriorated to its worst level ever. The activities of Yousif Kowa, 
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the SPLA/M leader in the Nuba Mountains, led to mobilisation of the Nuba people,
35
 
such that the number of Nubians in the SPLA/M doubled. The rebels became strong 
enough to threaten the Sudanese army under al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government, as well as 
large cities, such as Kadugli, Dalang, and Lagawa, and the Eastern Mountains’ region. 
The danger in South Kordofan extended to the border area, with clashes between the 
Miseriya tribe and SPLA/M. Attacks continued in Almayram, Abyei, Muglad, and 
Babanousa, while the capital Khartoum was insecure, with clear signs of an impending 
military coup. There were more weapons in the hands of citizens, and people in 
different parts of Khartoum began to secure their local areas by themselves 
(Abdelsalam, 2009, p.87). 
Political disorder led to economic complications, and the economic crisis led to security 
dilemmas; al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2005) affirms that: 
“The dispute between the political parties was not the only obstacle that faced 
the government; the coalition between the parties was facing a collapsing 
economy to the extent that moved the Finance Minister to describe it as 
horrendous. This was the result of three factors, namely slow production, 
expanded expenditure in the absence of real income sources, and the dependence 
on external sources of food supply in the context of supply and development.” 
In addition, the government was busy facing the increasing pressure of trade unions. 
The situation was going from bad to worse, with no political stability, and no support 
for the government. Al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2005) determined that: 
“there was no single comprehensive project to unite the elected government and 
the trade unions; … what caused the situation to deteriorate, and reason for 
anxiety, was that trade union demands were unprecedented; al-Jazeera Farmers 
General Union announced a strike (they refused to plant cotton on its scheduled 
time), although the union was dominated by the DUP, which was one of the 
coalition parties.” 
                                                 
35
 Tribes live in south Kordofan in the south-west of Sudan the Nuba people are primarily farmers as well 
as herders who keep cattle, goats, chickens and other domestic animals. The majority of Nuba – those 
living in the east, west and northern parts of the mountain – are Muslims, while those living in the south 
are either Christians or practise traditional animistic religions. 
 153 
It is clear that economic and security factors influence one other, and that some 
politicians used the economic crisis to undermine the government. Also, as was 
mentioned, the government was unable to fulfil its obligations to the military. A report 
evaluating the performance of the government discussed the Minister of Defence’s 
speech on 13 June 1988. The Minister admitted that the economic crises were a threat to 
internal security. He referred to particular social problems, such as crimes against public 
funds, abuse of political power, destruction of the national economy, illegal currency 
trading, crimes against persons, and monopolising essential goods. The Minister also 
commented on two incidents, the Mahdi al-Hakim assassination in the Khartoum 
Hilton, and the bombing of the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum. He asserted that these two 
incidents were associated with the complications of international terrorism, which could 
expose the country to more of these kinds of political crimes (Hamid, 2009, p.192). It 
could be concluded that a large body of evidence was provided by scholars and in daily 
newspaper reports, which confirmed the chaos, absence of security, and economic 
threats. The consequences were reflected in political action against the government. The 
economic and security conflicts created the best environment to carry out a military 
coup by any of the political powers, and to make the people accept it.  
 
1.3 Internal and External Pressure for Removal of the NIF 
1.3.1 Internal pressure  
The NIF departure from government was preceded by a memorandum
36
 from the armed 
forces’ leadership on 20 February 1989. This asked the Prime Minister to support the 
                                                 
36
 The memorandum referred to many issues, namely the threat to Sudanese national security, the 
deteriorating economic situation, widespread corruption, militias belonging to the political parties, the 
civil war’s impact on security in regions such as Darfur, and the weakness of the armed forces. It 
concluded that the armed forces were paying the price of the economic and media siege, and gave the 
Prime Minister one week to respond to demands and take effective steps. Many scholars consider this a 
clear threat. 
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military forces, and revise the government’s foreign policy. In addition, the 
memorandum demanded that government should move rapidly towards signing a peace 
agreement (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.83). It should be noted that the memorandum aimed to 
exclude the NIF. The reasons offered were that the government’s: 
“foreign policy was unable to attract the international support because of the 
presence of the NIF and the Secretary-General, Hasan al-Turabi, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. They referred the reason for 
delaying signing of the peace agreement to the alliance between the NIF and the 
UP, who stood together and voted against what was known as the al-
Mirghani/Garang Convention, because the agreement rejected the Islamic laws; 
this led DUP ministers to resign from the cabinet on 29 December 1988” 
(Abdelsalam, 2009, p.84). 
Moreover, Mahdi, in many interviews, asserted that Fathi Ahmed Ali, Commander of 
the Sudanese Armed Forces, and Mahdi Babo Nimir from the High Command, came to 
see him and asked him to exclude the NIF from government, otherwise the army would 
act (Musa, 2009, p.41). On this issue, Turabi asserted that: “the army commanders came 
to al-Mahdi and said to him, if you do not exclude them [the NIF], we will exclude you” 
(Turabi interview, 25 December 2010). Suleiman Hamid (2009, p. 203) concluded in his 
study that: “[i]t was clear to observers and scholars that the Communist Party was 
behind this memorandum.” He added that “the General Federation of Trade Unions 
issued a statement supporting the demands in the armed forces’ memorandum; they 
advised the government to be committed to the deadline” (Hamid, 2009, p.203). It 
should be noted that the memorandum gave the Prime Minister one week to meet the 
demands, and that “the General Federation of Trade Unions was dominated by leftists at 
that time” (Abdelsalam, interview, 12 May 2011). However, not only was the General 
Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) against the coalition with the NIF, but some leftists 
within the Umma party also supported the GFTU; for example, Mohammed Ibrahim 
Khalil (1993, p.27), the Speaker of the Parliament, asserted that: 
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“what is related to the participation of NIF in the coalition was rejected by the 
party institutions—the party Political Bureau and the parliamentary group. It 
was completely rejected on the evening of the first session of parliament” 
(Hamid, 2009, p.249). 
These incidents could refer to the competition between the political parties, more 
precisely between the leftist and the Islamists. Hamid (2009) added that the Southern 
Front, which opposed Shari‘a law, was one of the factors that exerted pressure on the 
Prime Minister. However, according to the Islamists’ version of events, matters did not 
stop at that point, but were more than what appeared on the surface. At the time, there 
were preparations for a number of military coups
37
 by distinct groups of army officers; 
the priority for some of these coups was to eliminate the Islamists. So the movement 
had no choice but to act quickly, and use force to avoid annihilation (Muhi al-Din, 2006, 
p.165). Moreover, the memorandum was interpreted as a first step towards intervention 
by the armed forces in politics. Some Islamists considered this the same as the case of 
Turkey, where the military guarded a secular constitution. On the other hand, some 
scholars explained that: 
“the armed forces were sure that the presence of the NIF in authority meant that 
the war would be prosecuted under the banner of Jihad, while they rejected any 
existence of military forces or other forces outside the military institution; this 
meant stopping any political party militia or the idea of popular defence forces” 
(Hamid, 2009, p.204). 
The events demonstrated that, in fact, the conflict was between the Islamic trends in the 
community, represented by the NIF and some members of the two traditional political 
parties, UP and DUP, on the one hand, and secular groups represented by the 
Communist Party and some members of the UP and DUP, on the other. Moreover, the 
leftists, supported by other secular groups, tried to abolish Shari'a law, and there was 
clear interference in the country's internal affairs by foreign embassies, such as the 
                                                 
37 Coups were being planned by the Umma party, and also leaders of the May revolution (supporters of 
former president Nimeiri); this latter group agreed to cooperate with the NIF and the Ba’th party, and was 
the most dangerous one, as the Arab nationalists had eliminated Islamists in the countries in which they 
took power, such as Egypt (Nassir), Syria (Assad), and Iraq (Saddam). The NIF leadership was fully 
informed of all this information.  
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Egyptian and American embassies; “they called, through the newspapers, for a military 
coup to be led by the former Minister of Defence, Abdelmajid Hamid Khalil” (Mekki, 
2001, p.31). It could be concluded that the internal pressure was represented by the 
army, communists and leftists in general through their different umbrellas to pull NIF 
from any participation in the government. It is clear those trends were against the law 
which was supported by NIF. 
 
1.3.2 External pressure 
Islamists throughout history have faced external pressures, particularly when they were 
about to take power, or participate in any government. Turabi, in an interview in 2007 
on al-Hiwar TV,
38
 asserted that: 
“when we were a small Da’wa group, people did not care about us, and when we 
were about to assume rule, Bush [the father]—during Nimeiri’s regime—came 
to Nimeiri and asked him to throw us out, or you [Nimeiri] have no future; so he 
[Nimeiri] jailed us and went to the US.”  
From that moment, the NIF leadership started thinking of the military as a means of 
achieving change. Turabi confirmed the same to the researcher in an interview on 25 
September 2010. Earlier, the US ambassador lodged a protest with Nimeiri, asking 
“how he could put an important daily newspaper, such as ‘al-Ayam’ in the hands of the 
Muslim Brotherhood” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.26). The ambassador meant the editor of 
al-Ayam daily newspaper, Yasin Omer al-Imam, one of the movement’s leaders, and so 
Nimeiri sacked him. For me, these events demonstrate that the superpowers were 
opposed to any Islamist participation in any government, and at any level. Islamists 
understood that they had to find alternatives. Moreover, for more substantiation of the 
international pressure directed at driving out the NIF from government, Hasan Mekki 
asserts that: 
                                                 
38
 All series available at YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mVzyuuQfig  
 157 
“there is a lot of evidence for what has been claimed by the NIF; on 21 February 
1989, one day after the memorandum was published, Margaret Thatcher, the UK 
Prime Minister, made a statement supporting the position taken by the armed 
forces. Also, because of the widening political crisis in Sudan, she delayed her 
visit to three African countries, including Sudan” (Mekki, 2001, p.31). 
This position was interpreted by Hasan Mekki and others, as mentioned above, as 
support for the memorandum that called for expulsion of the NIF from Mahdi’s 
government. Given these pressures on the Prime Minister, the coalition between the UP 
and NIF collapsed. The NIF leadership understood that: “they will not let us rule alone 
or in coalition with others.” Turabi asserts, in his Madrid lecture on 2 August 1994, that: 
“The West is democratic, but if democracy anywhere gave birth to an Islamic 
state, they would abort it immediately. Unfortunately, many Western powers do 
not believe that democracy is an absolute and universal value; there are other 
values as well, but if democracy breeds Islam, then let us frustrate it completely. 
This has happened time and again in Turkey and it happened in Algeria. I'm sure 
it will happen anywhere else.” 
My observation shows that most Islamists also reached this conclusion, and it became 
their conviction. The same was said by Egyptian Islamic Movement leaders, and 
scholars, such as al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin, and Hasan Mekki. This belief was also shared 
by the mass of Islamists, specifically youth and student leaders. Finally, Turabi 
repeatedly affirms that there was internal and external pressure to throw the NIF out of 
power: 
“this [the partial involvement in political power presenting renewed challenges 
to the movement …] went on until the movement was thrown out of power 
through internal and external pressures, which thought to embarrass the 
movement by scrapping its legislative programme. This was the second time this 
happened. The first was the external pressures that forced the May regime 
[Nimeiri] to water down the implementation of Shari‘a and crack down on the 
Islamists. This was an important lesson about the relation between democracy, 
Islam and external actors. It appeared that no sooner had democracy given birth 
to an Islamic order through the free expression of the will of masses, than its 
alleged proponents hasten to abort and distort it through pressure from inside 
and outside” (Turabi, 2009, p.222). 
It could be concluded that the movement never felt that it could take part in government 
without facing external and internal pressures, leading to a crackdown and the threat of 
being eliminated. This situation forced the movement to consider other solutions to 
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protect itself, its Islamic project, and members. This decision influenced its methods, 
doctrine, and priorities significantly. 
1.4 The Coup Decision 
The Sudanese Islamists began revealing the details of their coup plan, almost a decade 
later. An imperative part of the question is how they arrived at the decision, to what 
extent did they perform consultation or ‘Shura’, and how did they take the decision? 
However, “when Turabi was asked in 1982, in a newspaper interview, whether he would 
repeat the October Revolution if there was a chance to do so; would he encourage the 
people to revolt; he answered ‘no’ without hesitation” (el-Affendi, 1995, p.18). This 
meant that Turabi and the movement were opposed to any anarchy that could not be 
controlled and might cause bloodshed. However, given the reasons mentioned above, 
the Islamists proceeded all the way to a military coup. Leading up to a coup, the NIF 
Political Bureau was convened for consultation (Shura). Abdelsalam (2009, p.90) 
confirmed that: 
“in this meeting, the opposing views confronted each other, and a deadlock was 
reached, such that some members left the meeting in anger. However, according 
to the NIF constitution, the Political Bureau has no right to make a decision; its 
role is to discuss and put forward a proposal to the upper level—the Executive 
Office and Shura Council, where decisions are made.” 
Yet: 
“Some months before the coup, there was a meeting of the NIF Shura Council to 
discuss political issues. It appeared to them that Sudan, at that moment, was at a 
crossroads. They expressed the view that they held no hope for reform by the 
political parties with structures based on sectarianism. These parties had come to 
power through a democratic system [meaning that they had a majority by virtue 
of votes], but were not qualified to rule in a complicated situation, such as in 
Sudan. The meeting considered that al-Mahdi, the Prime Minister, lacked the 
political will and decision-making skills, and had missed all the opportunities 
throughout his history, and should leave” (Abdelsalam, 2010, p.86). 
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From the result of this meeting, it appeared as if they had not yet made the decision, 
since: 
“in this Shura meeting, the leaders asked the Shura Council to delegate some of 
them [the Executive Office] to find a solution for the complicated social, 
economic, military and security situation in the country” (Abdelsalam, 
interview, 2011). 
Other evidence demonstrates that the decision made to implement such a change was 
crystallised years before this meeting. The plan was initiated more than a decade before, 
where, according to Yasin Omer al-Imam, “we started preparation for change in the year 
1977-78.” He added: “we had made a decision earlier [after the reconciliation with 
Nimeiri]” (Muhi al-Din, 2005, p.175). However, I could say that there is no 
contradiction between Abdelsalam’s and Imam’s arguments. The former demonstrates 
that the decision was made to implement the coup and to decide clear steps towards it, 
i.e. delegating the NIF Secretary-General and the Executive Office to pursue practical 
steps. On the other hand, Imam’s argument provides evidence of establishment of a 
strategic plan, revealed recently as the ‘empowerment strategy’. With regard to the 
research question about the Shura as a mechanism of decision making, a full Shura or 
democratic process was applied in making this decision. The most crucial point made so 
far, from the substantial evidence provided above, is that the movement started 
preparing for change long before this meeting of the NIF Shura Council. However, the 
change was definitely not a military one. More to the point is the fact that Imam 
emphasises that: 
“we started to search for our people in the Armed Forces, and the Shura Council 
delegated the Executive Office to deal with the military issue, [and in turn] the 
Executive Office delegated the Secretary-General Hasan al-Turabi” (Muhi al-
Din, 2005, p.167). 
Abdelsalam asserted that the Shura Council understood the request for delegation by 
leaders, meaning that the instrument of change was ready. The leaders understood this 
from the Shura Council, after they presented reports from all regions of Sudan asking 
 160 
for the country’s salvation, as soon as possible (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.87). According to 
this delegated authority, the leaders started to investigate their standing principle 
regarding military coups, and discussed this option. According to Abdelsalam (2009, 
p.88): 
“In terms of political thought and state of reference, they [the leadership] 
discussed the issue, and the Shura Council concluded these points.  
First: freedom is a fundamental principle ‘Asl’, of the faith, and comes before 
unity, in terms of priority, in the principles (Usūl) of the movement fiqh 
[jurisprudence] from its birth. This means it is an essential value, and not a 
subordinate one. A military coup will definitely take away freedom, even for 
some time. 
Second: the Islamic movement in Sudan, and all over the world, had been the 
victim of military coups, but never committed them.  
Third: the movement in all its speeches, including the speeches of the Secretary-
General, at the major NIF conferences had confirmed that the Army should be 
kept away from practicing politics, and that adventure should not drive any 
political party or individual to commit prohibited deeds, i.e. a military coup. 
However, the issue of military involvement, even to protect the country from 
chaos, or by a loyal member, who will adhere to the movement steps of 
empowerment, needs more cautious and deep thinking.” 
It is notable that all these points were against the involvement of the military forces in 
political change, for the principle reasons mentioned above. However, the argument still 
left room for strict, controlled change, through military force. With regard to the 
research question, we notice that Islamists, when they took the decision concerning the 
military coup, they made use of the notion of Shura; but the decision itself was not 
expected to be taken, according to Turabi’s theory of democracy. This means the gap 
between theory and practice had become apparent, although the Islamists tried to justify 
their decision. 
 
1.5 Reasons for Choosing a Military Coup as a Method of Change 
The fundamental question is: why did the Islamists go on to plan a military coup? As 
was mentioned, there were external and internal factors that forced the Islamists in 
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Sudan to choose a military coup as a method of change. However, the points above 
were only accepted by some members of the movement, and not others. Those 
supporting a military coup, as a method of change, claimed that:  
First: in the powerful, dominant, and arrogant world, democracy is a value, and 
at the same time, civilisation is a value as well. However, civilisation has a 
higher value than democracy. Therefore, if democracy brings Islam, it threatens 
the higher valued ‘civilisation’. Islamic movements suffered humiliation all over 
the world, with silence from what is known as the free world; this confirmed that 
any democracy which brings Islam will be immediately eliminated, a point 
emphasised by Turabi (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010). 
Second: democracy dominated the world after revolutions, violence, and civil 
wars. We want it to prevail through a white revolution, not a bloody one. In the 
Qur’an, Jihad was connected with the context of rule, and the believers, 
whenever they ruled, or nearly ruled, faced trials (challenges)
39
 requiring Jihad. 
Third: The democratic period in Sudan, 1985-1989, was frustrated by the army’s 
memorandum, and the ultimatum, they [the military leadership] put as a 
condition on the Prime Minister. What had happened may be considered a 
military coup, breaking the army’s oath to stay out of politics and obey the 
Minister of Defence, who was the Prime Minister (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.88). 
Turabi repeatedly affirmed that there was internal and external pressure to 
remove the NIF from power (Turabi, 2009, p.222). In all these arguments, if you 
read them in their historical contexts, you may accept their excuses, but if you 
compare them to Turabi’s theory of democracy you will find a huge  
contradiction between theory and practice. 
                                                 
39
 Turabi used the term ‘trial’ (ibtilaa in Arabic) meaning challenge. 
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It could be argued that democracy needed more time to mature and be developed 
through more practice, not to be crossed out each time through a military coup, as 
happened in 1958, 1969 and 1989. The first point mentioned by Turabi is not an excuse 
for an Islamic movement that calls for Shura and more democracy in the political 
practice of the political parties. Turkey may serve as a good example for the movement. 
There, the movement respected the democratic process, and participated under the rule 
of law. They succeeded in securing the majority in the election, and the dominant 
power, the army, had to respect the people’s choice. However, for the second point it 
was a bloodless military coup, but in the first year, the government executed 28 army 
officers and two civilians.
40
 For the last point, the NIF at that time was strong enough to 
stop any military action and protect democracy, which was developing and the 
awareness that was increasing. Accordingly the gap between theory and practice could 
be clearly noticed, and later on it became clear that Turabi regretted in this decision. 
However, given these arguments between both groups, Shura was applied and the 
Executive Office was delegated to take the decision to accomplish the mission with 
tremendously strict restrictions. It is important to point out that the delegated committee 
that prepared for the coup had started its work earlier, but was waiting for the Shura 
Council decision to be made, to start the practical steps. The reason is that these 
preparations required technical steps, needing greater security procedures. On the other 
hand, some would argue that the Islamists had planned for the coup well before the 
reasons they mention here. It may be agreed that they may not have continued until they 
found themselves under the pressure of systematic methods of driving them away from 
power, followed by eradication plans, especially since they had rejected the coup 
method, when it was suggested by al-Rashid al-Tahir Bakr in the 1960s. This means 
                                                 
40
 The 28 officers who carried out a military coup in 1990 were executed under military law. The two 
civilians were executed because of trade with foreign currency, which was not allowed at that time  
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they found themselves in a situation where they had no choice other than to use this 
method to protect their existence and their project. In conclusion, all these factors 
played a significant role in driving the Islamists to adopt change through a military 
coup. Indeed, they still believed it was not the best choice, but were forced to take the 
risks. However, now, they admit that the method was not ideal, and regretted that they 
had used it.  
At that time the movement was strong enough to win the election, and have the 
majority, allowing it to rule alone or in coalition with others, such as the traditional 
parties, UP and DUP, the NIF went on to plan its coup. However, to find the reasons for 
this decision, the statements of Islamists should be analysed, and the historical context 
of these statements should be taken into account. Adding to the above external and 
internal reasons, the study found that Turabi asserts that: 
“the experiment of rule, which was established by the Islamic movement 
through a military coup,
41
 took the lesson from the clear Western precautions in 
aborting any Islamic revival coming through Western democracy because, to 
reject religion, specifically Islam, is more valuable to them than democracy as a 
principle” (Turabi, 2003, p.68). 
In another interview, Turabi asserted that: 
“all the doors were shut in our faces, depriving us [Islamists] from practising a 
political role. We were persecuted in Nimeiri’s [the former president] regime, we 
were expelled from the broad government, led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, who later 
disclosed the pressure from the army to kick us out; … Nimeiri [also] admitted 
that there were international pressures on him to jail us” (al-Hayat, 19 December 
1999). 
Many observers view the Algerian experiment as evidence of Western rejection of rule 
by Islamists even through a democratic election. It was concluded by Turabi (2009, 
p.222) that: 
“the partial involvement in political power continued to present renewed 
challenges to the movement and raised issues of rethinking touching on the 
movement’s unity or practice. This went on until the movement was thrown out 
of power through internal and external pressure, which sought to embarrass the 
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 Turabi speaks here about the revolution started by the military coup in June 1989. 
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movement by scrapping its legislative programme. This was the second time this 
happened. The first was when the external pressures forced the May regime 
[Nimeiri] to water down the implementation of Shari‘a laws, and crack down on 
Islamists. This was an important lesson on the relation between democracy, 
Islam, and external factors. It appeared that no sooner had democracy given 
birth to an Islamic order through the free expression of the will of the masses, 
than its alleged proponents hastened to abort and distort it through pressures 
from inside and outside.” 
Finally, the decision was made, and: 
“the Shura Council and then the Shura body was delegated; then the Secretary 
General chose six leaders.
42
 The seven members of the committee were 
delegated to take suitable political decisions that protected the country and 
empower the movement; the decision made by the movement’s institutions was 
a military coup to grab power” (Abdelsalam, 2010, p.94).  
Going back to the research question, it could be said that when Islamists found 
themselves in this situation they made the decision which was contradictory to their 
theories of democracy and chose a military coup as a method of change. However, the 
gap between theory and practice is noticeable and it is similar to the gap between theory 
and practice in the communist and socialist theories.  
 
Section 2. Preparation for the Coup 
The claim made by the Islamists is that the situation was alarming, and moved them to 
act so as to defend the country, protect its citizens, and prevent the economic and 
security meltdown. Unexpectedly, in the published discourse of Islamists in Sudan, 
there were no signs to indicate that they might resort to military force to take power, 
especially since they had been badly treated by successive military dictatorships, 
namely Aboud’s and Nimeiri’s regimes. It must be said that, a decade before the coup, 
there was no evidence in published literature to indicate that the Islamists in Sudan 
advocated any theory that justified taking power through a military coup. In this 
context, it is worthwhile to recall that they had rejected the idea when it was first 
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 The members were: Hasan al-Turabi, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, Ali al-Haj, Yasin Omer al-Imam, 
Awad Ahmed al-Jaz, Abdellah Hasan Ahmed, Ibrahim Mohammed al-Sanousi.  
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proposed by Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr in the 1960s. Yasin Omer el-Imam emphasised that 
“Turabi from the 1960s was against any military action” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.177). 
Abdelsalam confirms that “it was one of the options that they were ready for, but they 
never thought they may need to use it” (Abdelsalam, interview, May 2011). However, 
Mustafa Osman Ismail argued that “they started preparing for the coup after having a 
bad experience with the last democratic government (1985-1989)” (Ismail, interview, 11 
April 2011). Controversially, Yasin Omer al-Imam asserted that: 
“the group that was planning for this change started in 1977-78; I was following 
it through— I and another seven brothers. Our decision was early; it was after 
the reconciliation in 1977. Our slogan was ‘the movement will not be beaten 
again, and no one of its leaders will be jailed again’; this was the principle of 
preparation” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.175). 
He added: 
“we started searching for our members in the military forces, and the Shura 
Council delegated the Executive Office to take the responsibility for the military 
issues; the office delegated Turabi for this issue in 1982-1983.” 
Moreover, Imam confirms that “some members rejected the idea of military 
involvement, such as Mohammed Yousif and al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin” (Muhi al-Din, 
2006, p.176). Imam also claimed that they were ready to take over in 1985 (Muhi al-
Din, 2006, p.177). In order to demonstrate these viewpoints, it is useful to consider 
Hamid’s study, which concluded that: 
“The movement illustrated a proposal of an ambiguous idea of the ‘popular 
military alternative’ in its conferences in 1982, without specifying precisely 
what it is” (Hamid, 2009, p.210). 
However, after the official Shura – consultation – in the Shura Council, Turabi also 
consulted other influential members of the movement: 
“the conclusion of the Secretary-General’s informal Shura—by asking the 
members who were not on the Shura Council—was positive; the Shura Council 
was investigating the consequence of a coup against a democratic regime; it 
demonstrates trepidation from those members, but the result was positive; most 
of the responses expressed that the framework of Sudanese politics was not 
democratic, and it threatened all the country and its unity” (Abdelsalam, 2010, 
p.92).  
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Referring back to the question raised, evidence to date would appear to suggest that the 
movement was planning to protect itself following the reconciliation with Nimeiri. The 
plan was to establish a military section without using this tool, unless there was no other 
choice. For this reason, they did not use this military option in 1985, although they were 
ready. The decision would not be taken without referring to the movement institutions, 
and the decision was made by this means. 
Abdelsalam (2009) asserted that: 
“the special institutions received signals for … a coup at the beginning of the 
transitional year (1985-86); consequently, the NIF reformed its frameworks in 
the transformation from a movement working under the May dictatorship 
[Nimeiri’s] regime to a pluralistic political parties system.” 
Abdelsalam asserts that: “In conclusion, the NIF was responsible for the security of the 
party and its leaders … In other words, the movement members—the committee—
initiated steps towards the coup” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.92). In summary, Abdelsalam’s 
argument is that, through its members, the movement started to collect information to 
help the committee make the right decision at the right time; they started to share the 
work according to the final plan. On the other hand, the military groups were doing their 
job separately. Abdelrahim Mohammed Hussein (2005) declared that they were 
connected with the civilians involved in the coup through members of the committee. 
However, he claimed that the coup was executed by the military alone, and no civilians 
participated in achieving it. He argued that the civilians’ role was only to provide 
information to help the military; some of them helped as guides to political leaders’ 
homes on the day of the coup (Muhi al-Din, 2005, p.168). Hussein’s argument is not 
accurate, because many civilians participated in all the steps leading up to the coup but, 
for secrecy, military and civilian groups did not know about each other’s role. 
Abdelsalam (2010) emphasises that the plan was for the coup to be fully under the 
military, i.e. the movement’s involvement would be concealed. In order to maintain the 
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deception, the Secretary-General, Turabi, and other leaders, such as Ahmed 
Abdurrahman Mohammed, would be detained with other political leaders and activists. 
In addition, one of the leaders, Ali al-Haj Mohammed, would be abroad, while two 
other leaders, of whom Ali Osman was one, would deal with the coup leader, el-Bashir. 
Abdelsalam’s words do not mean that the military achieved it alone, and that civilians 
did not participate.
43
 It could be concluded that the plan was executed by the movement, 
where both civilians and military personnel participated in all phases of the coup under 
the supervision of the movement’s Executive Office, which had been delegated by the 
Shura Council to pursue the practical steps towards executing the coup.  
 
2.1 Empowerment Plan 
The empowerment plan was designed by the Islamic Movement in Sudan, with the 
objective of coming to power through election or other means. In this plan, the 
movement aimed to increase its membership tenfold, and develop a theoretical approach 
addressing all aspects of life – economy, politics, arts, social and family issues, issues 
relating to ethnic and religious minorities, international relations, and education. The 
aim was also to develop social organisations that play a pivotal role in society. This was 
an important part of Turabi’s theory, which grants society a greater role than the 
government in state building. At the same time, it seeks to emancipate women in 
different fields, and support them to play political, economic, and social roles. The 
empowerment plan touched on all these issues, and tried to find solutions for them, in 
preparation for the day when the Islamists would rule Sudan (unpublished document, no 
date). 
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 Members of the movement, youth, and students etc. 
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2.1.1 Coups in movement plans and actions 
The Islamists in Sudan rejected the idea of a military coup, when the Supreme Guide, 
Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr, suggested it in the 1960s. This rejection led to Rasheed al-Tahir 
Bakr stepping down. However: 
“by the end of 1981, the movement leaders felt that Nimeiri may turn his back 
on them; and as a consequence would eliminate them. So they started to revise 
their strategies and plans, [and] started considering a coup as an alternative. But 
they felt that they needed other partners, as the movement could not take the 
responsibility alone. So they contacted the Vice President, at the time, 
Abdelmajid Hamid Khalil, encouraging him to lead a coup against Nimeiri, but 
he sacked him with others” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.91). 
The idea of a coup was discussed, but the movement believed that it was not yet ready 
for such action; it still needed more time to prepare cadres and institutions (Abdelsalam 
interview, May 2011). The idea of a military coup was again raised, when Nimeiri 
turned against the movement, detained its leaders, and started trials aiming to execute its 
leaders, using the same excuses as those used to bring about the execution of Mahmoud 
Mohammed Taha.
44
 The movement leaders then considered staging a coup, and were 
about to proceed, but the revolution on 6 April 1985, known as ‘the April Intifada’, 
provided a timely exit (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.91). However, I argue that, while the 
movement was technically ready to execute a coup, it still needed greater qualification 
and experience to rule a country like Sudan. In addition, had the movement carried out a 
coup at that time, it would have faced diverse challenges, internationally, nationally, and 
also internally. The internal factors can be noted in the development of the movement 
after the establishment of the NIF in 1985. This is considered a significant evolution in 
the level of experience, and organisation of the movement. Its members gained 
experience in high-level posts in the government, and in parliament as an opposition 
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 Taha (1909-January 1985) he was educated as a civil engineer in a British-run university in the years 
before Sudan's independence. After working briefly for Sudan Railways he started his own engineering 
business. In 1945, he founded an anti-monarchical political group, the Republican Party, and was twice 
imprisoned by the British authorities. He was executed for apostasy at the age of 76 by the regime of 
Gaafar Nimeiri.  
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party, where they formed a shadow government. At the level of organisation, the 
movement reformed itself to be able to rise to the challenge of assuming state 
responsibilities; as Turabi stated “the pattern of evolution from improvisation to 
systematisation is not only apparent in theoretical and moral issues, but organisational 
reform as well” (Turabi, 2009, p.306). Moreover, the movement’s supporters increased 
significantly in number, turning it into a mass movement. It can be said that the 
movement benefited from the democratic experience to expand into all Sudan’s social 
sectors and institutions, and to train members to hold political and social 
responsibilities. 
In the context of the military coup, the movement claimed that it took this decision as it 
had come to a dead end with its allies, the UP and UDP. Moreover, “NIF discovered the 
conspiracy being plotted against the rise of an Islamic party” (Turabi, interview 25 
December 2010). Muhi al-Din (2006) asserts that, when al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s 
government was in its weakened state, in an NIF meeting, Ahmed Suleiman
45
 
encouraged the NIF to take power through a military coup; he literally said: 
“the authority is falling to the ground ... We should take it before others do. I do 
not know about Islamists in the military, but I am sure that, when we did the 
coup, such as the Communist Party in May 1969, we were less in numbers and 
power [than the NIF at that time], so we should not hesitate in this matter” 
(Muhi al-din, 2006, p.165). 
At the opposite end, Osman Khalid Modawi expressed his opposition to any military 
intervention in politics, whatever the reasons. He maintained that a military coup has 
more disadvantages than benefits, and that a democratic regime, whatever it is, is much 
better than any military regime (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.165). However, what Muhi al-
Din’s study demonstrates is that many movement leaders did not accept the idea of a 
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 Ahmed Suleiman (1924-April 2009), one of the Sudanese Communist Party leaders who turned to the 
Islamic movement; he was a lawyer, he was a minister of justice in the May regime, then he was the 
Ambassador of Sudan in Moscow and Washington and then a Sudan representative in the UN in 1992-
1993.  
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coup, and even those who accepted it put restrictions on the matter. These different 
views in the movement demonstrated that not all members or leaders agreed on the coup 
as a method to reach power. Abdelsalam reached the same conclusion: 
“the vision was that the change should be limited, and kept to the minimum that 
achieves the needed political changes to control the army HQ and army units in 
the capital and regions, and to detain a limited number of political and military 
leaders; the other ideas of bloody action were absolutely rejected” (Abdelsalam, 
2010, p.94).  
One may argue that at the beginning they tried to apply these points, and detain a 
limited number of politicians and negotiate with them.
46
 However, after some time, the 
regime turned into a military dictatorship similar to regimes in Africa or the Arab 
countries. These actions significantly show the huge gap between theory and practice in 
Islamist experiments in Sudan.  
 
2.2 The Objective of the Coup 
The above reasons show that the movement only thought of staging the coup after it felt 
that the movement and its programme were in danger of extinction, and threatened by 
internal and external forces. Interviews with Turabi, Abdelsalam and Mustafa Osman 
Ismail demonstrate that the main objective was to protect the country from economic 
and security collapse, and also to protect the Islamists from being eradicated by the 
military forces that threatened Prime Minister Mahdi. Moreover, the international 
powers had threatened Mahdi, and forced him to break the alliance with the NIF. 
Furthermore, the: 
“Islamists received information that indicated that they will be erased from 
political life in Sudan, if any of the military coups planned by the leftist or anti-
Islamist groups took power in Sudan” (Abdelsalam interview, 2011). 
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 Referring to the suggestion by Turabi in the prison, he proposed a national government representing all 
the political parties.  
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As such, the NIF carried out its mobilisation programme, and activated community 
activities and societies, through youth, student and women organisations. This reached a 
peak in what was known as the Quran revolution (Thawrat al-Masahif) in Ramadan 
1988. I may argue that the popularity of the movement at that time may have protected 
it from being eradicated; it may have faced difficulties, its leaders prosecuted, but it 
could not be eradicated. The researcher believes that this generation of leaders 
witnessed the military coups in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in Africa and the Arab 
world, and may have accepted it as a method of change. On the other hand, some 
leaders came from a communist background, and so were influenced by such ideas.  
 
2.3 After the Coup d'état  
It is important to shed light on the Sudan Charter, written in January 1987. The Charter 
represents an Islamist thesis, covering governance, social change, foreign affairs, and 
defence policies. It presented a comprehensive programme for a political party that 
planned to rebuild the state and society according to certain spiritual and cultural values. 
The Charter focused on the idea of citizenship in politics and governance, and the 
principles to be observed in consideration of dignity and unity, such that no-one would 
be deprived of holding a public position because of any religious or ethnic reasons: 
“respect for religious belief and for the right to express one’s religiousness in all 
aspects of life; there shall be no suppression of religion as such, and no 
exclusion thereof from any dimensions of life” (Sudan Charter, January 1987). 
One may agree with Abdelsalam’s beliefs that this charter is a remarkable point that 
reflects the maturity of the Islamic thesis in ruling a country, such as Sudan, which is 
complex in its multi-ethnic background, multi-cultural character, and diverse religions 
and languages. He claims that the NIF in 1989 was better organised and had a better 
project for Sudan than all the other political parties, both leftist and traditional rightist, 
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who could not fill the existing vacuum in government (Abdelsalam 2009, p.84). 
‘Abdullahi Gallab considers that: 
“the significant feature of the charter is not that it promotes a platform for a 
political party competing for votes, but that it introduces a blueprint for a 
comprehensive program entailing radical change, and hence it foresees not only 
an alternative regime, but an alternative society” (Gallab, 2008, p.10). 
While el-Affendi claimed that: 
“the Charter was a culmination of Turabi’s drive to reformulate the movement’s 
thesis in the light of contention that Islam, as a universal religion, could not 
isolate itself from the world around it; it must seek a common ground with 
others, and address the world in the language it understands” (el-Affendi, 1991, 
p.176). 
Subsequently, he criticised the contradictions that appeared in the practical application. 
He asserts that: 
“obviously, the treatment of non-Muslims in this state is an important influence 
on how world opinion would regard Islam. The Sudan Charter is therefore meant 
to impress non-Muslims inside and outside the country, and that is precisely 
where it appears to have failed” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.176).  
The Charter represents some of the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with 
particular reference to democracy. Turabi’s political thinking will be evaluated as well 
as how it was made operational in his political action. When we talk about the gap 
between theory and practice we usually refer to the fact that theory relies on idealisation 
and is therefore not representing reality accurately. This is the case about all man-made 
theories and conjectures about reality. They are and will always remain incomplete 
representation of reality that means the gap between theory and practice could be 
noticed in this case. Turabi in 2003 discussed the issue of ‘free choice’, locating it on 
the trajectory of evolution of Islamist doctrine, starting from the movement’s stance 
during the revival in the last century, arriving at the idea of people’s freedom in politics 
to make whatever choice, and to take turns to govern based on collective competition; 
the exception was a minority maintaining a conservative and traditional isolated 
position on this issue (he meant Sufis). Turabi continues his criticism to include even 
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those who adopted a forgiving and relaxed position in their Ijtihād, and opening up to 
the idea of freedom to differ, and pluralism (the multi-party system), yet continue to 
insist that this must submit to the condition of adherence to the unchanging principles of 
Islam. He says in criticism: 
“One is amazed; how could they impose a limit on the permission, applying 
state authority, upon non-Muslims in society, hypocrites, or those who believe in 
part of the Qur'an and disbelieve in the parts relating to politics, while the 
evidence from the Qur'an and Sunna applied in Madinah are clear proof that this 
is a right in the context of Da'wa and not matters of ruling authority, according 
to the Shari'a of Islam” (Turabi, 2003, p.207). 
He adds that: 
“the freedom to differ on doctrine, and the alternation (Muwalah) in governing 
based on that, through diverse parties, is indeed one of the fundamentals of 
wisdom and government in Islam” (Turabi, 2003, p.207). 
In other words “What Allah left for the people should not be monopolised” (Turabi, 
2003, p.209). Turabi believes that the Islamic movement is only an instrument for social 
and political change, with the aim of establishing the state. Yet, the state is a product of 
social movement, and indeed one of its mechanisms. Therefore, the state and the 
movement are not objectives in themselves, but a way to worship Allah, if built in the 
right way. However, these are essential elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with 
particular reference to democracy, e.g. freedom of religion, freedom of political choice, 
and freedom of expression. Turabi, the theorist and the leader of the movement, believes 
in the above, but when Islamists took power in 1989, they monopolised it. Yet lately, in 
2001, Turabi apologised for this failure. As such, this Islamist experiment should be 
studied and criticised according to its declared values.  
 
2.3.1 Turabi’s search for consensus 
Historically, in the late 1960s, a broad consensus emerged among most of the traditional 
Sudanese political parties, UP, DUP, and MB or Islamists. This consensus was presented 
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in the report of the National Committee for the Constitution. However, in June 1989 
after the coup, Turabi met the leaders of the same political parties in prison. He 
proposed that they come together, and adopt one programme – Islam. Abdelsalam 
confirmed that: 
“the Secretary-General, Turabi, was in jail, where he met the two leaders, al-
Mahdi and al-Merghani, and tried to encourage them to join together, and adopt 
a consensus to draw a new era in the history of Sudan, and to quit executive 
work, to show the new leaders and the Sudanese that they had now come 
together to apply Islam as a belief, and Shari‘a; one that approaches the 
socialists on the basis of Islam’s justice, and the nationalists on its Arab [roots] 
and [the] Africans as a neighbourhood” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.122). 
The same words were used by Turabi in his interview with Hiwar TV on 14 November 
2009. It is important to analyse these actions, since Turabi was trying to convince the 
two traditional leaders to join the revolution from the beginning. If they agreed, then 
they could form a national government that would stop the deterioration in the 
economic and security fields, and rebuild the political structure on a new solid doctrine, 
and a balanced equation of power distribution among the Sudanese elites, regions, and 
minorities. In fact, Turabi’s attitude indicates that this NIF objective, mentioned above, 
was on his mind when he was trying to talk with these leaders. Moreover, it could be 
said that he was trying to achieve these objectives at minimum cost. Hence, he 
contacted those leaders whose election manifesto was Islamic; an Islamic republic as 
advocated by the DUP, and Islamic Revival (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah) by the UP. In 
essence, he was seeking consensus on the project of Islam. The leaders of the political 
parties in prison rejected Turabi’s offer, because they were sure that the coup had been 
done by NIF. In the meantime, they (all except Turabi) started their opposition activities 
by signing an agreement that established the Democratic Alliance. Moreover, 
Abdelsalam (2009) affirms that the security forces did not spare any effort to obstruct 
the efforts of the Secretary General, Turabi, after the first release of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi 
and al-Mirghani from prison, to reconcile with these leaders. They humiliated Mahdi 
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badly, sending a message to him and his brother-in-law, Turabi, saying that the 
revolution was not ready to conciliate with the political parties. Moreover, the 
communists and leftists played a significant role in not giving any chance for the regime 
to meet the two leaders and reconcile with them, as intended by Turabi. 
 
Section 3. Building the State Institutions 
After the coup, Turabi and Islamists started building the state according to their plan. It 
was claimed that the main principle adopted was Shura, where the Islamists tried to 
encourage the Sudanese people to participate in building the political system, practise 
Shura, and advance the intellectual ideas and effort to build the country. A series of 
conferences was started, beginning with the ‘National Dialogue for Peace Issues’ 
conference held from 9 September to 21 October 1989. The decisions and 
recommendations of this conference shaped the peace process with the southern 
movements, where it proposed a presidential and federal system. Between 3 October 
and 30 November 1989, the ‘National Dialogue for Economic Salvation’ conference 
was held (Hamid, 2009, p.236). This was followed by the diplomatic conference that 
drew up the plan for Sudanese foreign policy. Then the women, trade union, displaced 
people, education, media, social development, and sport and youth conferences were 
convened (Hamid, 2009, p.237). It is important to mention that many experts 
participated in these conferences, and that most of them were not NIF members. In this 
context, Turabi (2009) asserted that everybody should participate in building the 
country; “Shura should be applied at every level and the people should participate in all 
levels of decision[-making]; because of that we adopted these kinds of conferences.” 
Perhaps the most important conference was the ‘National Dialogue for the Political 
System’, which was held between 16 August and 20 October 1990 (Hamid, 2009, 
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p.338). This conference discussed the issues relevant to the political system in Sudan, 
where, at the conclusion, a federal system was proposed. The government adopted this 
proposal and, accordingly, later in 1994,
47
 the country was divided into 16 federal states 
in the North, and 10 in the South. Each state had its own government, ministers, and 
legislature, i.e. executive and legislative institutions. By the end of these conferences, a 
strategic plan had emerged. Experts in all fields had been invited, and most of them 
participated; yet some of the opposition’s leaders and active members did not. In the 
words of el-Affendi (1995, p.56), “most of the opposition did not participate in these 
conferences.” Abdelsalam (2009) believes that these conferences played a significant 
role as a public relations exercise that mobilised most of those leaders, who were not 
members of the movement. It was those leaders who were represented actively in the 
government executive body, and later they became leaders in ruling the National 
Congress (NC). It could be noticed that the strategic plan was significantly influenced 
by some elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular reference to democracy, 
the federal system, the women’s sector, culture etc., which could be regarded as a 
political action towards the application of the theory; but still the gap between theory 
and practice could be observed, although theory was turned into a project (the strategic 
plan).  
 
3.1 The Constitution 
Turabi is an expert in constitutions, and was involved in formulating the constitutions of 
Pakistan and some Gulf states. When the movement came to power, as head of the 
National Assembly (NA; Parliament), he proposed the 1998 constitution, which was 
ratified in March 1998. 
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 It took four years to do the administrative job and many constitutional decrees to reach the peek in the 
last announcement of the 10
th
 constitutional decree that announced Sudan as a federal state.  
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3.1.1 Doctrine and principles of the constitution 
The 1989 coup d'état ended the third democracy in Sudan; the first constitutional decree 
after the coup stated that: 
“the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is the highest constitutional 
authority, legislative and executive in the country and is responsible for issuing 
declarations and constitutional amendments, and promulgation of laws and 
management of security and military affairs, and the appointing of ministers and 
supervision” (the President’s first speech, 30 June 1989). 
This meant that the constitution and laws issued before that date were annulled. In 
addition, all the political leaders, including Turabi, Ibrahim al-Sanoussi, and Ahmed 
Abdulrahman from the NIF, were arrested and jailed in Kober prison in Khartoum 
North, along with other politicians. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
dissolved the media, and shut down newspapers, except for state radio and TV, and the 
weekly Armed Forces newspaper (al-Quwat al-Mussallahah).
48
 All these actions were 
contradicting Turabi’s theory of democracy, and could be a good example of the gap 
between theory and practice in the Islamist experiment in Sudan, regardless of whatever 
excuses they made. 
 
3.1.2 Minorities in the constitution 
The Sudanese are a diverse nation, and their society is recognised by its multiplicity of 
religious and cultural affiliations. Islamists in Sudan established the federal system of 
the government quite early, so as to address the problem of minorities, religion, and 
culture. This topic is discussed theoretically in Chapter 6 ‘Islamists and the state’. 
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 Social scientists had identified more than a hundred languages and dialects that are used by the 
Sudanese; this encompassed more than 50 ethnic groups and 600 tribes. In addition to common 
boundaries, Sudan is bound by complex racial and ethnic links to the countries of the region. For more 
information see: http://www.sudan-embassy.co.uk/infobook/people.php  
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Indeed, before the separation of South Sudan in 2011, Christians made up 17% of the 
population.  
Esposito noted that: 
“in general terms, the constitution tends to define a state of Muslims rather than 
an Islamic state, although there are distinctively Islamic provisions” (Esposito, 
2001, p.143). 
Esposito considered that the first provision defined the state in relatively inclusive 
terms: 
“The state of Sudan is an embracing homeland, wherein races and cultures 
coalesce and religion conciliates. Islam is the religion of the majority of the 
populations. Christianity and customary creeds have considerable followers” 
(The Sudan Constitution, Article 1-1). 
In addressing the problem of a majority Muslim population and the minorities, the 1998 
constitution adopted a federal system. This had been proposed by the NIF in the 1987 
Sudan Charter, and adopted by the relevant conferences held after the coup. The 
movement had previously proposed a federal system in the 1960s. Researchers noted 
that the official policy of NIF in the 1990s reflected the principles presented in the 1987 
NIF Sudan Charter, for example: 
“the effectiveness of some laws shall be subject to territorial limitations, 
considering the prevalence of certain religions or cultures in the areas of 
variance with the religion dominant in the country at large. … In these matters, 
exclusive local rules can be established in the area based on the local majority 
mandate ... Thus, the legislative authority of any region predominantly inhabited 
by non-Muslims can take exception to the general operation of the national law, 
with respect to any rule of criminal or penal nature derived directly and solely 
from a text in the Shari‘a contrary to the local culture” (NIF Sudan Charter, 
1987, B-8). 
This advanced legislation was applied in some areas (the South) but was problematic in 
the North. It faced practical difficulties, including the awareness of young officers, who 
punished people outside the judicial system. This meant that some violations took place 
by officers who had not been trained and educated about the rights of citizens. 
Moreover, the judiciary was not playing its role effectively in this area. 
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3.1.3 Legislative authority 
By the end of December 1991, the RCC issued the 5
th
 decree establishing the 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA); with this act, the legislative authority passed 
from the RCC to this assembly. However, before 1997, the dialogue on political 
pluralism had begun between the opposition and the regime’s supporters, and included 
the independent elite as well. However, a trend inside the movement did not believe in 
political pluralism, but the majority did. Hamid (2009, p.290) asserted that: 
“it was clear that the result of this dialogue would be reflected in the constitution 
… Its draft was in the hands of the National Assembly to be passed in 1998. This 
constitution would authorise political pluralism, according to the law, before this 
constitution is submitted to a public referendum”. 
However, before the constitution had reached the stage of being submitted to popular 
referendum, the President dissolved the NA, and put Turabi under house arrest in 1999.  
In March 1998, the constitution was passed, and article 26-2 states: 
“freedom of political association is not constrained, except with the conditions 
of Shura and democracy in leading the association, and to use dialogue not force 
in the competition, and to be attached to the constitutions ... as organised by 
law” (Sudan Constitution, Article 26-2). 
Based on the constitution, the law of freedom of association was issued in December 
1998, and up to 22 political parties were subsequently registered. The law was amended 
in 2000, and renamed ‘the law of political parties and organisations’ (Hamid, 2009, 
p.294). Turabi evaluated the development of the political system, from military coup to 
the evolution of a constitution and laws that reflected its principles, and enhanced the 
freedom of expression and political association. These laws organised fair and free 
election of governors, and assured the continuity of the government system, posts, and 
institutions with checks and balances, without any monopolies or unfairness in 
authority. The constitution organised non-central legislative and public affairs, so as to 
balance the distribution of wealth and authority (Turabi, 2009, p.328). 
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In conclusion, the political system was based on political association (al-Tawali al-
Siyasi). Moreover, the safeguards agreed upon in the peace accords of April 1997 had 
been enshrined in the constitution passed by the NA in March 1998, and which came 
into effect the following June. This development took care of the constitutional void 
mentioned above, and offered safeguards, in theory at least. Freedom of expression had 
been enhanced in theory and to some extent practice over the past decade, while the 
constitution conceded the freedom of association. The 1998 constitution did not end the 
period of authoritarian and totalitarian rule completely, or lift the oppressive restrictions 
imposed by the regime on people’s political views. However, it offered a chance for the 
political parties to approach supporters and organise their activities to face such 
oppressive measures, and offered freedom of expression and political association; 
because of this, Sudan had entered a new era. Back to the research question, this 
constitution illustrates most of the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with 
particular reference to democracy. Despite these developments, both the judiciary and 
the government executive body were not able to cope with these changes. These 
institutions remained below standard in safeguarding the rights of the people, as 
individuals and as groups (political parties or NGOs, cultural organisations etc.). 
 
3.2 The Structure of the Government 
The first problem facing any military coup is the issue of legitimacy; the government, 
after the coup, started mobilising the people to participate actively in state building, and 
drew up plans for the future through a series of conferences.
49
 After the coup, the RCC 
had suspended both parliament and the executive institutions; it had detained 
government officials and leaders of the political parties, and imposed a state of 
                                                 
49
 These conferences included dialogue for peace, political system, economic issues, media, women, 
diplomacy, the native (Ahli) system, and the conference for the comprehensive strategic plan. 
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emergency. The RCC was composed of military officers, who came from different 
branches of the Armed Forces and different regions of Sudan; the RCC formed a 
cabinet, and in the process started ruling the country, meaning that the RCC exercised 
exclusive legislative and executive authority in the country. In essence, they 
monopolised power and practised a dictatorship; this practice contradicted Turabi’s 
theory of democracy.  
The conference series, mentioned earlier, occupied the vacuum left by the dissolution of 
the legislative and executive institutions. This was then filled by new institutions based 
on the recommendations of these conferences, which counted as points of reference for 
the new regime. The RCC formed four committees, namely the security, political, 
economic, and media committees. The role of these committees was to assist in ruling 
the country, in the absence of the executive and legislative institutions (Turabi, 2003, 
p.366). The revolution in its first days was inclined towards decentralisation and 
federalism, which had been advocated by the Islamic movement. A conference held in 
Khartoum that brought together the northerners and southerners also agreed on 
federalism for all of Sudan. When the permanent constitution was developed, the 
government moved towards democracy, which was adopted by the movement as a call 
for freedom and Shura accessible to all. In the federal model for Sudan, 10 states 
(Wilayat) were established in the South and 15 in the North; all were established with 
elected legislative institutions and a state governor (Wāli) (Turabi, 2009, p.366). These 
steps were part of the movement’s plan, which they later claimed had been delayed by 
the military rulers, and some movement members who feared the democratic process. It 
is well-known that Islamists adopted a federal system, even in the structure of the 
movement itself. The plan was to move towards a legitimate regime through building 
institutions that enabled the people to participate in planning and decision making. The 
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RCC established the TNA
50
 in 1991, which continued until 1995. The TNA was 
designed to play a legislative and accountability role, but its main role was to build the 
political system, try to secure peace in the country, and to agree on the comprehensive 
national strategic plan. At this stage, the regime was planning to move towards 
institutional legitimacy by electing a NA to replace the appointed TNA. The newly 
elected NA was called to session in April 1996 with 400 members, including 120 from 
the ruling NC. This NA passed the 1998 Sudan constitution, but was dissolved by the 
President in 1999, before it had completed its term. 
On the other hand, the RCC issued a temporary bill to establish the popular 
committees.
51
 The political system was built on these popular committees, which 
worked in the provinces, councils, and local areas, as well as at national level. President 
Omer Hasan Ahmed al-Bashir in the opening session of the ‘National Dialogue in the 
Political System’ conference declared that the political system was intended to avoid the 
weaknesses of the previous regimes, to avoid the ethical imperfection and inaccuracy of 
traditional elections that benefited political parties only (President’s speech, 6 August 
1990). In the speech, the President asked the conference to explore the means to 
accommodate all people, organisations, fields and sectors. He added that laws should 
seek efficiency in performance, and in the role of mobilisation, Shura, and 
accountability and monitoring; all this should be adopted within the framework of 
federalism, where the conference would scrutinise how to delegate authority to the 
people. However, the real objective of the conferences system was to rally and unify the 
grassroots of the traditional political parties. Turabi adopted this system to bring the 
members of Islamic political parties (UP, DUP, NIF) into one structure or party, 
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 It had 303 members, from all regions and fields, among them the RCC members after it was dissolved 
(except the President), the state governors (Walis) and the cabinet ministers, the RCC advisers, and the 
head of the popular committees. 
51
 These popular committees were similar to Libyan popular congresses, which started from the local 
areas to the counties, regions and then went on to the national level.  
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bypassing the leaders. The leaders of the political parties refused to participate in the 
NC, although the Islamists made great efforts to persuade them. With this hierarchical 
institution of popular committees, the popular system was established, and was called 
the National Congress. Hamad Omer Hawi concluded in his study titled ‘The nature of 
the state in Islam: Sudan’s example’ that: 
“The NC was considered the political system not a political party, and it was 
announced that this system included the features of pluralism in its 
comprehensive conceptions, according to, first, the intellectual pluralism that 
enables the intellectual freedom of the individual [to have a voice] in the public 
issues through participating in the Congress and councils, and protects the 
political arena from the trends of alienation and conflict” (Hawi, 2004, pp.251-
253). 
According to Turabi’s consensus approach, it could be said that he proposed a structure 
for the NC that ensured diversity of opinion in the organisation. The organisation would 
uphold freedom of expression, intellectual participation, and open discussion to reach 
consensus, with decisions based on this political consensus. However, the organisation 
failed to achieve this objective: it is clear that it is not a realistic objective in a highly 
politicised society; moreover, they cannot dissolve the political parties and then ask 
their leaders to join them. The regime then adopted the concept of political association 
(al-Tawali al-Siyasi), or plurality of organisations; in other words, a multi-party system. 
However, al-Karouri (2000) attributes the failure of the popular conferences system to a 
number of factors. First, the system was elitist, complicated, and difficult for average 
people to understand. Second, the members of the Islamic movement did not actively 
promote and explain it; they had become complacent due to the absence of rivals within 
the political institutions challenging and forcing them to make the effort. Third, the 
Sudanese people were highly politicised by virtue of their environment, influenced by 
sectarian institutions and geographical loyalties. The pursuit of power was conducted 
competitively through challenge and rivalry. In this environment, Karouri (2000) 
believed that lively and credible elections could only be achieved through a direct race 
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for government. Subsequently, the regime considered other alternatives that were more 
active and expressed the dynamic of political activitism. This resulted in greater 
openness by the regime towards other structures and political organisations, as well as 
the traditional opposition parties. Therefore, al-Tawali al-Siyasi (freedom of 
association) was included in the 1998 constitution (Karouri, 2000, p.163). The NC 
Secretary-General, Turabi, had proposed re-establishing the freedom of association and 
expression in Winter 1997. However, the fall of the towns of Kurmuk and Gisan to the 
SPLA, with support from Ethiopia, led to a delay in this proposal being ratified by the 
NC Shura Council. Turabi resubmitted his proposal to the NC Shura Council in 1997, 
where he argued that Islam establishes belief (Īman) based on the fundamentals of 
freedom and submission. He considered that the wisdom gained from recent years had 
shown the need to move towards freedom and de-centralisation. Although this petition 
came too late, it was a sincere call for real democracy. One may agree with Esposito, 
who affirms that: 
“the constitution of 1998 is an important milestone in the evolution of his 
[Turabi’s] thinking, it contains many themes that have long been present in his 
writings. However, the multiparty federal system defined by the constitution is 
also a new phase” (Esposito, 2001, p.144). 
In February 1998, the NC was announced as a political party, with President al-Bashir 
as its president, and Turabi as its Secretary-General. This made the NC the ruling party, 
with 22 other political parties on the political scene. This step came eight years late, but 
it is worthwhile examining the practice of real democracy as intended by the leaders at 
that time. Moreover, it is important to mention that these developments led to a split in 
the body of the movement. The evaluation of this experiment shows that there is a gap 
between the theory of democracy adopted by Turabi and the practice of Islam in Sudan, 
although he claims that he suffers from the obstacles made by the executives in the 
government. The relation between the thinkers and the army leaders and the executive 
ministers may cause this gap between the theory and practice, moreover the 
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complications between the two bodies (the movement as a party and the executives in 
the state) that controlled the country.  
 
3.3 The Economic Institutions: Islamic banks and insurance companies 
Historically, economic activity has been one of the movement’s key concerns since its 
establishment in the mid-1940s. It was considered vital to funding the movement at that 
time. After 1964, this interest expanded, parallel to the developments in ICF activities. 
Abdelsalam (2009) reported that the first ICF investment was in printing and 
publication (ICF printing). However, this venture was confiscated by the new 
government, following the May 1969 coup. After the reconciliation (al-Musalahah) 
with Nimeiri, the economic aspect witnessed a degree of development, where some 
movement members began to establish businesses. As was mentioned previously, the 
empowerment plan was set in motion in the 1970s. At the same time, Islamic banking 
had started to be established in the Arab world, and came to Sudan on 18 August 1976.
52
 
According to Abdelsalam (2009), the establishment of Islamic banking brought 
questions over Islamic economics into prominence. This experiment started in the 
practical domain, guided by limited theoretical Ijtihād, and depending mostly on partial 
Fatwas that focused on eliminating usurious transactions that were necessarily 
connected to the capitalist world economy. Islamic banking revived Islamic economic 
transactions and sales, and applied fiqh models of Mudarabah, Murabahah, Muzara‘ah, 
and Salam.
53
 Turabi (2009) and Abdelsalam (2009) believe that the movement relied on 
practical experience as a guide to developing a theoretical framework through research 
committees, Fatwa councils, and trustee boards. However, the experiment was also 
criticised by Turabi, Abdelsalam and other members, who believed that the efforts of 
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 Faisal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, established by Prince Mohamed Al-Faisal Al-Saud. For more details, 
http://www.fibsudan.com/ar/? http://www.fibsudan.com/ar/?#content/23   
53
 These are Islamic formulae of transactions.  
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Ijtihād had not concentrated on developing macroeconomic issues. Yet, it is important to 
say that Islamists also established Islamic insurance companies in the 1980s. However, 
Abdelsalam (2009) asserted that the same group of people or, in his words, class, were 
concerned about the agricultural sector, and invited many Arabs to invest in this 
important sector. However, he added that the Islamist bourgeoisie could not lead 
freedom and renaissance initiatives, as well as intellectual and economic development, 
as the pioneering Europeans did. Yet, Abdelsalam’s claim is unfounded, as the 
agricultural sector in Sudan needed the infrastructure, which was very poor at that time, 
as well as political support and clear policies. 
The national strategic plan proposed by the economic conference was based on four 
principles; first, it should be established on the principles of Islam, and national 
aspirations that lead to development, combating monopoly, and establishing a system 
founded on the values of fairness and justice, the significance of mercy, and the 
substance of fear of the Day of Judgement. Second, justice and equality should be 
observed, and firm steps taken to redistribute wealth, and adopt an economic 
programme that rewards those who work (intellectuals and labourers). Third, 
dependence on the country’s resources without isolating it from others and, at the same 
time, without reacting (negatively) to external pressures. Fourth, adopting a strategy of 
economic reform, which establishes a free market of the enhanced guided market form, 
and removes those laws and rules that destroy market mechanisms (Comprehensive 
National Strategic Plan (1992-2002), p.189). While the economic plan was established 
upon these principles, the National Salvation Revolution was unable to solve all the 
economic problems in Sudan. The strategic plan contained many values that were not 
implemented in any action plan. Moreover, no mechanisms were developed to enhance 
these values, while the civil war and international pressures wasted most of the efforts 
and resources that could be directed to treating the Sudanese economy. 
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In reality, the new government had inherited many problems, including the economy, 
low productivity, corruption in the civil service and poor infrastructure. The government 
failed to solve most of these problems, because of the centralised approach to tackling 
economic problems in the early days of the regime. El-Affendi asserts that: 
“Even though the policy of economic liberalisation is fundamentally correct, yet 
the continuing inflation made such liberalisation result in huge price rises. The 
government was unable to reduce its spending to combat inflation, due to the 
war in the South, and the drying up of foreign aid. Thus, the government was 
forced to fund essential economic projects on deficit. For this reason, the 
government had no margin to raise workers’ salaries to meet inflation. The result 
was that economic liberalisation affected all aspects of life, except labour. By 
necessity, this led to the crushing of the middle class—the government’s main 
support, and tool for change—on the grindstone of poverty and need” (el-
Affendi, 1995, p.166).  
One may agree that the paradox in this situation is that the modern class, which was 
supposed to build the state and undertake modernisation, was the main loser from this 
economic reform. The other factor, or the civil service, faced huge change due to 
integration of NIF members into public institutions, and removing all those who were 
not pro-government. Moreover, huge restructuring of the banking sector took place in 
the first three years, included in the package of economic reform. This three-year 
economic reform programme was advocated by the Finance Minister, Abdelrahim 
Hamdi. Its principle was: 
“the liberalisation of the economy, based on a free market of the enhanced 
guided market type, some services to be provided by the private sector rather 
than the government, and, in the industrial sector, shared stockholder companies 
encouraged” (Comprehensive National Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.190). 
These steps were meant to establish a free and just market, which refers to the principles 
of Islamic economic theory as adopted and developed by the Islamists. These steps were 
criticised by both politicians and experts, such as el-Affendi, Haydar Ibrahim Ali, Tijani 
Abdalgadir Hamid, and Islamist political leaders, such as Hasan Mekki and Ghazi Salah 
al-Din; they all agreed that, although these were important steps, they should not be 
implemented in a hurry, and not without first establishing the structures and 
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mechanisms that would absorb the side-effects of privatisation and the free market. 
Abdelrahim Hamdi, the Finance Minister, asserted that the policy was successful, but 
had been slow given the weak structure of Sudan’s economy, and the effect of some 
social traditions (Hamdi TV interview, 2 September 2011). In addition, he criticised the 
agricultural and industrial sectors, which had delayed the growth of the national 
economy. 
The strategic plans connected social development to references in terms of the values of 
Islam. Therefore, these plans encouraged Zakat
54
 and mutual social support between 
members of society. Hence, the law on Zakat was issued in 1990 (Madani, 2008, p.6), 
less than a year after the new regime took power. One of the objectives of the economic 
strategy was to increase GDP by up to 20 times, through investing in national resources, 
especially oil (Comprehensive National Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.191). Zakat was 
one of the economic issues that took prime place in the strategic plan. In general, Zakat 
has its own unique rules of collection and distribution; yet, the strategic plan indicated 
that Zakat should be part of the government’s budget, and should contribute to GDP. 
The plan added that the Zakat administration (Diwan al-Zakat) was responsible for 
distributing the Zakat funds to those legally entitled to receive them (al-Masarif al-
Shar‘iyyah).55 The plan called for supporting the Diwan to develop its capacity, so as to 
be able to cater for the large numbers of those in need (Comprehensive National 
Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.195). The collection of Zakat was increasing significantly; 
it was SD 27.7 million in 1990, then SD 11.9 billion in 2000, and jumped to SD 31.4 
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 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. 
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 These are special categories of people defined in the Qur’an as the sole eligible recipients of Zakat. 
Zakat must be distributed in the channels prescribed by Shari‘a  , as set by Allah in the Qur’an: “Zakat is 
for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer it; for those whose hearts were (recently) 
reconciled (to Islam); for those in bondage and debtors; in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer: 
ordained by Allah, and Allah is Knower and Wise” [At-Tawbah: 60]. The categories specified in this 
glorious ayah are the people to whom Zakat must be paid, and it may not be paid to other than them 
according to the consensus of scholars. Therefore, Zakat may not be spent in any other channels 
designated by the Allah, of charitable projects, such as building mosques and schools, because the ayah is 
clear on that matter. The meaning is that Zakat is exclusively for the eight categories. 
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billion in 2006, where 64% of it was distributed to the poor and marginalised people in 
society to secure their essential needs, such as food, clothing, education, housing, and 
the productive family project. Of the collected Zakat, 14% was spent on the employees 
of the Diwan as prescribed by Shari‘a (Madani, 2008, p.6). Diwan al-Zakat also paid a 
monthly allowance to poor people in the provinces and local areas. Despite the 
significant development in the Zakat sector, the government could not develop a 
mechanism to reach all those in need fairly and easily, and continued to apply the 
traditional way of distributing Zakat.  
Islamic values have great potential to contribute to overall development in the Muslim 
world, only if they can be cultivated in practical ways, and taking into account the local 
socio-economic factors that impact on the development process. Such values minimise 
the after-effects of reforms, such as privatisation and free market economics, in a weak 
national economy. The Sudanese Islamists have criticised other movements in society, 
such as the Mahdiyyah movement, which concentrated only on Jihad, or Sufism that 
concentrated only on individual education. The Islamists argued that these movements 
had not included development of livelihood in their programmes; yet Islam is a 
comprehensive religion that concerns all aspects of life. The Islamists and Turabi were 
concerned about Zakat and its role in the society, so the Islamists did many research and 
workshops regarding Zakat so as to develop the theory and the practice, a noticeable 
development achieved in this sector.  
 
3.4 Infrastructure Development and Oil 
In August 1999, President Bashir witnessed a ceremony celebrating the start of oil 
exports from Sudan, at Port Basha’ir formerly Marsa Nimeiri – an oil terminal 15 miles 
south of Port Sudan. A Panamanian tanker was loaded with six million barrels of 
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Sudanese crude oil bound for Singapore. A second vessel, a South Korean tanker, was 
ready to load oil, destined for a refinery in South Korea. Port Basha’ir has a storage 
capacity of two million barrels of crude oil, which was set to increase to 3.2 million 
barrels. In addition, a billion dollar pipeline would be expanded to 450,000 bopd in four 
to seven years. Sudan had become an oil producer, and a member of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Burr, 2003, p.256). Oil extraction was 
beneficial to the Sudanese people; for example, bringing a reduction in cooking gas 
prices, where the government reduced the price of the unit LPG (Liquid Petrol Gas) 
cylinder from 25,000 to 13,000 SD. 
It took five years of exploration and building of infrastructure before oil exports began. 
As such, the government started to receive oil revenues one decade after the revolution. 
Notable developments in the country’s infrastructure were achieved. Roads were 
extended between the regions, and inside towns, where the national highway network 
was extended for 11,000 km, with 34,021 km still under construction. Similarly, fifteen 
airports, and seven seaports were expanded and developed. According to figures from 
the Ministry of Information (2011, p.31), existing TV channels were modernised, and a 
new one was launched; these comprised one national, nineteen regional, and six 
privately-owned channels. The national channel, Sudan TV, was expanded to give 
global coverage for a worldwide audience; prior to 1989, it could barely cover parts of 
the national territory. In contrast to the boom in road construction, the government was 
unable to modernise Sudan’s railway infrastructure because of economic sanctions 
imposed by the US.  
Turabi (2010, p.329) reflected on these developments, and referred to the success of the 
revolution in the communications sector to privatisation. Regarding Sudatel, the 
telecommunications provider, he said: 
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“It is the most modern communications company; Sudan is the first in Africa 
and second in the Middle East; the free market encouraged the private sector to 
participate in developing the country and drive the economy” (Turabi, 2010, 
p.329). 
Agriculture: Sudan has about two hundred million acres of arable land, of which only 
20% is cultivated. Free market economic policies were introduced to encourage 
investment in the agricultural sector, including removal of taxes and export levies on 
agricultural production, support for agricultural inputs, and reducing the financial costs 
of the sector; the agricultural sector was given an unlimited financial ceiling (Ministry 
of Information, 2011, p.51). The tax burden and rising prices of agricultural inputs, 
transport problems, primitive means of agriculture, and the challenge of raising the 
productivity of Sudanese farmers, have all led to higher food prices in the market (al-
Jazeera Report, 3 January 2001). The government established Jiad – an industrial 
venture building tractors and agricultural machines – to meet the needs of agriculture. 
The Kenana Sugar Company and the White Nile Company were other important actors, 
both producing high quality sugar for export. 
As incentives, the government provided the agricultural sector with 39% of the budget 
for the “Agricultural Renaissance”,56 with infrastructure development in the agricultural 
regions. Customs and taxes were removed in the sector, and the capital of the 
Agricultural Bank increased to fulfil the needs of this government project (Ministry of 
Information, 2011, p.52). The government worked to develop the agricultural sector, but 
many factors played a significant role in delaying the results of these efforts; some 
factors were related to government policies, while others were connected to failure of 
coordination with other sectors, such as finance, electricity, infrastructure, and civil 
service performance. It could be suggested that economic development was achieved, 
but many internal and external factors impacted on overall performance. Some of the 
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 This was the name given to the government project aimed at developing the agricultural sector. 
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internal factors related to the war in the South, poor infrastructure, and the nature of 
Sudanese business, which is not collective and depends on individual investment, and 
the historical state centralisation in the country, specifically in the economic sector. 
Furthermore, the state owned most of the services, agricultural, and industrial sectors; as 
for external factors, economic sanctions, debt, and political pressures affected the 
economic sector. Yet, despite all these challenges: 
“[the] World Bank has classified the Sudanese economy as one of the fastest 
recovering economies from the financial crisis in its estimates based on 
performance in the first quarter of 2010, in the Middle East and North Africa, it 
came after the state of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, its GDP was 5.5 in 2010 and 6.2 
in 2011” (Ministry of Communications, 2011, p.12). 
In conclusion, the Islamists succeeded to some extend in building infrastructure, and 
privatising the services and industrial sectors, and also attracting investors to the oil 
production, agricultural, and livestock sectors, and to industries, such as cane sugar, 
edible oils, green forage, flour, leather, Gum Arabic, and cement. However, the 
international economic crisis affected the prices of food and imported goods. The 
process of privatisation affected labourers and employees; in other words, the middle 
class and the poor people were affected more than the wealthy and business people. On 
the other hand, the sustainability of the economic project is questionable, given 
government policies, administrative weaknesses, and unskilled labour. 
 
Section 4. The Role of Society 
Society in Islam played a significant role in administering most activities and services. 
Turabi on 10 May 1992, when asked at South Florida University about the role of 
society and the state, stated that: “the society, not the state, is the first institution in 
Islam.” He then added “the society cannot be described as an Islamic society, unless it is 
motivated by itself to apply the teachings of the Qur’an to amend mistakes and to 
encourage the righteous.” The Islamists before the revolution had established social 
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organisations and charities that played a remarkable role in education, health, and relief 
aid.  
The strategic plan for the first decade (1992-2002) was oriented to the concepts of the 
national culture of Sudan, and the diversity of Arab-African ethnicity. The objectives of 
the strategic plan were to lead a cultural revival, to contribute to a comprehensive 
cultural revolution leading to civilisation development, and to fulfil its objectives and 
long-term ends. It was directed towards the characteristics of the society, its cultural 
components, methods of performance, social behaviour, and the influence on all 
generations. The plan concentrated on arts and human science, where arts included 
painting, music and songs, theatre and folklore, children’s culture, documentaries on 
Sudanese life, and cinema and publishing (Strategic Plan, pp.123-127). The most 
important aspect of this strategic plan was to establish the infrastructure for arts, music, 
and cultural activities, such as theatres in the capital and regions, public libraries, 
colleges of music and drama, support for music and theatre groups, as well as 
establishing and supporting arts music and theatre magazines; on the other hand, issuing 
legislation that encourages artists to be more creative. Although the government built 
theatres in most cities and towns, and encouraged the people to participate in 
establishing cultural centres, there is no verified record quantifying the success of such 
actions. In addition, it established more radio stations alongside the veteran state 
broadcaster, Omdurman National Radio; so there were 16 regional and 14 private radio 
stations (Ministry of Information, 2011, p.31). These TV channels and radio stations 
played a notable role in promoting and developing arts and music movements, and other 
cultural activities. Moreover, the government contributed in the form of annual prizes 
for the arts and music, such as the Tayib Salih Prize for novelists. While the government 
made many efforts, there remained many problems in this field. These involved the 
practical application of these policies, such as financial and administrative 
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complications, as well as apathy from most governors, who did not regard this as a 
priority. Moreover, the government was also repressing and marginalising anti-
government artists, which forced most of them to emigrate. Although Turabi confirms 
that “the society not the state is the first institution in Islam”, in Sudan, the state 
monopolised power and marginalised society.  
 
4.1 The Role of Society in Charitable Fields 
The society in Sudan played a significant role in the charitable fields, specifically the 
Islamists. El-Amin Mohammed Osman asserted that, in “the years of National 
Reconciliation with Nimeiri (1977-1985), there was room for freedom of Da‘wa and 
charitable work that enabled Islamists to establish humanitarian and charitable work. An 
Islamic Da‘wa organisation, the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), was 
established, followed by other agencies in child and maternal care, education and health 
organisations, and youth and student organisations for voluntary work in different fields 
(Interview Osman, London 2011). However, it is important to say that these 
orgenisations played a significant role in Sudan and Africa, in the health and education 
sectors.  
The Centre of Strategic Studies published the strategic plan for the voluntary and 
charity sector for the first decade (1992-2002). The objective of the strategic plan was: 
first, to establish a comprehensive social renaissance inspired by well-established 
morals in religious and national heritage, the national culture, and effective human 
values; second, to develop voluntary work; third, for Sudan to be the best society in the 
world in cohesion and solidarity; and fourth, to be a society that depends on itself to 
meet most of its needs (Centre of Strategic Studies, 1992-2002, p.54). The plan divided 
voluntary and charitable work into three fields. First, reform, such as social care for 
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children, displaced people, delinquents, and anti-drug and harmful traditional practice 
campaigns. Second, preventive, such as public order police, civil defence, children and 
youth care, and environmental protection. Third, development and services, such as 
social enterprises, i.e. small businesses, workshops, bakeries, agricultural schemes, 
animal and plant nurseries, and human development programmes, and supporting 
productive families (Centre of Strategic Studies, 1992, p.55).  
After the coup, the Islamists mobilised all their organisations to cover the shortfall in 
the state’s contribution to welfare, by helping refugees and displaced people, cleaning 
cities, hospitals, and public institutions, rebuilding schools, and helping poor people in 
different areas. There were 262 associations and organisations in the charitable field, but 
these were not able to achieve most of the planned goals. Moreover, they did not cover 
all the country, and most of the workers were incompetent, with no effective training 
and no monitoring of work. In contrast, foreign organisations covered most of the 
country, cooperated with each other, and benefited from regular international finance 
and support, which local organisations lacked. Despite these circumstances, local 
organisations played a crucial role in supporting the society during war, crises, and 
natural disasters. In order to address these shortcomings, the government issued the law 
in 1990 (Madani, 2008, p.5). On closer inspection, Diwan al-Zakat’s evaluation report 
showed that it played a remarkable role in supporting poor people, e.g. in 2006 about 
SD 31.4 billion (now pounds) were distributed to the poor and marginalised people to 
secure their essential needs, such as food, clothing, education, health care, and 
productive family schemes (Madani, 2008, p.6). The Regional Support Fund and Diwan 
al-Zakat provides monthly payments to the poor people at the level of councils. 
Moreover, civil society organisations supported boarding school students by providing 
breakfast meals. More significantly, however, in the field of health care, the Regional 
Support Fund covers the cost of surgery in government hospitals for poor people, it 
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provides free essential medicines, and free treatment for patients with kidney problems, 
heart disease, and cancer. The fund also provides health insurance for many sectors in 
the society, including students and labourers. In the education field, the Fund supports 
250,000 students in primary schools, by providing books and classroom furniture in the 
poor states (Madani, 2008, pp.6-7). It could be said in this field the government exerted 
significant effort, but this was not focused on practical and sustainable projects. It is 
important to mention that organisations, such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamia (an 
Islamic charitable and missionary organisation) and the Islamic African Relief Agency 
(IARA), were affected negatively by the Gulf war in the early 1990s, when financial 
resources were affected by Sudan’s political stance (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.456) and then 
the war on terror from 2001. Moreover, the government itself marginalised and 
minimised their role.  
On the other hand, some organisations played an initiative role in solving some of the 
social problems, such as poverty. In 2006, Unique Wins consultancy (a Sudanese 
consultent company) published an article on the evolution and development of the 
micro-finance sector in Sudan. The article reported that “micro finance was not 
established in the beginning by Sudan Central Bank, but it was supported and adopted 
by the local civil society organisation[s]” (Unique Wins, 2006, p.17). A survey 
conducted by Unique Wins showed that 90% of these organisations started their projects 
after 1991, i.e. when free market policies were first implemented. It could be concluded 
that many of these funding institutions played a significant role, but poverty was still 
prevalent across all regions in Sudan. As such, more cooperation was required to 
advance the achievement of these organisations. It could be concluded that Turabi 
shows a great concern to the role of the society in the charitable field, and Islamists 
have developed considerable experiments in this regard. 
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4.2 The Role of Society in Security and Defence 
When Islamists came to power in 1989, Sudan was engaged in a civil war, as well as 
conflicts with neighbours in the east, west and south, such as Chad, Libya, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda. The Islamists’ perspective in the military field was 
different. In their view, defence was the role of all citizens, not a specific group, 
contrasting with modern schools, which allocate defence work exclusively to the Armed 
Forces. However, Turabi explains that: 
“we found the army had inherited the Western system, established on fighting at 
the ruler’s command and [dedicated to] his obedience; it was far from religion 
and the Sunna of Jihad. Specifically the Jihad, was the most prohibited – in the 
colonial period – because earlier they had been defeated by the Mujahideen ... 
dictatorial leadership does not know collective decision making, or control by 
the pious” (Turabi, 2009, p.433). 
Islamists believe that they came to power to change the methods and doctrines of the 
armed forces in Sudan, so as to be more Islamic and pious, and observe the values of 
Islam. Islamists believe that the military’s role should be the duty of every citizen in the 
country. Hence, they began establishing what was known as the ‘Popular Defence 
Forces’. Training camps were opened for citizen volunteers over 18 years old. Tijani 
Abdalgadir evaluated the experiment, and asserted that: 
“the Sudanese experiment displaced these models by reviving the Jihad concept, 
when homeland defence is a duty upon every Muslim who is able to fight. When 
the training camps were opened, tens of thousands came; some of them 
participated in real battles against the rebel army in South Sudan. It was 
confirmed by observers that the people who were fighting were a new asset that 
was added to the account of power in Sudan” (Abdalgadir, 1995, p.62). 
Some Islamists consider that this project contributed to unifying the Sudanese; for 
example, Turabi asserted that: 
“popular defence is one of the biggest projects that unified the Sudanese society, 
so as not to be separated into civil and military, or elites and the dregs of society, 
and those have their weight” (Turabi, 1995, p.168). 
It could be concluded that society participated actively in the defence role. They believe 
that they participated in applying Islamic values in this field: students, labourers, 
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diplomats, doctors, and employers from all fields participated voluntarily, and some 
paid with their life for what they believed in. This part of the Islamist project was 
criticised by many groups, Western journalists, politicians, some country leaders and 
academics. Some of them regarded this project as being against their direct interest, 
specifically neighbouring countries such as Egypt. It is one of the projects that impacted 
negatively on the reputation of Sudan, and was used as an excuse for isolating and 
pressuring Sudan, claiming that these were terrorist activities. Yet this project played a 
significant role domestically in changing the society positively.
57
 
 
4.3 The Role of Society in Art and Culture 
Islamists in Sudan showed significant concern for all branches of art; in the 1970s, 
Turabi lectured young students on the dialogue between religion and art (Hiwar al-Dīn 
wa al-Fan); this lecture was published in a book in 1978. “Al-Turabi applied a new 
methodology to the relationship between religion and art” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.175). He 
criticised the traditional fiqh (jurisprudence), which had occupied Muslim schools of 
thought for many centuries. He made a radical change in understanding the message of 
art as a part of religion under the umbrella of Tawhīd (unification), where all the life of 
a human being should be in the worship of God. Turabi defines art as “a creation of 
beauty, it should be [a source of] power and a supreme gift from God that is to be 
enjoyed in gratitude” (Turabi, 1987, p.87).  
Turabi believes that art occupies a significant area in modern life, and that the artist 
should enjoy social dimensions and contribute with cultural materials, and the worldly 
life should be one of beauty, as well as religious. Practically, the NIF, in the 1980s, 
established many groups in the field of theatre, especially in universities and youth 
                                                 
57 The project changed into a national service, which applied in other countries. 
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organisations, music such as the Namariq musical group, architecture, and painting. In 
the 1990s, they produced many TV programmes, documentaries, and children’s 
programmes. It is important to report that Turabi met with musicians and singers in his 
office in the early 1990s, and explained to them that they were playing a grand role in 
establishing the culture of society, and that their art could be worship of God, if their 
intention was directed in that way, and if they chose noble words and values. In the 
2000s, the Islamists started cinema production.  
However, serious debates on Turabi’s ideas were held by Islamists, during the 1990s, 
which led to a solid conclusion that art is part of worship, and is the heritage of human 
civilisation, which must continue to reflect that beauty and participate in human 
civilisation, such as what we see in Spain. The revolutionary work done by Turabi in 
this field led to protection of the artist, media, music and theatre, and enabled 
conservative society to accept these arts without objection. In this context, many youth 
and student organisations played a vital role in introducing the arts and music to society, 
within its values. The youth opened their headquarters and theatres to musicians, 
singers, and artists, and introduced many of them to society. Abdelsalam (2009) pointed 
out that the National Sudanese Youth Union in the 1990s led the dialogue in the field of 
arts, and impacted positively on actors, authors, and playwrights; the Union was open 
towards these sectors in all regions of Sudan, with regional associations of actors and 
artists. Abdelsalam (2009, p.456) evaluated the dialogue with those mentioned above, 
and considered that it was a success; artists felt that there were no contradictions 
between their stance towards the country, and the Islamic project of al-Inghaz (the 
Islamist Revolution). Conversely, unfortunately the state officers, security forces and 
some executives did not reach the understanding of the elites of the Islamists to accept 
and protect the freedom of art and artist. Conversely, unfortunately the state officers, 
security forces and some executives were not in the same waves-length as elites of the 
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Islamists with regard to accepting and protecting the freedom of art and artist. As a 
result of this schism, many artists were intimidated; their activities were restricted and 
the Islamists did not defend the right of those groups to practise their activities freely; 
because of these polices, many actors and artists migrated. This is one of the good 
examples of the huge gap between theories and practice; Islamists should create the 
rules and the mechanisms that protect these rights –the freedom of art and artist- and 
educate the officers and executives who deal with these cases. 
4.4 Women’s Sector 
Women participated in the 1989 revolution at all levels; the significant encouragement 
by Turabi and the movement was based on the belief in the important role of women in 
building the country in the different fields. Islamists went further in supporting women 
to achieve the most, from the level of policies, to the level of high executive posts. For 
the first time in Sudan, a woman became a state governor in 1991; in the parliament, 
there were 78 women parliament members, representing 25% of members. In the 2011 
Cabinet, the Judiciary, and the Prosecutor-General’s office, there were 5 women 
ministers, 89 judges, and 284 consultants respectively. In the police force, the 
percentage reached 10%, in the army 15%, lawyers 41%, in higher education 67%, and 
in the diplomatic field about 7% (Ministry of Information, 2011, p.50). The most 
important achievement of Turabi was legislation in the form of the country’s 
constitution and law, such as giving women the right to pass citizenship to their children 
from a non-Sudanese father. Moreover, Turabi opened the ranks of the army, police and 
diplomatic service to women. Women gained the right to reach the top, and compete 
with men, on the basis of qualifications. This means that there is no legislation to 
prevent women from occupying public positions. Women even played a significant 
international role in non-governmental organisations; Burr (2003, p.22) argued “that he 
[Turabi] played an influential role in the creation of the International Organisation for 
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Muslim Women in November 1989.” Burr believes that Turabi had long been a 
champion of women’s equality.  
Women participated in Jihad, and in business women’s groups; they led many important 
institutions in the government, in the finance, education, political, and social 
institutions. However, there have been some incidents to the contrary; for example, the 
decision made by Majzoob al-Khalifa, Khartoum State Governor, to prevent women 
from working in petrol stations, or promoting a law that asks women to obtain 
permission from the family to travel abroad. However, the General Union of Sudanese 
Women, which supports the government, stood against these decisions, and succeeded 
in winning the battle, after pressuring the government through the courts, media, and 
different women’s organisations. The study will discuss the theoretical framework 
relating to women in the next chapterbut, as a general evaluation, it could be said that 
under Islamist law, and by the support of Turabi, women gained many rights and played 
a significant role in public life.  
 
Section 5. Human Rights 
This part of the thesis will look at the overall picture regarding the human rights’ 
situation in Sudan after June 1989. It will examine its relation to Islamic norms, and will 
then proceed to explore possible remedies. With the rise of Islamic movements in the 
last century, Western scholars, politicians, and the media often question the underlying 
compatibility of Islam with democracy, human rights, individual liberty, civil society, 
and limited government. “For many Muslims, the desire and even imperative for 
implementing an Islamic state with Shari'a as the basis for both law and ethics …” 
(Esposito, 1998, p.75). 
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In Sudan: 
“the coup leaders witnessed the rise of the visions and the voices that call for 
good government established on human rights, particularly the right of 
expression, association and peaceful exchange of power, the rule of law and the 
consequent decline of the traditional concept of state sovereignty” (Abdelsalam, 
2009, p.338). 
The strategic plan for the government for the first decade, 1992-2002, aimed: 
“to fulfil and secure the rights of the children [and women] in all the Arab, 
Islamic and international human rights conventions” (National Strategic Plan, 
1992-2002, p.33). 
However: 
“On the night of the coup, several hundred politicians, including leaders of 
political parties and ministers, as well as senior army officers, trade unionists, 
lawyers, journalists, and businessmen were detained, and all non-religious 
organisations were dissolved, newspapers were shut down, and only the state 
radio and TV stations and the weekly army newspaper, al-Quwat al-Musallahah 
were allowed to operate” (Gallab, 2008, p.3). 
Indeed: 
“The fact that the new regime targeted almost everybody – dissolving all 
political parties, banning all trade unions, closing all independent publications, 
etc., meant that it had few friends left and many enemies” (el-Affendi, 2001, 
p.482). 
In this case, it could be said that revolutions everywhere act in the same way, whether 
Islamist or other. However, it could be added that Islamists were very keen to carry out 
the coup without any bloodshed, as stated by Turabi in the interview conducted by the 
researcher, and they succeeded in this point. Sudan avoided the slaughter and controlled 
the extreme actions typical of revolutions, yet some members mistreated the opposition, 
but the Islamists themselves criticised such actions. Despite the above arguments, each 
of these actions contradicts Turabi’s democratic theory, and shows how the gap between 
theory and practice could be noticed from the beginning. 
Abdelsalam criticised the human rights’ situation in Sudan after the coup, and attributed 
this to “lack of fiqh (understanding or jurisprudence) and shortage of training.” He 
asserted that this fiqh offered by Islamic heritage books on Jihad, which had not been 
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practised in civil society and the modern state, opened the doors to a culture of power 
and impunity practised in the first era of the revolution; particularly since the revolution 
came through a military coup that suspended the constitution and laws, and tempted its 
supporters to act on varying pretexts, whether protecting the revolution, revenge, or 
simply citing the need to remove the pharaoh or despot. This was especially the case 
for: 
“groups related to the technical executive (popular security forces) groups that 
played some role in the preparation for the revolution. They dealt with 
opposition activities, but lacked the skills and experience needed in this 
situation” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.262). 
Evidence of human rights’ violations were uncovered, yet the regime leaders claimed 
that it was not the policy of the government. However, they did not act to stop these 
violations, and even the judicial system failed to address these violations and protect the 
victims. 
However, theoretically, Moussalli (2003) demonstrates that the disagreement between 
Islam and democracy is more illusory than real. He offers as evidence the striking 
variety in Islamic thought that has been largely overlooked in contemporary scholarly 
and public policy debate. Reviewing Islamic texts and writings from some of the most 
important Islamic thinkers, he summarises classical theory as developed not by the 
philosophically-important thinkers, such as Ibn Rushd and al-Farabi, but rather by al-
Mawardi and others. He demonstrated that the theoretical foundations of limited 
government, civil society, and individual liberty had been developed by Muslim 
philosophers, jurists, and theologians independently of Islamic regimes. Moving to 
more contemporary thinkers, he demonstrates the same for Banna, Turabi, Ghanouchi, 
and others. However, Turabi and Ghanouchi, as reformers and political leaders, tried to 
develop a theoretical framework for human rights in the Islamic state; Turabi expressed 
his ideas in his book (al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm: al-Nuzum al-Sultaniyyah bayn al-Usūl 
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wa al-Waqi‘) (Politics and governance: Ruling systems between principles and reality) 
and Ghanouchi in his renowned book (al-Huriyyat al-‘Amah fī al-Dawlah al-
Islamiyyah) (Public Freedoms in the Islamic state). This development on the theoretical 
level needs to be examined in practice. Turabi asserted: 
“whatever happens, the ruler has no right to be coercive and order arrogantly, or 
ban, using his power to corrupt the free-will, which was created by Allah, 
whether he forces them—the people—to follow a specific religion, or doctrine, 
or to push them to act in a specific way, prevent them from seeing others, and 
humiliate them using terror and torture” (Turabi, 2003, p.142). 
Despite this clear vision, in practical reality, the new regime humiliated, terrorised and 
tortured its opponents from the very first days.  
According to Turabi, the individual has intrinsic rights, which the state ought to 
recognise and guarantee for better fulfilment of the religious ideal, including the right to 
physical existence, general social well-being, dignity, peace, privacy, education and 
freedom of religion and expression. Power must be held in check, and Turabi asserts 
that the judiciary plays an extremely important role as a check and balance (Turabi, 
1997, p.133). This he confirmed again in the interview with the researcher on 26 
December 2010 in Khartoum, adding that it must also supervise the executive closely. 
Therefore, he maintains that, to play this role effectively, the judicial authority must be 
independent. These theories should be examined, in Sudan – the case study – during the 
first decade of Islamist government.  
Although Turabi’s theoretical framework is comprehensive, he could not apply it in the 
Sudan after 1989. El-Affendi (2001, p.502) asserted that the issue of human rights in 
Sudan has received enormous publicity, and has exercised international human rights’ 
organisations and the UN to levels unprecedented in modern history. The unanimity 
displayed in all international forums on the issue is also remarkable. It was for this 
reason that Sudan has been regarded by human rights’ groups worldwide in the early 
1990s as a test case for the potency of the new international drive towards democracy 
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and human rights. The situation of human rights was a controversial issue in Sudan after 
the military coup in 1989. Islamists themselves criticised the behaviour of the regime in 
the first days, and some were punished secretly by the authority, as mentioned by 
Abdelsalam (2009, p.418). In contrast, some members were active in the eviction of 
opposition party members from the civil service, actions labelled “a random slaughter” 
by Abdelsalam (2009). This behaviour in the early years was described by the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (LCHR); 
“the first years of the regime were characterised by gross human rights 
violations of a kind common to secular regimes worldwide, such as extrajudicial 
killings, arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trial procedures and repressive 
security measures.”(LCHR, pp. 28-29) 
These reports show the real gap between theory and practice of Islamist in Sudan, this 
human rights violations could be explained in terms of the absence of the accountability 
if we accept the government argument that such violations is not a government policy. 
Indeed, before the 1998 constitution, one of the main criticisms of the legal framework 
was that it lacked “an overarching constitutional framework to define the rights of 
individuals and establish the rule of law.” The 1998 constitution affirmed freedom of 
association, and the law permitting the formation of political parties came into effect in 
January 1999. 
With regard to the Islamically-inspired legal provisions, the standard allegations 
levelled have been those of non-compliance with Sudan’s obligations under 
international law. The country is a signatory of the Convention Against Torture, and 
Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The intrusive nature of 
some legislation regulating private life, prejudice to the rights of women and non-
Muslims, the vagueness of provisions, and the arbitrary way in which they were being 
enforced, were also subject to criticism (el-Affendi, 2001, p.484). 
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In the realm of practice, abuses have been alleged, with or without legal sanction. 
Between June 1989 and early 1995, Amnesty International estimated the number of 
political detainees, who were held at one time or other, all over the country at around 
1,500 (Amnesty, 1995, p.13). Turabi, in the round table conference, Islam, Democracy 
and the West, held at Florida University, stated that: 
“Yes, some people were tortured, in the first days, but this happened in the 
police stations not in prisons. I can confirm the prisoners were safe; when I was 
in prison, the detainees were about 200, but now the political detainees are not 
more that 20-30” (Turabi, 1995, p.140). 
However, in 2001, Turabi was regretful, and published his book, ‘Ibrat al-Masīr, in 
which he criticised the regime, and described it as a dictatorship. Despite his regression, 
el-Affendi in the Arab newspaper, al-Quds al-‘Arabi, criticised the book saying that it 
was not enough criticism of a regime that was described by its main sponsor,Turabi, as 
an authoritarian and totalitarian regime, but that clear apologies were needed for the 
mistakes and violations; apologies to the Sudanese people (el-Affendi, 13 June 2001, 
p.19). 
The actual number of detainees was always open to dispute, with the government 
maintaining it was low, and the opposition parties exaggerating the figure. However, 
Haydar Ibrahim Ali asserts that the position of the international community on human 
rights in the practice of the Sudanese Civilisation Project (al-Mashru‘al-Hadari al-
Sudani) did not change. Yet the regime, in the period 1989-1998, had made many 
amendments and reversals, which brought it closer to international human rights’ 
concepts, and not the opposite (Ali, 2004, p.79). Another criticism is that due process 
guarantees are circumscribed by the existence of a “parallel justice system,” which 
allows special courts and the security apparatus to circumvent and bypass whatever 
guarantees existed. Vague legislation criminalising all sorts of private conduct had been 
passed, and were being implemented by Public Order Courts that employed summary 
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procedures. This, together with the immunity given to security officials, the lack of 
judicial supervision of pre-trial procedures, and the existence of the Special Courts’ 
system, through which “normal rules of procedure were suspended”, all add up to 
“structural flaws in the criminal justice system” (el-Affendi, 2001, p.483). Protests 
against this repression thus came from every political perspective, and from a wide 
array of civil society organisations. Sudan’s international isolation also helped to make 
these protests resonate around the globe. The combination of these factors explains why 
Sudan came to stand out as a symbol of the international community’s determination to 
stand up and be counted on human rights’ issues (el-Affendi, 2001, p.483). Based on the 
reports of Gaspar Biro, who was appointed as Special Rapporteur on Sudan in 1993, a 
resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 1 February 1994: 
“Noting with deep concern reports of grave human rights violations in the 
Sudan, particularly summary executions, detentions without trial, forced 
displacement of persons and torture, described in part in the reports submitted to 
the Commission on Human Rights at its forty-ninth session by the Special 
Rapporteurs on the question of torture and on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions.” (UN Resolution 48/147, 20 December 1993) 
The report criticised the failure of the Government of the Sudan to provide for a full 
impartial investigation of the killings of Sudanese nationals employed by foreign 
government relief organisations, despite the announcement by the government of its 
intention to convene an independent judicial commission of inquiry. However, most of 
the condemnation concentrated on violations of human rights in South Sudan, where 
there was a war. The main criticisms in the subsequent years’ reports were the same, but 
adding more issues, such as the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in South 
Kordofan. The Special Rapporteur’s conclusion was: 
“that the abduction of persons, mainly women and children, belonging to ethnic 
and religious minorities from southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the 
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Ingessana Hills area, and their subjection to the slave trade, servitude and forced 
labour are taking place with the knowledge of the Government of the Sudan.”58 
However, a 1996 UN resolution welcomed the release of some political prisoners by the 
Government of the Sudan in August 1995. It noted the recent announcement of open, 
free, and fair elections in 1996, as well as the dialogues and contacts between non-
governmental organisations and religious minorities in Sudan, aimed at developing a 
more balanced relationship between the government and religious minority groups. 
However, it expressed deep concern: 
“at the serious, widespread and continuing human rights violations in the Sudan, 
including extrajudicial killings and summary executions; detentions without due 
process; forced displacement of persons; enforced or involuntary 
disappearances, torture and other forms of cruel and unusual punishment; 
slavery, practices similar to slavery and forced labour; and denial of the 
freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly” (UN General 
Assembly, 1996).  
It could be said the criticism concentrated on the judicial system, the side-effects of war, 
and national security measures. However, UN resolutions in the next few years changed 
tone and began to praise the Sudanese government’s efforts and cooperation; for 
example: 
“welcoming new practices regarding street children, which centre on 
rehabilitation and family reunification and the increasing involvement of the 
United Nations Children’s Fund in projects with the Government of the Sudan” 
(UN General Assembly, 1998).  
Moreover, resolutions encouraged: 
“the Government of the Sudan to work actively for the eradication of practices 
which are directed against and particularly violate the human rights of women 
and girls, especially in light of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for 
Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women.” (UN, 1995) 
The UN General Assembly also called for: 
“visits to the Sudan by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
                                                 
58
 This conclusion has been reported in two documents the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/48/632/Add.3)], situation of human rights in Sudan. And the 
‘Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1994, Supplement No. 4 and corrigendum 
(E/1994/24 and Corr.1), chap. II. 
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expression and the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery of the 
Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
of the Commission on Human Rights, who have both been invited by the 
Government of the Sudan, and requests both to report to the Commission and to 
the General Assembly on their findings.” (UN, 3 March 1998) 
At same time, the General Assembly welcomed: 
“the establishment by the Government of the Sudan of the Special Investigation 
Committee on Allegations of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and 
Reported Cases of Slavery.” (UN, 5 March 1997) 
It is notable that the government began to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur after 
1996. However, while the Rapporteur appreciated the efforts of the Sudanese 
government, his report contained the same allegations mentioned above. The report 
acknowledged that the Sudanese government reported the release of female detainees 
with children, and other activities designed to assist such persons. It encouraged the 
government to work actively for the eradication of practices directed against, and in 
particular, violated the human rights of women and girls. (UN, March 1997). However, 
there was a noticeable development in the human rights’ issues in Sudan, and the 
report’s tone changed after 1997, because the government signed a peace agreement 
with one group of southern rebels led by Riak Machar. This was followed by the 
acceptance of the Declaration of Principles as a basis for negotiations, and then the 
government announcement of a comprehensive ceasefire on 5 April 1999.  
Although some accusations were still stated in reports between 1997-2001, a tone of 
remarkable appreciation appeared in the UN resolutions in 2000 and 2001, and in the 
many visits by high representatives of the UN Secretary-General, and towards the 
cooperation extended by the Sudanese government to the needs’ assessment mission of 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which took place on 14-26 
September 1999. The Government of the Sudan had extended an invitation for a fact-
finding mission by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the 
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promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in 
September 1999. As such, the General Assembly expressed: 
 “its firm belief that progress towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict in 
southern Sudan within the peace initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development will greatly contribute to the creation of a better environment to 
encourage respect for human rights in the Sudan.” (UN, 29 February 2000) 
Other important points stated in the report may explain the improvement in the 
situation. 
 First, the stipulation of basic human rights and freedoms in the constitution of the 
Sudan, which came into force on 1 July 1998.  
 Second, the expressed commitment of the Government of the Sudan to respect and 
promote human rights and the rule of law, and its express commitment to a process 
of democratisation, with a view to establishing a representative and accountable 
government, reflecting the aspirations of the people of the Sudan.  
 Third, the establishment of the Constitutional Court, which has been in operation 
since April 1999. 
 Fourth, the creation of the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women 
and Children as a constructive response on the part of the government, and the 
cooperation extended to the Committee by the local communities and the support of 
the international community and non-governmental organisations.  
 Fifth, efforts to implement the right to education.  
 Sixth, the commitments made by the Government of the Sudan to the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, in 
particular the commitment not to use or recruit children under the age of 18 as 
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soldiers, although these children were recruited by the SPLA, as stated in the 
General Assembly resolutions.  
 Seventh, the efforts to address the problem of internally-displaced persons. (UN, 29 
February 2000) 
However these changes were interpreted differently; while some refer these changes to 
political and economic weakness, others believe them to be tactical responses focusing 
on a new political message and public relations, without effect on the essential nature of 
the regime. Even the US State Department also appears to concur in the view that the 
decline in reports of abuses may be “due to the increased control of the NIF regime,” 
which reduced the need to intimidate opposition groups. The same report also notes that 
the government, after a period of non-cooperation, “began to implement international 
conventions and basic human rights practices” (el-Affendi, 2001, p.485). It could also 
be said that the government leaders had gained experience in the field, and learned to 
speak the language. Turabi on many occasions confirmed that these steps had been 
taken two years after the coup: 
“previously, after any military coup, democracy resumes after three years, but in 
this regime, it did not take more than two years; moreover, we went on applying 
the federal system so as to distribute the power and responsibilities to the local 
councils, e.g. we encouraged private sectors to be involved” (Turabi, May 1992, 
p.84). 
On human rights’ violations and pluralism, Turabi asserted that, in: 
“human rights, I am not claiming that we have reached an ideal situation yet, 
there should be a balance between the government and society, and freedom and 
individual, because of the economic crisis and the security situations ... it is 
difficult in the crisis to keep the balance between the regime and the individual 
freedom; what do you expect from Sudan suffering from economic crisis and 
living under a civil war for seven years; why are the Americans turning a blind 
eye to the practice of some of Sudan’s neighbours” (Turabi, May 1992, p.128). 
In another interview in Khartoum in October 1994, he asserted that “They [the 
Americans] accuse us of breaching human rights, while political detention does not 
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exceed 1% of that in Egypt for example.” Although this is not an excuse, it could be 
interpreted as a tactic to reduce the pressure on the regime at that time, and also 
embarrass the Americans. Since 1997,
59
 the government took some significant steps 
towards complying with the 1998 constitution, which conceded the freedom of 
association and freedom of expression. These developments were assessed by el-
Affendi (2001, p.485), who considered that: 
“This development takes care of the constitutional void mentioned above and 
offers some safeguards, in theory at least. The freedom of expression had been 
enhanced in both theory and practice over the past three years, while the 
constitution concedes the freedom of association.” 
This meant that the government prior to 1998 had not dealt with the allegations of 
abuse; el-Affendi (2001) believes that the absence of an effective constitutional system 
was not the only problem, nor the main cause, but refers this problem to the fact that 
“most alleged abuses in Sudan were not sanctioned by either law or constitution.” He 
considers the existence of credible constitutions and mechanisms to uphold the 
commitment to justice as being at the heart of the matter.  
The fact that justice and the rule of law are the essence of any viable political system, 
whether Islamic or not, Turabi considered that “the priority duty for the government is 
to establish the rule of law” (Turabi, 2009, p.19). Turabi believed that he could not 
introduce and enhance institutions to establish the rule of law, while most of the 
violations were outside of these institutions. Moreover, Turabi (2009) confirmed the 
statement of el-Affendi (2001), that “the rule of law is more fundamental to a system 
that purports to be Islamic, since such a system is by definition one that is governed by 
Islamic law.” For both Turabi (2009) and el-Affendi (2001), for the rule of law to 
prevail, the judiciary must be independent and free from any political control or 
manipulation. Turabi (2009, p.299) added that the principles of Shari'a and its 
                                                 
59
 The safeguards agreed upon in the peace accords of April 1997 had been enshrined in the constitution 
passed by the NA in March 1998, and which came into effect the following June. 
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foundation of independence is granted by a procedure that complies with the precepts of 
justice.  
According to Abdelsalam (2009, p.384), 1998 witnessed the most important domestic 
event, where the constitution was passed by the NA in March 1998. The leaders of the 
movement explained it to Western leaders and diplomats, who appreciated the freedom 
of expression and political association it allowed. However, el-Affendi (2001) and 
Abdelsalam (2009) agreed that opposition groups remained far from satisfied by the 
changes made by the government. They believed that these changes did not go far 
enough, and wanted the government to offer more guarantees. In particular, they 
believed that the hegemony over all aspects of political and economic life by 
government supporters made fair elections impossible. 
Organisations, such as Amnesty International, criticised the situation of women and 
minorities; some of their concern was that the Shari‘a provisions created an obstacle to 
maintaining equality for women and non-Muslims. However, LCHR found that 
“Sudanese law includes a variety of provisions which appear to guarantee equality of 
treatment for all Sudanese citizens.” LCHR also found “no systematic discrimination 
against female witnesses in criminal cases” and acknowledged that Shari‘a was not 
applied in the South. Moreover, non-Muslims in the North had provisions protecting 
them from prosecution for acts that are not crimes for them, such as drinking alcohol. 
LCHR agreed with the Sudanese government that “the Sudanese people must be free to 
live in the social system of their choice.” But, at the same time, they stipulated the 
condition of international human rights’ standards. “This freedom, however, must be 
balanced with Sudan's obligations to uphold international human rights standards aimed 
at individuals.” (LCHR, 1996, p.84) The LCHR report admitted in the conclusion to 
“[T]he right of Sudanese citizens to the social and political system of their choice” but 
deprived the government of such rights; “[it] does not, however, grant the government 
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of Sudan the right to disregard basic freedoms guaranteed by the international human 
rights treaties that Sudan has signed.” 
Shortly after the 1998 constitution came into effect, and the government took some 
significant steps towards normalisation, the Sudanese government started dialogue with 
Europe and the US; France continued its dialogue with the government, followed by 
Italy after Turabi’s visit to the Vatican, then Germany and subsequently the EU.  
On the domestic level, some political leaders returned to Sudan and began rebuilding 
their political parties. Independent and political party newspapers began to be published. 
It is important to note that Mahdi, after years of exile, returned to Sudan on 23 
November 2000. He has been gradually rebuilding his political party structure since 
then, and has spoken in conciliatory terms of the government. El-Affendi (2001) affirms 
that a combination of internal dissent within the ranks of the government, tentative 
political reform measures, political agreements with opponents, and improved foreign 
relations with neighbours and Western and regional powers has led to a toning down of 
criticism of human rights’ violations in Sudan. 
In conclusion, this chapter critically evaluated the Islamist experiment in Sudan in the 
period 1989-2001. It explored why they chose the military coup as a method of change. 
It discussed the extent to which they applied their theories of state building, especially 
in terms of how they developed the constitution. It explored the status of ethnic and 
religious minorities in the constitution based on Turabi’s theory. The role of the society 
in different fields, i.e. culture, charity, and defence, and the role of women in the state 
and society according to Islamist theory were also presented.  
The movement before the coup, represented by the NIF, had been strong enough to win 
elections with a majority, allowing it to rule in coalition with others, such as the 
traditional parties, UP and DUP. Why did they then choose a coup as a method of 
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change? The study found that there were internal and external factors that forced them 
to choose a military coup as a method of change. The main objective of the coup was to 
protect the country from economic and security collapse, and also to protect the 
Islamists from being eradicated by the forces within the military that threatened the 
Prime Minister, Mahdi, at the time. Moreover, the international powers had threatened 
Mahdi, and forced him to break the alliance with the NIF. Some members of the 
movement executed the coup plan, where both civilians and military personnel 
participated in all phases, under the supervision of the movement’s Executive Office, 
which had been delegated by the Shura Council to pursue the practical steps towards 
executing the coup. Accordingly, the Islamists in Sudan successfully carried out a 
bloodless military coup. 
The study found that the Sudan Charter is an important document that represents the 
Islamist thesis, covering governance, social change, foreign affairs, and defence 
policies. It presented a comprehensive programme for a political party that planned to 
rebuild the state and society, according to certain spiritual and cultural values. It was a 
big challenge for the movement to reflect the maturity of the Islamic thesis in ruling a 
country, such as Sudan, which is complex in its multi-ethnic background, multi-cultural 
character, and diverse religions and languages. Indeed, the movement succeeded in 
developing a theoretical framework for its thesis, but failed to properly implement it to 
the satisfaction of its members and the Sudanese people. 
However, after 1989, the movement developed the ideas of this charter further. The 
literature published subsequently illustrates that practical reality proved their theory 
solid and comprehensive, although they failed to put all of it into practice. After the 
coup, Turabi sought to achieve consensus with the leaders of the traditional political 
parties, Mahdi and al-Mirghani. However, his efforts were frustrated by the attitude of 
the security forces, and the efforts of leftist and communist parties, and did not succeed 
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in reaching any agreement. In any case, the government after the coup was in full 
control, with all the legislative and executive powers in the hands of RCC, which could 
be described as a military Junta. Islamists started building the state according to their 
plan. It was claimed that the main principle adopted was Shura, where Islamists tried to 
encourage the Sudanese people to participate in building the political system, to practise 
Shura, and advance the intellectual ideas and effort to build the country. A series of 
conferences was started, under the headings of peace, the economy, diplomatic strategy, 
political system, women, the media, and other important issues. These conferences 
formulated the national strategic plan for the first decade (1992-2002). Shura, which 
was practised in this conference, was limited since many of the opposition leaders and 
politicians did not participated in these conferences. 
As in any other military coup, although it was bloodless, all the political leaders were 
arrested and jailed in Kober prison. The RCC dissolved the media, and shut down 
newspapers. Gradually, the RCC delegated authority, by December 1991, to the 
appointed TNC (1991-1995) then to the elected NA (1995-). Eight years later in 1997, 
the dialogue on achieving political pluralism had begun, between the opposition and the 
regime’s supporters. In March 1998, the constitution was passed and, according to that, 
the law of freedom of association was issued in December 1998, and up to 22 political 
parties were subsequently registered. The law was amended in 2000, and named the 
Law of Political Parties and Organisations. This development took care of the 
constitutional void, and offered safeguards, in theory at least. Freedom of expression 
had been enhanced in both theory and to some extent in practice over the past decade, 
while the constitution conceded the freedom of association. This constitution illustrates 
basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular reference to democracy. 
Turabi played a legislative role when he was the president of the NA, in March 1996. 
Turabi was elected as the chairman in the NA, where he served as speaker of the NA, 
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and had an exceutive role when he was the Secretary-General of NC before that. In the 
international dimension he was the Secretary-General for the PAIC from 1991-1994, but 
he was influential during the entire period between 1989-1999.  
This study observed that the 1998 constitution did not end the period of authoritarian 
and totalitarian rule completely, nor the oppressive restrictions imposed by the authority 
on people’s political views. However, this constitution offered a chance for the political 
parties to freely approach their supporters and organise activities to confront oppression. 
The first provision defined the state in relatively inclusive terms by addressing the 
problem of a majority Muslim population and the minorities, where the 1998 
constitution adopted a federal system. Researchers noted that official NIF policy in the 
1990s reflected the principles presented in the 1987 NIF Sudan Charter, where the 
constitution and laws preserved the minorities’ rights.  
The unique contribution of Turabi in the field of majority-minority relations is that he 
agrees to exempt the southern region – with the non-Muslim majority – from the 
application of the Shari‘a, and the individuals who live in the northern regions as well. 
This is a very advanced thesis in this field. In the South, the application did not face 
problems but, in the North, some officers committed mistakes against some people. This 
is due to their -officers- lack of skills and awareness of the rights and duties of the 
exempted people. These are important elements in Turabi’s political thinking with 
particular reference to democracy. 
For the government, Turabi proposed a structure for the NC that ensured diversity of 
opinion in the organisation. The organisation would uphold freedom of expression, 
intellectual participation, and open discussion to reach consensus, with decisions based 
on this political consensus. However, the organisation failed to achieve this objective, 
and the regime subsequently adopted the concept of political association (al-Tawali al-
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Siyasi), or multi-party system. This political system is heavily criticised, the failure of 
the previous popular conferences system is attributed to a number of factors; the system 
had been elitist, complicated, and that the Sudanese people were highly politicised by 
virtue of their environment, and influenced by sectarian institutions and geographical 
loyalties. In this context, in February 1998, the NC was announced as a political party, 
whereby President Bashir became NC president, and Turabi Secretary-General. Thus, 
the NC was the ruling party competing with 22 other political parties. 
The proposed national strategic plan was based on Islamic and national aspirations, 
which meant establishing a system founded on the values of fairness and justice, the 
significance of mercy, and the substance of fear of the Day of Judgement.  
The government adopted a three-year economic reform project. While the economic 
plan was established upon these principles, the government was unable to solve most of 
the economic problems in Sudan. Moreover, no mechanisms were developed to enhance 
these values, while the civil war, and international pressures, wasted most of the efforts 
and resources that could be directed to treating the Sudanese economy.  
In reality, the new government had inherited many problems, including a struggling 
economy, low productivity, corruption in the civil service, and poor infrastructure. The 
government failed to solve these problems, because of the centralised approach to 
tackling economic problems in the early days of the regime. Indeed, its economic 
performance was imbalanced: while the reform and changes made were quite important 
steps, they should not have been implemented hastily, and not without first establishing 
the structures and mechanisms that would absorb the side-effects of privatisation and 
the free market. These polices affected the middle class and the poor people who 
represent the majority of the population.  
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The policy of freemarket was successful, but had been slow to achieve its goals, given 
the weak structure of Sudan’s economy, and the effect of some social traditions. In 
addition, the agricultural and industrial sectors had delayed the growth of the national 
economy in this period. The law on Zakat was issued in 1990, and the regime developed 
the Zakat system to absorb the side-effects of its economic policies. Zakat played a 
remarkable role in social support for the poor family directly, by providing monthly 
allowances, and indirectly through supporting the education and health sectors, but it 
remains traditional and slow in facing the rapid economic challenges.  
The oil sector witnessed considerable development and, by 1999, Sudan had started 
exporting oil. The government started to receive oil revenues one decade after the 
revolution. It built up an oil infrastructure, such as seaports on the Red Sea and 
pipelines. The Sudan had become an oil producer, and an OPEC member after one 
decade of the Islamist coup which indicated their serious efforts to develop this sector. 
Although the government paid attention to the agricultural sector, it was not developed 
compared to the other sectors. Islamists succeeded in building an infrastructure, 
privatising the services and industrial sectors, and also attracting investors to the oil 
production, agricultural, and livestock sectors, and to industries, such as cars, cane 
sugar, edible oils, green forage, flour, leather, Gum Arabic, and cement. In contrast to 
the boom in road construction, the government was unable to modernise Sudan’s 
railway infrastructure, because of economic sanctions imposed by the US. In addition, 
the international economic crisis affected the prices of food and imported goods. The 
process of privatisation affected labourers and employees; in other words, the middle 
class and poor people were affected more so than the wealthy and business people.  
The study demonstrated that Turabi believes that the society, not the state, is the first 
institution in Islam. He considers that the society cannot be described as an Islamic 
society, unless it is self-motivated to apply the teachings of the Qur’an to amend 
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mistakes and to encourage righteousness. However, many efforts in this field were made 
and many projects adopted, but it was not sustainable and it was affected by the 
government approach of monopolising the power; another factor is the war, which 
affected the society significantly.  
On another note, Turabi and Islamists in Sudan had shown significant concern for all 
branches of art since the 1970s, although the strategic plan for the first decade (1992-
2002) was oriented to the concepts of the national culture of Sudan, and the diversity of 
Arab-African ethnicity. Despite the Islamist elites encouraging art and cultural 
activities, the officers and security forces intimidated the artist; this example shows the 
gap between theory and practice and proves that the elite only cannot build a state.  
Sudanese society played a significant role in cultural projects, and government policies 
encouraged it to develop the art infrastructure and activities. However, policies were not 
turned into action plans, and faced problems, such as financial and administrative 
complications, while most officials did not regard them as a priority. The society 
participated actively in the charitable sector through organisations in the fields of 
education, health, and relief, and reports show the remarkable participation in these 
fields. 
Turabi and Islamists in Sudan believe that defence is the role of all citizens, including 
women, not just a specific group, contrasting with modern schools of thought, which 
allocate defence work exclusively to the Armed Forces. This role is one of the important 
elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular respect to democracy and people 
participation. Based on this view, the society participated actively in the defence role, 
under what was known as ‘Popular Defence’. It participated in applying Islamic values 
in this field, where students, labourers, diplomats, doctors, and employers from all 
 221 
fields, women and men, participated voluntarily, and some paid with their lives for what 
they believed in.  
Women participated at all levels of the government; reports showed a significant 
increase in related legislation, and women’s participation in all fields and levels of the 
government, and other sectors, such as women’s Jihad and business groups. They led 
many important institutions in the government, in finance, education, and political and 
social institutions. Burr (2003, p.22) argues that Turabi had long been a champion of 
women’s equality; in this field it could be said that Islamists succeeded in implementing 
their political ideas in the level of laws and in practice. However, there have been some 
incidents to the contrary, with accusations of human rights’ abuses against women, 
caused by some executives in the government, or officers in the police. Despite all these 
incidents, general evaluation shows the women’s sector could be the winner in the 
Islamist project in Sudan. 
Regarding the human rights’ record after 1989, it could be pointed out that there were 
considerable violations at different periods of time. The dispute between the 
government and the opposition activists shows that each part tried to win the battle in 
the international organisation. Yet it can be pointed out that the government faces more 
pressure from the West and international human rights’ organisations. Many human 
rights’ special rapporteurs were sent to Sudan, although their reports documented both 
positive and negative developments the pressure continued. However, there were some 
violations, but it was not a policy of the government. Incidents were attributed to 
isolated mistakes by individuals, but there was no accountability for those individuals. 
Indeed, the government claimed that activists were exaggerating and lying about the 
number and seriousness of incidents.  
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However, human rights’ violations occurred on different levels, particularly in the first 
days of the revolution: the constitution was suspended, the leaders of political parties 
were jailed, newspapers were closed, trade unions were banned, and opposition party 
members were expelled from the civil service, under the pretext of protecting the 
revolution. The Islamist regime, at this stage, behaved in the same way as a secular 
regime. Both peace agreements in 1997, approval of the constitution in 1998, a 
comprehensive ceasefire declared in 1999, and the signing of the CPA in 2005 impacted 
positively on the human rights’ issues, as most of them were connected to the war 
situations.  
However, if the human rights’ situation in Sudan was judged on the declared principles 
of the Sudanese Islamists, it should be said that they fell far short of the expectations of 
their members, as well as the Sudanese people. On the other hand, the 1998 constitution 
confirmed the freedom of association, and forming political parties was legalised in 
January 1999. These developments on the constitutional domain offered some 
safeguards, in theory at least. In addition, the freedom of expression was enhanced, in 
both theory and practice, after the constitution conceded the freedom of association. 
These changes reflected positively, to some extent, on Sudan’s foreign relations. 
To conclude, Turabi’s theory of democracy built a comprehensive theoretical frame of 
work that is compatible with the values of Islam, which were established on the freedom 
of choice, freedom of expression, dignity etc. but it failed to devlop mechanisms that 
turned these values into practice. Turabi believes that any human invention belongs to 
all humanity, which means that the mechanisms used by the West could be adopted to 
apply these values. Despite these beliefs, Islamists failed to use these mechanisms 
effectively due to: first, the lack of skilled officers and executives; second the weak 
structure of the state in a country such as Sudan; third, the lack of the accountability; 
fourth, the political culture in Sudan. According to all these reasons mentioned in this 
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chapter, the evaluation shows that there is a huge gap between theory and practice in the 
political ideas of Turabi’s theory of democracy, and the elements of his theory could not 
make an effective operation in his political action. 
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Chapter 5: Islamists in Sudan and International Relations (1989-2001) 
 
This chapter will focus on Sudan’s international relations in the period 1989-2001. It 
explores the principles adopted by Islamists and Turabi after the coup. The chapter will 
critically evaluate the practice of Islamists in different stages and fields. Moreover, it 
will examine the factors that shaped Sudan’s foreign affairs in 1989-2001, and to what 
extent international powers influenced the relations with Sudan’s neighbours, and also 
regional, and international relations.  
Sudan’s international relations after the 1989 coup played an influential role on the 
Islamist project in Sudan; on the other hand Turabi and the Islamists had a significant 
impact on Sudan’s international relations. Although Turabi developed a broad general 
principle for international relations, in practice he influenced the Sudan foreign affairs 
significantly. Islamists came to power during a period that witnessed momentous 
changes in world relations, embodied first in the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
second in the Gulf War. These two events had a critical impact on Islamist decisions and 
the future of their project. As such, Sudan has faced a complicated situation over the last 
three decades. The objective of this section is to investigate the nature of the 
communication and cooperation by Sudan’s Islamist government with external entities. 
Furthermore, it seeks to determine the extent to which the Islamists managed to cope 
with the significant international changes of the 1990s. These changes included the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the US as the sole superpower and the Gulf 
War. This period also witnessed the appearance of new dimensions in international 
relations, such as waves of democracy in the Third World, and the rise of ‘terrorism’ 
connected to some Islamic Jihadist groups paralleling the rise of the Islamist movement. 
 225 
In this period, Islam came to prominence as a factor shaping international politics and 
relations. 
Other challenges included civil wars in Africa, Asia and even Europe, causing great 
concern to international organisations and international powers. As a consequence of all 
these factors, the issue of human rights was one that also came to prominence as a 
necessary element in the new world order. However, some factors, internal, regional and 
international, influenced Sudan’s foreign relations, which must be placed within the 
context of surrounding local and international spheres of influence. The chapter will 
critically evaluate the experiment of the Sudanese Islamic Movement in the first decade 
of their government. The chapter is divided into three sections that assess the principles 
and practice of the Islamist state in Sudan, in light of Turabi’s political theory. The first 
section evaluates Sudan’s foreign affairs: principles, values and plan. The second 
section evaluates Sudan’s relations with the US and EU, the countries of the Horn of 
Africa, and relations with neighbouring and North African countries, Asia and the Far 
East, as well as Sudan-China relations, which were regarded as the most significant of 
Sudan’s relations in the last two decades. Section three comprises a general evaluation.  
 
Section 1. Sudan Foreign Affairs: Principles, values and plan 
The strategic perception of Islamists in Sudan, as stated in their documents, is derived 
from Islamic approaches, ethics and values that developed in Turabi’s political theory. 
Historically, the Sudanese Islamists’ perception of the world was influenced by the 
challenges they faced; yet the constant vision remained the pan-Islamic perception. In 
the years of communist dominance in Sudan and in the world, Islamists everywhere 
worked against worldwide communism, e.g. the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, while in the 
colonial period they opposed Western hegemony. The objective of the state’s foreign 
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policy strategic plan was established on clear Islamic values that emphasis justice. In 
the words of Turabi: 
“political international relations for Sudan are determined by its national 
resolution, subject to the policies of other equally-sovereign governments and to 
international law developed by treaties or conventions. World relations should 
be based on peace; a fundamental Islamic principle against any initiation of use 
of force with resort thereto against aggression. This is Jihad (struggle), which is 
self-defence, but only to the limit of equal response and pious reserve” (Turabi, 
14 July 2003, p.17). 
Turabi’s words can be interpreted as follows: sovereign states are equal, no state should 
be superior over others, international law and treaties signed by states are binding on 
them, the principles of Islam should be observed, signifying that peace and fairness 
between states should be the basis of any relations. Islamically, you are not allowed to 
commence aggression, but you have the right to fight back, as Jihad in self-defence is 
subject to the limit of using the force in equal response. This means not exceeding the 
limit, and if you are fair then you are pious. It demonstrates that Turabi’s views are 
established on the same principles of international law. Moreover, in the same 
document, he reaffirmed that “human rights are to be recognised nationally and 
internationally,” and stated that: 
“honest regard for inter-state, international and universal institutions, based on 
treaties is a tent of Islam, as well as the movement towards a closer association 
and coordination of interests advancing future unity” (Turabi, 14 July 2003, 
p.17). 
On this point, Turabi always believes in pan-Islamic and regional and global unity: he 
confirms the belief in a pan-Islamic or global unity, with an emphasis on fulfilling the 
conditions of justice and freedom. He states “all political unity should maintain the 
balance and equilibrate common government to order and freedom, or independence of 
particular units”; for Turabi, “united countries should relate similarly to the level of 
federated provinces, autonomous localities and down, fundamentally, to the individual.” 
Sudan’s foreign relations were established on “independence and dignity and it is the 
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value that was confirmed by the Islamic Shari‘a from the first days of the revolution” 
(Hamid, 2009, p.325). 
However, it is important to reflect on the fundamentals guiding Sudan’s foreign affairs, 
as stated in unpublished documents. Briefly, it can be said that openness, strengthening 
neighbourly relations, non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, except by 
explicit request to help in solving a problem or mediate in a conflict, and respect for 
rights, freedoms, religion and culture of others (Foreign Affairs unpublished document). 
The same principle and guidance is stated in the Strategic Plan 2002-2012.  
Turabi and Islamists, when they came to power, claimed that they worked hard to build 
the nation, secure peace, and develop the country. At the same time, they attempted to 
realise universal goals, on the principle of Islamic values emphasising the unity of the 
Ummah. One of the most influential factors that played a significant role in shaping the 
image of Sudan in the West, and consequently in international organisations, was when 
President Bashir announced the application of Shari‘a in the north of Sudan, and not the 
south, on 1 January 1990. This announcement is based on Turabi’s fiqh, which is 
discussed in this thesis. On the other hand, Turabi, on many occasions, emphasised his 
global scope; he stated that: 
“Islam is a religion that transcends all geographic boundaries; Muslims have 
continuously striven to extend Islam in space, and disengage it from territorial 
confinement or parochial characterisation, towards a universal scope ... final 
loyalty must be rendered to the Ummah, the whole community of Muslims” 
(Turabi, 27 April 1992). 
Islamists understand that the application of Shari‘a, and other factors to be mentioned 
later are the main reasons for the complications in Sudan’s foreign relations. Some 
neighbours and Western nations interpreted Turabi’s vision expressed above as 
expansionist intentions of the new regime spreading its values, which they considered a 
 228 
threat to their own. These interpretations led to complicated relations between these 
countries. 
 
1.2 The Gulf War 
In the 1990s, many important international events shaped Sudan’s relations with the US, 
the Arab region, and African countries. These included the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Sudan being classified as a fundamentalist state. Sudan 
faced pressure from the US, the sole superpower, and at the same time lost some Arab 
allies. Mustafa Osman Ismail explained that Sudan’s stance on the invasion of Kuwait 
was against American military intervention in the Arab world, and did not support Iraq. 
Rather, it called on Iraq to depart from Kuwait, through an Arab solution. However, this 
stance was interpreted in the media as though Sudan was supporting Iraq against 
Kuwait, and so it paid the price for more than a decade (Ismail, interview, May 2011). 
In an interview with the International Crisis Group (ICG) on 11 October 1994, Turabi 
affirmed that: 
“we said that before the Gulf war was on, that the so-called international 
intervention was not about Kuwait, they were not interested in only liberating 
Kuwait; I know that Iraq was going beyond the red line as far as advanced 
technology, including the military industry, was concerned. The UN determined 
that Iraq would never develop beyond the limit” (Mirak, 1994). 
In this interview Turabi expresses the vision of the Islamic movement: it was counted as 
an official statement of the government; this kind of view impacted negatively on the 
Sudan relations. However, there were other reasons impacted negatively in Sudan 
relations such as the demonstration of the Sudanese people against the existence of the 
American troops in the Middle East. Ismail in the same interview claimed that US 
pressure was extended to neighbouring countries to isolate Sudan, and deepen the 
economic sanctions.  
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The Gulf War was crucial in Sudan’s international relations, because it resulted in the 
isolation of the country from its friends in the Arab world, Africa, and the Middle East, 
generally, and complicated its foreign affair situation, when it critically needed the 
support at that time. The daily newspaper, al-Inghaz al-Watani (15 January 1990) and 
al-‘Ālam magazine stated (15 August 1990, p.15) that: 
“Sudan faced an extensive media attack based on its stance on the Gulf war … it 
was claimed that there were Iraqi missiles and weapons to attack Saudi Arabia 
from Sudan if the war started.” 
However, these criticisms continued, and American pressure continued as well. The 
Sudanese Foreign Ministry revealed in a press release that “the US withdrew its 
ambassador from Sudan and most of its employees, claiming that there is a threat to 
their life from terrorism.” The US ambassador returned to Sudan on 12 March 1992, 
claiming that a new chapter in relations will be opened, and promised that the US would 
resume aid to Sudan. However, Ismail confirmed that they did not fulfil their promises, 
and it was understood to be a tactical step to put more pressure on Sudan.  
 
1.3 People’s Diplomacy 
The new regime tried to apply new methods and concepts, such as people’s diplomacy,60 
to break the circle of sanctions and diplomatic isolation. They began to approach people 
through what was known as people’s diplomacy. The idea was that, while the diplomatic 
policy of other countries focused on isolating Sudan, the people of Sudan were reaching 
out wherever they wished. Tijani Abdalgadir gave reasons for adopting this kind of 
diplomacy: 
“when the United States and Britain campaigned against Sudan, some Sudanese 
ambassadors applied for political refugee status preferring to stay in the US and 
Europe; this encouraged the regime to manipulate the concept of people’s 
diplomacy, as a tool for communication and direct understanding between the 
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 Not the official diplomacy, but building relations with individuals, organisations such as political 
parties, and other cultural, women’s, youth etc. organisations. 
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people, then intellectual, cultural, and economic delegations were coming to 
Khartoum from Iraq, Chad, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Japan, Britain, and other 
countries” (Abdalgadir, 1995, p.62). 
The International People’s Friendship Council (IPFC) was established in 1991 to fulfil 
these objectives, and to motivate Sudan’s friends to support the new regime, and also 
reach out to the international media, decision-making centres, local, regional and 
international organisations, political parties and leaders, and public opinion in general 
(Ismail, interview, May 2011). The IPFC Secretary-General, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, 
later became Sudan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. I believe this is one of the inventive 
ideas of the Islamists in the Sudan; it resembles Turabi’s thought in the free relations 
between people on earth without borders or government intervention. 
 
1.4 Popular Arab Islamic Conference 
In the aftermath of the second Gulf War, the IPFC conference was held on 25-28 April 
1991, to which eminent persons from the Arab and Islamic world were invited. The 
objective was to study the impact of the Gulf War, and to create cooperation between 
the Arab nationalist and Islamic movements. As a result, the PAIC was established. This 
idea was established over Turabi’s political theory that called the people to overcome 
their differences and to stand together against the evil in the world, for Muslims from 
different sects, Sunnah, Shi’a, Sufi, Jihadist etc., or different ideologies, Islamist, Arab 
Nationalist, communistetc. or different religious groups, Muslim, Christian or any other 
religion.The PAIC was described as a non-governmental organisation set up by various 
Arab Islamic groups. In this conference, for the first time, both Islamic and Arab 
nationalist trends overcame their differences and united on this common platform, as 
reported in al-Inghaz al-Watani newspaper (25 April 1991). Mustafa Osman Ismail, the 
IPFC Secretary-General at that time, stated in al-Inghaz al-Watani newspaper on 16 
June 1991: 
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“the conference represents a mature step for the Islamic and nationalist 
intellectuals, who were wasting efforts in dispute. These trends are now united. 
This will advance the Ummah, and will be one of the steps towards Islamic Arab 
solidarity, at this time, when the official bodies were unable to find a solution to 
the Gulf war.” 
Turabi, speaking to al-Inghaz al-Watani newspaper (25 April 1991) stated: “the PAIC 
will be the start for a new international order, and it will be a popular front that concerns 
the Umma.” The idea of the congress resembles Turabi’s political thought that unifies 
the Umma and crossed the ideological differences, sectors and religions. Internationally, 
the conference was classified as a terrorist conference, and a stage for Islamic and Arab 
opposition leaders. This impacted negatively on Sudan’s relations, both regionally and 
internationally. In this context, the conference was the only voice that opposed the 
actions of the US as a superpower, and leader of the New World Order (NWO). 
In 1991, PAIC took the initiative to launch an inter-faith dialogue, which culminated in 
the first inter-faith conference, held in Khartoum in April 1993, and a second one on 8-
10 October 1994. Both conferences gathered hundreds of people from 30 countries, and 
50 churches and associations. The international conference for dialogue of religions, 
held in Khartoum, was described by Western media as: the most dangerous meeting 
between Islamic terrorist organisations (Burr, 2003, p.123). However, Shari'a Journal 
(10 October 1994, pp.26-27) conducted an interview with Turabi about the 
accommodation of both militant-armed Islamists and peaceful ones, adding to that 
representation from the Vatican. Turabi believed that: “there is a common problem. The 
Vatican, the Holy Pope and the Islamic movements are today standing to do battle over 
what is termed in Western civilisation, ‘religious principles’ …” These statements could 
be counted against the interest groups in the NWO. 
It is important to mention that the attendees at the conference were from different 
Islamist groups, and other religious groups and churches. In another interview with 
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Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) on 11 October 1994, when he was asked about the 
achievement of PAIC, Turabi asserted that: 
“It has assembled Muslims from all over the world, America, Canada and the 
Caribbean, white and black, Japanese and Europeans, European stock and 
European nationalities, Asians, Africans and the Middle East – Arabs mostly. 
For the first time, from all over the world, we assembled one meeting after the 
other; we have overcome the international divisions, Shi‘a-Sunna, differences in 
jurisprudence, or spiritual orders, they now speak together, the dialogue between 
Christianity and Islam, we were behind it, and trying to develop dialogue 
between governments in the Muslim countries and societies, whether in Algeria 
or other countries. Differences between Muslim countries, Iraq-Iran, what were 
formally known as Southern and Northern Yemen, and settlement of the problem 
in Afghanistan, and some African countries; Muslim minorities all over the 
world, and dealing with Christian minorities also. This is the first time in world 
history that Muslim societies have met, not at a diplomatic level, because the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is not representative of the 
people; it represents the governments, and is not active.” 
However, these objectives that started to be achieved by PAIC attracted the attention 
and concern of the world; the US, in particular, treated it as dangerous steps by Islamists 
in Sudan to try and play an international role. These conferences were considered by the 
US as terrorist actions. A US state department publication in 1995 stated that: 
“the government of Sudan provided safe haven and support for members of 
several international terrorist groups operating in Sudan. The regime also 
permitted Tehran to use Sudan as a secure transit point and meeting site for 
Iranian-backed extremist groups ... The list of groups that maintain a presence or 
operate in Sudan is disturbing, and includes some of the world’s most violent 
organisations” (State Department publication, April 1995). 
As a result, the Sudanese government faced significant pressure to halt these activities, 
and responded by subsequently cancelling the agreement to host the PAIC 
Headquarters, and informed Secretary-General Turabi (Abdelsalam interview, 2011). 
According to Ismail, these serious allegations were picked up by the media, and Sudan 
was judged accordingly, even though there was no evidence that the government of 
Sudan carried out, or sponsored any terrorist actions. A document titled ‘Background 
note: Sudan’, by the Bureau of African Affairs in the US Department of State, stated the 
interests of US policy towards Sudan were in the areas of counter-terrorism, regional 
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stability, internal peace, protection of human rights, and humanitarian relief. In another 
document, titled ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994’, the Department of State points 
out that: 
“while there is no evidence that the Government of Sudan conducted or 
sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994, the regime provides a safe haven 
and support for several members of international terrorist groups operating in 
Sudan; some of Sudan’s neighbours have complained that insurgents in North 
Africa have received training, funds, weapons, travel documents and 
indoctrination from Sudan. In December, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations 
with Sudan for its support for subversive activities and hostile acts” (Wilcox Jr., 
1995). 
Despite admitting that there is no evidence against the Government of the Sudan for 
conducting or suporting terrorism, the Americans pressured the Sudanese government, 
and each time they issued resolutions against it. On the other hand, Turabi asserted that: 
“while the Sudanese movement and government developed closer ties with similar 
regimes and governments, the US reaction was to put Sudan on the list of states that 
sponsor terrorism” (Hamdi, 1998, p.29). The Sudanese government denied on every 
occasion being a sponsor or supporter of terrorism (Ismail, interview, 11 May 2011). 
Turabi denied all the allegations in all the conferences held in Khartoum, and in his 
visits to Canada and the US in 1992, and Madrid in 1994. Sudan’s diplomatic 
representatives all over the world also denied these allegations, especially as no 
evidence was ever offered. 
 
Section 2. Sudan’s Foreign Relations  
2.1 US and EU Relations with Sudan 
Following the military coup on 30 June 1989, al-Sudan al-Hadith newspaper (1 April 
1990) reported that: “the US government had tried to establish a relationship with the 
new regime, hoping to find a solution for the problems of the south of Sudan and 
Sudan’s relations with Libya and Iran.” 
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In the democratic period, 1985-1989, relations between the US and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s 
regime had deteriorated sharply, because of the close relations with Gaddafi’s regime 
and Iran. However, in 1989, the US cautiously started relations with the new regime in 
Khartoum, despite invoking the 1989 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act – Sec 513 
that blocked American aid to Sudan, because the new regime had overthrown a 
democratic one. Nevertheless, about one month after the coup, the new regime received 
the first American visitor, Mr Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, as reported by Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He announced that 
the US could help Sudan, but on three conditions; one of them was to abandon Shari‘a. 
The same had happened in 1983, when Nimeiri applied Shari‘a, as reported in Majalat 
al-Mujtama‘ (a Kuwaiti news magazine) on 19 March 1985. The US stopped its aid to 
Sudan, and then asked Nimeiri to delay his annual visit to the US. The US government 
then sent some executives, such as Edward Kennedy, and experts from the IMF. The US 
Vice President then called on the Sudanese government to suspend Shari‘a,61 fulfil the 
conditions of the IMF, and unify the South under a Christian leadership.  
As a consequence of all these events, Nimeiri detained the Islamists, and started a 
process of abandoning Shari'a (al-Kushi, 1986, p.299) but his regime fell before he 
could do that. Hence, Islamists understood that the West and the US would never allow 
them to apply their values in a political system. In any meeting with the Sudanese 
government, the US stressed the issue of Shari‘a law. So the government concluded that 
the US would continue to pressure it to abandon Shari‘a, and would use the 
international organisations and the international community to punish Sudan. Abdallah 
(2009, p.171) concluded that the US antagonised Sudan. The EU to some extent 
followed the US in its plans and decisions, especially those related to human rights’ 
issues and economic sanctions on Sudan. After 1997, relations started to improve after 
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 For more details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports between February 1989-October 1992. 
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the government signed an agreement with Riek Machar, which was known as the 
Khartoum peace agreement (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.382).  
Moreover, 1998 witnessed an important domestic event, where the 1998 Sudan 
constitution was passed by parliament. Abdelsalam argued that the constitution paved 
the way for freedom of association, expression, and political association, and opened the 
door to dialogue between Sudan and France, Germany, and Italy (Abdelsalam, 2009, 
p.384). He added that the American administration had attacked and destroyed al-Shifa 
Medicine Factory in Khartoum in August 1998 with missiles, claiming that it produced 
chemical weapons. As a consequence, the door of dialogue between Sudan and the 
Clinton administration was closed. It could be concluded that relations between Sudan 
and the US were not normalised, although Sudanese government minsters claimed that 
they had made many efforts to establish a healthy relationship with the US.  
 
2.2 The Horn of Africa 
Sudan’s relations with most of its African neighbours were similar. Historically, Sudan 
has border disputes with most of them, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda 
and Chad. The war in Somalia was one of the factors that added pressure on Sudan. 
Sudan considered the American presence in the Horn of Africa as aimed at subjugating 
the people in these countries. Hasan Mekki, in an interview with al-Inghaz al-Watani 
daily newspaper on 11 January 1994, opined that: 
“the USA considers its presence in Somalia an easy gain of a military base, to 
secure influence all over the region and across the Gulf, overlooking the oil and 
trade route on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, watching Iraq, Iran, the Horn of 
Africa and Sudan, and fundamentalism in Somalia”. 
This was also the understanding of the Sudanese government regarding international 
intervention in the Horn of African region. Al-Sudan al-Hadith newspaper on 14 
December 1992 stated that “the Sudanese government continued to announce its 
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constant position of the necessity of solving the Somalia problem regionally, without 
any external intervention.” These were the principles governing the Sudanese 
government foreign affairs position, which rejected using the region’s crisis as a means 
to implicate Sudan. Bashir in an interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper on 5 
January 1993 stated that, “when the international forces invaded Somalia under the flag 
of ‘Restore Hope’, Sudan believed that it was not for humanitarian reasons only.” In 
addition, the US supported General Ali Mahdi against General Mohammed Farrah 
Aidid, while the Sudanese government had great sympathy for the latter, and so 
opposed the American intervention in Somalia. As such, rumours spread everywhere 
saying that General Aidid, who was wanted by US forces, was present in Sudan; 
accordingly, the campaign against Sudan escalated. In this context and according to 
Abdallah (2009): 
“the Americans boarded a Sudanese ship named ‘Yousr’, claiming that it was 
carrying weapons to Aidid, but they found nothing. Indeed, this was the second 
incident of its type, the first occurring during the Iraq War, when the US 
intercepted the Sudanese ship ‘Dongola’ claiming that it was carrying Iraqi 
weapons to Sudan, and found nothing.”  
However, these are just examples of how the US mobilised the media and the 
international community against Sudan. In addition, on 18 August 1993, the American 
Embassy in Khartoum issued a press release that Sudan had been added to the list of 
countries supporting international terrorism (American Embassy, 18 August 1993). 
When Turabi was asked by the EIR on 11 October 1994 about what it is that conjured 
up such fears in the US Turabi affirmed that “it was lobbies.” He added that “Americans 
when they vote, know little about foreign policy, they are interested in their domestic 
economic policy.” He explained that “There are lobbies, which focus on Sudan being an 
Islamic country, and that is not representative of American society.” Moreover, he 
compared the Americans with the Europeans who had known Sudan for more than a 
century: “Not a single European has said that there is any terrorism in Sudan. The 
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Europeans know Sudan much better.” The current debate regarding this issue confirms 
Turabi’s claim; Abdallah (2009), Madmani (2008), Hoile (2008), Ismail (2010) and 
many newspapers and researchers emphasised that most of these allegations were not 
true, and that the Sudanese suffered from the consequences, including economic 
sanctions, and being on the list of states sponsoring terrorism. 
Sudan started supporting the Eritrean revolutionaries against Ethiopia, while Ethiopia 
was supporting the SPLA rebels in South Sudan. Ethiopia made a connection between 
solving the problem of South Sudan and the Eritrean problem, while Sudan rejected this 
connection because of the different natures of each of the problems. Sudan’s 
government, with Arab help, supported the Ethiopian opposition groups till they 
overthrew the regime and established a new government in Ethiopia. The Sudanese 
government regarded this as a great victory that would help them defeat the SPLA, 
which had been supported by the Ethiopian government. The Sudanese government was 
supporting Assisi Afwerki, although he was a Christian. Moreover, it pushed the 
Islamists in Eritrea to work with him inside Eritrea, but they refused, claiming that he 
was a dictator, and would not allow them to work as an organisation (Zain al-Abdin, 
2005, p.68). 
In western Sudan, and according to Zain al-Abdin, the Chadian opposition, supported 
by Libya, was present in Darfur. The Sudanese government believed that the troubles in 
Darfur were caused by Chad, and so they supported the opposition until it overthrew the 
government in Chad in 1990 (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, pp.64-65). The Sudanese 
government was keen to solve the security problems on the border between Darfur and 
Chad because this was a tribal area and could cause a security disturbance that could be 
exploited by the opposition from the South or the North, which might be dangerous 
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(Hanafi, 1996, p.27). Following the collapse of the Chadian government, and the 
establishment of a new government, al-Isbu‘ magazine wrote: 
“the Sudanese government sent aid to the new regime in the field of agriculture, 
and teaching the Arabic language, as well as support in international bodies; 
Sudan participated in strengthening peace and stability in Chad.” 
This meant that the Sudanese government had supported regime change in two 
neighbouring countries, so as to secure its borders. However, Ismail (interview 11 May 
2011) claimed that the government developed its relations with Central Africa and 
Zaire, and paid much effort to developing its relations with Kenya and Uganda. It is 
clear that the relationship between Uganda and Sudan was complicated, as Uganda 
supported and accommodated the SPLA, while Sudan supported the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA). On the other hand, Kenya was supporting the SPLA but, in the end, it 
facilitated the negotiation between Sudan’s government and the SPLA, leading to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Although, Islamists in Sudan were 
seeking a good relationship and secure borders with neighbours according to the 
principle of their foreign relations, they could not manage to gain this objective easily. 
 
2.3 Relations with Neighbouring and North African Countries 
Sudan is surrounded by nine
62
 neighbouring countries, which complicates managing 
relations with neighbours, and indeed creates significant potential for conflict. 
Moreover, most of these countries suffer domestic conflicts, such as Uganda, Chad, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, Zaire, Egypt and Libya. However, in 
terms of relations with neighbours, Abdelsalam (2009) asserted that Egypt was the first 
country to announce support for the new regime. Indeed, Egypt’s President Mubarak 
contacted other Arab countries and neighbours, and encouraged them to support the new 
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regime in Khartoum. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia released previously-frozen relief funds, 
Libya sent the first oil shipment to Sudan, Gulf countries opened their doors to 
Sudanese migrant labour, and Arab countries started to plan investment in agriculture in 
Sudan. However, Sudanese-Egyptian relations deteriorated after it became clear that the 
coup was carried out by the NIF, and the subsequent announcement of Shari‘a law. 
Unfortunately, the Sudanese-Egyptian relationship was also influenced by the Gulf War. 
The Egyptian government summoned the Sudanese ambassador in Cairo, and informed 
him of their anger at the pro-Iraq demonstrations in Sudan, and the Sudanese objection 
against the international coalition. Sudan also summoned the Egyptian ambassador in 
Khartoum, and protested about the Egyptian officials’ statements. The situation 
escalated between the two countries, when President Mubarak announced that: “Sudan 
is threatening Egyptian territory” (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, pp.52-53). However, the 
Sudanese government responded to this by confiscating Egyptian assets in Sudan, 
including the Cairo University branch in Khartoum, Egyptian schools, and the Egyptian 
Irrigation residences and offices from Khartoum to Juba; in turn, Egyptian forces moved 
into the disputed Halayib triangle.
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 Moreover, Sudan was accused of supporting the 
Jihadist group that tried to assassinate Mubarak in 1995. This complicated the situation 
between Sudan and the US, where international organisations supported by lobbies 
accused Sudan of supporting terrorist groups.
64
 The coordinator for counter-terrorism at 
the US State Department, Kenneth R. McKuen (15 May 1997), asserted that: 
“the Sudan ... provided – and continues to provide – safe haven to terrorist 
groups. Although we do not have information that Sudan provides the level and 
type of assistance and active support for specific operations as do some 
countries in the state sponsor list, the type of hospitality Sudan grants to terrorist 
groups makes it easier for them to maintain their viability, to train and to carry 
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Islamic Jihad, and the Egyptian Islamic group, in addition to non-Islamic opposition groups from Algeria, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.” 
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out terrorist actions – such as the June 1995 attack by al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyyah 
against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa.” 
A new phase in Sudanese-Egyptian relations began, where cooperation was difficult, 
and clashes between the secular regime in Egypt and Islamic regime in Sudan have been 
numerous. Egypt has long accused Sudan of supporting and even setting up Islamic 
fundamentalist groups (Moussalli, 1998, p.9), and shares the US concerns about Sudan’s 
Islamist government: “as the current regime in Sudan resisted all the Western, including 
efforts to help end the civil war, its official line is Islamist, and constant reference is 
made to Sharia” (Jacqus, 2004, p.266). In fact, former US president, Jimmy Carter, in 
the Boston Globe on 8 December 1999, “… concluded that the US has been committed 
to overthrowing the government in Khartoum, because of its Islamic orientation;” a 
view shared by many political analysts. This is supported by the opinion of a Middle 
East Affairs expert interviewed by al-Mustaqillah newspaper on 6 December 1996. He 
confirmed that: 
“indeed, the increasing pressure on Sudan’s government reflects to a large extent 
the pressure that faced the Clinton administration from Egypt and Israel; both of 
them agreed on escalating the political and media war against Sudan.” 
The expert added that: 
“tightening the siege on Sudan was always one of the essential Egyptian 
demands of President Mubarak on all his visits to Washington. The Government 
of Egypt considered the Sudanese government a strategic danger to its political 
and security war against Islamists, both moderate or extremist.” 
This attitude from Egypt could be interpreted as Mubarak not being happy about the 
participation of Turabi in the set of top leaders of the regime in Sudan and all his actions 
were against his participation. However, a significant positive development in Egypt-
Sudan relations started after the dispute between President Bashir and Turabi, but it 
could not be described as a strong relationship. This is how Turabi’s leading role in the 
Sudan government influenced indirectly the relation of Sudan, and reacted on the 
neighbouring countries’ relations and regional and international relations of Sudan. 
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However, Egypt played a significant role at the level of media and intelligence agencies 
to isolate Sudan, and weaken the regime by supporting the Sudanese opposition parties 
based in Cairo, e.g. the NDA, and working with them to overthrow the regime. In 
conclusion, Sudanese-Egyptian relations deteriorated once the Islamists took power. 
Indeed, relations had not been very good during the democratic period, when Mahdi 
was Prime Minister. Consequently, the relationship between this northern neighbour and 
Sudan was unstable.  
However, in the late 1990s, relations started to improve for many reasons: the first was 
the 1998 constitution, which opened new doors in Sudan’s relations with Europe, and 
the US. The second reason was the split among Islamists, where Turabi ended up with 
no influence in Sudanese politics, and founded his own political party on the opposition 
side. 
Moussalli (1998) believes that: 
“in addition to the US government, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and other states in 
the region, were also trying to propagate the notion of the existence of an 
international network of Islamic fundamentalist groups organised by the 
Sudanese fundamentalist state.” 
In this respect, Tunisia recalled its ambassador, protesting against what it claimed was 
interference in its internal affairs, and accommodating an opposition group. The 
Sudanese government had issued a Sudanese passport to Rashid al-Ghannouchi, leader 
of the Tunisian Islamic Movement (Hanafi, 1996, p.14). These governments argued that 
it was the influence of Turabi.  
However, Sudan had always confirmed its intention to develop its relationship with 
Tunisia. On the other hand: 
“Algeria, reduced the level of its diplomatic representation level to charge 
d’affaires, and Algeria voted against Sudan in the Third Committee of Human 
Rights, supporting the American decision on 13.12.1994” (Hanafi, 1996, p.15). 
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Yet Sudanese-Algerian relations did not resume until September 1994, on the initiative 
of the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi. Indeed, Turabi had mediated between the 
Algerian government and FIS in 1990. However, in 1993, he invited FIS to participate 
in the second PAIC conference in Khartoum. “The conflict between the FIS and the 
military government had further escalated, and Turabi once more tried to mediate 
between the parties” (Hamdi, 1998, p.54). Turabi stated: “we want Algeria to be united 
and stable as a part of our ambition to see a united Arab and Muslim world” (Hamdi, 
1998, p.55). This meant that Turabi mediated between the Algerian government and 
FIS, because he wanted to see peace in neighbouring countries, where any cooperation 
between FIS and the Algerian government would reflect positively on the relationship 
between Algeria and Sudan.  
Compared to all the previously mentioned countries, Moroccan-Sudanese relations were 
always developing, and were never affected, as were Sudan-Arab relations during the 
Gulf War. King Hasan II asserted to France Radio, as subsequently reported in al-Sudan 
al-Hadith daily newspaper on 2 May 1995, that “Sudan is not exporting extremism, 
confirming that the Sudan is under a civil war.” King Hasan II led mediation between 
Egypt and Sudan, after the Egyptians occupied the Halayib triangle, and then he 
mediated between Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995, p.5).
65
 
Libyan relations with Sudan were an important factor on the Sudanese political scene. 
For over 42 years, no-one could predict what Gaddafi would do to any of his 
neighbours. At the beginning of the revolution, he supported the regime; he thought they 
were only a military junta, and not an ideological group: 
“The relationship between Sudan and Libya was affected by the Gulf War, and 
after the PAIC conference, when Sudan’s government accommodated some 
Libyan Islamists. However, this did not appear on the surface of the relation, but 
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in reality it was deteriorated and was surrounded by doubt from both sides. The 
problem of debt, which was more than half a billion dollars, and the Libyan 
security suspicions, which were dictated by the Egyptian security forces, 
reflected negatively on the relations between Sudan and Libya” (Hanafi, 1997, 
p.130). 
In fact, Gaddafi had supported most rebellions in Sudan during Nimeiri’s regime (1969-
1985). He had supported al-Jabha al-Watania, comprising the Islamist National Front, 
the Ummah party, and the DUP, in 1977, and then John Garang’s SPLA in 1983. He 
continued to support the SPLA during Bashir’s regime, throughout the 1990s, and then 
the Darfur rebels in the 2000s. Hence, Sudanese relations with the Libyan regime were 
never stable, and took unpredictable directions, because of Gaddafi’s shifting policies. It 
is difficult to draw any conclusion about constant or strategic cooperation between the 
regime in Sudan and Gaddafi.  
However, it could be said that neighbouring countries fell under the influence of both 
the media and intelligence services, which claimed that Sudan’s government is 
fundamentalist, and supports extremists everywhere. Pateman claimed that: 
“[T]here is considerable concern in neighbouring countries that Sudanese 
fundamentalists with Iranian support, may attempt to subvert their governments. 
Intelligence services in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and Egypt are devoting 
efforts to counter this threat” (Pateman, 1995, p.68). 
In another example, Maria do Ceo Pinto writes in her book ‘Political Islam’, about US 
foreign policy towards Islamic movements in the Middle East, that Sudan “has become 
one of the most dangerous terrorist regimes not only in Africa, but also in the entire 
Muslim world” (Pinto, 1999, p.258). Pinto’s argument was based on allegations 
extracted from US documents, and statements from the US Congress, US Department of 
State and two US newspapers. However, the terrorist organisations indicated in these 
reports were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Hizbollah, as 
is explained in the mentioned document. Along with US sources, another example of 
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allegations by the intelligence agencies of neighbouring countries was attributed to 
Egyptian intelligence by Michael S. Serrill in ‘Time International’ (19 February 1996): 
“Egyptian intelligence has claimed that as many as 4,000 Islamic radicals are 
receiving military training in at least twenty Sudanese camps under the 
supervision of Iranian Revolutionary Guards.” 
The Sudanese regime, confronted by these claims, strongly denied them, and offered 
any person the chance to visit wherever they choose. However, none of these allegations 
was approved by that intelligence. In this atmosphere, the Sudanese government was 
trying hard to build a healthy relationship with its neighbours. 
 
2.4 Asia and the Far East 
In Southeast Asia and the Far East, Sudan cooperated with Malaysia, China, Iran and 
Pakistan. The African Confidential, on 28 February 1997, reported that “In the mid-
1990s, Malaysian authorities agreed to pay off some of Sudan’s US$1.7 billion arrears 
to the International Monetary Fund.” Shortly after, Malaysia and China started 
investment in Sudan’s oil sector. However, Sudanese-Iranian relations concentrated on 
trade. In the round table conference in Florida, Turabi asserted that: 
“They [Iran] got a very good welcome in Sudan, there is an exchange of trade. 
The idea was to trade meat and oil, seeds and other Sudanese products for 
Iranian products, electrical manufactures and whatever” (Lowrie, 1993, p.71). 
Sudanese-Iranian relations were developed and strengthened significantly under the 
regime, even though Iran defines itself as a Shi‘a state and Sudan is Sunni, as mentioned 
in Chapters 2 and 7; Turabi adopted the approach of unifying the Umma and 
encouraged Muslims to overcome the sectarianism.  
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2.5 Sudan’s Relations with the People's Republic of China 
Bilateral relations between Sudan and China go back to the 1950s; Sudan established 
diplomatic relationships with China in 1959.
66
 The principle of reciprocal non-
interference represents a key factor in this relationship between Sudan and China, even 
though Sudan’s regimes alternated between periods of parliamentary democracy and 
military rule. Many trade agreements were signed between the two countries during this 
period of bilateral relations. However, the relationship during the 1990s was of vital 
importance, because of China’s investments in oil and other essential industrial fields. 
The sanctions imposed by the US and some Western countries played a significant role 
in making Sudan rely on Chinese, Malaysian, and Canadian companies in oil 
prospecting and production after 1989. Chinese-Sudanese relations went even further, 
taking on political dimensions, as China supported Sudan at the UN and the Security 
Council, and also mediated between Sudan and its neighbours in some conflicts.  
Historically, bilateral trade agreements underpinned relations with China in the early 
1950s and the 1960s; cotton was exported to China in return for manufactured and 
capital goods, in a continuously increasing trend. China, for which sesame imports from 
Sudan represent about 5% of its imports of this commodity, is the world’s largest 
producer and supplier of sesame. Sudan comes in third place as a producer, but in first 
place as exporter, with China occupying the third place in the list of exporting countries 
(Ministry of Finance, 2007). In the 1970s, China’s investment in, and assistance to, 
Sudan concentrated on small-scale investments in the construction of roads, bridges and 
public buildings, such as hospitals and the landmark, Friendship Hall. Ali (2006) 
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 Another interesting issue is the salient economic position China now occupies in Sudan has been 
achieved comparatively recently but continues a longer history of ties. These are marked by the unique 
symbolic connection of ‘Chinese’ Gordon. After a career featuring service for the Qing Dynasty fighting 
Taiping rebels in China, as well as a period as Governor General of Sudan, Gordon was killed in 
Khartoum in 1885 but continues to be a common bond as the personification of shared colonial 
oppression. 
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asserted that “in the 1970s the two countries signed an Agreement in Economic and 
Technical Cooperation and a Cultural, Scientific and Technical Protocol, which 
strengthened trade relations.”  
However, after 1988, Islamists in Sudan cemented their relationship with China, when 
NIF Secretary-General Turabi and other leaders visited China and instituted the basis of 
a strong strategic relationship (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.70). It is believed that this 
relationship was further extended after the movement took over the government in June 
1989. Such relations were of extensive benefit in building the country after the 
revolution, especially in executing strategic plans for oil investment and infrastructure, 
where a wide range of industrialisation programmes and economic reconstruction took 
place. Salah al-Din M.A. Karar (2012) explained that Turabi asserted that “the Islamic 
movement chose China as a superpower to seek refuge in when faced with the expected 
conflict with the West.”  
Turabi believes that the relations between the people could be organised through 
covenant. Moreover, Turabi explains further why Islamists chose to cooperate with 
China. He concluded that this was for a number of reasons. First, China had been under 
colonial rule, and was not a colonial country. Second, it did not interfere in the internal 
affairs of other countries. Third, Chinese experts were simple and adaptable people, 
who could work under any circumstances. Fourth, Sudan needed uncomplicated 
technology, which is found in China. Fifth, Sudan needed rapid economic achievement. 
Sixth, Turabi predicted that the West would isolate the revolution and describe it as 
fundamentalist. China was chosen as a strategic ally by Turabi and Islamists before the 
coup because of the reasons mentioned above.  
Yet China faces criticism from some scholars asking, “how much is the behaviour of 
Chinese companies in Africa symptomatic of contemporary global capital flows in 
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general, and how much is down to norms and practices that are distinctively Chinese?” 
(Strauss & Saavedra, 2009, p.5). The Sudan-China relationship grew tremendously to 
the mutual benefit of both countries in the 1990s, when direct investment and aid 
witnessed a rapid increase. By the end of the 1990s, China had become Sudan’s main 
trading partner. A huge amount of direct investment had taken place in oil extraction, oil 
infrastructure, and imports of Sudanese oil by China. Although Chinese-Sudanese 
relations were regarded as strong since the 1950s, they became even more important 
during Sudan’s economic isolation in the 1990s.  
Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Foreign Minister in the 1990s, concluded that: 
“the relationship with China was significantly important specifically under the 
economic political, diplomatic and military sanctions that Sudan suffered; this 
relation is important because of the political and economic weight of China” 
(Ismail, 2010, p.360). 
President el-Bashir visited China in November 1990, and then in 1995, and so relations 
were strengthened, with China supporting the economic and political relations between 
the two countries. “Analysts say China's most successful African energy investment has 
been in Sudan, which now sends 60 percent of its oil output to China” (Hanson, June 
2008). Indeed, studies, such as Hanson (June 2008), regarded that this economic 
relationship reached unprecedented proportions in the 1990s, with China being the key 
player in the development of the oil sector. When President Omer el-Bashir visited 
China in 1995, the Chinese-Sudanese Friendship Society was formed, and joint 
ministerial committees were established for political coordination. 
In addition, Sudan and China took practical steps towards partnership. Chris (2005) 
asserts that the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), in 1996, purchased the 
largest share (40%) of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and 
has used its technical expertise and links to other Chinese government enterprises to 
transform the industry into a major export earner for Khartoum. Industry analysts 
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characterised Sudan, said to be China’s largest overseas investment target to date, as 
China’s “premier off shore oil source” and a base for its own broader petroleum 
interests in the region. Sudan’s 6% share of China’s oil imports is set to increase sharply 
when new fields in the Melut basin go into production. Although the situation is now 
different, after Sudan separated into two countries, relations between China and Sudan 
remain strong. Other important projects currently being implemented by Chinese 
companies include the Merawe Dam, Khartoum International Airport, and other 
industrial projects.  
It was challenging for China to stick to “the principles of non-interference ... where 
Beijing has had to exert pressure in Sudan to curb its militias and took the lead in 
winning Khartoum’s acceptance of a hybrid African Union-UN peace keeping force” 
(Strauss & Saavedra, 2009, p.18). This is an example of how China has interfered in 
Sudan’s domestic affairs, and participated in facilitating and helping the international 
community deal with Sudan.  
 
2.5.1 Sudan and the China-Africa forum 
As mentioned previously, during President Omer el-Bashir’s 1995 visit to China, the 
Chinese-Sudanese Friendship Society was formed, and joint ministerial committees 
were established for political coordination. Sudan sought to help China in strengthening 
the relationship between African countries and China, and convened the China-Africa 
Forum in 1997, bringing together China and the African countries. The forum’s 
objective was to enhance economic, political, social, and cultural relations between 
China and African nations. The forum served to bring China together with African 
countries and the Group of 77, which included the non-aligned countries (Ismail, 2010, 
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p.287). Therefore, China succeeded in expanding its relations in Africa between 2002 
and 2005: 
“Sudan was among the African countries which attended the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and again in 2006. Eighty-five percent of 
Africa's exports to China come from five oil-rich countries (Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan)” (Hanson, June 
2008). 
The topic of Chinese-African relations is beyond the scope of this study; however, its 
political, economic, and environmental dimensions were heavily criticised. 
2.5.2 Sudan-China political issues 
The US imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 1997, which affected economic 
projects and development. This pushed Sudan to cooperate with alternative partners, 
such as China, Turkey and Malaysia; these countries have “no political interests and 
ambitions in the other countries” (Ismail, 2010, p.252). However, al-Tayib Zain al-
A’abdin argued that: 
“these countries participated in breaking the economic siege; they participated in 
the oil exploration, regarded as a strategic commodity and essential pillar of 
Sudan’s economy. Actually, Bashaier Port received 16 million barrels from 1 
September 1999 to 15 of January 2000 [bound] for China, Indonesia, Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, Italy, Australia and Singapore” (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, p.90). 
It is known that China expanded its investment in Sudan after American sanctions were 
imposed: “China confronts foreign competition” said Chen Fengying, an expert at the 
China Contemporary International Relations Institute, based in Beijing, and affiliated 
with the state security system. “Chinese companies must go places for oil where 
American [and] European companies are not present. Sudan represents this strategy put 
into practice” (Goodman, 23 December 2004). On the other hand, Maglad (February 
2008) believed that investment in the oil sector presented an opportunity for China to 
meet the demand for energy by its growing economy. Therefore, China sustained the 
political regime in Sudan, which was squeezed for foreign capital due to the boycott by 
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foreign donors, was politically isolated regionally and internationally, and declared 
uncooperative by multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF. Revenue from oil, 
the introduction of macro-economic reform policies, and liberalisation of trade and 
investment regimes in the beginning of the 1990s, induced foreign direct investment 
flows from rich oil countries in the Middle East. This relieved the government and 
helped it break away from the economic and political restrictions under which it was 
put. Accordingly, China faced pressure from the US; Mustafa Osman Ismail (2010, 
p.349) confirms that, in the US, “pressure groups called on Congress to put pressure on 
China, other big companies and individuals to stop their investments in Sudan.” 
Moreover, “one of the Congress members proposed a resolution for the United States to 
boycott the Olympics in China, because China is supporting the Sudan regime” (Ismail, 
2010, p.351). These measures were intended to deprive Sudan from use of its resources, 
and so put more pressure on the government. In addition, they highlighted the extent of 
the competition for energy resources in Africa among the various economic and 
political powers. Hence, the wider aim was to force China to limit its activities on the 
African continent.  
Large (2008) argues that: 
“Today China is the most important external economic actor in northern Sudan, 
whose oil-fuelled economic boom saw real GDP growing officially by some 
11.8 per cent in 2006 according to the IMF. China has played the leading role in 
the reorientation of Sudan’s foreign economic relations toward ‘Asia’, now 
Sudan’s leading regional block for trade and investment. According to the Bank 
of Sudan, the Asian – and particularly the Chinese – share of Sudan’s total 
imports and exports has increased appreciably since oil exports started in late 
1999” (Large, 2008, p.94). 
As in any other country, China’s foreign policy appears to be evolving, as it realises the 
need to protect its economic interests. For instance, it has altered its policy of blocking 
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UN Security Council resolutions authorising peacekeepers for Darfur
67
 and placed 
modest pressure on the Sudanese government to allow a UN peacekeeping deployment. 
Beijing’s recent handling of the situation in Sudan shows that it is learning the 
limitations of non-interference. However, much of that principle remains part of its 
official rhetoric. Then again, politically, Zain al-Abdin (2005) believes that Sudan is 
reliant on China to halt further punishments. On its part, Sudan has consistently 
supported the unity of Chinese land. It did not support Taiwan’s membership of the UN, 
and did not establish any kind of relationship with Taiwan. 
In defending Sudan’s case, China has made many efforts both inside and outside the 
Security Council, such as blocking the decision for a no-fly zone in Sudan. Indeed, 
China did not vote in the Security Council for Resolution 1070 against Sudan. It is 
important to mention that China played a significant role in developing Sudan’s 
relations with Egypt and Algeria, which were poor most of the time in the 1990s. China 
expressed its reservations regarding wording that stated that Sudan supports terrorism, 
in UN Resolutions, pointing out that Sudan had made great efforts to comply with 
Resolutions 1044 and 1054. It should be said that more extensive cooperation took 
place on far more diverse levels than previously. In all these cases, China faced pressure 
from Sudanese opposition activist media and lobbies inside the United States. 
Sudan turned to China to buy weapons after US sanctions, as an alternative to importing 
from the US and Britain. Sudan also imports textiles, furniture, cars, and electronics 
from China, while China imports 6% of its oil needs from Sudan.  
However, in diplomatic discussions with African nations, China does make suggestions 
on issues of governance and intra-state affairs. What distinguishes Chinese suggestions 
from Western interventions is that they are provided in a friendly rather than coercive 
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 A region in the west of the Sudan that suffered a rebel conflict starting in 2003; the UN forced the 
Sudanese government to allow the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. 
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manner (Anshan, 2007, pp.69-73). It is known that China also insists on using influence 
without interference; they view respect as vital to finding solutions. Anshan (Summer 
2007) asserted that China has used its ties with Sudan to persuade the Sudanese 
government to cooperate with the United Nations. Since China has sought to alleviate 
the suffering of the Sudanese people with a solution agreeable to all parties, the 
Sudanese government trusts China. In 2007, the Sudanese government accepted the 
“hybrid peacekeeping force” in Darfur. The turning point for the political process 
resulted from negotiations with the Sudanese government based on equality, not 
coercion or the threat of sanctions. 
Zweig and Jianhai (October 2005) explained that the Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou 
Wenzhong, in the summer of 2004 confirmed that “Business is business”; “We try to 
separate politics from business”; he added: “I think the internal situation in the Sudan is 
an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them.” Meanwhile, 
Beijing has deftly protected its oil interests there. Yet, he gives more details: 
“in September 2004, China successfully watered down a UN resolution 
condemning Khartoum, undermining US efforts to threaten sanctions against 
Sudan’s oil industry. As if oblivious to the tensions created by Beijing’s 
manoeuvrings, those two Chinese professors argued that China’s assistance in 
turning Sudan into an oil-exporting state shows how China is raising standards 
of living in the developing world.”  
However, after the Darfur crisis, China faced criticism and pressure from groups in the 
US, as well as non-governmental organisations with a human-rights’ orientation. These 
bodies will continue to be at the forefront of those castigating Chinese actions in Sudan. 
Increasingly, however, there is also criticism from African sources. Even in Sudan, 
public demonstrations were held to protest over Beijing’s failure to block UN Security 
Council resolutions critical of the government (Chris, 2005, pp.147-164). However, it 
could be said that China is protecting its interests in Sudan. At the same time, it plays a 
significant role in supporting Sudan and its people to realise their strategic projects. 
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However, China is aware that there are no other choices open to them, given the 
pressure of US economic and political sanctions. Nevertheless, some scholars have 
expressed reservations about the attitude of China regarding the environment in its 
ventures in Africa.  
In conclusion, Sudanese-Chinese bilateral relations stretch back to the 1950s; the 
principle of reciprocal non-interference represents the key factor in this relationship. It 
is notable that, throughout Sudan’s history, China played a significant role in different 
development projects. The Islamists initiated their unique relationship with China in the 
late 1980s; NIF Secretary-General Turabi and others visited China in 1988. When they 
came to power in June 1989, they developed this relationship significantly. The Sudan-
China relationship grew tremendously to the mutual benefit of both countries 
throughout the 1990s, when Chinese direct investment and aid witnessed a rapid rise. 
By the end of the 1990s, China had become Sudan’s major trading partner, just as the 
US imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 1997. The researcher believes that China 
is protecting its investments in Sudan to cover its needs for oil and other products. 
Indeed, Beijing supported Khartoum at the UN and the Security Council. However, 
China faces mounting pressures from human rights’ organisations and Western 
countries, specifically the US. They claim that Sudan is violating human rights in 
Darfur, while multilateral financial institutions, e.g. IMF, consider it an uncooperative 
country.  
China put pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the UN and, accordingly, the Sudanese 
government accepted the “hybrid peacekeeping force” in Darfur. Furthermore, the 
turning point for the political process resulted from negotiations with the Sudanese 
government based on equality, and not coercion or the threat of sanctions. China has 
played a political role in cultivating Sudan’s relations with other countries, while Sudan 
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played a significant role in introducing China to some African countries. Although 
Sudan separated into two countries, Sudan-China relations continue to grow, with 
further investment poured into the country. In the end, China was chosen as a strategic 
ally by Turabi and the Islamists before the coup because of specific reasons explained 
by Turabi, and it played a significant role in Sudan’s economic and political dimensions.  
 
Section 3. General Evaluation 
The new revolution inherited an enormous network of international contacts from the 
Islamic movement; most movement members and leaders had studied in universities all 
over the world, and established different kinds of relations. These relationships included 
the traditional ones, of leaders with other Islamic movement leaders and scholars, such 
as Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi in India and Malik Bennabi in Algeria. They invited 
Malcolm X to Khartoum, and influenced the main trend of his movement. They also 
strengthened the relationship with Warith Deen Muhammad, the son of the late Nation 
of Islam leader, Elijah Muhammad. They connected with most Islamic movement 
leaders in the world, who visited Sudan in 1984, after Nimeiri applied Shari‘a in 1983. 
The movement also had members, resident in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Uganda, 
West Africa, Nigeria, North Africa, and Europe. 
During the years after the reconciliation with Nimeiri’s regime (1977-1985), Islamists in 
Sudan started charitable work by establishing charitable organisations and associations. 
Relief agencies employed many students, whom they trained in this field, and whom 
became useful cadres at the beginning of the revolution. On the other hand, they were 
connected with the freedom fighters in Palestine, Eritrea, and other African countries. 
When the Jihad started in Afghanistan, they contacted the Mujahidin leaders, and 
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Secretary-General Turabi mediated between the Jihadists and the US during the Cold 
War (Abdelsalam, 2009, pp.232-235). 
The philosophy of the regime was to consult the Sudanese people in the first years of 
the revolution through what was known as national dialogue conferences, starting with 
the national dialogue for peace. The government also called the people to what was 
known as the diplomatic conference. One of the objectives of this conference was to 
develop the policy, vision, and strategic plan, while another objective was to further 
develop the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, prior to the coup, 
according to Abdelsalam (2009, p.81): 
 
“the NIF extended its relations with neighbouring countries, in the Arab region, 
Africa, Asia ... It is important to be connected through dialogue and relations 
with Europe, the leaders of the old world, and where most Islamist leaders 
studied and live, then with the US, which controlled the world at that time, and 
the Soviet Union which was changing.” 
The NIF Secretary-General visited Egypt, Libya, the Gulf countries, China, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Uganda, and Algeria to establish relationships with these countries. This shows 
the extent of the influence of NIF as a political party. Moreover, it highlights the vision 
of the movement and its leader Turabi towards international relations. 
In conclusion, this chapter focused on Sudan’s international relations after the coup in 
1989 and the role of Turabi and the Islamists. The principles of Sudan’s international 
relations were established on the same principles relating to Islamic values and 
international law and human rights, which are recognised nationally and internationally. 
Sudan’s international relations were based on a belief in a pan-Islamic or global unity, 
but fulfilling the conditions of justice and freedom. The declared fundamentals guiding 
Sudan’s foreign affairs were openness, strengthening neighbourly relations, non-
interference in other countries’ internal affairs, except by explicit request, to help in 
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solving a problem or to mediate in a conflict, and respect for the rights, freedoms, 
religion, and culture of others; all these principles introduced by Turabi’s political 
thought are regarded as indispensable elements of his political thought. 
There are many factors that shaped Sudan’s foreign affairs and its international 
relations. First, international factors, such as the dramatic change in the world after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf war, 9/11, the war on terrorism, and unstable 
neighbouring countries. Second, internal factors, such as the war in the South, the East 
and Darfur, the application of Shari‘a, the declared foreign policies of the government 
in supporting Islamic movements and accommodating their leaders, including Hamas, 
al-Nahda and others. The chapter evaluated Sudan’s relations with the US and EU, the 
countries of the Horn of Africa, relations with neighbouring and North African 
countries, Asia and the Far East and Sudanese relations with China. Based on these 
factors, Sudan’s relations were unstable with its neighbours, the Arab countries, the US, 
and Europe. This was reflected in economic sanctions imposed by the US, and 
international pressure on the government. It is well known that the 1989 National 
Salvation Revolution inherited an enormous network of international contacts from the 
Islamic movement represented by the NIF and its leader Turabi. This included relations 
with individual leaders, Islamic movements, political parties, states, and economic 
institutions. These relationships were beneficial in bringing support to the regime in 
international organisations, the media, and in the economic field.  
China was chosen as a strategic ally by Turabi and the Islamists before the coup because 
of reasons explained above. According to this ally, the Sudan-China relationship grew 
tremendously to the mutual benefit of both countries throughout the 1990s, when direct 
investment and aid witnessed a rapid rise. By the end of the 1990s, China had become 
Sudan’s major trading partner, as the US imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 
1997. This relation is counted as important for Sudan and it strengthened the regime 
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politically when China provide political support at the UN and in the Security Council; 
and economically through the increasing investment in different sectors, specifically the 
oil sector. On the other hand, China is protecting its investments in Sudan to cover its 
needs of oil and other products.  
Turabi and the Islamists were calling for a Pan-Islamic movement and they tried to 
apply this approach in the beginning of the revolution but it was attacked by the 
international emerging power after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Gulf War was 
one of the other factors that influenced negatively the Sudan relations internationally 
and regionally. The approach that Islamists adopted could be interpreted by others as if 
they have expansionist ambitions so they were being attacked by all neighbours with the 
help of the international powers. Sudan at that time was not strong enough to play such 
an expensive leading role. 
Islamists, and specifically Turabi, tried to cross the borders between Islamists and other 
ideologies such as Arab nationalists and the Shi’a sector, and other trends inside Islamist 
groups such as Jihadist and Salafi, and to set a platform of dialogue between all these 
groups. This is a very important step but it needs to be applied gradually and all the 
communities should participate in this step, such as academic, media, social 
organisations, not only the political leaders.  
Moreover, Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan tried to unify all the religious people in one 
front so they started dialogue with different churches and the Vatican. This step is very 
significant but it needs to be gradual and it needs international support. It is important to 
affirm that these efforts were done under close supervision and encouragement of 
Turabi, through different activities and coordination with the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
and the other related bodies such as IPFC and PAIC, of which Turabi was the Secretary-
General. These efforts were faced by severe attack regionally and internationally, from 
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lobbies, media and activists. The approach adopted in relations with some countries 
such as China, Iran, Russia, and other Far East countries was a pragmatic approach and 
it helped the country in different dimensions, specifically economic and political. 
Finally, despite all these efforts, it could be said that there is no comprehensive 
international relations theory but there are broad principles which they have tried to 
follow. 
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Chapter 6: Islamists in Sudan and the State 
Establishing an Islamic state has been an important objective for most Islamic 
movements throughout history, yet the nature of that state remains a controversial issue 
among Islamists themselves. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 shocked 
Muslim thinkers, and they began to search for solutions, alternatives, and ways to 
restore the Caliphate. It could be said that they began to articulate a theory for the 
Islamic state, but only when the historical institution of the Caliphate was in decline, 
and colonial armies were at the gates of its constituencies. “The idea of ‘Islamic state’ 
dominated the recent Muslim history since the 1950s when most Muslim countries 
obtained their independence” (el-Affendi, 2008, p.17). After independence, intellectuals 
and elites advanced many theses about the nature of the state, which may be classified 
under two headings or schools: the secular and the Islamic.  
Throughout history, Islamists have demanded the establishment of Islamic states in 
Muslim countries. Most of the powerful movements, such as Jamaat-e-Islami in 
Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, al-Nahdha in Tunisia, and NIF in Sudan, 
devoted all their energies to this goal. However, these movements faced tension 
between two competing approaches: one that advocated formal programmes of 
Islamisation of laws and society to be implemented by the state itself, and the other that 
saw an Islamic state as the final product of the Islamisation of society. Yet both schools 
still had to face the challenges of developing comprehensive and appropriate concepts 
and projects required to build an Islamic state, even though some have governed for 
decades, specifically Sudan and Iran. In other words, the theory is still under 
development, with the theoretical framework subject to contributions of reformers and 
intellectuals. Some of these reformers have played leading roles in their countries, such 
as Turabi in Sudan, while others only recently so, such as Ghannouchi in Tunisia in the 
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current Arab awakening. Indeed, Ghannouchi was a close observer of Sudan’s Islamist 
experiment, from which he learned valuable lessons, to try and avoid the mistakes 
committed by the Islamists in Sudan throughout their rule in the past two decades. 
Historically, the issue of the state is one of the most controversial among scholars and 
Islamic movements leaders, in two respects. First, there is significant dispute on 
whether or not the establishment of the Islamic state is the main objective of Islamic 
movements; some believe it to be an objective in itself, while others consider it a mere 
tool to establish a pious society.
68
 Second, the nature of the state and its role is an area 
of further difference. 
This chapter critically explores the development of the notion of the ‘Islamic state’ and 
its role. This includes the balance between the role of government and that of society in 
such a state, in the absence of a homogeneous example of an Islamic state, from the 
Madina state and the Caliphate (Khilafah), and is therefore challenging to envisage. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections; it provides a theoretical evaluation of 
Turabi’s contribution to the questions of Islamists and the state, democracy, gender, and 
minorities. It critically evaluates the role of the state in Islamist political thought. 
Moreover, it evaluates the role of society, the distribution of wealth and power, civil 
liberties and freedom of speech, elections, etc. It explores the participation of women, 
ethnic minorities, and non-Muslims, no-party and multi-party systems, and international 
relations in an Islamic state. These are the issues that faced Islamists in Sudan and other 
countries, specifically in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Far East. 
The chapter explores the theoretical frameworks proposed by Turabi and other 
revivalists in the second half of the last century, and the two decades of this century. It 
will also reveal the foundations on which these scholars based themselves. 
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 The society that plays its role in ‘the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice’. 
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What is an Islamic state in Turabi’s thought? 
An Islamic state is not one model, nor any one form, but is to be established on 
permanent values. This perspective holds that the Caliphate was not the exclusive 
Islamic state, but an Islamic model only. Scholars in different periods tackled this 
subject, e.g. Mawardi (deceased 450 H), was the first systematic theorist, committing 
his ideas to a book, al-Ahkām al-Sultaniyyah (the Rules of High Authority), followed by 
early Muslim reformers, such as Sayyid Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani (1838-1897), 
Mohammed ‘Abdu (1849-1905), and Mawdudi (1903-1979), followed by the modern 
reformers, such as Turabi and Ghannouchi. These scholars considered the Madinah 
state, which was established by the Prophet, as the authentic Islamic state. It is 
important to draw attention to the conclusion of el-Affendi (2008), in which he 
criticised the current Islamist vision of the concept of the state. He stated that: 
“the basic problem with the current Islamist vision of the state is that it accepts 
the modern concept of the state as a principle of restriction. This conflicts with 
the original Islamic vision of the polity as the principle of liberation and self-
fulfilment” (el-Affendi, 2008, p.99). 
However, questions remain unanswered about the Islamic state, and the limitations on 
the roles of state (government) and the community (people). El-Affendi (2008, p.99) 
considers that “modern Islamic thought has imported into the debate all the ambiguities 
and confusions of classical Islamic political theory.” The researcher believes that the 
role of reformers is to free the concepts from their historical context, and redefine them 
in the contemporary context. Moreover, they need to develop mechanisms through 
which Islamic values could be applied. Many reformers, such as Turabi and 
Ghannouchi, pay significant attention to these points; indeed, they focus on the issue of 
public freedoms in the Islamic state, and how to stop rulers becoming dictators. 
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Turabi defined the Muslim state as “a state where its population is predominantly by 
Muslims.” He considers the ‘Islamic state’ as: 
“the state that is not only Islamic at its private level, but also at the level of 
public life; it means that politics is integrated into religion, economics is 
integrated into religion, and international relations are integrated into religion; 
all life—public life is integrated into religion; Islam is a comprehensive way of 
life” (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010). 
Turabi in this statement provides an answer to the question ‘what is an Islamic state?’ 
but does not answer how politics, economic, etc. could be integrated into religion and 
how the rulers and society can integrate these activities into religion. It is clear that 
Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory is reflected in his definition of the Islamic state. However, in 
his written literature and speeches, Turabi uses the terms ‘state’, ‘government’, and 
‘authority’ on several occasions; the term ‘state’ means government or authority, as is 
discussed in another part of this chapter. ‘An Islamic state’ may mean an Islamic socio-
economic and political administration evolving from within individuals to their own 
family, society, state, and eventually to a global level. In this sense, an Islamic state 
does not necessarily come as a geographical entity. It evolves from below through the 
strengthening of individuals’ inner spiritual selves and rises upward to family, society, 
state and global levels. At each level, Islamic states with definitions of their own are 
established (Salleh, September 1999, pp.235-256).  
In comparison, in his discussion of the Islamic concept of state, Ghannouchi begins with 
the elementary supposition that for humans to live in decency and security, they need to 
be part of a community. A community in turn requires some form of authority to 
organise relations and administer justice among individual members. When an authority 
derives its laws and regulations from Shari‘a, it is said to be Islamic (Tamimi, 2001, 
p.93). 
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The model of the Madinah state is the one that established a state of reference and 
vision for these Islamists. Turabi understands the administrative body of the state, and 
the model in general as: 
“the exemplary model of the state of Islam in Madinah (the years 622-623) was 
a democratic federation, neither a theocracy (clerical) nor a plutocracy or 
autocracy. Religion, knowledge and wealth were free, and administration of the 
state was decentralised” (Turabi, 14 July 2003). 
From the history, I believe that the model of the Madinah state was multi-religious and 
multi-cultural, as the society contained Muslims, Jews and others. Turabi explains that 
the: 
“Jewish settlements, or suburbs were autonomous with separate religion, 
education, local peace and justice, and local public finances; where they 
interacted with other Muslim communities or with sovereign authorities outside 
Madinah, they were subject to the federal union authority presided over by the 
Prophet and organised according to a written accord. Each of the federal 
communities had its own law, although the legal affairs concerning the whole 
federation were within the scope of the federal power” (Turabi, 14 July 2003). 
Turabi’s understanding of the Madinah state is reflected in his view of the federal 
system he applied in Sudan, and in the Islamic movement’s own structure. It was also 
adopted in the approach to work with other organisations and states, in that he believes 
in federation at the international level as well. However, it is important to explain that 
Turabi believes in applying the law federally. At the personal level, law is based on 
individual traditions, or a monogamous personal law. This is an advance in the 
theoretical framework, which, if Islamists apply it, will solve most of the problems of 
authorities in their countries. To explain the point of personal law, Turabi asserted that: 
“it is personal law based on Christian traditions ... monogamous personal law, 
we allow non-Muslims to have their personal law, we consider that personal law 
is part of personal life; it is a part of your complete freedom; it is like your 
belief; it is like your ritual acts of worship; you are free to observe any value 
there; so the non-Muslim—we will ask him, what are your customs? Is he a 
pagan? ... You will never find this level of religious freedom in any country in 
the world, not even in the West” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994).  
In other words, personal law means to apply the law according to personal beliefs, 
which means Shari‘a is not applied to non-Muslims, even if they lived in the North of 
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Sudan. In addition, the government granted an exception to the southern regions of the 
country, where Muslims are a minority. It could be said that to apply this in reality is not 
easy, as it needs a solid system and skilled officers and clear separation of powers. 
Although Turabi has this clear vision, he failed to build it into a practical system and 
mechanisms in reality, and here the gap between theory and practice is noticed. Turabi 
wrote a key text on this debate, published in 2003, titled, Al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm: al-
Nuzum al-Sultaniyyah bayn al-Usūl wa Sunan al-Waqi‘, i.e. Politics and Rule: Systems 
of Authority between Principles and the Laws of Reality. It attempted to explain, in 
great depth and detail, the concepts relating to the issues of the state’s role and society’s 
role in theory relating to the Islamic state, and the checks and balance governing the 
ruler and those who are ruled.  
 
Section 1. The Role of the State in Turabi’s Thought 
The role of the state will be critically evaluated, as discussed and explained by Islamists 
from different points of view, where ‘state’ here means the authority or government 
rather than land, society, and authority. This section will compare Turabi’s opinion with 
other Islamists, such as Qutb, Amara, and Ghannouchi. M. Umar Chapra explains that 
the duty of the Islamic state is to ensure a respectable standard of living for every 
individual unable to take care of his own needs, and hence requiring assistance 
(Donohue and Esposito, 2007, p.242). However, Turabi confirms that this is part of the 
duty of both government and society, where the government’s role is to legislate for 
those rules that facilitate the role of society and the judicial authority. This will be 
explained in detail in this part.  
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Hasan al-Bana (1984, p.63) believes “the duty of the state is to support the ethics 
established in Shari'a through its executive and legislatives.” On the other hand, 
Mohammed Amara (1988, p.210) goes into more detail, and confirms that: 
“there are some duties that cannot be established unless there is an Islamic state; 
these duties such as Zakat collection and distribution, justice and judiciary 
system, observing the Islamic interests, [and] establishing Shura.” 
He then described that the role of the Prophet’s state in Madinah was in administration, 
education, foreign and economic affairs, judiciary, and defence. Turabi agrees with 
some of these details, and confirms that the government’s role should be limited to 
legislation, public policy, international affairs, the judicial system, and defence. 
However, the same leitmotif was sustained through the Turkish Welfare Party’s motto of 
‘Just Order’. This political campaign was aimed at the rehabilitation of the Turkish 
political system based on the welfare state model, instead of radical transformation 
(Yildiz, 2006, p.47). In comparison, Qutb’s argument explains the role of the Islamic 
state, where: 
“in the Islamic state, God is the supreme legislator and the ultimate source of 
governmental and legal authority. Government in Islam is thus specifically 
designed to implement Islamic law, that so, to administer justice in accordance 
with its decrees. Enforcing the law and facilitating its application requires Islam 
to function as religion and state. Although there is no place in the Islamic system 
for arbitrary rule by a single individual or group, there is always room for 
consultation [i.e.] Shura within the boundary of law” (Khatab, 2006, p.8). 
These different opinions emanating from scholarly effort or Ijtihād show that scholars 
were influenced by local culture and their historical moment. Hence, these experiments 
were influenced by local situations, and so it is important to analyse these different 
opinions deeply, and demonstrate that it is a matter of time before they converge 
regarding the role of authority in the Islamic state. The role of the state is to protect 
people’s rights on its territory, and (regarding popular will) should follow the will of the 
people. 
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In the researcher’s interview with Turabi in Khartoum in 26 December 2010, he agrees 
that a state is a geographical entity, with power and society; in other words, Islamic 
socio-economic and political administrations prevailing in a land. Turabi believes that 
the role of the Islamic state is comprehensive, yet shared between government and 
society. For him, an “Islamic state is one that is not only Islamic on the private level, but 
also at the level of public life.” He explains this further, affirming that: 
“politics is integrated into religion; economics and international relations are 
integrated not only in religion but all of life; and public life is integrated into 
religion; Islam is integrated into all aspects of life; Islam is a comprehensive 
way of life” (Turabi, 14 July 2003). 
However, this does not mean that the government is centralised, but that the values of 
Islam prevail in every aspect of life, as mentioned above. Moreover, Turabi does not 
agree that such a state is theocratic, and argues that: 
“the words ‘theocratic state’ in the Christian context is the state ruled by the 
church. God, of course, never intervenes directly in public life; the church 
always presented itself as the representative of God, and they dominated public 
life completely” (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010). 
In a BBC interview (1994), he refers to the problem between the church and the ruler as 
the historical conflict between clerics and rulers. On this point, he asserts that: 
“in Christianity, the conflict was not between religion and politics, it was 
between the churchmen and the other men who rule the state, revolutionary 
leaders or monarchs. The church was defeated as it was moved out, and the 
religion was moved completely outside” (BBC interview, 1994; Turabi, 2010, 
p.14). 
In the same interview, he compares this to the situation in the case of Islam, where there 
are no church or clerics: “in Islam there is no church at all, everyone has to have his 
direct access to God; the Islamic state is the state where Muslims rule—the believers 
decide in it.” Here, he means individual rules and decisions, not as a divine institution 
or clerics. However, for Turabi, in all religions, a deviation in a historical moment 
happens to isolate religion from some aspects of life. Explaining this, he stated that: 
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“all the religions started containing high unification (Tawhīd), but faced by the 
challenges (Ibtilā’) in the political field, as in all other aspects of life, the 
polytheists entered the field of knowledge, economics and art; yet the disease of 
the political polytheists afflicted every religious society specifically; the 
symptoms of religious disease are the same” (Turabi, 2000, p.6).  
Turabi deals with a number of taboos around the concept of the state, and most scholars 
agree that Turabi’s pragmatism on this issue can be explained by his direct involvement 
in political activities, as he is both an activist and thinker. However, Esposito (2001, 
p.137) considers that there is a direct relationship between Turabi’s activities as a 
political leader in Sudan, and the specifics of his evolving definition of an Islamic state. 
This point is supported by el-Affendi (1990) in his essay, ‘Long March for Democracy’. 
El-Affendi argues that Turabi always advocated dealing with reality, and complained 
that the main problem of the modern Islamic movement was its uncompromising 
idealism. It recognised only absolute ideals, and did not map the way to achieving them, 
by defining intermediate stations leading towards this. In contrast, the Sudanese 
Islamists were realistic, and so accepted compromise. I believe that the involvement of 
Turabi in politics and public life qualified him to develop a comprehensive approach or 
theory of Islamic practising in all aspects of life, but the Islamist experiment post-1989 
was putting in front of him the question of the mechanisms through which Islamists 
could apply these values in the field of politics, economics, and all aspects of life; 
moreover, it showed to Turabi, the researchers and politicians how theories and practice 
could be deviated. According to el-Affendi (1990), a corollary of Turabi’s methodology 
and substantive assumption behind it is the regeneration of reality, not precisely in 
Hegel’s manner of accepting that “what is real rational” but rather on the line of Marx’s 
dynamic realism. 
According to these experiments, Turabi rationally criticises some abstract conditions 
made by the Fugha. However, Moussalli (2004) argued that Turabi, as the leading, 
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powerful, fundamentalist thinker of contemporary Islamic movements, deals with 
several taboos attached to the concept of the state. Turabi removes a number of 
conditions in the nature of the institutions that were established according to Islamic 
constitutions and the Islamic state. In a more comprehensive way than Hasan al-Banna, 
Turabi imposes Islamic limitations on the role of the state, which are very similar to the 
limits of the liberal state (Moussalli, 2004, p.97).  
El-Affendi agrees, when he confirms that Turabi rejected the traditional assumption of 
the authoritative consensus of the religious scholars (ulama). He added that Turabi 
explains that the binding consensus was that of the Muslim populace (or public opinion) 
at any given moment (including the whole member body of the society, men and 
women). Popular choice should be enlightened by experts, including the scholars 
(ulama), but also others in various fields, such as economics, medicine, law, the social 
and exact sciences, etc. I consider this Ijtihād is very important because it sets the 
people free from traditional assumption of the authoritative consensus of the religious 
scholars. However, the government should also be freely chosen to reflect the popular 
will. Once this has happened, then the elected government would have a religiously 
significant legislative role, and could arbitrate on differences in interpretation of Shari’a 
(el-Affendi, 2008, p.94). El-Affendi claims that Turabi in a single stroke elevated the 
state to the role of religious adjudicator and subordinated it to popular will. It is my 
contention that the relationship between religion, law, and politics is absolutely clear for 
Turabi. He affirms that Islam implies normative traditions and doctrine based on the 
Qur’an (the divine text) and the Prophet’s Sunna. But, he insists that the interpretation 
of the divine text is not divine. 
This perspective can be understood from Turabi’s speeches on renewal, and his call to 
review the interpretations, which is important, because values are constant, but the 
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institutions or mechanisms to apply these values may be developed in time. Gudrun 
Kimer asserted that:  
“Both texts69 are considered by Muslims to be sacred and consequently 
inviolable: in the present political climate it is deemed impossible, at least in the 
Arab world, to engage in public discussions about the status of the Qur’an as 
God’s word and, all the more so, to attempt to analyse it with the methods of 
literary criticism. Attempts to treat the Sunna as a set of regulations (partially 
mandatory in the legal sense) from the Prophet’s teachings and acts to be 
followed by future generations are a little less taboo, though still not at all risk-
free” (Kimer, 2003, p.193). 
It can be seen that Turabi removes a number of conditions defining the nature of the 
institutions that may be established, following Islamic constitutions and the model 
Islamic state. Turabi argued that “there is ambiguity in the qualification conditions for 
authority and Shura.” He criticised Mawardi for his book, al-Ahkām al-Sultaniyyah, 
(Rules of High Authority) for mentioning these ambiguous qualifications, and 
concentrating on entrenching the status quo, and not on the scope open for Ijtihād, and 
rendering justice, based on knowledge of people’s life and wisdom in public affairs. He 
then explains the qualifications of the leader in Ibn Taymiyyah’s book, al-Siyasah al-
Shar‘iyyah, including knowledge, oratory skills, honesty, personal strength, and being a 
role model, and then the description of the model of governance (Imarah). At some 
point, scholars added lineage, as a powerful deciding element, to this list of 
prerequisites, as was mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. On his part, we noticed that Turabi 
criticised these opinions, and asserted that each one reflected the specific environment 
and period of the individual scholar, and was influenced by the scholar’s doctrine 
(Madhhab). He proposed that the wise course was to read these opinions within their 
historical context, particularly since, at those times, systematic methods for choosing 
the Sultan (ruler) were not available, leading to an individual monopoly (Turabi, 2003, 
p.277). Turabi believes that these situations led to excessive focus on these conditions, 
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 Qura’an and Sunnah. 
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which were driven by the traditional fiqh, establishing them as though divine rules in 
Shari‘a. In this context, Turabi focused on the condition of lineage, i.e. belonging to 
Quraysh, the tribe, and also being a free male, not a slave. It is my contention that 
Turabi’s Ijtihād logically accepted these conditions which had been put by scholars 
because they addressed a specific geographical area and a particular historical moment; 
nowadays the Islamic world is extending from the East to the West, so it needs to renew 
its fiqh and accommodate these changes. 
Indeed, Turabi (2003) discussed all these conditions, and concluded that they were not 
compatible with the values of Islam, and contradicted the verses of the Qur'an; this 
position clashed with the taboos mentioned by the above scholars. This is how Turabi 
deals with so-called ‘taboos’ surrounding the concept of the state.  
However, in practical terms, Turabi in the Sudan experiment developed the 
constitutional doctrine, laws and even some conceptions, which are now widely 
accepted by Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Morocco and most moderate 
Islamists belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood school. On the other hand, Turabi 
(1983) limited the power of the state in taxation; he asserted that “Another area where 
government was severely limited was in its power to tax.” It is notable that he tries to 
limit the state role of the ruler to the minimum. Although he believes in that, he did not 
specify any mechanism/instruction as to how to legislate for the taxation system in the 
state; it could be suggested that one such mechanism could be parliament or referendum 
or  their ilk. 
1.1 Hākimiyyah or ‘Sovereignty’ of the State 
Hākimiyyah is a term derived from the term, Hukm, which means to rule or govern. 
Hākimiyyah is a controversial concept among Islamist scholars, as “it appears to have 
come into Arabic use in the writing of Mawdudi” (Esposito, 1983, p.89). However, to 
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Qutb, the term ‘Hākimiyyah’ designated divinity, as it was synonymous with ultimate 
sovereignty. For Turabi the profession of faith reiterated daily by Muslims: 
“‘there is no God but Allah’, is a revolution against human sovereignty of any 
shape or form, whether that be of priests, tribal chiefs, princes, or governors --- 
in a matter of conscience, ritual wealth or justice” (Qutb, 1964, p.28). 
From the above, it may be noted that Qutb idealises the concept rather than setting it 
into reality. He concentrated on the definition of the concept, rather than the practical 
steps needed to establish an Islamic state. It could be understood that, at that time, the 
Muslim community needed clarification of these concepts, which had been absent for a 
long time, in addition to the confusion and issues raised in the post-independence 
period. Therefore, Qutb argues that: 
“There is no governance except for God, no legislation but from God, no 
sovereignty of one [person] over the other, because all sovereignty belongs to 
God” (Qutb, 1964, p.31). 
In comparison, Turabi distinguished between ultimate sovereignty, which belongs 
exclusively to God, and the sovereignty or authority of the people. For him, ultimate 
sovereignty belongs to God, who has given man an open margin or latitude to ultimately 
choose how to rule a particular situation (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010). He 
illustrates that “God, of course, never intervenes directly in the public life” (Turabi, 
BBC interview, 1994). Similarly Ghannouchi demonstrates that it “does not mean that 
God comes down and governs” (Tamimi, 2001, p.185). It means that people rule under 
the conditions laid down by the higher norms of Shari‘a, which represent God’s will. 
Politically, these rules are a form of abstraction, while legally they pave the way for the 
development of constitutional law, as a set of norms limiting state powers. This is 
Turabi’s understanding of how people can practise ruling.  
Turabi (1983) demonstrates that the Islamic tradition of rules limiting the power of the 
sovereign is much older than the concept of constitutional law in the secular West. He 
argues that, because the Islamic state is not absolute, Muslims have known from the 
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outset that the rules of international law, which derive from the supreme Shari‘a, bind 
the state in its relations with other states and peoples. However, the question of the 
theocratic state should be addressed and, as such, Turabi’s observation should be taken 
into account. He states that: 
“the words ‘theocratic state’ mean a state ruled by the church ... the church 
always presented itself as a representative of God and they (churchmen) 
dominated the public life completely, and in Christianity the problem was not 
between religion and politics, it was between churchmen and the other men, who 
rule the state, revolutionary leaders or monarch. The Church was defeated, and 
religion was moved completely outside. In Islam there is no church at all; 
everyone has to have a direct access to God” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994). 
According to these arguments the researcher believes that the Islamic state is not a 
theocratic state. Emphatically, it is a civil state, not ruled by clergy, but ruled by the 
people chosen by the community to serve it, and will be removed from, or reinstated in 
their position by that community. 
In his book, al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm (Politics and Rule), Turabi discussed in detail the 
historical background of the church’s domination of power, and how it was removed by 
revolution. However, this is beyond the scope of this research and is only discussed here 
briefly. Indeed, on this point, Turabi agrees with Amara’s view that: 
“al-Khilafah is not a theocratic state that repeals the authority of the nation, but 
it is a civil state chosen by the Ummah, authorised, monitored, prosecuted, and 
removed by the people, when appropriate. Bearing the authority of the Ummah 
under the rule of divine law, then the Ummah is the source of authority, on 
condition that he does not cross the limits representing borders of Halal and 
Haram, which were decided in the Shari‘a by God, because Man (human being), 
or Ummah in the global Islamic vision, is the Khalifa of God [and] is only an 
agent; he is not the owner of the earth, but He [Allah] is the owner” (Amara, 
2005, p.9).  
On the same issue, Fathi Osman asserted that: 
“However, the religious dimension in the Islamic ideology or plan, of individual 
and social, local and global reform, does not mean the establishment of a 
theocracy. There is no clergy in Islam; any intelligent human being who knows 
the language and the style can understand and interpret God’s message and no 
supernatural or metaphysical power can be required or claimed for such a work” 
(Osman, 1997, p.8). 
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It could be said that Amara (1998, p.46), Turabi (2003), Ghannouchi (2011), and 
Qaradawi (2011) believe that it is a duty to establish the Islamic state that guides the 
people by Islam, and protects the essence of the religion. At the same time, they reject 
the claims of a theocratic role for the ruler, and that the state is neither secular nor 
theocratic, but a civil one, which rules, and is ruled by Islamic Shari‘a.  
 
1.2 Hākimayyah and Shura  
Turabi argued that the words ‘Hakam’ and ‘Hākim’, from which Hākimiyyah is derived, 
mean ‘arbitrator’ or ‘anyone who rules others’, respectively, while ‘Hukm’ means ‘rule’ 
and should be read in its context. Thus, the term ‘Hākimiyyat al-Sha‘b’ means the 
‘authority of the people’, i.e. the people hold authority over their affairs, and may 
delegate it to anyone they choose, such as members of parliament to pass legislation, a 
judge in specific instances to resolve disputes, and to the administration in other 
instances, etc. (Turabi, interview, 26 December 2010). However, Turabi put Hākimiyyah 
in a practical context, and considered it on two levels: the first relates to absolute 
sovereignty, which belongs exclusively to God, while the second relates to people’s 
sovereignty (Hukm al-Sha‘b), exercised by the people. Therefore, the people 
consciously delegate their authority to a specific body (institution) for a specific 
mission, whether legislative, judicial, or administrative. Meanwhile, the people monitor 
their delegates, bodies or institutions, by imposing a system of checks and balances. At 
all times, the people maintain the right to take back the delegated authority by 
withdrawing the confidence.  
Turabi stresses that people’s sovereignty (Hukm al-Sha‘b) means the end of the 
monopoly on power, wealth and knowledge, and represents real liberation of the people. 
Turabi affirms that, in these circumstances, holding a “political opinion is a religious 
 274 
obligation ... to advise and practise Shura is a duty” (Turabi, 2003, p.178). This means 
that it is a religious obligation upon all the people in the country to practise Shura, voice 
their opinion, and advise the ruler, as acts of worship. It is my contention that what are 
the best mechanisms through which they can make their voice be heard, and how these 
obligations could be practised? Islamists need to develop effective mechanisms to put 
all these obligations into practice, whilst at the same time raising the awareness of the 
people about these duties and rights. 
Turabi addresses the issue of knowledge on two dimensions; first, he agrees that the 
scholars (Ulama) have monopolised the interpretation of the Qur'an, and control 
religious knowledge; second, they isolated politics from knowledge, and treated politics 
as though lying outside the bounds of religion. He confirms that: “it is a fact that the 
freedom of speech and expressing opinion in public affairs is a duty upon all believers 
without permission and limits” (Turabi, 2003, p.178). 
In other words, Turabi opposes the scholars’ (Ulama’s) monopoly on power and 
knowledge. He affirms that, “indeed, Muslims in repenting in the field of politics, and 
returning to the religion of Tawhīd, should restore authority to society (the community 
or people).” He believes that, in this case, society should make the effort (engage in 
Ijtihād) and speak out; the society should discuss and consult over (in a serious practice 
of Shura), their issues; if they all agree, in full consensus (Ijma‘ ) according to a written 
constitution or according to prevailing customs, then this is the supreme authority as 
exercised by the believers, and in turn emphasises the belief in the superiority of Shari‘a 
(Turabi, 2003, p.136). However, Shari‘a law, according to Muslim jurists, fulfils the 
criteria of justice and legitimacy, and binds governed and governor alike, because it is 
based on the rule of law, and thus deprives human beings of arbitrary authority over 
other human beings; in this sense, the community’s or people’s consensus, i.e. Ijma‘, is 
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superior to the agreement or juristic effort (Ijtihād) of the scholars. I agree with Fathi 
Osman’s statement: 
“Shura means a serious and effective participation in making a decision, not 
merely a ceremonial procedure. The Qur’an addresses the Prophet who received 
divine revelation to rely on Shura in making decisions concerning common 
matters for which no specific revelation had come: ‘and take counsel with them 
in all matters of common concern; then, when you have made a decision 
(accordingly), place your trust in God’ (Qur’an 3:159)” (Osman, 2007, p.10). 
From the above, the conclusion is that it is a religious obligation for believers to 
participate in Shura, and seriously discuss the issues and affairs of the community. The 
other important point is that the consensus (Ijma‘) is that of all the people, not only the 
scholars (Ulama),
70
 where the scholars’ (Ulama’s) role is to help the people, in 
spreading knowledge by teaching society or community members. Moreover, the power 
of knowledge should not be monopolised, and used to dominate in rule or power. 
Turabi shows that some experiments attempted to reach and practise the real values of 
Islam, in Iran and Sudan. In the case of Iran, he believes that the popular revolution in 
Iran pushed the people to be the source of authority. However, he recognised that the 
Shi‘a sect, which is dominant in Iran, does not believe in ruling in the Sunni way. They 
are waiting for the absent Imam, and have applied ‘Wilayat al-Faqīh’ in the interim, i.e. 
until the Imam reappears one day. This approach limited the authority of the people, and 
extended the authority of the Mullahs or scholars (Ulama) (Turabi, 2003, pp.133-135). 
On the other hand, for the experiment in Sudan, he points out that the military coup was 
carried out to establish a method of authority derived from Islam; as such, this ideal 
goal was delayed for a decade, until a constitution was established. This enshrined 
liberty and assigned the high legislative authority to society through direct referendum, 
or through electing members of parliament and a president, who practises authority 
under the scrutiny of the people. However, this ideal was not achieved in practice, as the 
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should participate with their knowledge in society. 
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president and the army prevented people from practising real democracy (Turabi, 2003, 
p.135). Turabi’s statement shows a contradiction; in that what can essentially be 
described as a power grab, i.e. a military coup, they cannot be expected to apply the 
values of Islam, namely justice, freedom, and Shura. Therefore, the objective was not 
achieved, and democracy could not be practised.  
In conclusion, Turabi explains that Hākimiyyah in a practical manner, can be applied by 
the people. He understands it to mean that God is the absolute sovereign, and any other 
authority is derived from God. However, for Turabi, the people’s sovereignty (Hukm al-
Sha‘b) can be practised by the people, who delegate their authority to specific bodies, 
legislative, judicial or administrative. However, they continue to monitor these 
institutions through a system of checks and balance, and may withdraw their confidence 
in, and annul the authority of, these institutions. This explanation of al-Hākimiyyah may 
help to understand that the people in the Islamic community have duties and rights, it is 
contractual obligation for them to delegate power, and they have the right to withdraw 
their allegiance. In this context, Turabi rejects the monopoly on power and knowledge 
by the scholars (Ulama), and confirms that legislative power and power of knowledge 
should be practised by the society – all society. This limits the ruler’s power, in that he 
plays an executive, more so than a legislative role. In these circumstances, the believers’ 
(men and women) duty is to express their opinion and advise the executive leaders. 
In conclusion, the Islamic movement and Turabi look to the state as legislator, playing 
the role of policy maker, and not intervening in society’s affairs and the individual’s 
private life. However, this is one of the good examples of the gap between theory and 
practice of Islamists in Sudan because the state had monopolised the legislative, 
executive and judiciary authorities for some time, and intervened in the society affairs 
and individuals’ private life, as explained in Chapter 4. 
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Section 2. The Role of Society 
The role of society in the Islamic state is essential; if the state is defined as a land, 
government and society, then society plays the key role in the administration, while the 
government’s role is limited, as explained by Turabi in most of his writings and 
speeches. The role of society in Turabi’s theory will be evaluated in detail in this 
section. In their experiment in Sudan, the Islamists adopted practical methods in 
implementing the values they believed in, and interacted with the society directly; “we 
started up where the community have ended, we interact with the society” as Turabi 
used to say. In the eyes of Islamists, the society in Sudan: 
“is not the ‘ignorant’ as in Sayyid Qutb or al-Mawdudi’s theory, but it is a 
Muslim society with (Jahiliya) ignorant pockets and the Islamic movement is a 
comprehensive revival and renewal movement that unified the private life of the 
Muslim with the public life of the society” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.22). 
Turabi affirms that “Society is the fundamental, state is one of the dimensions of the 
society” (Turabi, interview 25 December 2010). Oliver Roy (1994, p.41) distinguished 
between radical and moderate Islamists; in the “disagreement between moderate and 
radical Islamists”, he believes that both: “acknowledge the necessity of controlling 
political power. The moderates are partisans of re-Islamisation from the bottom up 
while pressuring the leaders to promote Islamisation from the top.” For the purpose of 
re-Islamising the society, Islamists established socio-cultural movements, such as youth 
and women’s organisations, which can play the role of pressure groups, particularly, 
through political alliances with other groups, as ICF did when it defended the Islamic 
constitution in the 1960s. However, the most important role Islamists played is the 
social and developmental role, in covering the failure of the government in these fields. 
However, Roy agrees with Abdelsalam that this is the notion of the founding fathers, 
Banna and Mawdudi, who accepted the notion of revolt, only if the state took a 
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revolutionary anti-Islamic stance, and if all means of peaceful protest had been 
exhausted: “If the government should become so alien as to transcend the Shari‘a, then 
the [individual] has the right and obligation to revolt. This is the revolutionary element 
in Islam” (Roy, 1994, p.41).  
In Turabi’s theory, it will become clear that he opposes any aggressive revolution and 
military action, specifically after his experiment with the army in Sudan in 1989. 
Meanwhile, the radicals consider that no compromise with current Muslim society is 
possible; they advocate political rupture and introduce the concept of revolution. Turabi 
counted this as another example of borrowing from the century’s progressive ideologies; 
with this he means Sayyid Qutb, the theoretician, who inspired the revolutionary groups 
in the 1970s and 1980s. It is noticeable that Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan may be 
categorised in both groups. They adopted the first group’s theory when they had less 
power, and were aligned with other traditional political parties having an Islamic 
background aiming to push the government towards an Islamic constitution. On the 
other hand, as mentioned by many leaders such as Abdelsalam (2009), they adopted the 
revolutionary line when they discovered that they would be eradicated, if any other 
political force executed a military coup before they did in 1989. However, this does not 
mean that they agreed with the whole concept articulated by Qutb. Indeed, Turabi 
counted this as an exceptional case, which they had been forced to adopt, as was 
mentioned in Chapter 4. However, the role of society in Turabi’s political thought is one 
of the most important points raised by most scholars. Turabi (2009, p.19) states: 
“the first duty of the society is to reward or punish the Muslim, such as to 
remind him if he forgets and advise or punish him by words or enjoin him by 
words, if he strays or reward him by good words if he goes straight; the role of 
the society is to support the Muslim conscience first by advising and reminding 
him, then by rewards or punishments through the natural mechanism of the 
society.” 
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This statement is very important because it provides the societies and individuals with 
the freedom of choice and freedom of expression. In this case the society can play the 
role described above by Turabi, I believe this role includes arts music and cultural 
issues. However, the role of the state in Turabi’s thought is explained by Moussalli 
when he pointed out that Turabi argued for the Islamic state, and that it must not go 
beyond formulating general rules that enable society to organise its affairs. The 
legitimacy limits the authority of the state, and emancipates society to the maximum, on 
the basis that “the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice” is the work of society 
not the state (Moussalli, 2004, p.97). Moussalli’s view is supported by Eissa (2005, 
p.321), who argued that many scholars believe that, according to Turabi, society is the 
basic Islamic institution, and not the state. This point is central in Turabi’s views related 
to the state, and was confirmed by him in the interviews conducted by the researcher in 
Khartoum on 25 December 2010. He stated that “the society, not the state, is the 
important institution in Islam.” This point of view was established by him, when he was 
addressing his audience in South Florida University on 10 May 1993; he explained in 
detail that: 
“Muslims were looking forward to limit[ing] the authority of the government … 
Muslims developed their education, health care and social systems far away 
from power, through Awqaf (endowments) and voluntary work.” 
He gave the example of Andalusia, when the kings in their palaces were drowned in 
pleasures, they did not represent the Islamic model. However, they were a good 
example for the weakness of authority, which at the same time proves society’s ability 
to undertake the responsibilities, and to carry on its affairs (Turabi, 1995, p.42). 
Public service in Turabi’s theory is a partnership between society and government. 
Turabi (2003) explains that public life is a partnership between the specific efforts of 
society and the public system of the government, e.g. the health sector. Society plays an 
essential role and holds a large share, as he illustrates that society should take the 
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initiative and show adequacy. He believes that this role is a part of worship, and should 
be perfected. In this context, it could be through bringing up children by the family, 
keeping them healthy, and teaching them their language and basic knowledge. 
Moreover, families care for the ill persons, and share knowledge about disease and 
treatments, but if relatives could not do this job, then it should be done by society 
voluntarily, through charitable organisations, which look after the elderly, children, 
orphans or the disabled, and those who do not have a carer; if these organisations are 
not able to respond, then it is the government’s duty (Turabi, 2003, pp.343-345).  
However, in this context, the role of government is to formulate policies, and intervene 
when there is an epidemic that needs curtailing; the direct duty is to monitor contagious 
diseases, to control them, and develop preventive methods. On the other hand, the 
Sultan’s (government’s) duty is to formulate medicines and drugs policies and 
legislation (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010). Moreover, the government should 
encourage and finance research in this field, adopt its results, and protect the rights of 
the people (Turabi, 2003, p.345). Ghannouchi agrees with Turabi, even in the details, as 
stated here: 
“Ghannouchi insists, perhaps with the intention of Islamising the concept, that 
civil society is one in which power is not monopolised by the state, but rather 
shared between the government—the political authority—and the society, where 
the balance is in favor of the latter, and if it is one in which the state has no 
monopoly over the people’s sustenance, so that private ownership is guaranteed; 
initiatives, whether individual or collective, are free; and the state monopolised 
neither education, nor the rendering of social or cultural services, then this 
according to him is one of the characteristic features of an Islamic society” 
(Tamimi, 2001, p.134). 
 
Turabi believes that the society guards values using its own means: 
“they judge you; if you do good, they will respect you and you will be one of the 
figures in the society; everybody will respect you and visit you; your good 
reputation will be everywhere, [while] the opposite will happen if your attitude 
is contradicting the values of the society directly; they will isolate you; the 
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society has its own mechanisms to protect its values” (Turabi, interview, 26 
December 2010). 
However, one may ask the question: what are the limits of the government vis-a-vis 
society and the individual? Turabi argues that: 
“on the whole, the aims and means and the government correspond to that of 
society, being related to religion and based on Shari‘a. Furthermore, the 
individual was largely free because the lawmaking and financial power were 
limited; so there was not any intolerable oppression. Even though the particular 
Caliph might be a usurper, he was not a totalitarian, absolute dictator. Certainly 
where his security is threatened, he would impinge on freedom, but otherwise 
people were left alone” (Turabi, 1983, p.247). 
In this case, if the society is free and not controlled by the government, then these 
mechanisms will work perfectly. However, if the government or authority intervenes in 
the society, and limits its freedom, then these mechanisms will be disturbed and will not 
work to protect society’s values. In the same interview, he gave the example of people’s 
dress, and confirms that, in Islam, the authority should not intervene or legislate for the 
way that people should dress, but should advise by encouraging the mechanisms of 
society to play this role. The means for the protection of the community’s values lie 
within the role of the society, and the government facilitates this role by giving more 
freedom to the society and the individual through the suitable mechanisms they choose. 
 
Section 3. Distribution of Wealth and Power 
Hasan al-Turabi as an Islamist thinker is significant, as he has developed the notion of a 
political system based on Shura. The concept of Shura has played a central role in 
Turabi’s political thinking, and his political activity in Sudan has required him to 
develop practical proposals about how Shura should be implemented. Shura itself is a 
method of preventing power from being monopolised by any group of people in society, 
whether they are scholars (Ulama), an ethnic group, social or political actors, or an 
economic class. This is because Shura is a duty upon everyone regardless of status in 
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society. People in their economic life are concerned with two purposes, namely the 
development in their livelihood to a better level, and applying justice in their 
transactions and distribution of wealth (Turabi, 1984, p.233). 
Scholars, such as Tim Niblock, who is familiar with Sudan’s history and political 
development, evaluated Turabi’s work. In a foreword to a study done by Sulami, 
Niblock concluded that: 
“the views expressed by Turabi are largely compatible with liberal democracy. 
Most of them mirror the rationale found in liberal democratic theory, while 
creating an Islamic justification which should help to give them more ready 
acceptance in the Islamic world” (Sulami, 2003, p.VI). 
One may agree with Niblock’s observation that “the central dilemma in the promotion 
of democracy in Islamic countries, therefore, is one of practical politics and not of 
religious-based incompatibility” (Sulami, 2003, p.VI). Paradoxically, Turabi’s own 
career tends to bear this out. While he may claim that he was never in a strong enough 
political position in Sudan to implement his true political ideas, the gap between his 
pronounced ideas and the political practice of the Sudanese political system, over which 
he held such a powerful influence through most of the 1990s, is wide and deep (Sulami, 
2003, p.VII). At the same time, when the struggle with Bashir’s government was 
revealed, in trying to apply these values, the circumstances changed, and re-evaluation 
is needed to explain why Turabi could not apply his ideal theory. The answer to this 
question is partially found in the previous two chapters.  
Despite all this, this experiment with the military coup and the armed forces that rely on 
coercion matured the experience of Islamists in Sudan, theoretically and practically, and 
benefited other Islamists in the Arab countries currently witnessing revolutions to end 
dictatorial rule, in the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ which has been by and large a popular 
uprising, and is quite distinct from a military coup. 
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Qutb believes that the spirit of Islam, and its approach to governance, is far removed 
from that of well-known empires, in the past and present. Islam deems Muslims all over 
the world to be equal, and so opposes tribalism, nationalism and regionalism. In this 
spirit, it does not count the regions as colonised or monopolised by the centre. Every 
region is part of the Islamic world, and its people enjoy the same rights as the people in 
the centre. Therefore, if the governor (Wāli) is appointed from the centre, it is because 
of his qualities as a pious and capable Muslim, and not a coloniser. Indeed, “the monies 
collected are to be consumed in these regions first, and whatever remains may then be 
given to the centre” (Qutb, 1995, p.77). Qutb here, like Turabi, speaks of an ideal 
situation, knowing full well that practice was far removed from reality. It could be said 
here that Qutb was influenced by the Caliphate in his vision and suggested related 
solutions, although he lived in a nationalist era. If this is compared to Turabi’s views, 
then it is clear that Turabi does not believe in the nationalist view that “it is not an 
Islamic state”, but accepts that states do exist, and prefers the gradual approach to unity, 
as was the case in Europe and the Gulf. In short, Qutb means that Islam is a religion and 
state rolled into one and, to him, the state is not a vague, but a clearly-defined concept, 
characterised by sovereignty (Hākimiyyah). 
It is well known that, in Islam, the right to private ownership is legitimised, yet Islam 
strictly forbids exploitation, monopoly, and earning of wealth through other than lawful 
and legitimate means. Islam encourages and restricts people to seek wealth through 
lawful work. The rich people in the community have a social mission to help the poor, 
by fulfiling a religious duty in paying Zakat,
71
 such that wealth is redistributed. Zakat is 
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 The word in the Arabic language means purification; the payment of Zakat is a religious act of 
purification. Zakat should be distributed to satisfy the needs of the poor within the locality, where it was 
collected, then any surplus sent to help the poor in other areas. It could also be used to meet community 
needs, such as building mosques, schools, or other categories of expenditure. Muslims with financial 
means (Nisab) are obliged to pay a certain percentage of their wealth (2.5% of net worth deducted 
annually.  
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one of the five pillars of Islam;
72
 within it are the concepts of philanthropy and 
charitable giving (Sadaqah),
73
 which constitute the foundation of the Islamic social 
security system. This is one of the dimensions, in which Islam constructs this social and 
economic system. Turabi’s philosophy was established on these values and concepts, 
and his vision was explained in his books, al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm (2003), and al-Fiqh 
al-Siyasi (2009). Welfare, security, hunger and fear are connected, and hard work is part 
of the worship of Allah, contingent on the intention of the believer. Therefore, the 
believer relies on Allah, the Giver, and so feels safe and satisfied; if he suffers limited 
provisions for a time, he considers this as a trial or challenge (Ibtilā’).74 The hoped-for 
outcome is social security, and minimal problems, reflected in a state of tranquillity, 
which leads to stability. The researcher believes that you cannot establish an Islamic 
state unless you have a well-established Islamic society. In Turabi’s words: 
“the state is the only political expression of an Islamic society; you cannot have 
an Islamic state except in so far that you have an Islamic society. Any attempt at 
establishing a political order for the establishment of a genuine Islamic society 
would be the superimposition of laws over reluctant society” (Turabi, 1983, 
p.241). 
Turabi establishes a clear sequence here, because the state is only an ‘expression’ of an 
Islamic society, as if the society comes first before the state, according to Turabi. This 
takes place in the course of a natural development process of Islamisation that 
constitutes the destiny of Muslim societies. For Turabi, states come and go (state here 
means government, as explained earlier in this research, when he criticises the 
translation of terms from English to Arabic and from Arabic to English); he believes 
that Islamic society can, and has, expanded without the structures of a state for 
centuries. He added that society is able to live religion in its integral comprehensive 
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 The five pillars of Islam are: the declaration of faith (Shahadah), prayer (Salah), charity (Zakat), 
Fasting (Siyam) and Pilgrimage (Hajj). 
73
 This is a voluntary charitable contribution, other than Zakat, which is obligatory. 
74
 Ibtilaa means God’s constant testing of the believers’ commitment and endurance in the face of worldly 
and spiritual challenges. 
 285 
manner, but would have its political dimensions in a government that seeks to fulfil 
some of the purposes of religious life (Turabi, 1983, p.243). 
Turabi’s works are essential for the study and practice of Islamic political thought, as 
his work is located in a new dimension and practice in the contemporary political scene, 
with its associated events, such as the practice of Islamists after the Arab awakening. 
Turabi provided a systematically focused and balanced explanation of political, 
economic, and social issues in the context of a variety of complex events, such as the 
‘War on Terror’, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the superiority of one power, as 
well as the issues raised by the international community, such as human rights, justice, 
ethnic minorities, socio-economic development and international relations.  
Turabi’s work is highly significant for a number of reasons; he is one of the prominent 
Muslim thinkers developing a systematic political, economic, social and moral reading 
of Islam. He was personally involved in political life in Sudan for more than five 
decades. He was leading and involved directly in a plan for socio-political reform in 
Sudan. He involved himself in a series of debates with Western intellectuals and 
politicians, and with Islamists from different schools and groups, then with politicians 
from different ideologies, conservatives, revolutionists, reformist leaders, the media and 
the general public. His works demonstrate his legacy as signposts along the way to 
apply and practise Shura, to renew and reform Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and advance 
the Tawhīd method. He saw Islam as a religion of Tawhīd that concerns all aspects of 
life, based on sound universal principles of social cohesion, and as a religion that is 
inherently protective of both society and state. Turabi affirms that: 
“wealth belongs to God, man is an agent only; normally, wealth belongs to some 
people; if we give it to the rulers as in the socialist system that means they will 
gather the two powers, economic power and authority, and these are the causes 
of tyranny” (Turabi, 2010, p.31). 
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He therefore calls for the distribution of these powers among the people through the 
means mentioned above.  
 
Section 4. Liberty and Freedom of Speech 
Freedom in Islam is one of the essential doctrines that springs directly from Tawhīd, as 
Islam itself is based on individual choice (he who wishes to believe ...). In the Islamic 
state, individual rights spring from the original doctrine of Islam. 
“Islam establishes all life relationships on freedom and choice … the highest 
relation is the relation between the slave (man) and his God; the will to believe 
or not is a choice, it is not fixed by God” (Turabi, 2003, p.183). 
This means that Allah created people not like any other creature that worships Him by 
nature, but He gave human beings the choice. Turabi (1983; 2009, p.60) believes that 
the freedom of the individual ultimately emanates from the doctrine of Tawhīd, which 
requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God 
exclusively. However, he explains that, where society, and those in power, are both 
inspired by the same principle, the collective endeavour is not one of hampering the 
liberty of the individual, but of cooperation towards the maximum achievement of this 
ideal. In order to promote this cooperation, the freedom of the individual is related to 
that of the general group.  
The ultimate common aim of religious life unites the private and social spheres, and that 
the Shari'a provides an arbiter between social order and individual freedom. However, 
the relation between the state and society in Islam is clear in Islamic jurisprudence, in 
that the individual has the right to his physical existence, general social well-being, 
reputation, peace, privacy, education and a decent life. However, Turabi confirms that: 
“these are the rights that the state ought to provide and guarantee for better 
fulfilment of the religious ideals of life. Freedom of religion and of expression 
should also be guaranteed and encouraged” (Turabi, 1983, p.248). 
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What is different here is that these are not only rights, but social obligations as well, 
where the individual should contribute to the political cohesion and well-being of the 
state. In other words, if the: 
“state became so alien as to transcend the Shari‘a        , he (the citizen) has the 
right and obligation to revolt; this is the revolutionary element in Islam. A 
Muslim’s ultimate obedience is to God alone” (Turabi, 1983, p.248). 
It is noticeable that this is the only case for which Turabi advocates revolution; he 
always rejected the idea of revolution, and believes that revolution leads to anarchy, and 
the military coup leads to dictatorship. 
For Turabi, all the religion is about confidence in human beings; it gives them freedom 
and liberates them from nature, society, government, to be devoted exclusively to God 
Almighty. It could be said that this is the essence of religion, which must be present in 
jurisprudence, and in organising the family, Islamic groups and state. Turabi’s book, al-
Ahkām al-Shar‘iyyah, establishes the value of Shura, and advice, and not to enslave 
people. 
 
4.1 Freedom and Apostasy (Riddah) in Turabi’s thought 
Apostasy (Riddah) has been one of the controversial issues in Islamic jurisprudence 
throughout history. It is one of the issues on which Turabi disagrees with many scholars. 
It is important to define the term ‘Riddah’ in Islamic literature. Apostasy (Riddah) in 
classical literature is defined as: 
“the voluntary and conscious reversion to Kufr (disbelief) after having embraced 
Islam by means of denying any of its fundamentals, whether in the matter of 
Aqidah (faith), Shari‘a (law), or Sha‘īrah (rite): an example of the first would be 
the denial of deity of the Prophethood; of the second, the licensing of 
prohibitions; and of the third, negation of the obligations” (Tamimi, 2001, p.78). 
Turabi connects this concept with the original concept of freedom, where he explains: 
“as for the freedom of thinking, choosing doctrine, and the freedom of 
expression, it should revive a religion believing by choice, not force. There is no 
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inherited or fixed acceptance of the religion, so whom he apostates from his 
religion, as ‘there is no compulsion in religion’. No one should be asked to 
repent or be punished through the authority; the onus is upon the believers to 
call him and debate with him, till he repents and becomes a true believer, not a 
hypocrite, and to be the one who fears the punishment in the Hereafter, not in 
the worldly life” (Turabi, 2003, p.176). 
This is a very important statement: it declares clearly that the authority has nothing to 
do with the person’s belief; if he embraced Islam it is his choice and if he left it, it is 
also his choice. However, the society has a duty towards this person to invite him and 
debate with him, till he repents and becomes a true believer rather than a hypocrite.  
Turabi criticised the traditional schools of jurisprudence for blocking Ijtihād, and added 
that: 
“regarding the Hadith on killing the one who changes his religion; it is not 
lawful to kill a believer except ... one who left his religion, and separates himself 
from the community (Jama‘a). He explains this Hadith by saying that this 
Hadith and the practical Sunna clarifies the Qur'an does not abrogate it ... if he is 
an apostate and fighting against Muslims, in this case, it is allowed to kill him 
and it is a defence in this case not because he is an apostate but because he is 
fighting Muslims” (Turabi, 2003, p.177). 
This is an important Hadith which the scholars introduce as evidence for the punishment 
of the apostasy. This Hadith is explained by Turabi as above, and while his explanation 
is widely accepted; at the same time, it is rejected by many scholars.  
According to Turabi’s argument, an apostate may remain as a subject under the Muslim 
government bound by a covenant of peace and citizenship, as was the case in the first 
years of Madinah. Moreover, he argues that the Prophet only fought three categories of 
people: those who were fighting him, those who betrayed him, and those who attacked 
the Muslims, excluding hypocrites and apostates. His argument is that the Prophet did 
not fight anyone because of apostasy, but because they belonged to one of the three 
categories mentioned; the fact that they were former Muslims was not an excuse to treat 
them differently from any other combatant. Turabi drew heavily from the Qur’an to 
support his view; for example (6; verse 135), (17; verse 84), (10; verse 19), (50; verse 
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45), (88; verse 22) (11; verses 28, 93 and 121) and (7; verses 86-87). Turabi pointed out 
that: 
“freedom of opinion and freedom of expression is a religious duty upon the 
believer, without permission and without limitation, even if it is used 
excessively and harms the governor, as happened to the Prophet, who never 
oppressed anyone to be silent. However, the right is to answer and respond to 
falsehood, apostasy, and (fasiq
75
) lecher by verbal words and writings; when it 
goes beyond that then the response should be the same” (Turabi, 2003, p.179). 
It could be concluded that, from this freedom of faith, freedom of thought and 
expression emanate. Indeed, everybody is entitled to live freely and in peace, but those 
who violate the peace and take up arms should be confronted by force. Otherwise, it is a 
right to hold political opinion, and may, indeed, be a religious duty, in the context of 
promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, practising Shura and giving advice to the 
ruler; all the above are religious duties. Turabi’s contribution on this point is unique, and 
it lends great courage to other scholars to express their views on this controversial point 
in both the modern and traditional schools of fiqh (jurisprudence).  
 
Section 5. Non-Muslims in the Islamic State  
Religious minorities face the same dilemma all over the world, whether Muslim 
minorities in a non-Islamic state or non-Muslims in an Islamic state. The main concern 
is the struggle to achieve equality in every sphere of life. However, the issue of non-
Muslims in an Islamic state is central to any discussion on political Islam, and among 
Muslim scholars. Non-Muslims should enjoy their freedom in an Islamic state, as was 
discussed above in the example of the first state in Madinah. Turabi (2003) affirms the 
right of other faiths (Millahs) to exist. In such cases, the Qur’an prohibits Muslims from 
being racist or forcing and pressuring followers of other faiths using the power of 
government or any other. Islam forbids compulsion, as the Qur’an clearly states that 
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 Anyone who commits major sins and has not repented, or insists on doing minor sins continuously. 
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“there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256). Indeed, religion compels the ruler of 
Muslims not to trespass on other faiths, and they should be left to freely observe their 
rituals, and be ruled by their faith. Furthermore, they are not to be subject to Islam’s 
Shari‘a, which is applied to the rest of the community, i.e. the Muslims (Turabi, 2003, 
p.459). Turabi in this view refers to the verses of the Qur’an (5:42), (10:99) and (29:46), 
and is guided by the Prophet’s experiment in Madinah, where the community was multi-
religious and multi-cultural, as was explained above in this chapter. 
Turabi’s views were fiercely attacked by conservatives and liberals; a paper published 
by el-Affendi (2006) evaluated these attacks. This is exemplified by an article published 
in al-Ayyam daily on 30 June 1988, by Abdalla Fadallah Abdallah, in which he accused 
Turabi of defying Shari‘a by propagating eccentric views not supported by any credible 
authority. He argued that Turabi’s ideas were erroneously being applied to adherents of 
“African creeds” in Sudan, saying that Turabi wanted to make them part of his “Islamic 
state”. He indicated that both modern and traditional authorities dispute Turabi’s view 
that non-Muslims occupied leading roles in Muslim polities in the past; writers like Abu 
A‘la al-Mawdudi demonstrated that non-Muslims have never occupied executive roles 
in Muslim polities, nor did they participate in electing the Caliph. Abdullah concluded 
that Turabi’s claim that non-Muslims have equal rights under Islamic law has no basis 
whatsoever in Shari‘a (Abdullah, 30 June 1988).  
Turabi stated clearly that the rules on issues, such as marriage, transactions, and 
atonement for certain obscene sins and conduct, are public provisions implemented 
voluntarily by Muslims, if not by the government. However, in the case of non-
Muslims, Shari'a is not applied to them, even if they live as individuals among Muslims, 
unless they freely and voluntarily accept to come under its provisions, and are 
committed to it. Otherwise, it is an issue related to the traditions of their faith, which 
they address themselves. Hence, it is related to the sanctity of choice, satisfaction, and 
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contract between people. Muslims choose the rule of their law, and non-Muslims, if 
they wish, remain distinct under the rule of their faith (Turabi, 2003, p.64). I may agree 
with these points of view, which do not contradict Islamic values, but also lead society 
towards greater coherence and satisfaction. Turabi’s words may be understood to mean 
that such rules should be established in a social contract, and a system of government. 
This is the guidance of Islam on this issue of government, on organising rules in the 
state. In this social contract, individual sanctity, freedom and equality should be 
safeguarded.  
However, it is important to explain that Turabi believes in applying a personal law 
based on traditions, i.e. a monogamous personal law; he asserted that: 
“it is personal law based on Christian traditions ... we allow non-Muslims to 
have their personal law; we consider that personal law is a part of personal life; 
it is a part of your complete freedom; it is like your belief; it is like your ritual 
acts of worship; you are free to observe any value there; so the non-Muslim, we 
will ask him what are your customs (he means in court, so as to be judged 
according to them); you will never find this level of religious freedom in any 
country in the world, not even in the West” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994).  
In other words, personal law means to apply the law according to the personal beliefs of 
those involved. This means that Shari‘a is not applied to non-Muslims, even if they live 
within the Muslim community. This was applied in North Sudan, where, practically, the 
government granted an exception to the southern regions of the country. Thus, this part 
represents the conclusions arising from Turabi’s practical experiences in a multi-
religious, and multi-cultural community. Turabi went further, asserting that a non-
Muslim also has the right to be nominated as president, with the people free to choose 
whomever they wanted. 
 
“all human beings are equally related to the same origin. Those differences in 
colour and language are some prejudices that human communities used against 
each other. These should not be reasons for dispute, but rather mutual 
acquaintance and cooperation among all human beings. Islam strongly 
repudiates segregation and apartheid” (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010). 
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On many occasions, Turabi emphasises the rich diversity of the Muslim community, in 
its different colours, cultures and languages. Turabi agrees with many scholars, such as 
Ghannouchi and Qutb, about the guaranteed rights in the Islamic state. First, protection 
from external threat, and second, protection from persecution, assault, violence or 
unlawful detention by any hostile party operating within the national boundaries. 
Moreover, Turabi gave non-Muslims the right to reject the contract of citizenship, and 
migrate to the place of their choice, and no authority or government could deprive them 
of this right (Turabi, interview 25 December 2010). In the same interview, he illustrated 
that non-Muslims have the right to choose when to have their holidays, whether 
Saturday or Sunday, and the right to their places of worship, schools, etc. Turabi 
believes that citizenship is embodied in a contract between the individual and the state. 
Therefore, citizens are free to go wherever they want, and change their citizenship if 
they so wished. The state had no right to stop them, if they wished to terminate this 
social contract. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, many human rights’ violations occurred, even 
though Turabi was an influential and key person in the regime after the coup. The rights 
of individuals were violated on numerous occasions. Although there were national 
policies and laws protecting individual rights, the mechanisms to apply these laws were 
not effective enough. Those charged with upholding the law, officers and others, were 
primitive and arrogant most of the time, and the security forces operated with immunity, 
immune from any monitoring by the judiciary system.  
 
Section 6. No-Party and Multi-Party Systems 
In the traditional Islamic model of government, there are no political parties as in the 
modern conception and definition. However, a different opinion may have developed 
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due to the various trends within the Muslim nation (Ummah) or community. The natural 
development in the life of human beings created mechanisms through which people 
may express their viewpoints or opinions. Turabi believes that the ideal state model in 
history is Rome, and the Madinah model where “the source of legitimacy is the Muslim 
community” (Turabi, 2003, p.113). Here, he means all society without exception, i.e. 
men and women, specialists in all fields, and not only the religious scholars (Ulama); he 
believes that all are qualified, and all are included. However, the problem is that the 
Madinah state was small, and all its people could be assembled together. Nowadays, 
states are large, and their populations huge and, hence, cannot be gathered in one place. 
In these circumstances, what are the mechanisms that allow the people to express their 
views, participate in Shura, and give advice to the ruler, particularly, since it is a 
religious duty for them? On this point, Turabi explains that political parties in the 
Islamic world, in its modern version, have developed in history, during the colonial 
period, when “they were established as resistance movements,” which then evolved in 
most countries into political parties. He also discussed the trends and parties in the 
Madinah state during the Prophet Muhammed’s time. He divided the Madinah society 
into al-Muhajirūn—immigrants who came from Mecca, al-Ansār—the indigenous 
people of Madinah, al-Munafiqūn—the hypocrites and, finally, the Jews. This society 
was an example of social and political associations, the first two being the Muslims and 
the “Jews who differ from Muslims in the origin of the creed (Aqidah); they used to 
argue with Muslims on public policies” (Turabi, 2003, p.189). However, he explains 
that, “in politics, Muslims agree and associate in one party (Hizb Allah)” meaning the 
believers’ party, and the other, which opposes them, i.e. the non-believers’ party (Hizb 
al-Shaytan), and then “those in between, who did not belong to those (believers) or 
those (non-believers)” (Turabi, 2003, p.184). A further explanation is that: 
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“all these parties agreed to live in Madinah under one ruler as one Ummah that 
was mentioned in Sahifat al-Madinah
76
 (the Madinah document); despite the 
differentiations of the tribes, they accepted the Prophet as a ruler (commander-
in-chief)” (Turabi, 2003 p.189). 
It may be noted here that the use of the term ‘Ummah’ does not mean Muslims only; 
hence, Turabi asked us to read it in its context. 
When it is impossible for all people to gather in one place to perform Shura, then the 
solution is to delegate representatives to present their views in appropriate institutions. 
“The delegated (representative) rulers are commissioners; these commissioners 
are the second source of legitimacy after society—the first source ... Society 
chooses these people voluntarily, yet these commissioners have no authority 
over the people” (Turabi, 2003, p.126). 
In the interview with the researcher in 25 December 2010 in Khartoum, Turabi confirms 
that he supports the multi-party system as a method of rule. In his writings, he affirms 
that: 
“Islam has been emancipated in the earth as a government (in Madinah); though 
it was tolerant towards the pluralistic community, it reconciles between Muslims 
if tribal problems arise, and is patient towards the hypocrites or the people of the 
Book, even if they campaign against the government” (Turabi, 2003, p.189). 
In conclusion, Turabi supports a multi-party system, on condition that it is not a rigid 
system. On this point, he affirms that:  
“there is no legal bar to the development of different parties or to the freedom of 
opinion and debate. Such was the case in the constitutional practice of the 
caliph. A well-developed Islamic society, however, would probably not be 
conducive to the growth of rigid parties wherein one stands by one's party 
whether it is wrong or right. This is a form of factionalism that can be very 
oppressive of individual freedom and divisive of the community, and it is 
therefore antithetical to a Muslim’s ultimate responsibility to Allah and to 
Ummah. While there may be a multiparty system, an Islamic government should 
function more as a consensus-oriented rather than a minority/majority system 
with political parties rigidly confronting each other over decisions. Parties 
should approach the decision-making process with an open mind and after a 
consensus adopt a mutually agreeable policy” (Turabi, 1987, p.5). 
                                                 
76
 Or Dostour al-Madina (The Constitution al-Madina), Madina constitution regarded as the first written 
constitutions in the history. 
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In previous sections, the study explored the experiment of the one-party system, which 
the government adopted four years after the coup, and tried to develop, i.e. 
accommodating different opinions in a one-party system. However, the experiment 
could not be made to work. Therefore, the 1998 constitution, which was written mainly 
by Turabi, adopted the multi-party system. It could be said there is no Islamic objection 
for people to organise themselves into trends or parties to practise Shura, which is a 
duty upon them.  
 
Section 7. Women’s Participation 
In 1949, the first women joined the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) movement, and 
started public work with them. Fatima Talib (Mekki, 1998, p.39) was the first, followed 
by others, where they started al-Manar weekly magazine. The Muslim Sisters 
movement started as a limited movement for students and graduates, and was not a 
social, popular movement at that time. 
“This was due to their inability to resist pressures from a society, which did not 
accept for young women to be ‘too religious’, to take an independent stance, or 
to deviate from the accepted norms and conventions governing the conduct of 
women” (Turabi, 2008, p.151). 
At this stage, the movement was influenced by society, where women were keen to play 
any role in reforming society. 
Hasan Mekki (1998) believes that the Islamists, in the early days, marginalised women 
in the movement, because they were influenced by Sudanese traditions and culture; in 
the 1940s and 1950s, the dominant culture in society was conservative. Furthermore, it 
could be said they had not developed the jurisprudence (fiqh) to deal with women’s 
issues, and depended on Egyptian literature. Additionally, women’s education in Sudan 
at that time was limited, and the Ikhwan movement was an educated people’s movement 
that was established in the universities and schools. Sudanese culture also isolated 
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women from public life, which influenced the Ikhwan movement for some time, and so 
women were excluded from executive office and public political activities. When the 
Ikhwan movement started women’s groups, these were separated from the movement’s 
mainstream, and so they did not develop in experience as much as their male 
counterparts at the time.  
However, the movement started revising its stance in the new era of freedom following 
the 1964 October Revolution. Turabi referred this revision to external challenges, and 
not self-motivated rethinking: 
“the main reason was the near total control of the women’s movement on the 
campuses by communists, a factor which worried Islamist activists, who were 
uneasy, because their scruples about contact with female students had led to this 
result, and it pained them to see that the vote of the female students constantly 
went against them, and was decisive in favouring their opponents” (Turabi, 
2008, p.152). 
Outside universities, matters were the same, where the communists led most women’s 
organisations and associations. Hence, they started to influence society in advocating 
the idea of women’s liberation according to their vision. At the same time, there was a 
Western trend influencing women in universities, schools and wider society. This 
situation forced the Islamic movement to seriously rethink the role of women within its 
comprehensive approach to Islam. At the beginning, this took the form of setting up a 
women’s organisation, named the Patriotic Women’s Front, headed by a small number 
of women members of the movement. It played a national role, where it is believed that 
it was influenced by the issues of that period, and other women’s organisations 
(advocating legal reforms, granting women political rights etc.) without referring issues 
to Islam directly.  
At this stage, the movement began to realise that no social reform could be undertaken 
without women’s participation. Hence, women’s activities began under the supervision 
of men, in what was known as the Women Affairs section. Its members, elected at the 
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1954 Eid conference, were Ahmed Awad al-Kareem, Isa Mekki, Osman Azrag, and 
some students, such as Mudathir Abdalrahim and Dafa‘ Allah al-Hajj Yousif. They 
started by establishing small study groups for teaching fiqh, Qur’an and general 
knowledge to the families of Ikhwan, and to warn them of the danger of the 
communists, who influenced society, using media and public lectures (Abdalgadir, 
1999, pp.134-135). At this stage, the women’s movement in Sudan benefited from the 
literature published by the Egyptian Ikhwan, e.g. “The message of the family and 
society”.  
However, after a few years, they achieved significant success with the support of 
influential leaders in the movement, and paved by Turabi’s fiqh. 
“By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the movement achieved a degree of 
intellectual maturity and social awareness, which caused it to critically re-
evaluate its past performance. Turabi issued a pamphlet about the message of 
women and, according to these ideas, the movement established its women’s 
fiqh, and developed the women’s sector according to Islam. Surprisingly, some 
Ikhwan rejected the idea of liberating women according to what was mentioned 
in the pamphlet ‘Message of Women’” (Imam, interview, 1998). 
However, after some time, they accepted that Turabi had been right, and had led them in 
the right direction; this was the conclusion of Yassin Omer al-Imam (interview, 1998), 
as he evaluated some periods of the movement, and Turabi’s role in pushing these 
further through his efforts and initiatives, especially in this field.  
In the 1980s, the movement achieved significant success in the mass mobilisation of 
women’s organisations in the social, education, and charity fields, across society. After 
1983, when Nimeiri applied Shari‘a, Ikhwan mobilised the youth and women’s sector to 
support the regime and establish their organisations. In 1985 they organised the largest 
rally seen in the country’s history, “Aman al-Sudan”, in which they gathered about one 
million supporters (by their estimates). At this stage, the movement recruited 
professionals, students, and women from all sectors, i.e. students, housewives, etc. This 
signalled a progressive shift in women’s organisations in all parts of the movement, 
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progressing from simplicity and naiveté to greater sophistication and complexity. With 
deeper involvement in the affairs of society, the organisation itself became more 
complex, as it was required to undertake ever new functions, coordinate increasing 
activities in various fields, increase its efficiency, and enhance its democratic character. 
In this period, the movement established many women’s organisations, e.g. Rai’dat al-
Nahda (women pioneers of the renaissance). Women participated in the body of the 
movement itself as effective members, while branches and affiliated groups were 
granted wide autonomy. Following the 1985 April Revolution, Nimeiri’s regime was 
overthrown, and the movement established the NIF. In this stage, women participated in 
movement conferences, at all levels of leadership, and in all areas of activism and 
struggle.  
The role of women developed significantly in all fields, both national and international. 
By the 1990s, the Islamic movement went further in opening prominent and sensitive 
posts to women, allowing them to become diplomats, judges, army officers, members of 
parliament, etc. Hence, there was no ceiling regarding the role of women in Islam. The 
fiqh itself developed theoretically and practically. Turabi, in an interview with al-
Arabiya TV, stated: 
“I want women to participate in public life ... Allah prefers some of us more than 
the others (both men and women); Allah created us from one soul and created 
from it its partner” (al-Arabiya, 10 April 2006). 
Turabi went further, in attacking the traditional fiqh by announcing his opinion on the 
position of Imam, leading a mixed congregation prayer. Turabi stated that: 
 
“I never found anything to prevent her from leading the congregation prayer. If 
she is knowledgeable, she can lead. I only found one Hadith about Um 
 299 
Waraqa,
77
 when the Prophet permitted her to lead the prayer and she could take a 
Mu’azzin (someone to call to prayer) and lead the prayer in her house (Dār).” 
He explains that Dār refers to a large area (e.g. Darfur), and not only the limited 
meaning of ‘home’. 
Among the political issues debated by scholars, there is great dispute on the issue of a 
woman becoming president. On this issue, Turabi confirmed that: 
“she can be a leader of the country, if she is the best of all candidates; if she is 
the most capable of meeting the challenges of the country. The country may be 
in social, economic, or military difficulties; depending on the difficulties, I vote 
for this person or that; according to the current needs” (Arabiya, 10 April 2006). 
It is important to mention that he voted for a woman candidate in elections in his 
constituency, which means he opposed most of the Ulama (scholars) who required the 
leader to be male. This is a real revolution in the field of jurisprudence that encourages 
others to follow in his footsteps. 
In concluding this chapter, it may be said that establishing an Islamic state is the 
objective of most Islamic movements. The majority of revivalists agreed on the 
Madinah model as the Islamic state, with its federal, multi-cultural, and multi-religious 
system. For Turabi, any other experiment is just a model, and the Islamic state is the 
state that is not only Islamic on the level of private, but also public life. The state should 
be established on the values of Islam, namely justice, freedom of religion, and freedom 
of expression. In Turabi’s political thought, sovereignty in the Islamic state is divided 
into two levels; absolute sovereignty, which belongs to God, and people’s sovereignty in 
ruling themselves according to the Shari‘a; hence, the Islamic state is not a theocratic 
state. The government’s role is legislating, making policy, and applying the law, through 
legislative (parliament) and executive bodies (administration), and the judiciary. Society 
in the Islamic state plays a fundamental role in the education, healthcare, and economic 
                                                 
77
 Um Waraga is a woman, who asked the Prophet to permit her to lead the prayer in her home. The 
Prophet used to visit her at home; the Prophet used to visit many of the female Companions, not for their 
husbands, but for them (women), because they hastened to believe and were more pious. 
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fields, by responding to the shortcomings of the government. Therefore, society guards 
the values of the people through its own means.  
In the Islamic state, the right to private ownership is legitimised, but Islam strictly 
forbids exploitation, monopoly and earning of wealth other than through lawful and 
legitimate means. Islam restricts and encourages people to seek wealth lawfully and 
through hard work; work is a kind of worship that should be observed and the person 
will gain its rewards in the worldly life and in the hereafter. Rich people in the 
community have a social mission to help the poor by fulfiling the religious duty of 
Zakat and giving charity. Turabi sees no monopoly of knowledge by the Ulama 
(scholars, scientists) and no monopoly of power by the rulers. Shura is a religious duty, 
and should be practised by all people; Ulama are not only the religious scholars, but 
also the scientists and experts in all fields, and it is their duty to participate in advising 
the ruler. In this regard, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
religion are guaranteed, as well as other rights, i.e. to life, free movement, choice of 
work, etc.  
People can express themselves through the Shura system. However, when it is 
impossible for all people to gather in one place to perform Shura, then the solution 
should be delegating representatives to express their views in institutions. The delegates 
(representatives) are commissioners, and are the second source of legitimacy after 
society – the first source. Turabi supports the multi-party system as a method of 
governance.  
A wide group of women in Sudan, including the researcher and prominent women 
leaders in Sudan, such as Lubaba al-Fadl, Thuraya Yousif, Najwa Abdellatif, and Eman 
Mohammed Hussein, regard Turabi as a women’s liberator. This is because he adopted 
religious opinions favourable to women, although these sometimes opposed Sudanese 
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traditional customs. He also pushed women to participate in public activities, and found 
the religious support for his views, achieving significant success, By the 1990s and 
2000s, the Islamic movement went further, by offering high posts to women. This paved 
the way for women diplomats, judges, army officers, members of parliament, and even 
for leading the country. As such, they proved that in practice there is no ceiling 
regarding the role of women in Islam. 
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Chapter 7: Turabi’s Tawhīdi Theory and Democratic Model 
Tawhīd (Monotheism) is an axial doctrine of Islam, and at the core of religious 
experience is the belief in God, with the confession of the Islamic faith (Shahadah), i.e. 
testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger. The 
word ‘Allah’ is God’s name rendered in Arabic, which uniquely means ‘the God’, and 
occupies a central position in every Muslim place, action, and thought. The presence of 
God fills the Muslim’s consciousness at all times.  
The term ‘Tawhīd’ in the classical Islamic literature refers to the affirmation of the 
‘Oneness of God’. In modern science, the study of human behaviour calls for a more 
comprehensive approach, which studies the effects of human beliefs on human life. El-
Affendi argued that: 
“it could be said that realities of life could be studied from the perspective of 
religious belief, since these are two separate fields, but this is not true because 
religion is not given in a vacuum. Religion is concerned mainly with life and 
how to live it. The whole of life is a theatre for the expression of religious belief, 
and therefore the discussion of the totality of human life” (el-Affendi, 1991, 
p.169). 
As mentioned below, this is a central point of Turabi’s thought; he affirms in all his 
writings and oral articulations that Islam is a comprehensive religion, obliging that all 
the believer’s life be submitted to God. Therefore, in accepting the oneness of God, 
everything in life must heed His Command. Turabi approaches any aspect of life from 
the Tawhīd perspective. This chapter critically evaluates this approach, and articulates 
his Tawhīdi theory in general. It critically studies the philosophical approach of Turabi 
in general, and how it affected his Tawhīdi theory specifically, since it approaches all 
existence as one unit. This chapter evaluates an important part that has significant 
implications on Turabi’s method of interpreting and approaching some aspects of life he 
is concerned about, such as knowledge and language. This chapter critically evaluates 
the concepts and the Tawhīdi theory based on Tawhīd as a main pillar of faith (Īman) 
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and the approach to all aspects of life; the role of Tawhīd in Turabi’s political thinking 
will be explained more concisely. It is divided into five sections: the first section 
evaluates Turabi’s philosophical approach. Section 2 covers  Turabi’s methodology, 
incorporating revolution. Section 3 illustrates Tawhīd and Tawhīdi (uniterianism) 
theory. Section 4 looks at Turabi’s democratic model; and section 5 explores the pillars 
of Turabi’s theory. 
 
Section 1. Philosophical Approach 
It is important to establish the philosophical base of Turabi’s thought through critical 
evaluation of his writings, speeches, and practice. However, Turabi’s philosophical 
approach is established on Tawhīd as a main pillar of his theory. Indeed, the whole idea 
of the Islamic experiment in his political thought is based on this concept of Tawhīd. In 
comparing the West to the experience of the Islamic world, Turabi (1984; 2003) 
confirms that the Islamic experiment is established on the unity and bond between earth 
and heaven, or this world and the Hereafter. Turabi (2003) demonstrated that modern 
Western civilisation was established, based on expelling religion from public life, more 
specifically political life. In contrast, the experience of the Islamic world was different, 
where its civilisation declined when public life was deprived of religion. Turabi (2003) 
addressed the problems arising from the Western experiment, when religious values 
were absent from politics and public life. Turabi (2003) observes that the: “Western 
rulers practiced exploitation of people when they were without religious values; they 
started to colonise other nations, misappropriate their resources, and enslave them to 
ensure development of the Western countries.”  
Despite his criticism of the Western experiment regarding values, Turabi calls for 
sharing the human experience. This may be applied to the practice of freedom, justice, 
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and other human values, and adopting the mechanisms of consultation (Shura) and 
democracy. The aim is to raise the level and quality of practising ‘Shura’ and ‘providing 
advice’ by all individuals, at all levels of life, ranging from issues of family to those of 
government.  
Traditionally and simply expressed, Tawhīd is the conviction, professed in pronouncing 
that “there is no god but Allah”; this seemingly negative statement, short to the limits of 
brevity, carries the greatest and richest meaning in the whole of Islam. 
“Sometimes a whole culture, a whole civilisation, or a whole history lies 
compressed in one sentence. This is certainly the case of the pronouncement 
(Kalimah) or Shahadah of Islam. All the diversity and wealth of history, culture, 
learning, and wisdom, as well as civilisation of Islam is compressed in this 
shortest of sentences ‘la illaha illa Allah’78 (al-Faruqi, 1992, p.9). 
This short sentence means that every Muslim says ‘la ilaha illa Allah, Muhammad rasul 
Allah’, professing the fact that ‘there is no deity worthy of worship except God’ is the 
fundamental pillar of Islam as a religion. One must add to all this one’s denial of every 
other object of worship, which may be wealth, power, the ruler, family, fear, reliance, 
etc. Hence, it is not enough to worship Him, but to worship none beside Him. This is 
what Turabi affirms and reflects in his explanations of freedom of individual, in that 
they should not be slave to any but God. This concept of Tawhīd shaped the political 
thought of Turabi because freedom of individual is the pillar of Iman, and it is the base 
of Turabi’s political theory. 
However, this explanation is an important platform for the philosophical ground of 
Tawhīd in Islam in general, and for Turabi in particular. 
The work of Turabi on the Tawhīdi theory is based on this understanding of Tawhīd. His 
work allows people not only to look at this axial doctrine of Islam but, furthermore, to 
                                                 
78
 Belief in God as the only creator and sustainer of everything that exists. Yet this was admitted even by 
the idolatrous Arabs before the advent of Muhammad, and is accepted by the majority of human beings 
all over the world; so, by itself, this does not make a person a believer in the sense in which all 
messengers of God wanted them to be. Moreover, belief that no-one other than God deserves to be 
worshipped.  
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understand doctrines from a number of different perspectives. These doctrines for him 
are not isolated from practical life, which he regarded as one unit. In the endeavour to 
explain the simple truths of his Tawhīdi doctrine, Turabi touches upon a specific 
understanding of the objective of the message of Islam, and the understanding of the 
concept of Tawhīd (Monotheism) itself, as a comprehensive concept. As such, his 
concept of Tawhīd is rich in the depth of its erudition, and abundant in its perceptions. 
Indeed, it is perhaps his work more than any other which reflects profound and original 
thought, as he articulates his Tawhīdi theory, and also explains the practical steps to put 
it into action.  
He concentrates most of his work on the issues of public life. These are aspects that he 
believes were taken out of being part of the practice of Islam, and indeed were absent 
from the fiqh efforts of scholars in most historical contexts. He criticises those scholars, 
whom, at different periods of time, concentrated their efforts on some branches of 
Islam, such as personal worship (‘Ibādāt) and family issues, i.e. marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance, and did not connect these rituals of worship (‘Ibādāt) with the prime 
objective of establishing Tawhīd, and reflecting this in all aspects of life. Moreover, he 
criticises those scholars in that they did not cover public issues, like Shura, or public 
rights and duties in fiqh, mostly for political reasons and the ruler’s oppression. I may 
agree with the analysis of el-Affendi about the broad concept of Tawhīd, as did 
Sidahmed (1996), who quoted el-Affendi (1991): 
“[o]f several pamphlets and books produced by Turabi in the past twenty years 
or so, two perhaps summarise his main philosophy and approach. The first is 
entitled ‘Religious belief: its effect on the life of man’, and the second, 
‘Renovations of the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence’. The religious belief, 
or Īman for short, deals with the concept of religion, its place in this life, its 
impact on the believers, and the most suitable approach towards religion. The 
central theme in the Islamic religion, according to Turabi, is Tawhīd. Apart from 
its classical meaning as the unity [Oneness] of God, Turabi employed the 
concept in a broader manner to indicate the meeting point between religion, the 
word of God, and this word, the domain of man: ‘Tawhīd is a union of the 
eternal divine command with the changing conditions of human life’...” 
 306 
Additionally, Turabi believes that: 
“Tawhīd enriches life, giving every material worldly experience a spiritual 
otherworldly dimension. It is a dynamic principle which unites the material and 
the spiritual, the real and the ideal, and subsumes the ever changing reality under 
the eternally valid principles” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.188). 
However, his books in the last decade confirm the same theme of Tawhīd, but 
concentrate on public life directly; his book, al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm: al-Nuzum al-
Sultaniyyah Bayn al-Usūl wa Sunan al-Waqi‘ (2003) or ‘al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm’ for 
short, specifically explains Tawhīd in public life, in detail. Turabi approaches the details 
of ruling systems established on the Tawhīd, and explains how to apply the values of 
Islam in public life, how to unite religion and the exercise of government, religion and 
society, how to practise, and check and balance the relationships between the 
authorities, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. In the book, he approaches the 
issues of human rights, ethnic and religious minorities, individual freedom, freedom of 
expression, political parties, the constitution, international relations, and international 
law. Moreover, he discusses and explains the role of government in public safety, 
justice, health, education, energy issues, irrigation, agriculture, industry, and defence. 
He explains the relationship between the national state and the unity of the Ummah, and 
Tawhīd in both personal and public life. In these explanations, Tawhīd is playing a 
significant role in his political theory and public life in general. When he explains these 
issues, he critically evaluates their historical development in different areas at different 
times, and confirms that we should not ignore the wisdom of history and the stories told 
by the Qur’an. In this part he reminds us of the destiny of the previous nations when 
they deviated from Tawhīd. Ghannouchi, speaking at the launch of this book in London 
in 2004, and in an interview on al-Jazeera TV on 24 June 2003, asserted that “this book  
is no less important than al-Muqaddimah (Introduction) written by Ibn Khaldun.”79  
                                                 
79
 Abū Zayd ‘Abdu r-Rahmān bin Muhammad bin Khaldūn Al-Hadrami (May 27, 1332AD in Tunisia –
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However, I may argue that the significant value of his contribution emerges here, 
because it comes after long political experience, given his participation in the first 
decade of the National Salvation Revolution regime in Sudan (1989-1999). It is 
noticeable that this practical experience matured his theories of government, and 
contributed considerably to isolating his conceptions from the idealistic initiatives that 
dominated much Islamist thought in the last century. His theories came as practical, 
realistic, and focused, even though he heavily criticises the experiment on the practical 
level in another book, ‘Ibrat al-Masīr (2001), in which he critically evaluated the 
practice of the movement in the period (1989-2001). This point is discussed in Chapter 
4 in the evaluation of the Islamist experiment in Sudan from 1989 to 2001.  
However, in his book, al-Sha‘ā’ir al-Dīniyyah wa Atharuhā ‘ala al-Hayat al-‘Āma, 
(Religious ritual and its effect on public life) (1974) he explains that “the sincere 
believer turns to Allah, and unifies the visible ritual with his interior” (Turabi, 2008, 
p.10). Moreover, he connects the practice of religious ritual (Sha‘ā’ir) and Tawhīd to all 
the believer’s actions, and considers that this helps and guides the believer to 
subordinate any action in his life to Allah. Therefore, he is able to confront difficulties 
with this faith (Īman), which leads to life’s unity (Turabi, 2008, p.44). Muslim society 
was established on unity and, as such, the practice of religious ritual (Sha‘ā’ir), such as 
ritual prayer (Salah), pilgrimage (Hajj) and obligatory tax on wealth (Zakat), leads to 
equality, and to real unification of the community. It is important to explain how Turabi 
connected acts of worship (‘Ibādat) with practical life; for example, in Salah, the 
followers of the Imam (leader) should obey and follow him in the steps of Salah, as 
long as he follows the rules. However, if he makes a mistake, they have to correct and 
                                                                                                                                               
March 19, 1406AD in Cairo) was a Muslim historiographer and historian who is often viewed as one of 
the forerunners of modern historiography, sociology and economics. His famous book ‘Muqaddimah’ 
was an influential book in the 17
th
 century – the Ottoman period. Later in the 19th century, Western 
scholars recognised him as one of the greatest philosophers to come out of the Muslim world.  
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advise him, but if he chooses not listen to them, then they are not obliged to obey him, 
and must choose another Imam. For Turabi, this symbolises the relationship between a 
ruler and his people. He explains this point of view in his book, al-Salah ‘Imad al-Dīn, 
published in 1984; in the same way, he explains the other acts of ritual worship 
(‘Ibādat) and what they represent.  
It could be concluded that his philosophical approach was established on Tawhīd as a 
main pillar, that articulates his political theory, as well as human experiences based on 
the values of Tawhīd, but put into practice. On the other hand, human values that do not 
contradict the values of Islam, such as justice, equality, and freedom, are regarded by 
Turabi as important pillars of the practical steps towards Tawhīd. In other words, a 
democratic process in all aspects of life, with Shura as a means of political participation 
and a decision-making process, which in public life is regarded as interpretation of 
Tawhīd into practical actions. Moreover, his practical experience over different periods 
of time, and more specifically after 1989, matured his theories and made them more 
realistic. Despite all this, Turabi failed to introduce a practical project and to develop 
comprehensive mechanisms that can turn these values from abstract theories into 
practical projects that were applicable, sustainable, and able to be checked; this is one of 
the weaknesses of his project. 
 
1.1 Knowledge 
For Turabi, knowledge should only be used for the sake of God; it should serve the 
objectives of Islam and guide people to Tawhīd through a renewal of jurisprudence 
(Tajdīd al-Fiqh). He discussed this issue in his book, Tajdīd Usūl al-Fiqh al-Islami, in 
the 1980s, and Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islami (1978). However, Turabi (1978) explains that 
knowledge was expanded and influenced all aspects of life. Accordingly, he calls for 
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renewal (Tajdīd), and revision of the fundamentals of jurisprudence (Usūl al-Fiqh), as 
well as the methodology used to establish fiqh. On this point, he asserts that: 
“human knowledge has expanded greatly: while the old fiqh was based on the 
knowledge that was restricted by the limitation of the nature and the facts of its 
historical context, it becomes imperative for us to adopt a new position of the 
new fiqh of Islam so that we can utilise all knowledge for the sake of 
worshipping God; this is a new construction which unites what exists in the 
transmitted traditions disciplines which are received, written or verbal, that 
means Qur’an or Sunnah [the revelation, and it is eternal], with the rational 
sciences, which are renewed every day, and which are completed by experiment 
and observation. With that achieved and unified knowledge, we can renew our 
fiqh for faith and what challenges it time after time in our contemporary life” 
(Turabi, 1978, p.69). 
However, it could be argued that this text explains the reasons for renewal (Tajdīd), and 
part of the principles of his Tawhīdi theory in the knowledge dimension, as he calls for 
utilising knowledge to serve the objectives of Tawhīd. On the other hand, he argues that: 
“these new changes need a new type of legal thinking, supplemented by the 
findings of the social sciences and the philosophy of sciences. New fiqh should 
concentrate on social rather than individual issues” (Elhacmi, 1998, p.36). 
As mentioned in this chapter, he criticises the focus on individual issues, which have 
dominated for a long time, and tries to push for public issues using all human 
knowledge.  
However, knowledge is another dimension of Tawhīd introduced by most scholars. 
Turabi (2009) believes that knowledge should not be monopolised by what he called 
religious ‘Ulama’ – moreover, he disagrees with the term. Rather, he believes that 
knowledge should be available and easily accessible to everyone, where they should 
share this knowledge with others, and no authority should limit or monopolise 
knowledge. In other words, a monopoly over knowledge means a monopoly over 
power, which leads to people’s oppression. He argues that: 
“[t]he traditionalists who wanted to restrict new interpretations by demanding 
stringent qualifications for anyone deemed fit to pronounce independent opinion 
on religious matters, espouse safeguards and precautions that now conflict with 
the needs of Muslim society. They thus tend to divide Muslim society into a 
majority that was excluded from thinking about religion, and a clique, which 
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monopolised religious secrets. Timid modernisers, on the other hand, are still 
intimidated by ready accusations of heresy in presenting their new ideas, while 
all the time looking in ancient books for ideas that may remotely resemble 
theirs” (Elhacmi, 1998, p.37). 
The relationship of power, knowledge, and freedom of people, with Tawhīd may be 
clearly noted from all these arguments. These elements lead directly to participation in 
public decision making and formulating legislation, which means that the Shura 
(democratic) process is compulsory at each step, ensuring there is no monopoly over 
power.  
Moreover, Turabi broadens the concept of Ulama to include experts in all fields, as 
discussed in the interview with the researcher. Esposito affirms this point, stating: 
“Turabi’s concept of the new Ulama, including experts in all fields become 
essential. Economists and physicists and others are crucial in this process of 
creating a new and comprehensive fiqh” (Esposito & Voll, 2001, p.130). 
Hence, including experts from all fields of knowledge means that every individual 
specialist and expert in society has a religious role to play in his field, and participates 
in decision making and public life. Moreover, Turabi believes in experts’ role as 
scholars, whose knowledge is integrated with that of others, thus sharing out 
responsibility among more individuals in society and, hence, limiting the power held by 
any one group in society. Turabi asserted several times that “religion requires that we 
should use our minds and common sense to the best of our ability.” He also championed 
freedom of thought and affirmed that “freedom of belief is a fundamental right in the 
Qur’an.” Turabi’s aim is to create a: 
“comprehensive programme based on indivisibility of human life … that life 
should be treated as a whole, rather than fragments; politics, economics, arts and 
literature, humanities and so on” (Elhacmi, 1998). 
Human life is one unit and should be treated as one unit, this is Tawhīdi vision that 
interprets the political theory of Turabi that rejects the isolation of public life from the 
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religion. In this sense, it could be said that thought is an act of worship, and is 
obligatory upon every individual. 
Human science itself has developed, where rational science is broader today than in the 
past. Therefore, when scholars (Ulama) seek to solve the problems of current times, the 
methods they use need to be developed to accommodate new issues, and new scientific 
methods. For this reason, Turabi (2003) believes that it is obligatory for us to utilise all 
knowledge to worship Allah and set a new method that unifies rational knowledge 
(‘Ulūm al-‘Aql), and divine knowledge (‘Ulūm al-Naql) or Qur’an and Sunnah. Indeed, 
rational knowledge is renewed and innovated every day, with integration between 
experiment and observation. With this unified knowledge, rational and divine, we may 
renew our fiqh and understanding of religion, and meet the changing needs of 
temporary or worldly life. Therefore, we need Tajdīd, and: 
“[T]o achieve the require Tajdīd, Turabi suggested the necessity of Tajdīd, that is 
renewal of the faith in order to achieve the required harmony between ‘the 
eternal revelation’ and changing reality. At another level, renewal is necessitated 
by the dominance of Western civilisation and the challenges it poses to Muslim 
life and societies” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.188). 
Tajdīd is important to achieve the objectives of religion and preserve its basic 
principles, mainly Tawhīd as explained above. Moreover, Turabi believes that practising 
Tajdīd is a role for the whole community, not only a designated group of Ulama; he 
argues that: 
“it is the responsibility of the community as a whole, and should be undertaken 
in our time by a movement or a large group, since it has become a very complex 
task, which cannot be undertaken by individuals” (Elhacmi, 1998, p.173).  
Tawhīd of scientific life is important, Shari‘a and natural science are separate today. 
This separation referred to the historical conflict between science and church; 
accordingly, science was isolated from religion. According to Turabi, Muslims had 
earlier united all science. He explains that, lately, Muslims have separated the Shari‘a 
from the natural sciences, and have built universities and colleges for each. He confirms 
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that the scientific renaissance could not be implemented unless the values of faith were 
mobilised behind it. Furthermore, science should reach everybody, and should be 
harnessed to achieve justice and benefits for the people, and not for evil objectives 
(Turabi, 1995, p.13). 
In conclusion, it is my contention that knowledge should only be sought for the sake of 
understating/knowing reality. Now, since according to believers God is the ultimate 
reality, a search for reality would inevitably take us to God. An impartial, objective 
search for reality should lead us to all aspects of reality. Whereas a search for ‘God’ 
does not necessarily shed fruitful light on reality since people may create their own 
conception of God and just explore those man-made conceptions. However, Turabi 
believes that knowledge should only be used for the sake of God; it should serve the 
objectives of Islam and guide people to Tawhīd. Science should serve all people, and 
knowledge should be accessible to everyone, because a monopoly on knowledge leads 
to a monopoly on power. Rational and divine knowledge should be unified, we must 
renew our fiqh and understanding of religion to meet the changing needs of temporary 
or worldly life. The responsibility for Tajdīd lies with the community and not the 
specific individuals, which requires practising Shura, where participation in decision 
making is obligatory upon the community.  
 
1.2 Tawhīd and Religion 
The term ‘religion’ (Dīn) is used in different conceptions; Turabi discussed the term 
‘Dīn’ or religion, and its usage in the Qur'an. He found that its first use was to describe 
man’s submission, given he is a free entity in existence, and subsequently organises his 
relations with all existence. Turabi explained that religion is a vision and position for the 
believers with respect to existence, and also as a guide to knowing God, the Absolute, 
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while recognising the existence of the other creatures. In this context, the meaning of 
religion in Islam is submission to the Oneness of God, where nothing stands in life 
except His Decrees, and there is no rule except his Shari‘a. The second explanation is 
that religion (Dīn) describes the relation between the slave (human-being) and his Lord 
(Allah); therefore, it is the message that has been sent by God to the people. Hence, 
humans should act according to this message (which explains both the seen and unseen 
worlds), and is an ideal and complete religion, as explained by Turabi. In this case, the 
term ‘religion’ (Dīn) is used in the Qur’an as an absolute to express integrality. 
Furthermore, it is connected to the position freely adopted by human beings, with 
respect to their relation with God (Allah); this is stated in the Qur’an: 
“If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it 
be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who 
have lost (all spiritual good)” Qur’an (3:85). 
Turabi demonstrated that, for the term ‘religion’ (Dīn), the above three usages are in 
agreement, and emphasise that religion is Tawhīd. He explained the use of the term 
‘Yawm al-Dīn’ or the Day of Judgment, when each individual receives his reward, either 
heaven or hellfire, and will be happy or sad in the Afterlife, based on his effort in this 
worldly life. He explains this as unifying the worldly life and the Afterlife, because the 
individual continues life, as existence is continuous (Turabi, 1987, p.111). However, the 
term ‘religion’ (Dīn) itself is also used to distinguish the religious from the worldly, i.e. 
in the Arabic, Dīn versus Dunya. This usage may appear to be in contradiction to the 
notion of unity of Muslim life; yet, if this were to happen, e.g. isolating any aspect of 
life from religious practice such as economics or politics, it would represent ‘Shirk’ or 
associating partners with Allah in worship, as Turabi explains. Indeed, this is the case in 
the European context, based on their historical experience with religion; they separated 
religion from political life, in a descriptive phrase, “Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and 
to God what is God's” (Turabi, 1987, pp.114-117). This means that they isolated the 
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Church (religion) from all aspects of life, and restricted its role to personal spiritual 
issues only. Some Muslims today believe in this isolation for the religion from public 
life, and this one of the diseases that afflicted religions.  
Turabi (2003) also criticised the socialist approach, which considered religion as 
stagnant and, in their view, incapable of keeping up with the evolving human condition, 
and contrasting with a dynamic existence. These views may have been prompted by 
some religious views, which considered the existence as static and unchanging. 
However, the Tawhīdi approach believes that: 
“religion is both static and dynamic, because it connects the changing reality 
with the infinite permanent guidance. Therefore, the terms faith (Īman) and 
Islam (submission) are unified, as they concentrated on the outward and inward 
regarding religion” (Turabi, 1987, p.117). 
Turabi (2000) in his book, Nazara fī al-Fiqh al-Siyasi (View into Political Jurisprudence 
– originally a lecture presented in 1981 in Doha), asserted “that the obvious creed of 
religion, Islam, is Tawhīd.” He explained how it unifies existence, and criticised the 
vision of some Muslims, who think of religion, only as a list of prohibitions, in that 
some people understand religion as limits and constraints, not as motives and 
objectives. If we evaluate his ideas during this period, I may agree to some extent with 
Esposito, when he confirms that Turabi was constant in his views. Moreover, I would 
argue that the book he wrote after the 1990s and 2000s is very detailed compared to 
most of his previous books. Previously, he focused on rituals and faith, but nowadays he 
concentres more on issues of public life.  
Furthermore, Turabi accommodates Qur’anic exegesis and context, in dealing with 
issues of politics and government, exploring legislative matters and the branches of law, 
shedding light on issues relating to society, culture and arts, in his understanding of the 
Arabic language. This is another aspect of the relationship between Turabi and the 
Qur’an, as revealed in his unique and innovative language and writings (Turabi, 2004, 
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p.9). Indeed, he applied Shura, even in Qur’an exegesis (Tafsīr), as explained by 
Abdelsalam in the introduction to Turabi’s book, al-Tafsīr al-Tawhīdi: 
“the method of the Qur’an Tafsīr, verses and issues and objectives, he adopted 
Shura as a way and means … as he used to call for Shura in his revival Tawhīdi 
theory” (Turabi, 2004, p.10). 
However, Shura is a significant element in Turabi’s political thought, Shura should be 
applied at all levels of life; on the personal level, such as on family issues, decisions 
inside the family should be taken through Shura or true consultation, including all 
members of the family, and at the public level, such as issues of government and 
administering public institutions. Adopting Shura to the personal level in family issues 
educates people and develops their skills and ability to participate in public life. 
Abdelsalam in the introduction of al-Tafsīr al-Tawhīdi explains the Tawhīdi method of 
Turabi in interpreting the Qur’an, and connecting it to all aspects of Muslim life: 
“One of the greatest motivators and reasons for the scholar of exegesis (Mufasir) 
to add a new book of Quranic exegesis (Tafsīr) to the many existing tomes, is 
the demand of his disciples, and protagonists, whom he meets with their diverse 
doctrines within Islam, or varied sects outside of it, of their need for a new 
reading of the Quran that helps them attain an understanding that unites its 
chapters (Surahs) and verses (Ayaat) given their differences and branching 
topics, which connects all that to their modern lives and close knit and populous 
contemporary societies, with their advanced and multiple sciences. The believer 
links the abundant and disparate diversities of existence in the book of the 
universe, and unifies their verses in worship of Allah; he must unify the various 
verses (Ayat) in the revealed Book, and link them in an act of worship of Allah, 
as these are all from Allah, the One, the Unique” (Turabi, 2004, p.11). 
This method explains his methodology and theory, and how it was reflected in the 
approach to life. 
“Consultation (Shura) in the Tawhīdi theory of exegesis expands with the 
human, from the small setting of a family that manages its affairs through 
consultation, mutual agreement, and preparation of an individual, who is good 
for society and state, established on the authority of the nation (Ummah), its 
consensus (Ijma‘), and consultation (Shura), in contract, choice, and election 
with liberty and justice” (Turabi, 2004, p.10). 
However, in his book, ‘Shura and democracy’, he agrees that Shura and democracy are 
compatible in their values of consultation, participation in decision making, and the 
 316 
accountability of the ruler. Shura is an important element in Turabi’s political theory and 
practice as explained in using this method in the Qur’an tafseer, and in any decision he 
made even to the family level.  
 
1.3 Language 
Turabi has great interest in language; he believes that it is the vehicle by which 
everybody introduces their ideas, and that “no civilisation could be built without 
language.” This statement was discussed in the interview with the researcher in 
Khartoum on 26 December 2010. Moreover, he confirms that “the decline of language 
leads to decline in all fields.”. For this reason, he uses all the power in the language to 
express his views. Indeed, he “uses the language of the Qur’an to interpret the Qur’an 
itself” (Turabi, 2004, p.16). He refers to the roots of the words to both understand and 
explain their exact meaning in their original context and time, and then express this 
meaning in today’s language. Moreover, he is concerned with the history of the 
language and the development of terminology, in how it deviates from its original 
meaning, how it could be loaded with new meanings during its development in specific 
social and historical contexts, and how new terminology emerges in each period of time 
according to the prevailing social, economic and political climate. He considers 
language to be like a living being, which is revived by the renascence of the Muslim 
nation (Umma). However, some terms die, while others emerge, and some terms that 
were wide become narrow and vice versa. In effect, conceptions may move from the 
general to the specific and from the specific to the general; this happens according to the 
socioeconomic and political environment. So this problem needs to be solved through a 
clear method of interpretation; this is what Turabi tries to do. 
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In addition, Turabi creates his own terms to express himself extensively. Ghannouchi in 
an interview with al-Jazeera TV on 24 June 2003 confirms this: 
“He always has his own language when he talks to people, but when he wrote 
this book (al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm) he wrote it in prison; he was isolated. So he 
found a chance to care about the language … he was carving the stones.” 
Nevertheless, he defines the concepts he uses. In an interview with the University of 
Pennsylvania, African Study Center in November 1994 Turabi criticises the 
misinterpretation of the term ‘Jihad’. He stated that: 
“Jihad does not mean ‘holy war’ The word ‘holy’ does not appear in the word, 
nor does ‘war’. Jihad means literally ‘effort for effort’. If the other commits an 
effort against you, you have to respond with an effort. It means also dialogue, by 
the way. If the effort is an argument, respond by another argument. If it is by 
aggression or force, respond; don't turn the other cheek. Of course, you can turn 
the other cheek if it is only personal, you can forgive. But if it is an effort to 
destroy Islam altogether, to undermine it, respond by force. Literally, it means 
this. It's comprehensive; it doesn't mean fighting only.”  
This misinterpretation of the terms causes misunderstanding and conflict between the 
people in different places. However, Turabi criticised the misinterpretation and 
definition of the term in the West. Moreover, he criticised the way of writing it in capital 
letters and in italic: 
“But now the word is popular; it has been spread in the West in Arabic letters; 
it's a ‘foreign’ word; they write it big, J-I-H-A-D, instead of translating it. And it 
means now the new revival from below, from society, sometimes it turns against 
the use of force by government. Some governments are not democratic; they 
won't allow freedom of expression, freedom of organisation, representation of 
the popular social will. I don't think the word ‘Jihad’ would have become so 
popular otherwise” (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010). 
As a result of this confusion, he calls for the clear definition of concepts used by media 
and scholars, and will not allow deviation from the true meaning. For these reasons, in 
2000, he published a book, al-Mustalahāt al-Siyasiyyah (Political Terminology), 
defining the political terminology of Islam. In the book, he defines the important terms, 
and explains the historical development of each; for example, public life, politics, rule 
or government, sovereignty, kingship, state, Ummah, people, politics and religion, 
freedom, privacy and principle duties, Shari'a and the fundamental principles of 
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government, fiqh, political parties, Shura, Ijma‘, customs and public opinion, covenant 
and social contract, reform and public issues. Al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2001), Professor 
of Political Science at the University of Khartoum, stated that “if Turabi did not write 
anything except this book it will be sufficient for him.” This means that it is an 
important book, which contributed significantly to establishing scientific definition in 
the Islamic political field, where it is important to justify the language and terms used. 
 
Section 2. Turabi’s Methodology 
Turabi introduced his methodology in the book, al-Īman wa Atharahu fī Hayat al-Insan 
(Religious Belief, its effect on the life of Man), first published in 1974, and his 
methodology of renewal (Tajdīd) in his book, Tajdīd Usūl al-Fiqh (1980). Recently, he 
introduced his methodology of Tawhīdi theory, in two books: al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm 
(2003) and al-Tafsīr al-Tawhīdi (2004). He started writing al-Tafsīr al-Tawhīdi in the 
mid-1990s, publishing two volumes while still working on the rest. The theme of unity 
of Muslim life features in Turabi’s books mentioned above. El-Affendi (1991, p.168) 
believes that: 
“It is an even more determined effort to push the point that believer, qua 
believer, is equipped on balance to be better than anybody else, in every 
conceivable field; significantly, the arguments refer to the worldly benefits to the 
worldly belief.” 
In order to understand how Turabi’s theory is a Tawhīdi theory, it is important to 
approach former philosophers’ responses and classification of the Islamic beliefs. El-
Affendi classified these responses into three categories: 
“the approach of theologians and philosophers who tried to defend Islamic 
beliefs against the challenge from heretics and followers of other religions; the 
approach of jurists who had a distance for the elaborations of theologians and 
were content to define the limits of belief and non-belief; and the approach of 
Sufis who were concern with the living reality of belief, beyond the forms of 
logic and the terms of jurisprudence, and tried to show how religious belief 
could be promoted and cultivated” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169). 
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Turabi’s approach is different than the three categories above, although he takes from all 
of them; the central point of his thought is what he calls Tawhīd (unification). When he 
defines the Islamic movement, he clearly rejects it being classified as Sufi, Salafi or any 
of the other classifications, but considers that it practically integrates all these trends, 
i.e. he is not rejectionist. Some criticised his stand and regarded it as opportunist, in 
wanting to keep concepts vague, while others claim that he calls for the unity of the 
Umma, and so does not recognise the divisions in the Umma, whether Sunni, Shi‘a, Sufi 
or other sects. I believe that he looks back to the Prophet’s time when there is no Sunni, 
Shi‘i or Sufi, so he calls for unification of Umma and rejects any kind of sectors which 
weaken the Umma. 
Turabi has made significant contributions in the development of the methodology of 
revival and renewal of Islamic fundamental jurisprudence (Usūl al-Fiqh), in revising the 
methodology of medieval scholars. He argues that they made important contributions, 
but criticises their contributions as limited by the conditions of their era and the 
historical context. He stated that “the issues of fundamental sources of fiqh were 
considered abstractly in the literature, so that they became sterile theoretical 
discussions, which produced absolutely no fiqh at all” (Turabi, 1978, p.68). Turabi 
presents what he sees as the most effective methods for renewal in different areas in the 
fiqh domain, the reformulations of the discipline of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the 
implementation of Shari‘a and how it was developed. He built on these experiences, and 
developed fiqh as is explained in this chapter. 
In his book, Usūl al-Fiqh al-Islami (1980), he critically evaluated fundamentals (Usūl) 
of fiqh, and called for developing new disciplines when he explained that “it becomes 
imperative for us to develop fundamental methodology (Manhaj Usūli) in thinking of 
the needs of the contemporary Islamic movement” (Turabi, 1978, p.68). It could be said 
that he is a pioneering contemporary revivalist, as he addresses this issue at this time.  
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Turabi contributed to the revival of fiqh in the last century, for the reasons mentioned in 
this chapter. He believes that both new and old methods should be adopted and 
developed. In order to explain this, it would be important to evaluate his statements and 
his methods of building his theory, and how he forms his views. However, Turabi 
studied human history generally, Muslim history specifically and then Sudanese history; 
he then reflects all these in his methodology, and so builds his theories over the lessons 
of nations. Yet, for further clarification of his method, he states that: 
“the Islamic movements reacted to the challenges in different ways. Some 
people do not prefer to adopt and restrict themselves to one method but they stay 
free to choose from all resources. That means to compare and choose what suits 
the situation with commitment to the broad doctrines of Islam. ... Some people 
adopted a broad method departing from the soul of Islam and the broad 
objective” (Turabi, 1978, p.70). 
Nevertheless, it is known that he prefers the adoption of broad methods that stand over 
the principles of Islam. In terms of specific methods, Esposito (2001, p.130) pointed out 
that: 
“Turabi argues for a thorough re-examination of fundamental sources of the 
Shari‘a. In this effort of reinterpretation Turabi proposes radical expansion of 
traditional methods of analysis. In the first centuries of Islam, it was recognised 
that the basic text did not deal with all of the specific situations which Muslims 
had to deal with. As a result one of the major developments in the study and 
definition of Islamic law was utilisation of ‘judicial reason by analogy’” (Qiyās). 
However, one may agree with Esposito’s analysis of Turabi’s statements that: 
“scholars developed many rules that narrowed the flexibility of specifically legal 
reasoning by analogy, and these became a part of the rigid structure that Turabi 
rejects. He proposes the replacement of the limited Qiyās by new, broad 
analogical analysis of the fundamental sources” (Esposito, 2001, p.131). 
He then quoted Sidahmed (1996, p.82), in that: 
“one area there Turabi outlines how this new approach would provide different 
perspectives is in the redefinition of the meaning of Shura (consultation) in the 
context of the modern world” (Esposito, 2001, p.131). 
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Turabi adopted another method, which is continuation of an established law (al-
Istishāb);80 he regards al-Istishāb as one of the broad methods in Usūl al-Fiqh. The 
objective of al-Istishāb could be explained in that when the religion was revealed, it did 
not establish a new life, but built on pre-existing values, accepting the relations built 
over these values; indeed, the religion came to redress the deviation away from these 
values. Therefore, when the Qur’an calls for ‘the promotion of virtue and prevention of 
vice’, this means that these values were previously known. Moreover, when it calls for 
justice, this means observing the values of justice was known to humans, and deeply 
ingrained in society’s consciousness; these were then connected by the Qur’an and 
corrected through the divine Shari‘a; the same could be said for conceptions of good 
and bad, the family system, and ceremonials (Turabi, 1987, p.84). He concluded that, if 
we join the fundamentals (Usūl) of al-Istishāb with the fundamentals of public interests 
(al-Masalih al-Mursalah), we will obtain broad fundamental fiqh principles or Usūl for 
public life – the broad jurisprudence of public life. In this case, many conditions should 
be observed when anyone wants to perform juristic reasoning (Ijtihād): he should start 
with the source text (Qur’an and Sunnah) using the principles guiding interpretation, 
followed by the methods of Masalih (interests) and al-Istishāb (Turabi, 1978, p.84). It 
should be noted that fiqh is a human activity, while Shari‘a is the divine revelation. On 
the other hand, Turabi (1978) argues that the Ijtihād or juristic reasoning is a 
complicated process; the Mujtahid (the person doing it) will be influenced by reality, 
interests, and fiqh culture taken from the former scholars; he should read the texts in 
their historical social context, determine the practical reality existing at the time, and 
explore the reasons, reactions and interests specifically related to public life.  
                                                 
80
 Part definition taken from: al Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1986), Toward Islamic English, Islamization of 
Knowledge Series No 3, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Virginia, USA. 
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One may agree with the conclusions of Moussalli (1994) that Turabi dissociates the 
correct religious intellectual method from theorisation or abstract thinking about God 
and the universe, and links it to the production of practical solutions. He even 
marginalises traditional Islamic jurisprudence considering that its practicability has been 
exhausted; practical configurations oppose religious ideals, and historical marginalia act 
as a buffer to people’s direct understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Accordingly, he 
postulates the need for a new and free theoretical origination of Usūl, from the Qur’an 
and Sunnah (Turabi, 1992, pp.8-70). 
Many scholars, such as Burr and Collins, Esposito, Moussalli, Tijani Abdalgadir, Mekki 
and el-Affendi, believe that he has courage to introduce new areas not addressed by the 
Ulama. However, as a revivalist, he opens the door for new issues to be discussed by 
Islamists all over the world; issues such as inter-religious dialogue to define common 
ground between Islam and Christianity and other religions and to defend the common 
values as believers, and organising activities for the purpose. “Turabi explained the 
conference was to introduce a dialogue (Hiwar) to close ‘the gap’ between Western and 
Arab Islamic civilisation” (Burr & Collins, 2003, p.164). In this statement, Turabi 
speaks about inter-religious dialogue in a conference (Hiwar al-Adyan) held in 
Khartoum in 1994. This conference was attended by different Muslim sects and 
Christian denominations. His approach was to reach out to everyone, as a human being, 
a Muslim, regardless of whether they are Sunni, Shi‘i, or any other.  
Turabi in his work is interested in any human intellectual effort and practical 
experiment, and the extent to which it should be taken into account and revised to 
achieve the most perfect example to suit the situation at any specific moment. Turabi 
aims to reach this point, to free thinkers from what is known as the ‘divine’. In this 
sense, Turabi explained what is divine and what is not. He considered the Qur’an text 
and the authentic Sunnah only, as divine texts; however, the interpretations of the 
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Qur’an by people are not divine, and could be reinterpreted, revised and re-examined, 
while fiqh is also not divine. This Ijtihād sets the people free from the previous 
interpretations. Moussalli asserts that: 
“Neither the phenomenon of Western intellectual power nor domination 
warrants, in al-Turabi’s opinion, a fundamental re-examination of any basic 
intellectual and structural Islamic framework” (Moussalli, 1994, p.52). 
However, he criticises those methods of Qur'anic interpretation that take individual 
words of the Qur'an and the verses, isolated from the surrounding words. He does not 
agree on this method of interpretation, and for him, interpretation should aim to reach 
the wisdom and comprehensive meaning of the verses connected to other verses, 
determine the significance of its location, how it is connected to the other words in the 
verse, how each verse is connected to the adjacent verses, and how it is connected to our 
life today. He believes that the: 
“methodology of the interpreters was influenced by Grecian Hellenic methods, 
which concentrate on the existence of specific things and their descriptions 
without concentrating on the general wisdom of incidents. This method brings 
the rules as details and on the branches; it never mentions its collective 
principles and its totality of wisdoms” (Turabi, 2004, p.19). 
This study provides Salah as an example; Turabi postulates that Salah in the traditional 
fiqh is explained by counting its pillars, the voluntary and obligatory acts, the 
discouraged and commended actions, etc., without a profound look to the branches of 
Īman expressed in the ritual’s words and actions, and the extent that it purifies the 
religious demeanour, and how it is reflected in all aspects of life. The same could be 
said of exegesis of the Qur’an; by concentrating on the words, the sentence and the 
verses, the interpreter treats it as though isolated from its context (Turabi, 2004, p.19). 
Therefore, interpretations of Qur’an are not divine in Turabi’s view. One may agree 
with Moussalli that “Islamic thought is viewed by al-Turabi as no more than the 
composite socio-economic, political and historical experience of human attempts to 
interpret the divine text, i.e. Qur’an” (Moussalli, January 1994, p.52). For him, Islamic 
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thought is an interaction between the Muslim’s intelligence and the eternal rules of 
religion. 
“It is the intellect that adapted with the rational knowledge and experience 
gained in each period of time, reacting to these situations with the guidance of 
the eternal guides (Qur’an) which has been explained by the Prophet (Sunnah)” 
(Turabi, 1978, p.9). 
It is known that any thought should be translated into actions; in particular, the 
religion’s obligations need to be practised, as religion is not an abstract, but should be 
practised in reality: 
“between the factors inside and outside the human being there is unity and 
interactions, the Īman intentions are not controlled by physical reality although 
influenced by it but not controlled by it as claimed by materialists” (Turabi, 
1978, p.156). 
According to the above arguments, the researcher may argue that Turabi adopted critical 
historical comparative methods for the analysis of the scholars’ output. On the other 
hand, he assumed the inability of those scholars to interpret the divine text in an eternal 
manner. This means that their interpretation is not divine or durable, but is for a specific 
period of time, addressing specific problems that belong to that historical moment. 
Agreeing with Moussalli in that: 
“Islamic thought cannot constitute categorical interpretive exposition of 
quintessential Islam. Qur’anic exegeses are, then, tentative and subject to 
review. But the Qur’anic text functions, on the one hand, as a unifying standard 
of Muslim consciousness” (Moussalli, January 1994, p.53). 
The above conclusions mean that Turabi calls for continuous revival, which should be 
done by the Ummah or the society that needs to solve its problems. If this revival or 
renewed interpretation of the divine text does not happen, and the Ummah relies on the 
interpretations inherited from earlier generations, then it is as if we raise human thought 
to be divine, and ignore the divine text (Qur’an). In Moussalli’s words: 
“for this separation between the divine text and the human thought made the 
latter function as an absolute substitute for the former. This position constitutes 
for al-Turabi a tahaddi Ishraki (polytheistic challenge), represented mainly by 
upgrading the materialistic and economic factors and by downgrading the role of 
God” (Moussalli, January1994, p.53).  
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He went further to set the minds free from past Ijtihād (interpretation of Islamic 
jurisprudence) that brought solutions specific to a previous period. He even regarded 
Ijma‘ (consensus) as time limited, i.e. it is bound by history and is not eternal, but could 
be superseded by a new Ijma‘ (Turabi interview, 26 December 2010). This could be 
explained in another way, in that the consensus (Ijma‘) of the Ummah in a specific 
period of time is not binding on subsequent generations, and so they can form their own 
Ijma‘, which is conditioned by their historical context. Turabi's call for continuous 
renewal and reform in the interpretation of the divine text, as any interpretation is time 
limited, is a very important issue. It frees each generation from the previous 
generations’ choices, and leads the new generation to build over the previous 
generations’ experiments and to take the wisdom from them.  
 
2.1 Revolution and Change 
People today have started to ask scholars about the best ways to govern society, and 
address administrative and economic issues, as well as other aspects of life. These 
questions were raised regarding issues of public life: how is it organised, and what is the 
guidance for individual behaviour in society. Turabi explains that: 
“Islamists were faced by these questions, but were not qualified to answer these 
questions, because traditional fiqh does not cover these issues, which were not 
part of its concern. Moreover, life itself, including social life, has changed and 
developed, such that the rules of a past time are not appropriate to solve today’s 
problems” (Turabi, 1978, p.69). 
However, Turabi advocates gradual change, as revolutionary change may cause anarchy, 
and the change may not come as it should, unless it is gradual (Turabi interview, 26 
December 2010). Paradoxically, this point contradicts his adoption of a military coup as 
a tool of change. However, the Ijtihād is not a role for the elites only, but all society, 
where every individual has his share in performing Ijtihād and rendering advice. 
Therefore, Turabi objects to the role of religious institutions, such as a ‘church’, ‘Fatwa 
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councils’ or any other institution, which restrict issuing Fatwa to a specific group of 
people. For him, this will inhibit creativity and limit intellectual output. However, he 
agrees on the need for revolutionary work in fiqh, calling for radical changes. Moussalli 
quoted Turabi (1992):  
“while traditional jurisprudence took a negative attitude towards radical reform 
and revolution, al-Turabi advocates unlimited political action in the pursuit of an 
Islamic state; for radicalism might be a necessity to break down resistance to 
reform and to uproot practical and theoretical indolence. And insofar as 
revolution seeks to eliminate backward and past residues, it must 
comprehensively strike a total political and theoretical renaissance” (Moussalli, 
1994, p.55). 
He believes in experiment as a method of developing the practical approach of his 
theory, standing over the broad values that are agreed upon, then to put it into practice, 
to elaborate it, and attract people into believing in it. He adopted practice and 
experiment to develop the practical and theoretical framework of his theory. Although 
this method is expensive in time and resources, he still believes in the theory of 
empowering society in developing the experiment itself. These methods explained how 
Islamists adopted democracy in the movement institutions. Turabi asserted that: 
“one can thus say that democracy was a natural inclination within the Sudanese 
Islamic movement, which was only later given a theoretical grounding, 
becoming a conscious commitment to the religious obligation among the widest 
possible number to achieve consensus and then abide by this consensus” 
(Turabi, 2009, p.109). 
In this case, he used the values of Sudanese society, which he then converted through 
the institutions of the movement. These values included consultation in traditional 
social institutions (tribes), and the Bedouin lifestyle. Turabi (2009) confirms that: 
“democracy was never a matter of dispute within the Sudanese Islamic 
movement ... they were also the product of the Sudanese environment, with its 
traditions of freedom, conventions of nomad and rural life and the absence of the 
tradition of strong central authority ... The values of freedom and democracy 
remain intrusive aspects of Sudanese public life” (Turabi, 2009, p.107). 
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For him, this is evidence of the gradual change, which was established over the values 
of the society and religion. Turabi remains opposed to revolutionary changes in the 
political system in Sudan, as expressed in the interview with the researcher.  
It is noticeable that he uses the term ‘democracy’ instead of ‘Shura’ in these statements 
without limiting conditions. His democratic model was established over religious values 
and society’s values. These values should not contradict each other, and it is important 
to build institutions through which these values can be applied. These institutions 
should be at the national level. 
 
Section 3. Tawhīd in Turabi’s Theory  
As explained above, the concept of Tawhīd is a central comprehensive concept in 
Turabi’s thought. Turabi believes that all human life is unified in worshipping Allah, the 
One; all the phenomena in the world, or whatever attracts us, are only signs, evidence, 
or lessons from Allah; indeed, all its enjoyment is only a means towards worshipping 
God (Turabi, 1987, p.86). He refers his interpretation to these verses of the Qur’an; 
“Say (O Muhammad): "Verily, my Salah (prayer), my sacrifice, my living, and 
my dying are for Allah, the Lord of the ‘Âlamîn (mankind, jinn and all that 
exists), He has no partner. And of this I have been commanded, and I am the first 
of the Muslims" (Qur’an 6; 162-163). 
This means that every single action in the life of a human being is linked to God, as 
explained in the previous chapters about politics, international relations, economics, 
social life, personal life, art, music, life and death. In other words, “the whole life is a 
theatre of expression of religious belief, and therefore the discussion of belief is a 
discussion of the totality of the human life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169). He tries to purify 
the human creeds from any kind of polytheism (Shirk). He believes that Shirk is one of 
the tests or challenges (Ibtilā’) facing Islam today. However, all aspects of life are 
challenged by Shirk, in the areas of economic, social, political, and even personal 
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beliefs, and in this point the role of Tawhīd in political thought appears as a significant 
element specifically in Turabi’s thought. The research focuses on this phenomenon in 
public life.  
When Turabi interpreted the Qur’an, he explained the phenomenon that leads other 
nations to Shirk, whether economic, political or in creed. He does not fully agree with 
Qutb and Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi on their description of disbelief (Kufr) reigning in 
the societies that isolated religion from public life. They describe it as a disbelieving 
society using the term, Mujtama‘ Jahili (ignorant society). In this case, Turabi believes 
that such a society is not disbelieving (Kāfir), but polytheistic (Mushrik), because they 
still believe in Allah as a God and Mohammed as a prophet, but did not apply religion to 
all aspects of life. However, this view shows that Tawhīd interprets the action of the 
Muslim: when he rejects the religious views in the politics domain he is counted as a 
Mushrik not a Kafir. This point explains the role of Tawhīd in Turabi’s political thinking 
and clearly describes the relationship between Tawhīd and public domain in Turabi’s 
political theory. 
We may agree with the ideas put forward by Moussalli in this part of his analysis, 
providing us with a simplified version of the divine governance (Hākimiyyah) denuded 
from historical or theoretical precedents. Turabi loads individual conducts with creedal 
connotations and equates misbehaviour with creedal polytheism, as happened with the 
people of Ibrahim when they worshipped the idols, and Ibrahim called them to worship 
God (Allah). Thus, Pharaoh becomes a model for political and economic polytheism 
(Shirk), and so God sent Moses to call them to worship God (Allah). He provided other 
examples of Shirk in history (Turabi, 1978, p.12). Other similar phenomena in history 
were mentioned by Turabi to prove the call to Tawhīd by all religions, and that each 
prophet concentrated on the Ibtilā’ (challenges) that faced his nation; for example, 
Prophet Shu‘ayb’s challenge was an economic one. Moussalli asserted that: 
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“his [Turabi] textual analysis of his topical figures and event replaces all 
preceding interpretations of Islam, or what Turabi thinks of as the first 
characteristic for failure of Islamic thought” (Moussalli, 1994, p.53). 
However, Turabi illustrates that the Islamic doctrine of Tawhīd is the creedal basis that 
determines its religious nature. In elaborating this, he affirms that: 
“public life in Islam is religious, being permitted by experience of the divine. Its 
function is to pursue the service of God as expressed in the concrete way in 
Shari‘a” (Turabi, 1983, p.242). 
Yet, it is clear that Turabi tried to institutionalise the concept of Tawhīd in the state 
institutions and, when he articulated the political goals of the government in state: 
“those in service in the state and public life shall envisage the dedication thereof 
for the worship of God, wherein Muslims stick to the scripture and tradition, and 
all shall maintain religious motivation and give due regard to such spirit in 
plans, law, politics and official business in the political, economic, social, and 
cultural fields in order to prompt public life towards its objectives, and adjust 
them towards justice and up-rightness to be directed towards the grace of God in 
the Hereafter” (NIF Charter, 1987, part 1, p.18). 
In conclusion, the concept of Tawhīd as explained above is as adopted by Turabi. 
However, it is clear that he added further explanation to the concepts of Tawhīd and 
Shirk; he regarded isolating the religion from any aspect of life as Shirk. His focus is on 
public life and practising Shura (democracy), and so cites Pharaoh as an example of 
political Shirk. This is an important part of Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory, which explains that 
all aspects of life should be united. It proposes that, for this reason, Allah sent prophets 
to redirect people to Tawhīd. Turabi connects the practising of Shura (democracy) as an 
obligatory action related directly to the highest value of belief (Tawhīd); this will be 
explained in the next section. As a final point, the Tawhīdi theory is a theory that 
explains the life as one unit, the religion plays a comprehensive role in all aspects of 
life, social, economic, politics etc.; any one of these aspects should not be isolated from 
religion doctrine. Each of these aspects is a kind of worship to God by practising His 
obligations. According to this understanding, isolating the religion from any one of 
these aspects of life will be counted as Shirk.  
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Section 4. Turabi’s Democratic Model 
One of the important chapters of Turabi’s revolutionary reform work is on the fiqh of 
state, built over the values of Tawhīd and Shura (democratic participation). Turabi 
connects individual freedom directly to Tawhīd, as explained above; this freedom 
cannot be achieved except through democratic participation (Shura) in decision making. 
This democratic participation sets the individual free from the oppression of a specific 
group using political, economic, and social powers and, when one is free, he submits to 
God (Allah). 
For Turabi, all the religion is about confidence in human beings; it gives them freedom, 
and liberates them from nature, society and government, to be devoted exclusively to 
God, Almighty. This is the essence of religion, which must be present in jurisprudence, 
and in organising the family, Islamic groups and state. 
“Consultation (Shura) in the Tawhīdi theory of exegesis expands with the 
human, from the small setting of a family that manages its affairs through 
consultation, mutual agreement, and preparation of an individual, who is good 
for society and state, established on the authority of the nation (Ummah), its 
consensus (Ijma‘), and consultation (Shura), in contract, choice, and election 
with liberty and justice” (Turabi, 2004, p.10).  
Turabi’s book, al-Ahkām al-Shar‘iyyah, establishes the values of ‘Shura’, and ‘advice’, 
and not enslaving people. The other important book is al-Ahkām al-Sultaniyyah (2003), 
which explains in-depth the relationship between the democratic model and the freedom 
of human beings, and Tawhīd. This prevents rulers from being like gods over others 
through legislative and directive rights over them, as a result of the servitude of those 
who accord these gods the aspects of divinity. Each of these factors influences the other; 
in other words, if the people apply real Tawhīd in their life, then they will practise their 
rights to perform checks and balances in the state institutions through a Shura system 
(democracy). It could be concluded Shura (consultation) is a significant element in 
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Turabi’s democratic model when he connected it directly to the higher values such as 
Tawhīd. Though one of the weaknesses of the theory, it did not propose how these 
checks and balances could be applied and implemented in the practical level.  
Moreover, Turabi agrees on applying the mechanisms developed by the people 
throughout history as mechanisms of applying Shura and governing the people through 
their real participation in public issues related to the state and their daily life. Turabi in 
discussing the mechanism of democracy asserted that “any human evolution or 
experiment belongs to all human beings and should be shared by them” (Turabi 
interview, 24 July 2007). Turabi declared this point clearly, while it is disputable for 
other Islamists, such as Jordanian Islamists, and this is one of the strengths of Turabi’s 
political theory. However, this model, established on freedom and political participation 
with its philosophical base, is connected to the higher religious value of Tawhīd. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, mechanisms developed by people through history, such as 
parliaments or any other method, should be used to apply Shura.  
 
4.1 Turabi’s Democratic Model, Tawhīd and Freedom 
Freedom is an important element in Islam, because it affects the creed of the individual, 
and is connected to the concept of Tawhīd. In Turabi’s understanding of the freedom of 
the individual, and how it is connected to Tawhīd, he regards freedom of the individual 
as the way towards achieving Tawhīd. He asserted that: 
“freedom then, is means and a fruit of worship of the God, the absolute freedom 
requires a total human submission to Tawhīd (in practice of religion) and 
freedom from enslavement to any other kind of Shirk (human, materialist, 
political, economic) … that means he seeks refuge to the eternal God who never 
dies (Turabi, 1978, p.12). 
I may agree with the conclusion of Esposito’s study: 
“the freedom of individual ultimately emanates the doctrine of Tawhīd which 
requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God 
 332 
exclusively. Society, and particularly those in powers, is inspired by the same 
principle and the collective endeavour is not one hampering the liberty of an 
individual but of cooperation toward the maximum achievement of this ideal. To 
promote this cooperation the freedom of one individual is related to that of a 
general group. The ultimate common aim of the religious life unites the private 
and the social perhaps; and the Shari‘a provides an arbiter between social order 
and individual freedom” (Esposito, 1983, p.247). 
In an article the ‘Principles of Governance, Freedom, and Responsibility in Islam’, 
published in ‘The American Journal of Islamic Sciences’, Turabi used the concept of 
Tawhīd as the core foundation to articulate his theory of liberation or freedom in Islam, 
which represents a fundamental part of his Tawhīdi theory which bonds all these parts 
together. According to Turabi: 
“human submission to divine Tawhīd makes freedom meaningful and paves the 
way for individuals to liberate themselves from enslavement to others. Without 
Tawhīd, humankind has no superior doctrine to liberate it, since human 
liberating philosophy serves to free people from one ideology only to have them 
enslaved by another” (Turabi, 1987, pp.1-11). 
Tawhīd liberates the individual from the power of fear, so their choice is freed, and the 
practice of Shura (consultation) will bring genuine opinions on public issues related to 
the rule and this will strengthen and develop the state; these are some of the elements of 
his democratic model. In the following statement, Turabi explains that the relationship 
between Man and God is established on being free from any worldly power.  
“Islam establishes all life relationships on freedom and choice … the highest 
relation is the relation between the slave (Man) and his God; the will to believe 
or not is a choice, it is not fixed by God” (Turabi, 2003, p.183). 
This means that Allah did not create people like any other creature that worships him by 
nature, but He gave the individual the choice; on this base Turabi established his 
political theory. Turabi believes that: 
“the freedom of the individual ultimately emanates from the doctrine of Tawhīd, 
which requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to 
serve God exclusively” (Turabi, 1983; 2009, p.60). 
However, he explains that, where society, and those in power, are both inspired by the 
same principle, the collective enterprise is not one of obstructing the liberty of the 
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individual, but of collaboration towards the maximum achievement of this ideal. It 
could be said that freedom or liberation of the human being is a fundamental principle 
in Turabi’s democratic model, which emanates directly from Tawhīd practice; this point 
is explained more in the next part of this chapter. 
 
4.2 Political Participation, ‘Shura’ and Tawhīd  
According to the above statements, it is clear that the freedom of the individual is a core 
foundation of Tawhīd. Accordingly, if the freedom of choice is practised in the highest 
relation between the individual and his God, then it should be practised at the other 
levels of human life, such as choosing the ruler, husband and other family issues and 
public affairs. Hence, it is one system that should work on the same rule. Indeed, 
political participation, and practising Shura is obligatory upon believers, but all these 
practices are founded on freedom, which is related directly to Tawhīd. According to 
these arguments, the efficiency of any part depends on and affects the other parts; so all 
parts should work together as one unit, with checks and balances on their role. 
However, Turabi agrees that, in Muslim society, the unity of the society is established 
over what he calls ‘preventive’ and congregational methods in decision-making 
procedures, which guarantees that the different opinions in fiqh, regardless of what 
happens, never lead to practical separation or division at the end (Turabi, 1978, p.70). 
Shura (democracy) and political participation, if practised, means no monopoly of 
power and wealth, and individuals are free to exercise their freedom; this ultimately 
springs from the doctrine of Tawhīd, which requires self-liberation of one from any 
worldly authority, in order to serve God exclusively. In other words, and according to 
Turabi’s arguments, if the individual is free and not oppressed by any power, he will 
express his views without fear. This means real Shura (consultation) is practised and 
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strong different opinions result. Such a process leads to self-satisfaction and different 
choices, where, in the end, the society will choose the most agreeable one, i.e. 
consensus can be reached by this society. Had this ideal theory been applied in Sudan, 
the country may never have witnessed the crisis of wealth and power sharing in the east, 
west and north. The gap between the theory and practice is noticeable in the experiment 
of Islamists in Sudan. The idealistic approach is one of the weaknesses of the theory as 
it should consider the human conflicts and antagonism and ambitions.  
In summing up this part, it could be said that Muslims testified that there is no god other 
than Allah (God): this means that God is the exclusive possessor of divinity; the first 
characteristic of divinity is absolute rule. This rule is revealed through the prescribed 
values that represent the basis of the believer’s practical life; how to rule themselves, 
and how to practise Shura as the method decreed by Allah to legislate their affairs 
according to His Commands. Moreover, no-one has the right to legislate in addition to 
God: “They have taken them as lords”. In this case, they have ignored God's command 
concerning Tawhīd, and attributed partners to Him. This process would not be done 
unless all the Ummah participates in decision making, and real Shura is practised, with 
Ijma‘ reached after that; this is a democratic process. In terms of mechanisms, Turabi 
agreed that any such mechanisms developed through human experiment, as mentioned 
above, were acceptable. The idealistic approach is one of the weaknesses of the theory 
as it should consider the human conflicts and antagonism and ambitions. The practical 
processes were discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Section 5. Pillars of Turabi’s Theory; its Relation to his Democratic Model 
One can never read any book or listen to a lecture by Turabi without it being based on 
the concept of Tawhīd. Whatever the topic he is dealing with, whether social, economic, 
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political, or relating to international relations, he approaches it as a part of a unified life. 
However, he regards Tawhīd as a fundamental principle of the religion’s doctrines and 
practice; when he speaks about unity and freedom, he connects them directly to the 
concept of Tawhīd: “The freedom on its creed framework is not for it is own sake, but 
only as a means towards worshipping God” (Turabi, 1978, p.12). Turabi regards 
freedom of the individual as the way towards Tawhīd, as explained in the previous 
points. The “freedom of individual ultimately emanates the doctrine of Tawhīd which 
requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God 
exclusively” (Esposito, 1983, p.247). Turabi believes that: 
“it is obligatory upon the Islamic movement to start revival of Tawhīd in 
political life, till it sincerely becomes worship of Allah. It is not for the sake of 
authority and power only, and its objective is to secure public rights and build 
the authority’s relations on brotherhood, unity and justice, and not conflict” 
(Turabi 1995, p.12). 
This means he advises Islamists to build relations in government on the values of 
brotherhood, unity and justice. In the same book, he calls for Tawhīd in economic life, 
and confirms that the materialistic view dominates economics these days. In this 
respect, economic relations should not be built on selfishness, greediness, uncontrolled 
desire, and class struggle, but should be founded on brotherhood, sharing, and 
cooperation. People should be encouraged to pay charity and practise economic 
dealings based on the religion’s values.  
However, social life should be established on values of participation in Shura for 
decision making, justice and freedom, which emanate from Tawhīd, whereby the 
ethnicity that divides people should be removed. The divisions created by national states 
forced on us (our staes) by the West, sectarianism, and nationalism, should be overcome 
by the united Muslim Umma. However, the most dangerous social issue, due to loss of 
Tawhīd, is the unjust treatment of women and their isolation from public life. Turabi 
compares the example of the Prophet’s time to the examples from other periods, and to 
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how women are being exploited in the West, and isolated from public life in Muslim 
countries. Moreover, he explains how women and men were created, and how they 
represent the unity of humanity, in being created from one soul, and how women and 
men are equal (Turabi, 1995, p.12). This means that the real Shura or democratic 
practice enhances the values of justice and freedom. The theory illustrates these 
important values but it needs to answer the question as to how we can apply these 
values in our life through institutions, law, and other mechanisms that strength these 
values in the societies. The failure of the theory to provide an answer to this question is 
one of the weaknesses of this theory. 
According to Turabi (2003), other issues, such as Shura and public opinion, are 
fundamental principles in religion, and are significant doctrines in Tawhīd theory. He 
believes that it is important to introduce examples in other aspects of life, such as 
international relations, international law, and social science. Turabi argues that Muslims 
should contact each other and establish their renaissance (Nahda) on ‘Tawhīd’. 
According to the above, it is clear that all the pillars of this Muslim revival are 
connected to Tawhīd and its practice in Muslims’ life, specifically the political field 
where Shura (consultation, democracy) should be practised. 
Ethics and moral issues are important pillars in Turabi’s theory. Turabi regards ethics as 
an important factor in politics, as it is in all aspects of life. Turabi confirms that ethics 
imposes controls on political and economic behaviour, which prevents politicians from 
committing injustice, and pushes them to do justice, and be kind to the people. For him, 
ethics is a very important value, when he evaluated Western civilisation. As mentioned 
above, the West expelled religion from public life, and politics specifically; this made 
them lose the values of religion. Consequently, they fell into huge historical mistakes 
and wars, and treated other nations with injustice, cruelty, and oppression (Turabi, 2003, 
p.107). 
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In terms of an Islamic constitution, the constitutional committee tasked with this 
outlined the basic characteristics and principles of the Islamic state and Islamic society, 
which requires justice and Shura, meaning democratic participation; all these values are 
founded on ethical values. Turabi was a member of the constitutional committee in 1967 
that established the moral foundations in the proposed constitution. 
“The system of rule of Islam stands on the foundation that the state is land, the 
people and the government, just as the case in its modern form. However, Islam 
sets up moral foundations and it is required that the state operates within this 
framework. This leaves open the freedom to build structure in accord with these 
general foundations, while leaving open the details and secondary matters. 
(Constitution Committee Memorandum, 1967, p.5). 
In conclusion, ethics is regarded as one of the pillars of the political and social system in 
Islam. It keeps the balance, and through self-censorship controls the expected 
violations. 
Tawhīd is practical, as is mentioned in the state model and its institutions. Purifying 
religious creed from political and economic Shirk, and renewing the fiqh at intervals of 
time, serve the objective of religion, which is Tawhīd.  
Concluding this chapter, the term ‘Tawhīd’ (Monotheism) is a core concept in Islam and 
in Turabi’s intellectual work. The foundation of the philosophical approach of Turabi is 
fundamentally the concept of Tawhīd. This is reflected in his analysis of historical 
incidents, and the methods of past ‘religious scholars’, and their contributions. This 
chapter found that his work allows people not only to look at the axial doctrine of Islam, 
but further to understand doctrines from a number of different perspectives. These 
doctrines for him, as analysed in this chapter, are not isolated from practical life, which 
he regarded as one unit. In the endeavour to explain the simple truth of the doctrine of 
unity, Turabi touches upon the specific understanding of the objective of the message of 
Islam, and the understanding of the concept of Tawhīd (Monotheism) itself as a 
comprehensive concept related to all aspects of life. This chapter determined the 
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relationship between Tawhīd and freedom, as well as Turabi’s democratic model, which 
is established on freedom of the individual as an essential value that springs from the 
high value of Islam, i.e. Tawhīd. The chapter evaluated the important obligations in 
public life, such as Shura as a value and Tawhīd practice in the political field, and as 
one of the pillars of Tawhīdi theory in Turabi’s thought. In conclusion, Turabi explains 
that each of these concepts significantly affects Tawhīd. As such, his concept of Tawhīd 
is rich in the depth of its erudition, and abundant in its perceptions. Indeed, it is perhaps 
his work more than any other that reflects profound and original thought, when he 
articulates his Tawhīdi theory and democratic model which emanated to Tawhīd in 
practice. However, the Tawhīdi theory is a theory that explains the life as one unit, the 
religion plays a comprehensive role in all aspects of life, social, economic, politics etc.; 
any one of these should not be isolated from the religion doctrines. Each of these 
aspects is a kind of worship to God by practising His obligations. According to this 
understanding, isolating the religion from any aspect of life is Shirk. It could be said that 
Turabi’s theory is very idealistic and it approaches the elite thinkers, and scholars, 
although it should approach the public to encourage them to practise the values of 
Tawhīd, and this is one of the weaknesses of the theory. On the other hand the theory 
illustrates important values but it did not answer the question of how can we apply these 
values in our life through institutions, law, and other mechanisms that strengthen these 
values in the societies? This could be one of the weaknesses of this theory. The project 
adopted by the government in the 1990s to establish a “pious society”, and reveal the 
values of Tawhīd in the society, was primitive and not sustainable. One of the strengths 
of the theory is that it accepted and adopted the democratic mechanisms which have 
been developed by human experience throughout the history. Shura and freedom are 
significant elements in Turabi’s democratic model and these elements are connected 
directly to Tawhīd, the highest value of Islam.  
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Conclusion 
This work studies Islamists and democracy in Sudan, particularly the role of Hasan 
Turabi. The central research questions are:  
(a) What are the basic elements in Turabi’s Political thinking with particular 
respect with democracy?  
(b) How have these elements been made operational in his political action?  
(c) Is there a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice?  
These questions refer to Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan and the gap between theory 
and practice. The study also explored and articulated Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory. In this 
work, historical and comparative methods are used in studying Islamists and democracy. 
The historical method offers a more comprehensive understanding of the socio-
economic, demographic, and political conditions that influenced the political behaviour 
of the Islamic movement in Sudan. On the other hand, the comparative method provides 
a more comprehensive understanding of the response of the movement in different 
periods of time, and different movements, when faced with the same challenges, and 
how each movement understands, interprets, and applies Islam. The comparison of the 
theoretical and practical approaches of these movements presents a deep understanding 
of their behaviour and responses. In this respect, the comparative method was applied 
horizontally across the different movements in different countries, and vertically 
throughout their history. This comparative method offers a generalisation for some of 
the results of the thesis.  
In this research, Islamists are defined as those individuals and groups actively seeking 
to bring the political and social life of their nation into perfect accord with the sacred 
laws and norms of Shari‘a, whether abruptly or gradually, through social reform, 
 340 
political contest, or revolutionary takeover of the state. These groups understand Islam 
as a comprehensive religion, which should be applied to all aspects of life – social, 
economic, political, and private. In other words, a Muslim is one who believes in Islam, 
while the term ‘Islamist’ indicates an active Muslim, who tries to apply Islamic values 
in private and public life; this definition may be applied to the Sudanese Islamists. 
The establishment of the Islamic movement of Sudan in 1946 during the British colonial 
period, and its relationship with the Ikhwan in Egypt, are some of the factors that 
contributed to shaping its vision and project for the country. 
The complex demographics, with the diverse population of tribes and large variety of 
languages, had an impact on Sudan’s history, national and international relations, peace 
and war, and economic and social development. Consequently, these factors had an 
impact on the behaviour of the Islamic movement in Sudan; specifically, as a Sudanese 
social-political movement, its context influenced its political strategies, tactics, and 
policies. Moreover, these factors greatly influenced its practice, jurisprudence (fiqh) and 
its intellectual output generally.  
There were many decisive moments in the history of the movement in Sudan. First was 
the establishment of the ICF in 1956-1959, which represented the first shift for the 
movement towards becoming an active political actor. ICF symbolised the first activity 
of mobilising people publicly, coordinated with the two dominant traditional parties, 
which represent the two main sects in Sudan, i.e. the Ansar and Khatmiyyah. The most 
important factor in this period was that the relationship between the movement and 
Egypt as a neighbouring country was shaped according to the policies of the Egyptian 
government towards Ikhwan in Egypt. Indeed, the movement in Sudan supported union 
with Egypt, but changed position when the Egyptian government suppressed the 
Egyptian Ikhwan.  
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The second key historical period was represented by Abboud’s military regime (1959-
1964). The third key event was the 1964 October Revolution, which was one of the 
most important turning points in the history of the movement, as Turabi, the 
movement’s leader, played a significant role in initiating the Revolution. Fourth, the 
period of Nimeiri’s May regime (May 1969-April 1985), witnessed two distinct stages; 
the first was the movement’s opposition to the regime with the suppression of Ikhwan. 
This continued until 1976, when the Sudanese Ikhwan, along with the UP and DUP, 
took up arms against the regime. However, after failing to overthrow the regime by 
force, they made peace with it, heralding the second stage. This period of peace with the 
regime allowed the introduction of radical changes in the movement’s strategies, 
policies, structure, and mechanisms. It could be said that this period also witnessed 
development of a unique relationship between the movement and the Armed Forces, as 
well as the establishment of economic institutions, and youth and women’s 
organisations. 
Fifth, the second democratic period from April 1985 to June 1989 was when the 
movement reaped the fruits of the reconciliation with Nimeiri’s regime. In this respect, 
they established their own political party, the NIF, and competed effectively with the 
two traditional parties, the UP and DUP. This period was characterised by expansion in 
the Islamic movement’s international relationships, the growth of its economic 
institutions, the huge rise in the numbers of its supporters, and the demonstrable 
efficiency of its media and grassroots organisations.  
Sixth, the military coup carried out by the movement in June 1989. This period 
witnessed revolutionary transformation in the movement on different dimensions, and 
was a real test in terms of putting its programmes and ideas into practice. The 
transformation consisted of significant change for the movement, moving from the 
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limited structure of a political party to the broad arena of state institutions, i.e. from a 
group with the objective of pressuring the government to impose an Islamic constitution 
in Sudan, to establishing an Islamic state. Thus, they faced the task of leading and 
governing the country, which had been at war since the first day of independence, with 
nine conflictive neighbours, and plagued by border problems, and tribal interactions 
with most, as well as internal problems of poverty, development, and mediocre state 
institutions.  
Internationally, the movement faced the new world order, which emerged after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the US; the superpower guarding this new 
world order. These unbalanced relations changed the factors and mechanisms of 
international politics. However, at the level of the movement itself, it was not 
sufficiently ready to bear all these responsibilities at that exceptional historical moment. 
These factors impacted negatively in the development of the country and affected the 
Sudan relations regionally and internationally, and put it under different pressures of the 
great powers and the international organisations controlled by these countries most of 
the time.  
Indeed, some of the leaders and members of the movement agree that the decision to 
carry out a coup was not an intelligent one, and contradicted most of the movement’s 
principles, which upheld the Shura ‘democratic process’ as the choice method to rule 
the people. In this case, most of them agree that the movement ate from the forbidden 
tree, and committed the sin of the military coup; this group is growing in number with 
time.  
The movement’s experience of government was evaluated by many scholars, and 
movement members, as well as Turabi, the movement’s leader. They agreed that the 
first mistake was staging the coup, despite the reasons that justified the venture. The 
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second mistake lay in the manner of exercising power, in carrying out purges, in which 
many qualified persons were dismissed from their jobs solely due to their political 
affiliations, inflicting repressive security measures, and the unrestrained behaviour of 
security forces towards opposition party members. This behaviour reduced the 
credibility of the movement and betrayed a contradiction between the movement’s 
theoretical position and practice. 
In evaluating the objectives of the coup as put by Islamists, scholars and movement 
members agreed that Islamists had succeeded in some parts, and failed to reach their 
goals in others. In the economic sector, they succeeded to some extent in building 
infrastructure, privatising the service and industrial sectors, and also with much effort 
attracting investors to the oil and production, agricultural and livestock sector, such as 
cane sugar, edible oils, green forage, flour, leather, gum Arabic and cement, but it was 
limited compared to the needs of the country. On the other hand, privatisation affected 
the middle class and poor people. Yet, most of the criticisms could be directed to 
performance in the agriculture sector, which was expected to have been developed 
more. In addition, the oil revenue was not directed to the development and the people’s 
welfare, because of the government’s high expenditure and the war in the southern 
region. On the other hand, they failed to receive foreign aid from the IMF and other 
donors due to their internal and foreign policies that led to economic sanctions. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the southern rebels and Sudan’s 
government in 1997 was one of the significant achievements that brought peace to the 
country, in addition to another peace agreement in Eastern Sudan. Although the war 
stopped later, in 2005, in the south of Sudan, other groups rebelled in Western Sudan. 
The Western rebels were Islamists and were Turabi’s supporters, but they deny being 
part of his party. All these wars consume the resources of the country and have delayed 
the development of the country.  
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Sudanese society played a significant role in the first decade of Islamist rule, in its 
participation at all levels of activities, charitable organisations, security and defence, 
and art and culture. However, some groups were marginalised, specifically people 
belonging to opposition parties.  
This dissertation questioned the human rights’ situation in the Islamist state in Sudan in 
the first decade. Regarding the human rights’ record in Sudan after 1989, there were 
considerable violations at different periods of time. Although this is subject of dispute 
between the government and opposition parties and activists, there were huge human 
rights’ violations in the first decade. The government argues that their record is far 
better than neighbouring countries, and complains of facing more pressure from the 
West and international human rights’ organisations than others; yet this is not an excuse, 
specifically for leaders who claimed to establish an Islamic state. Indeed, the 
government admits to some violations. However, human rights’ violations have 
occurred at different levels; in the first days of the revolution, the constitution was 
suspended, the leaders of political parties were jailed, newspapers were shut down, trade 
unions were banned, and opposition party members in the civil service were dismissed 
from their positions; all under the pretext of protecting the revolution, and so the 
Islamist regime, at this stage, had behaved like the common secular regimes. However, 
these actions show the gap between theory and practice in the experiment of Islamists in 
Sudan.  
Many human rights’ special rapporteurs were sent to Sudan, and their reports 
documented many negative points, and some positive points that occurred only 
sporadically; for example, after both peace agreements in 1997, when the constitution 
was approved in 1998, and when the comprehensive ceasefire was announced in 1999.  
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By 2000, political parties started to rebuild, with political activism resuming in public, 
and political party newspapers being launched. However, if the human rights’ situation 
in Sudan was judged by the principles announced by the Sudanese Islamists, it should 
be said that they failed to achieve the expectations of their members and the Sudanese 
people in general.  
On the international scene, before the coup, the movement developed relationships that 
benefited its government, specifically, with China, Malaysia, Iran and Iraq. These 
relations developed considerably after Islamists came to power, and were translated into 
political and economic cooperation in the form of large economic projects, such as oil, 
car manufacturing, sugar, and cement industries, as well as infrastructure, like roads, 
bridges, dams, electricity, communications, etc. An example of the political cooperation 
is the Sudanese-Chinese cooperation in the Security Council, when China supported 
Sudan.  
Sudan’s Islamists, as mentioned above, came to power during a period that witnessed 
significant changes in the world’s balance of power. They faced complicated situations 
regarding international relations, and many challenges, including wars in Africa, Asia 
and Europe. The Islamists planned to establish their foreign relations’ policy on clear 
Islamic values that emphasise justice, respect for international law, openness in 
strengthening neighbourly relations, and non-interference in other countries’ internal 
affairs. Relations with neighbouring countries were very complicated and difficult to 
manage – Sudan had nine neighbours at that time (in January 2011, South Sudan was 
born).  
Some of Sudan’s neighbours supported the SPLA rebels at different times. Relations 
with Egypt, Uganda, and Libya were unstable most of the time, with hostility from 
Ethiopia and Chad, before their current governments, which came to power with the 
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support of the Islamist government in Sudan. The Gulf War was an important factor that 
shaped the relationship between Sudan and most Arab countries in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the fact that PAIC was held, and established its headquarters in Khartoum, 
pitted most Arab and Western countries against the Sudanese government. These 
countries regarded PAIC as an Islamist and Arab nationalist organisation that supports 
terrorist groups, such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and other Islamist parties and opposition 
leaders from different Arab countries.  
The Islamists faced many complications with the US and Europe, who maintained that 
they had come to power through a military coup, and were also very critical on the issue 
of human rights. Hence, Western nations applied a series of sanction regimes on the 
government of Sudan, and supported most opposition leaders, parties, and movements 
that were fighting the government; additionally, their parliaments and offices welcomed 
these opposition groups and figures. However, EU governments improved their 
relationship with the Sudanese government after the signing of the Khartoum peace 
agreements with the southern rebels in 1997.  
The 1998 constitution, which paved the way for freedom of association, and freedom of 
expression and political association, was one of the factors that led to the normalising of 
relations between Sudan’s government and some European countries. The war on terror 
after 9/11 played a momentous role in the relations between Sudan and the West, in 
general, and the US, specifically. Sanctions imposed by the US destroyed vital sectors 
in Sudan’s economy, including Sudan’s railways, the national airline (Sudan Airways), 
its shipping company (Sudan Line), and academic institutions and universities. The 
sanctions made it difficult to fund most government projects. 
The research enquiry also included Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. It 
evaluated Islamist discourse and practice in the field of democracy in these countries. 
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Many scholars in these countries had developed comprehensive approaches and 
concepts regarding Islam, Shura, and democracy. However, responding to inclusive 
overtures, many Islamic movements participated in democratic systems in their 
countries, such as Ikhwan in Sudan in the early 1980s, and movements in Egypt, Jordan, 
Yemen, Algeria, Turkey, Kuwait, Pakistan and Mauritania. In Tunisia, Islamists were 
oppressed and persecuted and, in Algeria, they were suppressed by the military when 
they won the election in 1991. 
In summary, the cases studied are similar in many of their characteristics, and the 
approaches adopted. They are characterised by similar reactions to similar 
circumstances. It could be said that, when these movements are compared in any of 
these countries, the study found that every movement has identical trends in terms of 
radical and moderate groups. The study observed that these movements were all 
exposed to splits at different periods in history, as in Tunisia and Sudan, and recently the 
emergence of moderate trends, in the form of political parties in Jordan and Egypt. 
Nevertheless, all these movements are distinguished by making Islam the frame of 
reference, and the Islamic state as their main objective. Moreover, they are fruits of 
Hasan al-Banna and his disciples’ schools of thought, inheriting the legacy of previous 
reformists, such as Afghani, ‘Abdu, Mawdudi, and Bennabi. Similarly, almost all these 
movements were influenced by reformists in this century, most of whom are leaders in 
their movements, such as Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, el-Awa, Amara and many 
others. 
It is important to recognise that the above-mentioned movements accepted democracy, 
but were also affected by their local circumstances. However, there are important and 
even essential differences in terms of accepting democracy and its mechanisms. 
Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia accepted democracy with its mechanisms, while in 
Jordan, they accepted the mechanisms and disputed over the values and ethics of 
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democracy and its philosophical bases. In accord with what has been circulated by some 
analysts, in each of these countries there are those Islamists who reject democracy and 
believe that it is incompatible with Islam and Shura. This emphasised that, even within 
one movement, there are many trends, which compete or dispute with each other, 
leading to a new approach developing.  
Revivalists throughout history have played a significant role in each period of time, in 
different areas of the world. Their discourse varies widely, ranging from moderate to 
extreme radicalism; some Islamist reformists are pluralistic in terms of inter-Muslim 
relations and between Muslims and other nations and minorities, while others are not. 
Indeed, some are politically pluralistic, but then theologically exclusive, while others 
are accommodating. Revivalists have influenced a wide range of Islamic movements in 
different countries. In general, they believe that governments in their countries do not 
serve Muslim values, ideologically, politically, and economically, but serve the interests 
of the dominant world powers. This is the case, specifically, in Mauritania, Jordan, 
Egypt, and Tunisia; the last two witnessed change in what is known as the Arab Spring 
in 2012, with Islamists winning most of the parliamentary seats in both countries.  
These revivalists developed theories that tried to answer the questions of state 
democracy, human rights, freedoms, women’s participation and rights, ethnic and 
religious minorities in the Muslim state, international relations, and international law. 
Most contemporary revivalists formulated a comprehensive theoretical framework for 
these issues; for example, Turabi, Ghannouchi, el-Awa, ‘Amara, and Qaradawi. Rich 
and significant studies critically evaluated their intellectual output, more discussion of 
their ideas ensued, and this contributed to querying and examining the validity of their 
discourse. However, the theory is still under development, and needs to be implemented 
and then examined again.  
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Establishing an Islamic state has been an important objective for most Islamic 
movements throughout history. Yet the nature of that state remains a controversial issue 
among Islamists themselves. However, two competing approaches emerged; one that 
advocated formal programmes of Islamisation of laws and society to be implemented by 
the state itself, and the other that saw an Islamic state as the final product of 
Islamisation of society.  
The majority of revivalists agreed on the Madinah model as the Islamic state, with its 
federal, multi-cultural, and multi-religious system. For Turabi, any other experiment is 
just a model, and the Islamic state is the state that is not only Islamic on the level of 
private, but also public life. It should be established on the values of Islam, namely 
justice, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.  
In Turabi’s political thought, sovereignty in the Islamic state is divided into two levels; 
absolute sovereignty, which belongs to God, and the people’s sovereignty in ruling 
themselves according to the Shari‘a; hence, the Islamic state is not a theocratic state. 
The government’s role is legislative, making policy, and applying the law, through 
legislative (parliament) and executive bodies (administration), and the judiciary.  
Society in the Islamic state in Turabi’s political thought plays a fundamental role in the 
education, healthcare, and economic fields, by responding to the shortcomings of the 
government. Therefore, society guards the values of the people through its own 
mechanisms.  
The research provides a theoretical evaluation of Turabi’s contribution to the questions 
of Islamists and the state, democracy, gender, and minorities. It explained the role of the 
state in Islamist political thought in different periods of time and different scholars. It 
reached the conclusion that society played a central role in Islamic theory; justice in 
distributing power and wealth, civil liberties, and freedom of speech are important 
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principles in Turabi’s political theory. Women are essential in decision making, and 
there is no limit to their participation in any post in the state.  
In Turabi’s political thought, ethnic minorities and non-Muslims should have the full 
right to choose their laws, and have the same right to public posts. Moreover, regions 
which are not occupied by Muslims should be exempted from the application of Shari‘a, 
e.g. South Sudan (prior to its independence), and individuals in majority Muslim 
regions were exempted as well and should be asked which law they want to be judged 
by; they enjoy full citizen’s rights in their country.  
In the Islamic state, international relations and conventions that aim to achieve justice 
and peace, and are compatible with the values of Islam, are obligatory. In this context, 
Turabi calls for further studies and juristic effort (Ijtihād) in scrutinising the issues in 
international relations. 
Turabi believes that, in the Islamic state, the right to private ownership is legitimised, 
but Islam strictly forbids exploitation, monopoly and earning of wealth other than 
through lawful and legitimate means. Turabi sees no monopoly of knowledge by the 
‘Ulama (scholars, scientists) and no monopoly of power by the rulers.  
Consultation (Shura) is a religious duty, and should be practised by all people; ‘Ulama 
are not only the religious scholars, but also the scientists and experts in all fields, and it 
is their duty to participate in advising the ruler. In this regard, freedom of speech, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of religion are guaranteed, as well as other rights, 
i.e. to life, free movement, choice of work, etc. People can express themselves through 
the Shura system.  
The foundation of Turabi’s philosophical approach is built on the concept of Tawhīd. 
This is reflected in his analysis, when he approaches historical incidents, and the 
methods advocated by past reformers. This study found that his work allows people not 
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only to look at the axial doctrine of Islam but, furthermore, to understand doctrines from 
a number of different perspectives. These doctrines for him are not isolated from 
practical life, which he regards as one consistent unit. In the endeavour to explain the 
simple truth of the doctrine of unity (Tawhīd), Turabi touches upon the specific 
understanding of the objectives of the message of Islam, and the understanding of the 
concept of Tawhīd itself, as a comprehensive concept related to all aspects of life.  
The study determined the relationship between Tawhīd and freedom, Turabi’s 
democratic model, Shura and Tawhīd, and the pillars of Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory in 
Turabi’s thought. Turabi explains that each of these concepts significantly affects 
Tawhīd. As such, his concept of Tawhīd is rich in the depth of its erudition, and 
abundant in its perceptions. Indeed, it is perhaps his work more than any other that 
reflects the profound and original thought, which he articulates in his Tawhīdi theory, 
and which connects the abstract ideas. 
The ideas and theories of Turabi have been heavily criticised epistemologically and 
politically by traditionalists and secularists on many theoretical and ethical grounds. 
This may be because he is politically active all the time, and does not present himself 
only as a theorist. Although his political activities award him much, they have cost him 
much as well. His political views, which are sometimes tactical, were faced with 
aggressive reactions from both Islamists and anti-Islamists in the media and politics, 
locally in Sudan and internationally; these political views have hindered proper 
understanding of his thought.  
However, his high standard of theoretical level could not be applied in reality and there 
is a huge gap between theory and practice; the study found that experiment itself was 
not evaluated seriously by Islamist institutions so as to develop practice. The parliament 
was not effective as an independent legislative body, even when it was under Turabi’s 
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leadership. The judiciary was also not independent, and it did not play any serious role 
in evaluating the violations of human rights. The executive body of the government was 
the most influential and controlled power in the country. The presidential institution 
interfered most of the time, until the president dissolved the parliament in 1999.  
Although Turabi, the theorist and the leader of the movement, believed in the above, 
Islamists monopolised it when they took power in 1989. Lately, in 2001, Turabi 
apologised for that, but it is still an Islamist experiment that should be studied, and 
criticised on its own values. In this context, the developments in the judicial system and 
the executive body of the government were not coping with these changes, and were not 
up to the standard to protect the rights of the people, as individuals and groups (political 
parties or NGOs, cultural organisations etc.)  
However, it could be said that, despite the comprehensive theories about freedom, Shura 
and democracy, but governance under Turabi remained dictatorial, with little freedom 
and many human rights’ abuses. Although elections and real consultation (Shura) should 
be the means through which the nation (Umma) makes decisions, the government could 
not hold a free and fair election only after 2001. Indeed, the decision was made 
following limited consultation among the powerful groups inside the government, 
although they claimed the participation of the majority of the people. 
Despite this clear vision of human rights’ issues, when it comes to practical application 
of these theories, humiliation, using terror and torture, happened from the early days of 
the military coup. 
However, practical steps towards emancipating women were taken by the government, 
and it could be said that positive legislation was adopted and enhanced. However, 
violations occurred, and were monitored by women’s organisations with Turabi’s 
support. For the minorities, at the level of the constitution and laws, they were exempted 
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from Shari'a law (southern regions and individuals living in the northern regions). 
However, on the practical level, there were many violations from officers, who were not 
trained and educated about the rights of people as citizens. At the same time, the judicial 
system was not playing an effective role in this area.  
In Turabi’s political theory, it could be said that he proposed a structure for the NC that 
ensured diversity of opinion in the organisation. The organisation would uphold 
freedom of expression, intellectual participation, and open discussion to reach 
consensus, with decisions based on this political consensus. However, the organisation 
failed to achieve this objective, and the regime then adopted the concept of political 
association (al-Tawali al-Siyasi), or plurality of organisations, in other words, a multi-
party system. 
Although the step towards democracy was eight years late, it was important to examine 
the real practice of democracy claimed to be intended by the leaders at that time. It is 
important to mention that it led to division in the body of the movement 
Social development in the strategic plan was ambitious, and the government made many 
efforts to incentivise society to play its role. However, theory proved far from practice, 
due to financial and administrative problems, while the priorities of the government 
changed each time. Despite the confirmation of Turabi that “the society not the state is 
the first institution in Islam”, the state monopolised power and marginalised the society; 
the government was restrictive and marginalised anti-government artists, which pushed 
most of them to migrate all over the world. Furthermore, important NGOs were 
constrained, such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamia. The government succeeded in 
developing the Zakat sector but it was not established on practical sustainable projects. 
Finally, the decision-making process and the applications of Shura mechanisms were 
not clear in the experiment of Islamists in Sudan.  
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The findings of this research point to the need for further study of some issues, 
specifically, the mechanisms of applying Shura. Indeed, there is still no comprehensive 
study in this field, as most of the studies concentrate on theoretical ideas, without 
suggesting any methods of application on the ground. The other field in which no 
comprehensive studies exist is that related to the Islamic state and international relations 
and international law, which requires more revivalist ideas and academic research. 
However, further discussion and critical evaluation is encouraged of the Islamist 
experiment of Sudan; especially, first, in the area of economic welfare projects and, 
second, in decision-making mechanisms and process. Discussion and comparative 
analysis of Islamic movements in Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey, Algeria, the 
Gulf, and Kuwait, on the theoretical and practical levels, should be encouraged. After 
the huge release of information on Sudan’s experiment recently, more research of this 
area in its different aspects is suggested. 
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